GLEN P. HAMNER, JR., )
vs. ) CASE NO. 81-967RX
Respondent. )
Pursuant to notice this cause came on for administrative hearing before P. Michael Ruff, duly designated Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings, in Pensacola, Florida, on July 23, 1981.
For Petitioner: William H. Congdon, Jr., Esquire
Ft. Walton Beach, Florida 32548
For Respondent: John J. Rimes, III, Esquire
The Petitioner, Glen Hamner, is an applicant for licensure by examination to practice architecture in the State of Florida. The Petitioner has challenged Rules 21B-14.01, 14.02 and 14.03, Florida Administrative Code, which superseded their predecessor Rule 21B-2.02(2), Florida Administrative Code, as invalid exercises of authority delegated to the Board of Architecture by the Legislature and also on the basis that the Board failed to comply with various sections of 120.54, Florida Statutes, in the adoption process pertaining to the rules. The rules in question concern the adoption of what is generally termed "Part A" of the Professional Architectural Examination. That portion is a design and site plan problem involving the use of graphic skills by architectural candidates over a 12-hour period in which various aspects of the skills required by architects are tested. The Petitioner took the site planning and design portion of the examination, which was prepared by the National Council of Architectural Registration Boards (NCARB) in June, 1980, and failed to achieve a passing score.
In addition to challenging the above rules providing for the adoption of "Part A" of the examination, the Petitioner, pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, initiated a formal proceeding and hearing on the issue of whether his score and effort on the design and site plan portion of the examination was adequate for a passing grade. That case (DOAH Case No. 80-1977) was first heard
in March, 1981. Subsequent to that hearing, the Petitioner obtained counsel and initiated this proceeding. The parties thereupon stipulated to hold Case No.
80-1977 in abeyance pending the outcome of the rules challenge proceeding herein, and waived the 30-day requirement for hearing and for rendition of the Final Order contained in Section 120.56(2)(3), Florida Statutes, and the 30-day requirement of Rule 28-5.402, Florida Administrative Code. The parties then stipulated that the cases be consolidated.
At the conclusion of both proceedings, the parties availed themselves of the opportunity to have the proceedings transcribed and of the opportunity to file Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and briefs. Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and briefs were filed timely August 28, 1981. The Petitioner presented two witnesses and fifteen exhibits. The Respondent presented one witness. Exhibits one through eight and Exhibits eleven, twelve and fifteen were admitted.
All proposed findings, conclusions and supporting arguments of the parties have been considered. To the extent that the proposed findings and conclusions submitted by the parties, and the arguments made by them, are in accordance with the findings, conclusions and views stated herein they have been accepted, and to the extent such proposed findings and conclusions of the parties, and such arguments made by the parties, are inconsistent therewith they have been rejected. Certain proposed findings and conclusions have been omitted as not relevant and/or as not necessary to a proper determination of the material issues presented. To the extent that the testimony of various witnesses is not in accord with the findings herein it is not credited.
The Petitioner, Glen Hamner, is an applicant for licensure by examination to practice architecture in the State of Florida. The examination consists of two parts. "Part B," which is a written examination, is given in December of each year and has already been successfully passed by the Petitioner. The other portion, "Part A," consists of a site plan and design problem and is administered in June of each year. The Petitioner met all the preliminary requirements for admittance to the licensure examination and took the subject design and site planning portion of the National Architectural Examination, adopted in Florida, in June of 1980. This portion of the examination consists of a 12-hour drafting or sketch problem involving design and site plan criteria and considerations. It is administered by the Office of Examination Services of the Department of Professional Regulation and is supplied to the State of Florida as well as all other jurisdictions in the United States by the National Council of Architectural Registration Board (NCARB). The examination problem involves requirements for placing a structure on a site, designing and drawing the elevations, the building cross-sections, the facades and the floor plan.
There are few factual questions disputed in this cause. The Board of Architecture has long required examination prior to a candidate being licensed as a registered architect in the State of Florida. This statutory authorization was continued in Section 481.213(2), Florida Statutes, when it was adopted by the Legislature in 1979. The original examination administered by the Board prior to 1974 was a seven-part, 36-hour examination, including as two of its parts a site plan and design problem essentially identical to that administered in the present "Part A" of the Professional Architectural Examination which is the subject matter of this proceeding. This original seven-part examination had been administered for many years by the Board until the Board, in consultation
with NCARB and other jurisdictions who are members of NCARB, determined that examination did not adequately test minimal competency to practice architecture. This ultimate determination was made after a thorough review by NCARB prior to 1974 and ultimately resulted in the creation of a new professional examination, which was adopted by all the member states and which consisted of what is now "Part B" of the Professional Architectural Examination (the written examination).
The Executive Director of NCARB, Samuel Balin, was instrumental in the preparation of the initial professional examination. His testimony described the concern the National Council and the Boards had regarding the original seven-part examination, that it was an extremely technical examination, aside from the site and design plan problem, designed primarily to cover subjects which had already been covered in most accredited college degree programs. Thus, at the time the NCARB and member boards were in the process of changing over from the seven-part examination to what is now the "Part B" professional examination, NCARB and the member boards of each state were also rapidly moving toward requiring the completion of architectural degrees by candidates as a
prerequisite to entry into the architectural profession. As established by this witness, NCARB research showed that much of the material contained in the seven- part examination was already adequately taught in the various universities offering architectural degree programs, and thus the examination necessary for registration should focus on the professional aspects of architecture and the practical methods by which an architect actually must provide his services to the public, rather than merely being an examination consisting of a review of what had already been taught in the colleges and universities.
Based on this intensive review regarding the most appropriate means to test architectural competency based upon what candidates were already receiving in various degree programs, the two-day "Part B" examination was developed and first offered in 1973, concurrently with the seven-part examination previously in effect. It was determined by the Respondent, other state boards and the NCARB that, since many individuals had successfully completed large portions of the seven-part examination, it would be unfair to not allow them to finish the examinations they had originally begun. A minimal number of parts passed on the seven-part examination was thus required in order for a candidate to continue to attain licensure based upon that examination during the 1974 examination session. Subsequent to 1974, an individual who had not already successfully completed the entire seven-part examination was required by the Board to take what is presently "Part B" of the current examination. Thus, from 1975 through 1977, the sole licensure examination, requirement in Florida was the "Part B" written examination provided to the Florida Board by NCARB and adopted by the Florida Board in its rules as Rule 21B-2.02(1), Florida Administrative Code (1974).
During the period 1974 to 1977, the Board became increasingly concerned with deficient graphic abilities of examination candidates in drafting plans, as well as their physical ability to synthesize the problems faced by an architect in building design into overall solutions and to incorporate those solutions into appropriate building and site plans for clients. Accordingly, a number of states expressed to NCARB their desire to have a site and design plan problem again incorporated into the National Architectural Examination. As a result of these requests, NCARB initiated a study to determine whether such a site and design plan problem was really a legitimate tool to test the competency of an architect in synthesizing building and construction design problems and expressing in a graphic manner the various component skills or abilities required to practice the profession of architecture and, corollarily, whether or
not the lack of it in the "Part B" examination rendered it a substandard tool for determining minimal competence.
The study resulted in a report by a distinguished panel of architects from various jurisdictions which recommended that, in fact, the site plan and design problem should be included in the professional examination. Florida then, in 1977, determined, based upon the evidence presented to it by NCARB, as well as through its own professional expertise, that a site and design plan problem was indeed a necessary component in determining minimal competency of architectural licensure candidates.
The NCARB, at its meeting of June, 1977, thus adopted the site and design plan problem as part of the uniform National Professional Architectural Examination. The Florida Board subsequently thereto, and after receiving detailed information regarding the contents of the new portion of the national examination, proposed its own Rule 21B-2.02(2), on March 31, 1978, by notice contained in the Florida Administrative Weekly, which rule constituted Florida's adoption of the new site and design plan problem added to the National Professional Architectural Examination by NCARB. A hearing was held before the Florida Board on April 28, 1978, and the rule was certified and filed with the Secretary of State on May 30, 1978. Documents required to be filed with that rule pursuant to Chapter 120 were admitted into evidence in this proceeding.
The effective date of Rule 21B-2.02(2) was June 19, 1978, therefore, subsequent to that date the professional architectural examination in Florida has consisted of two parts. One part being "Part A" which was the new site and design plan problem and the other part being the previously adopted "Part B" (multiple choice examination).
The Legislature in 1979 pursuant to the Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, "sunsetted" all professional boards. The Board of Architecture was reconstituted pursuant to Chapter 79-273, Laws of Florida. Pursuant to Chapter 79-273 it was provided that all rules in existence would be repealed as of January 1, 1980. Accordingly, on December 3, 1979, the Florida Board readopted, pursuant to Section 481.209, Florida Statutes, and Section 455.217, Florida Statutes, examination rules set out in Rules 21B-14.01, 14.02 and 14.03, Florida Administrative Code (the successors to the above-cited rule) . There have been no substantive amendments to those rules since their effective date of December 23, 1979, and the issues with which the Petitioner's challenge to the rules are concerned have not been substantially affected by that readoption procedure.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of this proceeding. Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner has standing as an examinee who sat for the Florida Professional Architectural Examination to challenge the above rules under which he was examined regarding whether or not he should be registered as an architect to practice in the State of Florida.
The Petitioner has mounted a number of procedural and substantive attacks upon the rules at issue. These procedural and substantive questions will be dealt with respectively in the Conclusions of Law. Section 467.08 (1)(a) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Provisions shall be made by the Florida State Board of Architecture for holding examinations at least once
in each year of applicants for regis- tration to practice architecture, if there shall be any such application. All persons now registered to practice architecture shall continue to be so registered but all architects must apply for and obtain annual renewals of their registrations as provided by
law. Upon payment of a fee, new appli- cants may be admitted by the board upon examination. The scope of the entrance- to practice examination shall be such
as to determine the qualifications of the applicant to practice architecture and shall cover such technical and pro- fessional subjects as relate to archi- tecture and the basic arts and sciences, a knowledge of which is material to the proper understanding application, and practice of the principles of architec- ture.
Section 455.217(b), Florida Statutes, regarding examinations provides as follows:
To the extent not otherwise speci- fied by statute, the board shall by rule specify the general areas of competency to be covered by each examination, the relative weight to be assigned in grading each area tested and the score necessary to achieve a passing grade. If a practical examination is deemed to
be necessary, the rules shall specify the grading criteria to be used by the examiner, the relative weight to
be assigned in grading each criterion, and the score necessary to achieve a passing grade.
Section 481.209(2), regarding examination provides that an applicant is entitled to take the licensure examination to practice as a registered architect if that applicant:
An applicant shall be entitled to take the licensure examination to practice in this state as a regis- tered architect if the applicant:
Is honest and trustworthy; and
Is a graduate from an approved architectural curriculum of 5 years or more, evidenced by a degree from a school or college of architecture
which meets standards of accreditation adopted by the board by rule based on a review and inspection by the board
of the curriculum of accredited schools or colleges of architecture in the United States, including those schools or colleges accredited by the National Architectural Accreditation Board.
Section 481.213(2), licensure, provides that the Board shall certify for licensure any applicant satisfying the requirements of Sections 481.209 and 481.211.
The rules which are pertinent hereto, beginning with the original Rule 21B-2.02(2), Part V, Architectural Design, provide in pertinent part as follows:
Part V of the Professional Exami- nation shall consist of a specific practical problem in architectural design requiring the applicant to successfully complete a multiple choice test on principles of design together with accomplishment of a graphic solution to the design problem in conformance with acceptable princi- ples of architectural design, of a kind and scale to present an efficient arrangement, logical, structural organization, compliance with basic codes for health and safety, appro-
priate economy and satisfying aesthetic quality. Part V of the professional examination may be given at a separate time and place from Parts I-IV as determined by the Board.
In a procedural vein the Petitioner has challenged the adequacy of notice of proposed enactment of the subject rules, and form of the notice, as well as the Economic Impact Statement filed by the Respondent during the adoption process for Rule 21B-2.02(2). Petitioner presented no evidence whatever regarding the notice or the Economic Impact Statement related to the successor Rules 21B-14.01, 14.02 or 14.03.
Regarding the Economic Impact Statement required under then Section 120.54(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), it should be noted that any attack upon that rule is foreclosed by the statute of limitations imposed by the Legislature embodied in Section 120.54(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1978). Even if Rule 21B- 2.02(2), being adopted prior to October 1, 1978, could be deemed not to be covered by that subsection, it is clear that no challenge regarding the Economic Impact Statement even related to the successor rules cited above may be sustained, since those rules became effective on December 23, 1979. This proceeding did not come into being until well after one year subsequent to that date.
If it be assumed arguendo, that the above-mentioned statute of limitations does not apply regarding the statement Originally filed with former Rule 21B-2.02(2), and that such a collateral attack could be made upon a repealed rule (upon a theory that its substantive re-enactment rendered the attack viable), it becomes obvious that the Economic Impact Statement filed with the Secretary of State is substantial and sufficient so as to meet the test
proposed by the Supreme Court in the case of Florida Texas Freight v. Hawkins,
379 So.2d 994; School Board of Broward County v. Gramith, 375 So.2d 340 (1st DCA 1979). There is no competent substantial evidence in this record which would show that the Petitioner suffered any harm capable of quantification due to the fact that the Economic Impact Statement did not specifically address the speculative question of potential lost wages by architectural candidates due to the addition of the "Part A" to the examination. The Economic Impact Statement at issue does adequately quantify all the actual costs which could have been forseeable at the time the rule was adopted adding "Part A" to the examination. See Broward County v. Department of Transportation, DOAH Case No. 79-1210R, September 13, 1978; State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation v. Florida Board of Real Estate, DOAH Case No. 80-1457R, November 7, 1980; Town of Palm Beach v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, DOAH Case No.
79-1774R, April 15, 1980.
Regarding the Petitioner's argument that the justification statement supportive of the rules and required by Section 120.54(11)(a), Florida Statutes, was inadequate, the Hearing Officer notes that the statement merely provides:
This is an amendment to describe
the subject matter of a professional examination in architecture adding Part V-Architecture Design.
The language in question contains scant detail, but it does clearly show that the Board was exercising its statutory authority to amend its rules pursuant to Sections 467.06 and 467.08, Florida Statutes. The evidence adduced by the Respondent established clearly that the Board's reasons for adopting the rule were based upon its own information and expertise as well as information provided by NCARB regarding the less than adequate level of performance by architectural examination licensure candidates, and after extensive investigation and deliberation regarding the best means of measuring the competency of architectural licensure candidates. The preponderance of the evidence shows that the Board's action was neither arbitrary nor capricious and the Petitioner did not establish that any harm was occasioned him due to any inadequacy in the justification statement, which the statute above requires to be filed with the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee and the Secretary of State, and not noticed to the general public. It is merely to be used by the committee in its review of the agency rules. See Section 120.54(11)(a), Florida Statutes. It is accordingly concluded that whatever deficiency may exist in the justification statement, such inadequacy is mere harmless error. See Florida Texas Freight v. Hawkins, supra; Miami Tiresoles, Inc., v. State of Florida, Department of Revenue, DOAH Case No. 80-927R, March 25, 1981.
The Petitioner has also attacked the Board's failure to provide him individual notice of the enactment of the rules (or to any other architectural examination candidate in the State of Florida). The case of Miami Tiresoles, Inc., v. State of Florida, Department of Revenue, supra, provides as follows:
an interpretation of section 120.54 (1)(a), to mean that every individual within a class of persons named in a rule must be individually noticed is unreasonable. Such an interpretation would mean, for instance, that the Department of Education could not adopt a rule regulating the conduct of teachers
without first mailing an individual notice to each teacher in the whole of Florida. The provision requiring noticing to all persons named in the proposed rule is reasonably inter- preted to mean those persons desig nated by name in the rule itself. In this case, adequate notice of rule making was given by the Department by the publication of the requisite notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly on October 13, 1978.
No evidence was presented to show that at the time notice was published the Petitioner was a member of any of the classes of individuals who were required to be given notice under the provisions of Section 120.54(1)(a). Even if the Petitioner bases his argument attacking the rule upon the alleged failure by the Board to give notice as prescribed by rule to the particular classes of persons to whom the intended action was directed, the above-cited statute could not have been intended to require notice to all affected parties, but rather to allow the agency by rule to give whatever reasonable notice to identifiable classes to whom the intended action is directed. In the event that the agency has not determined such readily identifiable classes (such as here where the potential class could include anyone who may wish to seek registration as an architect in Florida), then it may proceed under the remaining provisions regarding notice contained in Chapter 120.54.
Thus, it must be concluded that Petitioner's attacks of a procedural nature are based upon misplaced interpretations of Chapter 120 and are inadequate to show reasonable error by the Board and are barred by statutory restraints.
Regarding the Petitioner's substantive attack upon the rules, it is obvious that the Board has the statutory authority to enact rules governing content of examinations prerequisite to licensure to practice architecture in Florida. See Section 467.06, Florida Statutes (1977); Section 455.217 (1)(b), Florida Statutes; Sections 481.209(2) and 481.213(2)(1980)
Accordingly, given the above statutory mandate the Petitioner in a challenge to those rules must meet the burden of proof framed by the Court in Agrico Chemical Company v. State Department of Environmental Regulation, 365 So.2d 759, 763 (Fla. 1st DCA, 1978), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1979), wherein the Court stated:
The burden is upon one who attacks a proposed rule to show that the agency, if it adopts the rule, would
exceed its authority; that the require- ments of the rule are not appropriate to ends specified in the legislature's act; that the requirements contained
in the rule are not reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legis- lation or that the proposed rule or the requirements thereof are arbitrary or capricious. A capricious action is one which is taken without thought or
reason or irrationally. An arbitrary decision is one not supported by facts or logic, or despotic. Administrative discretion must be reasoned and based upon competent, substantial evidence. Competent, substantial evidence has been described as such evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
The requirement that a challenger has the burden of demonstrating agency action to be arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of administrative dis- cretion is a stringent one indeed.
Similarly, the Court in Broward County, Florida v. Department of Transportation, supra, stated:
That rules and regulations promulgated without an inquiry to pertinent facts are,arbitrary and invalid.
See also State ex rel. Railroad Commissioners v. Florida East Coast Railway Company, 64 Fla. 112, 59 So. 385 (Fla. 1912). The evidence in this record clearly reflects that the action of the Board in adopting Rule 21B-2.02(2) and the successor rules denominated above, which recreated the site and design problem as part of the Florida Professional Architectural Examination ("Part A"), was based upon a rational and considered belief and decision on the part of the Board that such was required in order to adquately test the competence of individuals desiring to become architects in Florida and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The unrefuted testimony of witness Helen showed that this addition to the NCARB National Professional Examination, which was adopted in Florida pursuant to the above rules, was adopted after two years of careful study and consideration by that body before the decision to reinstitute the site and design problem was made. The decision was shown in an unrefuted way by witness Balen to have been based upon legitimate concern by a panel of architectural experts, advising the member state boards that, based upon their professional knowledge and view of the skill requirements of their profession, the ability to perform well in graphic solutions to architectural design problems which synthesize all the major tasks required of a practicing architect was not being adequately tested in the examination as given prior to 1978.
Architect Herbert Coons, the Executive Director of the Florida Board, further elucidated this rationale and cause for concern as it motivated the NCARB and the Florida Board in adopting the addition to the examination. This rationale led to the determination on the part of the Florida Board that the' inclusion of a site and design plan problem on the examination was the only valid way to test an architectural license candidate's ability to combine all the major skills required of a practicing architect into a coherent and graphic solution to a design problem. It resulted in the Florida Board's amending its rule to require "Part A" of the examination. The Petitioner offered no competent, substantial evidence which could controvert the efficacy of this determination and decision by the Board or to refute witness Coons' testimony of the rationale underlying the decision to adopt "Part A" of the examination. Thus, the Petitioner failed to show that the rules at issue were not rationally related to the Board's
statutory charge, delineated above, to assure that minimal competence is attained by those admitted to practice architecture in the State of Florida.
The Petitioner argues in effect that the adoption of the subject rules adding "Part A" to the examination is an arbitrary and capricious act, since it went beyond the Board's obligation to protect the public health, safety and welfare. The Petitioner points to the fact that only four verified complaints regarding architect design negligence could be proven by a review of the Board's records for the period between 1974 and 1977 when only the "Part B" examination was administered. The logical extension of this argument, however, would dictate that an agency could never adopt more stringent criteria for entry into a licensed profession unless there is a massive public outcry regarding incompetence of those entering or practicing in that profession. Thus, in the architectural practice context, only a substantial number of public complaints triggered by faulty or negligent building design could justify the Board's increasing the stringency of the examination requirements according to the Petitioner's argument. This would foreclose the agency from meeting the professional "state of the art" as to requisite minimal standards of competence, thus limiting its function to merely responding to the effects of negligence by those admitted to the profession which have already occurred. This would effectively obviate any effort by the Board to use its collective professional expertise to ascertain that those it admits to practice are capable of preventing the negligent design of buildings or accidents attributable thereto. Such was obviously not the intent of the Legislature when it enacted the statutory framework constituting the Board and delineating its duties and responsibilities.
The record in this cause clearly establishes that the Florida Board acted as a result of the architectural expertise and advice it received from its own staff and from the promulgator of the national examination, NCARB, and determined that the adoption of "Part A" of the examination designed to test graphic solutions to architectural problems was necessary to protect the public health, safety and welfare. This action should not be distrubed in the absence of clear, competent, substantial evidence to the contrary, which was not adduced by the Petitioner. There was no showing that this decision was made in bad faith or without any inquiry into the actual tasks demanded of an architect. It therefore must be concluded that this action cannot be deemed to be arbitrary and capricious, but rather was the' result of a rational and deliberative inquiry into the best means to ascertain the true level of competency of architectural licensee candidates.
Finally, it must be remembered that the site and design plan problem contained in "Part A" was present in the old seven-part examination administered in Florida prior to 1974, in substantially identical form. The site and design plan problem in that examination was similarly challenged in a case arising in 1970 in Massachusetts wherein the Court stated:
There can be no doubt that one has the right to practice his profession free from arbitrary governmental interference. See, e.g., Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 752, 1 L.Ed.
2d 796 (1957). However, it has long been settled that consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment a state may prescribe that only persons possessing
reasonable necessary qualifications may practice a profession embracing
areas of legitimate state concern, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 9
S.Ct. 231, 32 L.Ed. 623 (1889). Like-
wise it has long been settled that a legislature may confer a power and delegate considerable discretion in its exercise to an administrative board to make determinations both as to the knowledge and skill which fit one to practice a particular profession and
as to the presence or absence of those qualities in a particular candidate.
Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 43
S.Ct. 303, 67 L.Ed. 590 (1923) .
Plaintiffs claim, however, that the alleged vagueness of the grading standards render the site planning and architectural design examination schemes totally incapable of func- tioning in a nonarbitrary manner.
For that reason they contend that they should not be required to take these examinations in order to be regis- tered as architects. This is in spite of the fact that the ability to express graphically solutions to specific design or site planning problems, as
is required in both challenged examinations, is unquestionably a skill to be expected of professional architects and in spite of the fact that none of the plaintiffs have come to court having demonstrated competence in that area. (e.s.) Henkes v. Fisher, 314 F. Supp. 101 (W.D. Mass. 1970)
(affirmed 91 Supreme Court 462, 400
U.S. 985, 27 L.Ed.2d 436, 1972)
In summary then, the Petitioner has failed in both his procedural and substantive attacks, pursuant to Sections 120.54 and 120.56, Florida Statutes, on the above-cited rules and has failed to present sufficient proof that those rules should be declared invalid either as procedural deficient or as substantively defective due to arbitrary and capricious enactment. Accordingly, it is, therefore
That the petition to determine the invalidity of the existing rules is hereby DENIED.
DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of November, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida.
P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of November, 1981.
William H. Congdon, Jr., Esquire
Ft. Walton Beach, Florida 32548
John J. Rimes, III, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Suite 1601, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Ms. Liz Cloud, Chief Administrative Code Bureau Department of State
