The issues are: Did the 2008 amendment of Florida Administrative Code rule 59G-13.082(2) incorporate the Developmental Disabilities Home and Community-Based Services Waiver Billing Code Matrix (Billing Code Matrix) when the amended rule explicitly incorporated the Developmental Disabilities Home and Community-Based Services Waiver Procedure Codes and Maximum Units of Service (Procedure Codes and Maximum Units of Service), but Respondent filed, as the incorporated document, the Billing Code Matrix with the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC), the Department of State, and the Medicaid fiscal agent? If the circumstances described in Issue 1 did not result in the incorporation of the Billing Code Matrix in the 2008 amendment of rule 59G-13.082(2), was the Billing Code Matrix incorporated in the amended rule when, four years after the amendment, the Department of State revised the language of the archived version of rule 59G-13.082(2) to incorporate explicitly the Billing Code Matrix, even though the amended rule submitted to the Department of State in 2008 explicitly incorporated the Procedure Codes and Maximum Units of Service? If the circumstances described in Issues 1 and 2 did not result in the incorporation of the Billing Code Matrix in the 2008 amendment of rule 59G-13.082(2), is the Billing Code Matrix an agency statement constituting a rule that Respondent has not adopted by the rulemaking procedure set forth in section 120.54, Florida Statutes? If the circumstances described in Issue 1 or 2 resulted in the incorporation of the Billing Code Matrix in the 2008 amendment of rule 59G-13.082(2), is the amended rule an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority?AHCA failed to incorporate document into rule. Its use of document rendered document an agency statement constituting a rule that was not adopted by the rulemaking procedure.

Whether, in making a preliminary decision to award a contract for the subject services, Respondent acted contrary to a governing statute, rule, policy, or project specification; and, if so, whether such misstep(s) was/were clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to competition. Also at issue is whether Petitioner’s response to the subject Request for Proposal (RFP) was responsive and whether Petitioner has standing to bring this proceeding.Petitioner`s bid was non-responsive. Respondent had insufficient information to ensure that Intervenor was a responsible bidder.

The issue in this case is whether the proposed award of contracts by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) to Caremark, Inc. (Caremark), and Lynnfield Drugs, Inc., d/b/a Hemophilia of the Sunshine State (Lynnfield), pursuant to AHCA's Request For Proposal (RFP) 0507, was contrary to AHCA's governing statutes, AHCA's rules or policies, or the solicitation specifications.Respondent`s award of contracts was not shown to be clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Petitioner would not have been awarded a contract even in the absence of the errors that were proven.

The issue in these cases is whether the Agency for Health Care Administration's (AHCA) proposed award of a contract to Caremark, Inc., based on evaluations of proposals submitted in response to a Request for Proposals (RFP), is clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.Respondent`s failure to evaluate cost proposals according to the Request for Proposals method is clearly erroneous, arbitrary, and capricious.

The issue in these cases is whether the Agency for Health Care Administration's (AHCA) proposed award of a contract to Caremark, Inc., based on evaluations of proposals submitted in response to a Request for Proposals (RFP), is clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.Respondent`s failure to evaluate cost proposals according to the Request for Proposals method is clearly erroneous, arbitrary, and capricious.

Substance of bid protest was directed to sufficiency of bid specs & not to bid award. Protest was, therefore, untimely.