STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
FLORIDA CONSTRUCTION ) INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 79-1356
)
JOE S. HARTSFIELD, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings, by its duly designated Hearing Officer, R. L. Caleen, Jr., held a formal hearing in this case on February 12, 1980, in Jacksonville, Florida.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Barry S. Sinoff, Esquire
2400 Independent Square
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
For Respondent: Jerry R. Poole, Esquire
Post Office Box 662 Callahan, Florida 32011
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether Respondent, a registered general contractor, (1) unlawfully and willfully committed fraud and theft, violated the Fictitious Name Statute, and violated Municipal and County Contractor Licensing Ordinances, and (2) violated other provisions of the Construction Industry Licensing Law relating to the name under which a qualifying agent may engage in business.
Conclusion:
The Board failed to present clear and convincing evidence in support of the charges contained in its Administrative Complaint.
Recommendation:
That the Board find the Respondent Not Guilty of the charges contained in its Administrative Complaint, and that the Administrative Complaint be DISMISSED.
Background
By Administrative Complaint filed on May 23, 1979, the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board ("Board") seeks to (1) revoke the registered general contractors license of Joe S. Hartsfield ("Respondent") until the injured parties have been reimbursed, and (2) impose an administrative fine of $500.00. As grounds therefore, the Board alleges that, in connection with Respondent's formation and sale of several construction companies, he violated the Construction Industry Licensing Law [Chapter 465, Part II, Florida Statutes (1978)], by committing fraud, theft, failing to notify the Board of a change in name, contracting under a nondesignated name, failing to register a fictitious name, and failing to secure a certificate of competence required in Volusia County. The Board further alleges that Respondent represented to the buyers of these construction companies that they could operate as an affiliate of his qualified company, Deltec Construction Co.
On June 11, 1979, Respondent disputed the factual allegations contained in the Board's Complaint and requested a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1979). Thereafter, the Board requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to assign a Hearing Officer to conduct a formal hearing in this case.
Final hearing was initially scheduled for September 27, 1979. Respondent moved for a continuance, with th Board's concurrence, in order that settlement negotiations could be pursued. Final hearing was subsequently rescheduled for February 12, 1980.
At final hearing, the Board called Darcy A. Vernior, Herbert Adams, Edward Garr, and Clyde R. Pirtle as its witnesses, and offered Petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 1 through 17, 1/ inclusive, each of which was received into evidence. By stipulation the record was held open for a sufficient amount of time for the Board to submit an affidavit, dated February 13, 1980, signed by Darcy A. Vernier. Respondent called Doris Glen Brown, Bonnie Best Fortner and testified on his own behalf. He offered Respondent's Exhibit Nos. 1 and 2, each of which was received into evidence and, by stipulation, the record was held open for & sufficient amount of time for Respondent to take and submit the deposition of Fred Holmes, a building official for the City of Daytona Beach.
The parties submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the last of which was received on May 2, 1980, and agreed that the time period for submittal of the Recommended Order would commence on that date.
Upon consideration of the evidence presented at hearing, the following Findings of Fact are determined:
FINDINGS OF FACT
At all times material hereto, Respondent was the holder of Registered General Contractors License No. RG0013533 issued by the Board to Respondent, d/b/a Deltec Construction Co. (Stipulation of counsel).
Respondent is a fifty-five year old general contractor who has worked in construction for thirty-seven years, and has never been disciplined for misconduct associated with construction activities. (Testimony of Respondent)
Respondent, at all times material hereto, did not qualify or license with the Board Trendway Construction Co., Trendway Construction Inc., or Trend- Tech Construction Co. (Testimony of Respondent, P.E. 1, 2, 3)
Respondent's Business Activities in Daytona Beach, Florida
On May 24, 1978, Respondent, d/b/a Deltec Construction Co., contracted with Darcy A. Vernier to assist him in the formation and operation of a corporation to be known as Trendway Construction Inc. In exchange for
$8,500.00, Respondent agreed to provide a broad range of business assistance, expertise, training, and equipment to Trendway Construction, Inc. Vernier was designated General Manager and President of the new Company, and agreed to be individually responsible for its overall management. Although the long-term goal of the new Company was to perform general contracting, Vernier and Respondent envisioned that the Company would first gain necessary knowledge and experience by limiting its construction work to masonry and flat concrete construction projects. Profits were to be equally divided between Respondent (Deltec) and Vernier (Trendway), and, as subsequently amended, the Corporation was to be wholly owned by Vernier. (Testimony of Vernier, Respondent, P.E. 4)
Prior to executing the contract, Vernier met with Respondent and discussed their proposed business venture on three separate occasions during a ten-day period. Vernier had his attorney review the contract prior to his signing, and fully understood its provisions. The proposed contract was modified, at Vernier's request, to ensure that Vernier would be the sole owner of the Corporation. (Testimony of Vernier)
Prior to executing the contract, Respondent took Vernier to observe a masonry or flat concrete construction job in Ormond Beach, which he had recently completed d/b/a Deltec Construction Co. (Testimony of Vernier, Respondent)
On July 6, 1978, pursuant to his contractual obligation, Respondent paid $250.00 for and obtained a Masonry Sub-Contractor's License, in Vernier's name, from the Building Department of the City of Daytona Beach. (Testimony of Respondent, Holmes, Vernier)
Conflicting evidence was presented on whether, in order to do sub- contracting, masonry and flat concrete work within the City of Daytona Beach, a sub-contractor must also secure a certificate of competency or license from Volusia County under Ordinance 69-3. By stipulation, the testimony of Fred Holmes, Building Official with the City of Daytona Beach, was subsequently taken by deposition and submitted to determine this question. However, the testimony of Holmes is inconclusive, conflicting and unclear. (Testimony of Respondent, Vernier, Holmes, P.E. 7)
Respondent did not represent to Vernier that Deltec Construction Co.'s licenses could be used by Vernier d/b/a Trendway Construction, Inc., and that no further licenses would be necessary. Vernier testified that Respondent made such representation, and Respondent denied it. Vernier's testimony is inconsistent with the express contractual provision which required Respondent to affirmatively secure "initial licensing" for Trendway Construction, Inc. Furthermore, Vernier's demeanor as a witness reflected a level of bitterness and hostility toward Respondent which may have influenced his recollection. (Since his construction company failed, Vernier had demanded Respondent return his money and filed a civil suit for such purpose.) In contrast, Respondent's unequivocal testimony on this question is buttressed by his consistent actions
in securing an additional license for the Company from the City of Daytona Beach), and his subsequent action in attempting to secure a local license for another company under a contract markedly similar to the one between Vernier and Respondent, post. (Testimony of Respondent, Vernier, Garr, Fortner)
Respondent was aware, however, that the Company would eventually have to acquire a license from Volusia County; he concluded, though, that his contractual obligations to secure "initial licensing" encompassed only the license required by the City of Daytona Beach. (Testimony of Respondent)
Trendway Construction, Inc., was never organized as a corporation as envisioned by the contract between Respondent and Vernier. Soon after the contract was signed, serious business disagreements arose between Respondent and Vernier. Vernier, then, unilaterally moved the business, including its equipment, furnishings, office forms, and principal employee from Daytona Beach and relocated in another community. From the execution of the contract to Vernier's ultimate closing of the business, Respondent never received any profits from its operation, and his non-participation in the business operations was acknowledged by Vernier. During September or October, 1978, Vernier changed the name of the Company to Pelican Construction Co. During its existence, Trendway Construction was not registered as a fictitious name with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Volusia County. (Testimony of Respondent, Vernier)
Respondent's Business Activities in Ocala, Florida
During September and October, 1978), Respondent operated a duly licensed masonry and flat concrete construction business known as Deltec Construction Co., in Ocala, Florida. (Testimony of Garr, Fortner, Respondent)
On October 5, 1978, Respondent d/b/a Deltec Construction Co. contracted with Albert W. Latham to assist in the formation and operation of a corporation to be known as Trendway Construction, Inc. (In the Daytona Beach transaction, Trendway Construction Co. had never been incorporated by Vernier, and he had subsequently changed the Company's name, infra.) In exchange for
$8,500.00, Respondent agreed to provide business assistance, expertise, training and equipment to Trendway Construction, Inc. Albert Latham was designated as General Manager and President of the newly formed Company, and agreed to be individually responsible for its general overall management. Although general construction was the Company's long-term objective, the parties invisioned that necessary knowledge and experience would be acquired by limiting their initial work to sub-contracting masonry and flat concrete construction projects.
Profits were to be equally divided between Respondent and Latham, and 60 percent of the capital stock of the corporation was to be owned by Latham--the remaining
40 percent, by Respondent. (Testimony of Respondent, P.E. 13)
On October 23, 1978, Trendway Construction, Inc., was officially organized and formed pursuant to the contract between Respondent and Latham. (P.E. 9)
Under the contract between Respondent and Latham, Respondent was obligated to secure initial licensing for the new Company, Trendway Construction, Inc. Because Trendway Construction, Inc., was going to initially engage only in masonry and flat concrete sub-contracting work, the only license required was a certification of competency from the City of Ocala. Respondent made reasonable, diligent and earnest efforts to obtain the required certification from the City. First, he tried to apply for the license on behalf
of Trendway Construction, Inc. But, since Latham owned a controlling interest in the Company, and was apparently considered its owner, City Building Department officials insisted that Latham must apply for the license on behalf of the Company. Respondent then obtained and delivered to Latham the necessary application forms and character reference letters, set up appointments for Latham at the Building Department, and repeatedly reminded him of the need to secure the local certification. Despite Respondent's efforts, Latham procrastinated, and failed to obtain from the City of Ocala the required license for Trendway Construction, Inc. It is probable that if proper application had been made for the license, it would have been issued to Latham d/b/a Trendway Construction, Inc., upon payment of the application fee and proof of insurance. (Testimony of Respondent, Garr, Fortner, P.E. 13)
After formation of the Corporation, Respondent continued to provide assistance to Latham and Trendway Construction, Inc., but he did not dictate what construction work would be done or whore it would be undertaken. Latham directed two construction work crews and made those decisions. Nevertheless, Respondent warned Latham that no construction work should be undertaken within Ocala until the necessary City certification was obtained. (Testimony of Respondent)
On October 24, 1978, Trendway Construction, Inc., poured a driveway slab for Herbert Adams at 2332 East Silver Spring Boulevard, Ocala, Florida, for
$668.72. Adams dealt only with Jack Cook, an employee of Trendway, and neither knew nor had any dealings with Respondent. (Testimony of Adams, Garr)
The name of "Trendway Construction, Inc.," has not been registered with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Marion County, Florida. (Testimony of Respondent)
Respondent did not attempt to mislead Latham by representing that Trendway Construction, Inc., could operate under Deltec's local or state licenses. (Testimony of Respondent)
There was no evidence that Respondent mislead or misrepresented any material fact to Latham or failed to diligently carry out his obligations under their contract; neither was any evidence presented to show Latham was dissatisfied, in any manner, with Respondent's contractual performance.
Respondent's Business Activities in Gainesville, Florida
Respondent sold a construction business to Valentine Webber of Gainesville, Florida, for $8,500.00. (Testimony of Respondent)
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this proceeding. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1979).
In this case, the Board seeks to enforce the Construction Industry Licensing Law, Chapter 468, Part II, Florida Statutes (1978), by revoking the Registered Contractor's License of Respondent upon the grounds specified in the Administrative Complaint. The statutes which provide for the revocation of licenses are penal in nature and must be strictly construed and applied. Bach
v. State Board of Dentistry, 378 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). In order to
revoke Respondent's license, and deprive him of his livelihood, the Board must Present clear and convincing evidence in support of its charges. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 322 So.2d 613 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1975) . In Reid v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 188 So.2d 846, 851 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1966), the Court cautioned:
"The power to revoke a license should
be exercised with no less careful circum- spection than the original granting of it. And the penal sections should be directed only toward those who by their conduct
have forfeited their right to the privilege, and then only upon clear and convincing proof of substantial causes justifying the forfeiture."
When a statute, such as the one applied here, authorizes the revocation of a license upon a showing that the licensee has violated any other law of the State, county, or municipality, the evidence presented must prove each element of the alleged violations. Id.
Section 468.112, Florida Statutes (1978), the law under which the Board's Administrative Complaint was filed, was repealed and replaced on July 1, 1979, by enactment of Chapter 79-200, Laws of Florida (1979). Accordingly, the law which now governs the Board's final action in this case is contained in Section 489.129(1), Florida Statutes (1979), which allows disciplinary action if a licensed contractor is found guilty of any of the acts enumerated. The actions proscribed in the 1978 law [Section 468.112, Florida Statutes (1978)] are similar or identical to the provisions contained in the 1979 law now in effect. Section 489.129(1), Florida Statutes (1979).
Section 489.129(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1979), authorizes revocation of a contractor's license if he is found guilty of:
"(d) Willful or deliberate disregard
and violation of the applicable building codes or laws of the state or of any municipalities or counties thereof."
The Board asserts that Respondent willfully and deliberately violated other laws of the State, including county and municipal ordinances, and that Respondent's license should therefore be revoked. Each of the Board's allegations, and the evidence presented in support thereof, will be separately treated below.
Theft and Fraud: Not Guilty
The Board alleges that Respondent, by his actions in selling and operating three construction firms, committed fraud and theft in violation of Chapters 812 and 814, Florida Statutes, supra.
Theft is a crime which is defined by Section 812.014 supra. There is no Chapter 814 contained in Florida Statutes (1977), (1978), or (1979). However, Chapter 817, supra, defines a panoply of fraudulent practices which constitute felony or misdemeanor crimes.
No evidence was presented by the Board which establishes, or even supports an inference, that Respondent, through his business dealings described,
infra, willfully or deliberately committed theft in violation of Section 812.014, supra. The Board's accusation of fraud and violation of Chapter 814, supra, is erroneously plead and unsupported by the evidence. It must be concluded, therefore, that as a matter of law, Respondent is not guilty of willful or deliberate disregard and violation of the State criminal laws proscribing theft or fraud.
Failure to Register Under Fictitious Name Statute:
Not Guilty
The Board charges Respondent with violation of Section 865.09, supra, the "Fictitious Name Statute" which makes it unlawful for any person to engage in business under a fictitious name without first registering such name with the appropriate Clerk of the Circuit Court. However, if a natural or artificial person, including a corporation, does business under his or its own name, registration is not required. See, e.g., Attorney General's Opinion 068-2, dated January 8, 1968.
As to Respondent's business activities in Daytona Beach, it was established that Vernier, the sole owner of Trendway Construction Inc., never organized a Corporation in violation of the provisions of the contract between Respondent and Vernier. It is evident that the business relationship between Respondent and Vernier was severed soon after the execution of their contract, that Vernier relocated the business without the participation or agreement of the Respondent, and that the Respondent received no income from the Company's operations. Under such circumstances, it is concluded that Respondent is not guilty of willfully or deliberately disregarding and violating the Fictitious Name Statute in connection with the Volusia County operations of Trendway Construction Co.
As to Respondent's business activities in Ocala, Florida, it was established that, pursuant to the contract between Latham and Respondent, their masonry and flat concrete sub-contracting business was organized and engaged in business as "Trendway Construction, Inc." Since the corporation engaged in business under its chartered name, no violation of the Fictitious Name Statutes occurred.
As to Respondent's business activities in Gainesville, Florida, no evidence was presented which established, or even inferred, that Trend-Tech Construction ever engaged in business. It is similarly concluded, therefore, that no violation of the Fictitious Name Statute, has been established.
Violation of Volusia County Ordinance No. 69-3: Not Guilty
The Board charges that Respondent deliberately or willfully violated Volusia County Ordinance No. 69-3 by not procuring a Certificate of Competence for Deltec, or Trendway Construction Co.
The Board failed to present clear and convincing evidence which establishes that Respondent willfully or deliberately engaged in general contracting in Volusia County without a required Certificate of Competence. It is also unclear whether a County Certificate of Competence is required prior to engaging in sub-contracting work limited to flat concrete and masonry. The portion of Ordinance No. 69-3 introduced into evidence by the Board does not
adequately define the type of contracting work which requires a Certificate of Competence under the Ordinance. Furthermore, no competent or substantial evidence was presented which establishes that Respondent willfully or deliberately violated this Ordinance. Indeed, Trendway Construction Co. was solely owned and operated by another individual (Vernier) who acknowledged that Respondent did not participate in its business operations.
Violation of Article V Ocala City Code:
Not Guilty
The Board alleges that Respondent willfully or deliberately violated Article V of the Ocala City Code which makes it unlawful for a contractor or sub-contractor to engage in business within the City without a Certificate.
The evidence establishes that Respondent made a reasonable and diligent effort to obtain the necessary City Certificate. After being advised by the City that only Latham, the controlling owner and manager of Trendway Construction, Inc., could apply for the required certificate, Respondent obtained the application forms, made appointments for Latham at the Building Department, and repeatedly reminded him of the importance of obtaining the necessary certificate. Respondent even expressly warned Latham against preforming construction work within the City without the required certificate.
Based on such evidence, it is concluded that no clear and convincing evidence was presented to establish that Respondent willfully or deliberately violated the City Licensing Code, and that Respondent is not guilty of this charge.
In summary, based on the evidence submitted, it is concluded that Respondent did not deliberately or willfully violate the State, county and municipal laws, as alleged and is, therefore, not guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(d) supra.
The Board accuses Respondent of violating Section 489.129(1)(g), supra, which prohibits a registered contractor from:
"(g) Acting in the capacity of a contractor under any . . . registra- tion issued hereunder except in the name of the . . . registrant as set forth on the . . . registration, or in accordance with the personnel of the . . . registrant as set forth in
the application for the . . . registra- tion, or as later changed as provided in this act." (Emphasis supplied)
No clear and convincing evidence was introduced which establishes that Respondent violated this statutory prohibition by acting in the capacity of contractor as defined by Section 489.105, supra, under the name of Trendway Construction Co., Trendway Construction Inc., or Trend-Tech Construction Co. It must be concluded, therefore, that Respondent is not guilty of this charge.
Respondent is also accused of violating Section 489.119(2), supra, which declares that the registration or certification of a contractor licensed
under Part I, Chapter 489, supra, "be in the name of the qualifying agent and the name of the business organization shall be noted thereon."
This appears to be an application processing and licensing issuing requirement directed to the Board rather than the licensee. It has not been explained how this provision applies to Respondent's actions. Respondent, d/b/a Deltec Construction Co., is properly qualified and registered with the Board.
No evidence was presented that any of the other companies with which Respondent was involved actually engaged in the business of contracting, as defined by Section 489.105, supra, or subject to the provisions of the Construction Industry Licensing Law. It must, therefore be concluded, that in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Respondent is not guilty of violating Section 489.119(2), supra.
Respondent is also charged with violating Section 489.119(3)(b), supra, which requires a qualifying agent, such as Respondent, to inform the Board when he proposes to engage in contracting in his own name or in affiliation with another business organization.
While the long-term objective of the companies which Respondent helped establish was to engage in general contracting which would be subject to the provisions of the Construction Industry Licensing Law, it is evident that the companies restricted their business activities to sub-contracting masonry and flat concrete work. Such limited construction work does not fall within the licensing provisions of Chapter 489, Part I, Florida Statutes. Therefore, this charge is premature and the Respondent must be found Not Guilty.
Application of the "clear and convincing, evidence standard is appropriate when the State seeks to deprive a professional person of his means of livelihood. See, e.g., Walker v. Florida State Board of Optometry, 322 So.2d 612 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). This standard of proof is consistent with appellate court decisions which have emphasized the penal nature of license revocation proceedings. See State ex rel. Vining v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 281 So.2d 487 (Fla. 1973) , Lester v. Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, 348 So.2d 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). However, even if the lower standard of proof, "preponderance of the evidence," Fitzpatrick v. City of Miami Beach, 328 So.2d 578 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) , is applied to the evidence presented in this case, the Board has failed to meet it.
To the extent any proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties are not incorporated herein, they are expressly rejected as unsupported by the evidence, irrelevant to the issues determined or conclusions of law as opposed to findings of fact.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED:
That the Board find Respondent Not Guilty of the charges contained in its Administrative Complaint, and that the Complaint be DISMISSED.
DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida.
R. L. CALEEN JR., Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
904/488-9675
ENDNOTE
1/ Petitioner's and Respondent's exhibits will be abbreviated as "P. E." and "R. E." respectively.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Barry S. Sinoff, Esquire 2400 Independent Square
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Jerry R. Poole, Esquire Post Office Box 662 Callahan, Florida 32011
Nancy Kelley Wittenberg, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 2009 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER
================================================================= BEFORE THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD,
Petitioner,
vs. DOAH CASE NO. 79-1356
JOE S. HARTSFIELD,
Respondent.
/
FINAL ORDER OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD
This cause came before the Construction Industry Licensing Board on August 15, 1980, in Fort Myers, Florida. A formal hearing, conducted at the licensee's election pursuant to 120.57(1), F.S., resulted in the rendering of a recommended order from the Division of Administrative Hearings.
Following a review of the complete record, the Board adopt's the findings of fact contained in the recommended order with the following additional findings:
Joe S. Hartsfield, at all times material hereto, did not qualify or license with the Construction Industry Licensing Board either Trendway Construction Company or Trend-Tech Construction Co. (Petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 1, 2, and 3; Testimony of Respondent, Tr. P. 187).
At all times material hereto regarding Respondent's activities in the Ocala, Florida, area, Respondent was engaged in business activities through an entity named Trendway Construction Inc. without obtaining the requisite occupational license or local certification as a masonry sub-contractor or any other contractor (testimony of Edward Garr, Jr. pp. 56 and 58) and that this condition continued to exist following written notification to Respondent and his business associate in that venture, Mr. Latham (Petitioner's Exhibit 15; Testimony of Edward Garr, Jr. pp. 59 and 60).
Business activity in the Ocala, Florida area in the name of Trendway Construction, Inc. is evidenced by a concrete job for Herbert Adams (Petitioner's Exhibit 12; Testimony Herbert Adams, Tr. p. 54), further violation occurred in that no building permit was secured for the Adams job (Testimony of Edward Carr, Tr. pp. 60 and 61). Respondent knew or should have known that Trendway's agents such as Jack Cook were soliciting masonry business; that Respondent was the only licensed masonry sub-contractor involved and that, as such, was responsible to supervise the work but, in fact, did not do so. (Testimony of Herbert Adams, Tr. pp. 53 and 54; Testimony of Edward Garr, Tr. pp. 76 and 77).
Pursuant to a contract agreement dated May 24, 1978 (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4), Respondent sold to Darcy A. Vernier a business named Trendway Construction, Inc., for which Respondent received the sum of 8,500 (Testimony of Darcy A. Vernier, Tr. P. 18; Testimony of Respondent, Tr. p 144). Under the terms of the contractual agreement, Respondent was required to "secure initial licensing" and to "provide information which may be necessary in qualifying in specific areas of Florida."
From Respondent's testimony he knew or should have known that Vernier could not operate Trendway Construction, Inc. even within the limited scope of concrete masonry work without obtaining a Volusia County occupational license in addition to the City of Daytona Beach occupational license which was purchased by check in the sum of $250.00. (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 14). Respondent admitted that Vernier and Trendway needed a Volusia County license. (Testimony of Respondent, Tr. p. 197). See also Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7.
Although Respondent gave an explanation for his conduct, he acknowledged that Trendway had not complied with the fictitious name law (Respondent's testimony, Tr. p. 187) and this was also included in the testimony of Petitioner's witness Pirtle. (Testimony of Clyde R. Pirtle).
In addition to the transaction with Mrs. Weber of Gainesville, Florida, Respondent has sold six other businesses of a similar nature for a sum of $8,500 each although "some of them were not that much," (Respondent's testimony, Tr. p. 190).
Following its review of the complete record, the Board hereby rejects the conclusions of law which state that Respondent is not guilty of violating 489.129(1)(d) and (g), 489.119(2) and 3(b), 865.09, F.S. Volusia County Ordinance No. 69-3, or Article V of the Code of the City of Ocala. It is concluded that the Findings of Fact included in this Final Order constitute violations of Sections 489.129(1)(g) and (j); 489.119(2) and (3)(b), 865.09(3), Florida Statutes; Article V of the Code of the City of Ocala, and Volusia County Ordinance No. 69-3. It is further found that the Respondent's violation of Article V of the Code of the City of Ocala, Volusia County Ordinance No. 69-3 and Sections 489.119(2) and (3)(b) and 865.09(3), Florida Statutes constitute violations of Section 489.129(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, based upon a review of the complete record by the Board, and the Modified Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the registered general contractor's license of Respondent Joe S. Hartsfield be and is hereby revoked and shall not be considered for reinstatement until restitution has been made to the injured parties named in the Administrative Complaint. It is further ordered that Respondent is fined 500.00
DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of September, 1980.
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD
John Henry Jones Chairman
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Sep. 11, 1980 | Final Order filed. |
| Jun. 11, 1980 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Sep. 05, 1980 | Agency Final Order | |
| Jun. 11, 1980 | Recommended Order | Dismiss complaints against Respondent for violating fictitious name statute, theft and violations of county ordinances. |
