STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DOG ISLAND COMPANY, )

A Florida Corporation, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 78-105

)

JOSEPH W. LANDERS, JR., )

Secretary, Department of )

Environmental Regulation, )

an Agency of the State )

of Florida, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before Charles C. Adams, a Hearing Officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings, at Room 106, Collins Building, Tallahassee, Florida, at 9:30 A.M., April 24 and continuing through April 25, 1978.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Daniel S. Dearing, Esquire

424 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302

For Respondent: Alfred W. Clarke, Esquire

Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building

2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the Petitioner, Dog Island Company, is entitled to the grant of a default permit from the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, premised upon a violation on the part of the Respondent of the conditions of Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, for the alleged failure on the part of the Respondent to respond to the application within the prescribed period of time in the above referenced section, thereby entitling the Petitioner to the grant of the requested permit without further justification on its part.

   
   

2. Whether or not on the facts and evidence in this cause, the Petitioner, Dog Island Company, is entitled to the requested permit, which is the subject of this controversy.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. This case concerns the application of Dog Island Company, Petitioner, to excavate a canal on Dog Island, a barrier island off the coast of Florida. This canal would be approximately 825 feet long, 85 feet wide, and 4 feet deep. At present the canal is partially completed.

   
   

2. The initial application permit filed with the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, was made on December 10, 1976, and the terms and conditions of that application may be found in the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. This application is by the "short-form" method; however, it was later determined that the application needed to be filed on the "long form," in view of the amount of material to be dredged and filled. Consequently, on June 6, 1977, the Petitioner filed its reapplication and that reapplication may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 9 admitted into evidence.

   
   

3. The Petitioner by its action raises two points. The first point considers the Petitioner's contention that the Respondent must issue a default permit to the Petitioner in view of the Respondent's alleged violation of the conditions of Section 120.60(2) Florida Statutes. More particularly, the Petitioner asserts that the Respondent violated the conditions of Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, when it, the Respondent, stated to the Petitioner that the Petitioner must fulfill the requirements of Section 253.77, Florida Statutes, as a necessary prerequisite to the granting of an application for a dredge and fill permit.

   
   

4. The second point of the petition is a prayer that the permit he granted on the merits of the request, if it is determined that the Petitioner is not entitled to a default permit.

   
   

5. Turning to a consideration of the initial point raised by the petition, it may be further categorized as one, a general attack on the Respondent's treatment of the Petitioner's application and reapplication permit, in the context of the requirements of Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes; and, two, the Respondent's alleged disallowance of the permit premised upon the belief that Section 253.77, Florida Statutes, would not allow the permit to be granted until the conditions of that portion of Chapter 253, Florida Statutes, had been complied with.

   
   

6. The questioned provision of Chapter 120, i.e., Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, states in pertinent part:

   
   

   120.60 Licensing.-

   * * *

   (2) When an application for a license is made as required by law, the agency shall conduct the proceedings required with reason- able dispatch and with due regard to the rights and privileges of all affected

   parties or aggrieved persons. Within 30 days after receipt of an application for a license, the agency shall examine the appli- cation, notify the applicant of any apparent errors or omissions, and request any addi- tional information the agency is permitted by law to require. Failure to correct an error or omission or to supply additional

   information shall not be grounds for denial of the license unless the agency timely notified the applicant within this 30-day

   period. The agency shall notify the applicant if the activity for which he seeks a license is exempt from the licensing requirement and return any tendered application fee within

   30 days after receipt of the original appli- cation or within 10 days after receipt of the timely requested additional information or correction of errors or omissions. Every application for license shall be approved or denied within 90 days after receipt of the

   original application or receipt of the timely requested additional information or correction of errors or omissions. . . .

   
   

7. By its argument herein, the Petitioner is convinced that the Respondent failed to notify the Petitioner within thirty (30) days after receipt of the initial application, of any apparent errors or omissions or to request any additional information the agency is permitted by law to require, again within the thirty (30) day period. This has a direct bearing in the mind of the Petitioner on the effective date of the license permit approval or denial, in relationship to the requirement that the license/permit be granted within ninety

   (90) days after the receipt of the original permit or receipt of the timely requested additional information or correction of errors or omissions.

   
   

8. Factually, we have the initial application of the Petitioner which was filed on December 10, 1976, and received that same date. This was responded to by two items of correspondence. One, dated January 6, 1976, from the Panama City District Office of the Respondent, that being reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 admitted into evidence; and a second exhibit, which is a January 10, 1977, correspondence from the central office of the Respondent, this item being found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 notifies the Petitioner that his application is on the wrong form. The proper form should have been the "long form." (The initial application had been submitted on the "short form.") Therefore, on that basis alone, the ninety day requirement for issuance of the application was tolled.

   
   

9. Subsequent to being informed by the Respondent that the application must be filed on the "long form," the Petitioner hired the firm of Barrett, Daffin and Figg, Architects, Engineers, Planners, Inc., to assist in the formulation of a reapplication. This document was filed June 6, 1977, and in the body of the document it is represented that this matter is a reapplication. A copy of this reapplication started the thirty-day clock for the Respondent to notify the applicant of apparent errors or omissions and request additional information permitted by the law, and it ran from June 6, 1977. The additional effect of the reapplication was to start a new ninety-day clock for approving or denying the permit and this clock was running from June 6, 1977, or from receipt of the timely requested additional information or correction of errors or omissions.

   
   

10. On July 11, 1977, an employee of the Respondent filed what purports to be additional requests for information addressed to the Petitioner. The contents of this request may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 10 and Respondent's Exhibit No. 7 admitted into evidence. This request is clearly outside the thirty day limitation set forth in Section 120.60(2), Florida

    Statutes, pertaining to the right of an agency to request additional information founded upon any apparent errors or omissions on behalf of the Petitioner, or any additional information the Respondent is permitted by law to require.

    Nonetheless, the Petitioner met with the Respondent to address the questions raised by the July 11, 1977, correspondence. This meeting was held on July 21, 1977, and out of this meeting the Petitioner, through its agent, responded in writing to the completeness summary of July 11, 1977. This response was dated July 25, 1977, and may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 14 admitted into evidence. These responses were acknowledged by the Respondent on a copy of its July 11, 1977, completeness summary, this being Respondent's Exhibit No. 7.

    These acknowledgments show the date, July 26, 1977, and create the requirement on the part of the Respondent that it approve or deny the application within ninety days of the date of July 26, 1977.

    
    

11. Within ninety days of that date, specifically on October 14, 1977, the Respondent issued the letter of intent to deny the permit; a copy of this letter of intent to deny may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 11 admitted into evidence. By its actions of responding to the July 11, 1977, completeness summary, the Petitioner has acquiesced in the right of the Respondent to make such request, notwithstanding the fact that the request had been made thirty days after the June 6, 1977, reapplication had been filed. The October 14, 1977, letter of intent to deny the permit application was timely and no default permit should be issued under the terms and conditions of Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes.

    
    

12. The Petitioner raises the additional point that Respondent was denying the permit application solely on the basis of the Respondent's contention that Section 253.77, Florida Statutes, had not been complied with. This impression on the part of the Petitioner came about after it had requested issuance of a default permit on November 17, 1977, under the belief that Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, required the permit to be issued. The Respondent, in the person of its secretary, issued a letter of November 29, 1977, in which document the secretary states that the permit cannot be granted because Section 253.77, Florida Statutes, has not been complied with in that proof of payment for state- owned dredge material is not reflected. Section 253.77, Florida Statutes, has the following language:

    
    

    253.77 State lands; state agency authoriza- tion for use prohibited without consent of agency in which title vested.-

    1. No department, including any division, bureau, section, or other subdivision thereof, or any other agency of the state possessing regulatory powers involving the issuance of permits shall issue any permit, license, or other evidence of authority involving the

       use of sovereignty or other lands of the state, title to which is vested in the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund or the Department of Natural Resources under chapter 253, until the applicant for such permit, license, or other evidence of permission shall have received from the

       Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund the required lease, license, ease- ment, or other form of consent authorizing the proposed use and exhibited it to such

       agency or department or subdivision thereof having regulatory power to permit such use.

    2. This act shall not apply to any permit, license, or other form of consent to take the regulated action which gas issued and outstanding on June 23, 1976.

    
    

13. It can be seen by an examination of that section that it does not require payment for state-owned dredge material. It simply requires that the applicant have permission of the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, in the person of the Department of Natural Resources. Moreover, there are no regulations existing which require that proof of payment be a precondition to any issuance of a dredge and fill permit by the Respondent. Nevertheless, the October 14, 1977, letter of intent to deny was sufficient compliance with the requirements of Section 120.60(2), Florida Statutes, and obviated the necessity to Issue a dredge and fill permit on a default basis.

    The issue in this cause should therefore be considered on its merits, and if the Petitioner prevails on the merits, then the permit should be granted conditioned upon the necessary approval of the State of Florida, Department of Natural Resources, on the question of payment for the fill material. This opinion is held because an examination of all the testimony and other items of evidence in this case leads to the conclusion that the land waterward of the mean high water line, at the mouth of the proposed canal, belongs to the State of Florida. (The land above the mean high water line at the site of the proposed canal is land which is owned by the Petitioner.)

    
    

14. What then is the determination to be reached on the merits? The initial question that should be addressed on the issue of the merits of the case, is the question of what class of waters is found in the St. George Sound, which is the body of water that is fronted by the mouth of the proposed canal. The argument between the parties is on the issue of whether the waters are Class II or Class III waters. The significance of the difference between the classification is the fact that Class II waters require a more careful consideration of the environmental issues, as stated in Rule 17-4.28(8), Florida Administrative Code.

    
    

15. The parties offered certain maps for consideration on the question of whether the waters were in fact Class II or Class III. These maps may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 23, and Respondent's Exhibits Nos. 13 and 15 admitted into evidence. The real question, however, is whether or not the area in dispute meets the criteria for classification as a Class II body of water. That criteria pertains to the inquiry whether the site, either actually or potentially, has the capability of supporting recreational commercial shellfish propagation and harvesting. From the testimony offered in the course of the hearing, it is evident that the eventuality and potential does exist as outlined in Rule 17-3.08, Florida Administrative Code. It exists because of the existence of fish, oysters and shrimp in the immediate vicinity of the proposed canal. As a consequence, the Petitioner must have a plan of procedure which adequately protects the project area and areas in the vicinity of the project from significant damage of the site as a source of commercial or recreational shellfish harvesting and as a nursery area for fish and shellfish. This particular requirement for dealing with Class II waters only has importance because it creates a responsibility on the part of the applicant to adequately address the question of the marine life for the reasons stated above. In fact, the Petitioner has offered its explanation of how it intends to protect the marine life in these Class II waters at a time when the project is being constructed and subsequent to the construction. However, this effort at

    explanation of its protection of the shellfish and other related marine life found in the Class II waters is not convincing.

    
    

16. If the canal is completed, certain forms of marsh grasses and attendant habitat will be removed, thus interfering with the function of the detrital food chain and associated food webs which are found near the proposed open end of the canal. This would result in the diminution of the marine resources. This can be seen by an examination of the Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 16, which is a series of photographs of the area and part of the Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, which contain further photographs of the area. Both of these sets of photographs have been admitted into evidence. Effectively, what exists at the site is a marsh area at the end of the canal nearest the sound, and a type of pond at the closed end of the canal. Furthermore, the removal of this marsh area will have no positive benefit to the public at large. This can be seen by a comparison of the proposed canal and an existing canal which is located in the immediate vicinity. There is a marked similarity between the length, width and depth of the proposed canal and the existing canal. In addition, the existing canal is a dead-end canal. In the existing canal, there is a substantial buildup of anaerobic muck at the closed end of the canal due to poor circulation and flushing by action of the tides.

    
    

17. The water quality in the existing canal is also very poor in the measure of the dissolved oxygen count and this condition is not conducive to the survival of marine live.

    
    

18. Although there is a worse condition, when speaking of anaerobic muck, that has built up in the proposed canal due to less circulation, there is no reason to believe that there will be any positive flushing effect to the proposed canal by completing the proposed canal and removing the marsh area.

    
    

19. There is also a legitimate concern of possible salt water intrusion into the fresh water lens which serves as a potable water supply for residents of the island. Additionally, the experience in the existing canal has shown a development of shoaling at the open end of the existing canal and it is reasonable to expect the same type of effect in the proposed canal. This would further diminish the flushing of the waters in the canal and cause an unsatisfactory concentration of dissolved oxygen, bringing about problems such as the anaerobic muck and resulting difficulty for marine life.

    
    

20. For the reasons stated above, the Respondent is justified in denying the reapplication for permit made by the Petitioner to excavate a dead-end canal of 825 feet long and 85 to 90 feet wide by 4 feet deep at the mean low water mark.

    
    

21. The Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the parties have been examined, and where appropriate have been incorporated in this order. Those that do not comport with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the undersigned are rejected.

    
    

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

22. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction in this cause.

    
    

23. Based upon a full consideration of the facts herein, it is concluded as a matter of law that the permit request by the Petitioner should be denied for reasons as set forth in the findings of fact.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the application for permit to excavate a dead-end canal as set forth in the reapplication of the Petitioner be denied.

DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of June, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida.

CHARLES C. ADAMS

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304

(904) 488-9675

COPIES FURNISHED:

Daniel S. Dearing, Esquire

424 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Alfred W. Clark, Esquire

Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building

2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Docket for Case No: 78-000105

Orders for Case No: 78-000105