STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
DR. JAMES J. WEAVER, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) DOAH CASE NO. 86-3715
) (FCHR # 86-1310) LEON CLASSROOM TEACHERS )
ASSOCIATION, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, a formal hearing was conducted in this case at Tallahassee, Florida, on March 24, 1987, before M. M. Parrish, a duly designated Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings. Appearances for the parties at the hearing were as follows:
FOR PETITIONER: Dr. James J. Weaver, pro se
3535 Roberts Avenue, Box 290
Tallahassee, Florida 32304
FOR RESPONDENT: Pamela L. Cooper, Esquire
911 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301
ISSUE
The issue in this case is whether the Respondent has discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of the Petitioner's race, in violation of Section 760.10(3), Florida Statutes.
PRELIMINARY MATTERS
On March 20, 1987, four days before the formal hearing, the Petitioner filed a Motion For Continuance and a Motion To Disqualify Hearing Officer. On that same day, the Petitioner filed a document addressed to the Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings in which he seeks to "appeal" several interlocutory orders issued earlier in this case. This last- mentioned document has not been ruled on by the Hearing Officer; first, because it was not addressed to the Hearing Officer and, second, because it requests relief in a manner for which there is no provision in the applicable statutes and rules.
At the commencement of the hearing on March 24, 1987, the Respondent filed Respondent's Motion In Opposition To Petitioner's Motion To Disqualify Hearing Officer And Motion For Continuance. The pending motions were taken up as the first order of business on the morning of the hearing, attention being given first to the Motion To Disqualify Hearing Officer. After hearing argument from both parties, the motion to disqualify was denied on two grounds: first, because it was untimely under Rule 221-6.13(1), Florida Administrative Code, and
second, because taking the Petitioner's allegations as true (as required by Rule 221-6.13(2), Florida Administrative Code), the allegations of fact contained in the Petitioner's affidavit are legally insufficient to show a basis for disqualification of the Hearing Officer.
After hearing further argument from both parties, the motion for continuance was also denied, both for untimeliness (see Rule 221-6.17, Florida Administrative Code) and for failure to show good cause for continuance.
On March 23, 1987, the Respondent filed a Motion To Take Judicial Notice which requests that judicial notice be taken of several documents involving prior litigation between these same parties. On the morning of the hearing, the Motion To Take Judicial Notice was amended to add to it the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order in PERC Case No. CB-85-006. Following argument by the parties, the Motion To Take Judicial Notice, as amended, was treated as a motion to take official recognition and was granted. The Petitioner made an oral motion to strike the Motion To Take Judicial Notice. Following argument by the parties, the motion to strike was denied. The Petitioner also made an oral renewed motion for continuance. Following argument by the parties, the renewed motion for continuance was denied.
The Respondent made an oral motion that the matters which had been officially recognized be given preclusive effect; specifically, that the findings of fact made by the Public Employees Relations Commission in the final order in PERC case number CB-85-006 be deemed to be binding on both parties and that both parties be precluded from relitigating in this case any fact that was actually found in the PERC case. Following argument by the parties, the motion was granted and the facts found in PERC case number CB-85-006 were deemed established in this case to the extent relevant.
Both parties were afforded an opportunity to offer evidence in support of their respective positions. The Petitioner testified on his own behalf and offered one exhibit that was received in evidence. The Petitioner offered several other exhibits that were rejected. The Respondent called one witness. The Respondent did not offer any exhibits.
Neither party arranged for the preparation of a transcript in this case. On April 6, 1987, the Petitioner filed a document titled Proposed Findings Of
Fact. Attached to Petitioner's Proposed Findings Of Fact are copies of numerous documents identified as Exhibits A through M. None of the "exhibits" attached to the Petitioner's Proposed Findings Of Fact were received in evidence at the hearing in this case.
On April 6, 1987, the Respondent filed a document titled Respondent's Proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law. On the same day the Respondent also filed a memorandum in support of its proposed findings and conclusions.
The proposed findings of fact filed by both parties have been carefully considered in the preparation of this order. Specific rulings on all findings of fact proposed by all parties are included in the Appendix which is attached to and incorporated into this recommended order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, on the exhibit received in evidence, and on the matters officially recognized, I make the following findings of fact.
The Petitioner, Dr. James J. Weaver, is a black male. He has never been a member of the Respondent, Leon Classroom Teachers Association. He has never applied to become a member of the Leon Classroom Teachers Association. During April of 1985, the Petitioner was a member of the bargaining unit of instructional employees represented by the Leon Classroom Teachers Association. During August of 1955, the Petitioner was not a member of that bargaining unit.
The Respondent, Leon Classroom Teachers Association ("LCTA") is an employee organization. At all times material to this case, the LCTA was the bargaining representative for a unit of instructional employees employed by the Leon County School District. Evans Hughes was, at all times material to this case, an organizer for LCTA whose duties included the handling of employee grievances. Evans Hughes is a white male.
Petitioner wrote a letter dated March 8, 1985, to Judy Johnson, who is a staff attorney for the School District. In the letter, the Petitioner complained that he had not received regular pay since January 18. He also complained about his erratic work schedule. Petitioner acknowledged his acceptance of a part-time position in February due to his lack of certification in English and he stated:
I am not trying to hold the Leon County School Board to our original agreement extending my employment through March 15, 1985. I am only seeking pay at the 1-0 level for the days in which I did work. However, I would never stand in the way of getting a certified teacher in an area of education endeavor that I lack certification.
Therefore, I am requesting that immediate action is taken whereby I am paid for the services that I have performed for Leon County School Board starting January 21, 1985 through February 15, 1985 .
On April 15, the Petitioner filed a grievance dated April 13, which stated in relevant part:
Statement of Grievance: To Mrs. Jackie Daniels, my complaint is centered around the fact that I was mislead or given a false impression by Dr. Paul Onkle, Director of Employee Relations, regarding regular pay for the period extending from January 21, 1985 through February 6, 1985. He told me on March 26, 1985 that he was going to have payroll cut a check for the days in question and I could come back March 27, 1985 and pick up the check but I haven't gotten paid.
Relief Sought:
Regular pay at the rate of 12.1720 an hour for the period extending from
January 21, 1985 through February 6, 1985 (see attached Position Control Personnel Action Form dated 12-18-85).
A written explanation as to why I was asked by you to take off one half of the day January 21, all day January 22, 23, and February 7, 1985.
An explanation as to why I was not paid on February 15, 1985 along with the rest of the teachers.
In filing the grievance, the Petitioner did not intend to raise the contention that Daniels had verbally extended his contract. Rather, because he needed the money, the Petitioner intended to pursue the contract duration issue separately at a later date.
The grievance form reflects on its face that the four copies, white, canary, pink and goldenrod, were to be respectively provided to the Director of Employee Relations, the LCTA, the grievant's immediate supervisor, and the grievant. However, the Petitioner did not retain a copy for himself because he thought that he would receive one after the disposition had been made by his immediate supervisor.
Upon the filing of the grievance, Clark, the president of the LCTA, directed Evan Hughes to evaluate the Petitioner's complaints. Shortly before April 22, Hughes called the Petitioner and asked that they meet and that the Petitioner bring all pertinent documents. At a meeting conducted on April 22, the Petitioner presented Hughes with various documents related to his complaints, including February, March, and April correspondence with Daniels, McDonald, Johnson, Giordano, Onkle, Couch and Clark. Prior to the April 22 meeting, LCTA had received a copy of the Petitioner's grievance. While the Petitioner may have intended to complain about the duration issue, he did not raise that issue in his discussions with Hughes and Clark. The Petitioner asked Hughes to process the April grievance and Hughes agreed that the LCTA would represent the Petitioner in the portion of the grievance concerning payment as a regular teacher for time that he had worked. However, Hughes explained that the LCTA would not represent the second and third elements of the grievance because the contract did not provide for the requested relief, i.e., written explanations.
Article VI of the collective bargaining agreement between LCTA and the School Board outlines the grievance procedure to be followed when filing a formal teacher's grievance such as the Petitioner's grievance of April 13, 1985.
Under Article VI, 6.02, Step II of the grievance procedure, if no disposition has been made within ten "Administrative Working Days" of the filing, the grievance shall be submitted to the second level within ten "Administrative Working Days" to the Superintendent. Thereafter, the contract provides that, within twenty "Administrative Working Days" the Superintendent or designee thereof shall meet with the LCTA to dispose of the grievance in writing. However, if the grievance can be resolved to the grievant's satisfaction, then no level two meetings are necessary.
Under the parties' practice, at Step I and II, the LCTA generally does not make written proposals, but rather works informally through verbal negotiations. The grievant generally does not become involved in these initial efforts. In the midst of informal negotiations, it is not unusual for the parties to extend the contractual time limits. Normally, when a grievance is not responded to at Step 1 in a timely fashion, this constitutes an effective denial and the grievance automatically proceeds to the next step.
Consistent with this practice, Hughes treated the grievance as if it were at the second step and he entered into discussions with Onkle, a representative of the School Board. Onkle presumed that the grievance was at the second step because this is the usual procedure when the dispute centers around the disagreement between an employee and his or her supervisor.
About April 25, the Petitioner talked to Hughes, who told the Petitioner that he could negotiate a settlement for the eleven days worked from January 21 through February 6, which amounted to 77 work hours, but that the Board would not pay for the days the Petitioner was absent on January 22 and 23 and February 7. The Petitioner expressly authorized Hughes to settle the matter on those terms. The Petitioner also agreed that the $161 that he had been paid in January as a substitute would be deducted from the settlement.
After the Petitioner's authorization, Hughes called Onkle and asked him to have a special check issued, so that the Petitioner would not have to wait for the money until his next regular paycheck. This was an unusual request. Giordano authorized the payroll department to issue the check for the
77 hours certified by Onkle.
On May 5, The Petitioner received a check in the gross amount of
$707.33. Because he calculated that he would receive $937.24 minus the $161 he received as payment as a substitute teacher, this check was $68.91 less than the Petitioner had anticipated. The check was prepared by Shirley M. Higgins, the District's Payroll Supervisor. The shortage was a consequence of an overpayment the Petitioner had received in his salaries paid to him up to January 18.
Higgins had discovered the overpayment and she made the deduction herself without directions from Onkle or Hughes. It is normal for the payroll department to automatically deduct overpayments from an employee's next check and this deduction would have been made from Petitioner's regular paycheck, had a separate check for the settlement not been issued. The deduction did not relate to the Petitioner's grievance. It had not been previously removed from his pay because the Petitioner had not received a paycheck since the overpayment was discovered. As reflected in his April 15 letter to Onkle, Weaver was aware that he had received $68 overpayment in January.
Hughes first found out about the $68 disparity after the Petitioner received the check. In a letter from the Petitioner to Hughes written about May 15, the Petitioner acknowledged his consent to settle "for 77 hours, (eleven days) for a total of $937.24 minus $161 paid to me in January as a substitute teacher." However, the Petitioner contended that this would result in a balance of $776.24, instead of the $707.33 that he received. Consequently, the Petitioner requested the difference of $68.91. Hughes called Onkle, who told Hughes that the $68 was an adjustment for a prior overpayment. Hughes relayed this information to the Petitioner. Because Hughes did not consider the disputed amount to relate to the grievance, he suggested the Petitioner consult with the District about the matter. The Petitioner never asked Hughes or Clark to withdraw from the settlement and proceed to arbitration or to file a new grievance on the $68 disputed amount.
Around May 16, the Petitioner received from Giordano a copy of a worksheet setting forth the School Board's reasoning for the $707.33. By letter dated May 17, the Petitioner responded to Giordano that he was still owed
$68.91. In reaction to this letter, Giordano met with Higgins and inquired about the disparity. Higgins defended the amount paid and Giordano asked her to present documentation so that he could explain the matter to the Petitioner. By letter dated June 17, Giordano explained to the Petitioner the overpayment through an analysis of Petitioner's pay history from November 2, 1984, to February 6, 1985. Giordano said that, for the periods ending on December 10, 1984, and January 18, 1985, the Petitioner worked a total of 308 hours which was paid at the contractual rate of $12.1720 for a total of $3,748.98. However, checks the Petitioner received totaled $3,817.62, which is an overpayment of
$68.64. Giordano specified that this was separate from the time period covered by the grievance between January 21 and February 6. Attached to the letter was a worksheet containing the exact calculations of the Petitioner's work and payment history. Giordano acknowledged that the calculations showed the Petitioner had been underpaid by $0.27 in his May 7 settlement check, so he enclosed $0.30 in the letter.
During the Petitioner's discussions with Giordano, the Petitioner did not indicate that he would revoke the settlement or file a new grievance. The Petitioner did not dispute that he had been previously overpaid. His complaints centered around the contention that the Board had not abided by the terms of the settlement.
The LCTA and the School Board maintain a practice wherein a grievance settled at the second step is reduced to a written agreement. For practical reasons, the written agreements are generally not executed contemporaneous with the settlement. Rather, due to conflicts in scheduling, written agreements are often executed at a later date. At the conclusion of the settlement of Petitioner's grievance, the School Board and the LCTA followed their usual practice of documenting the disposition of his grievance. The terms of the grievance settlement were set forth in a "Stipulation of Agreement" which was signed by Onkle on May 29 and by Hughes on June 10. This agreement reflected that the Petitioner was paid as a temporary regular teacher for the period from November 2, 1984, through February 6, 1985, but that the Petitioner would not receive payment for the days in which he did not work. The three week delay in Onkle's execution of the agreement was due to his tardiness. Hughes executed the agreement on a separate date because he had been on vacation, and he signed it on the day of his return. Upon signing, Hughes followed his regular practice and gave a copy to his secretary and instructed her to file a copy and to send copies to Onkle, Clark, and the Petitioner. Hughes considered this agreement to be the disposition under the contract. Although there is a space for listing the disposition of a grievance on the grievance form, the parties normally set forth a settlement on a separate page due to insufficient space.
Because the Petitioner was unsatisfied with the disposition of his grievance, he contacted Board Chairman Donna Harper, who suggested that he make a presentation to the Board. The Petitioner applied to appear at the School Board's June 20 meeting. In a memo dated June 18, which the Petitioner submitted to the Board at their June 20 meeting, he alleged that he had been discriminated against and he complained that: (1) he had not received payment for services performed from January 21 through February 6, (2) that his contract for full-time employment from February 6 to March 15 had been breached, and (3) that he did not receive payment for days taken off at his supervisor's direction on January 22 and 23, and February 7. He also asked for written responses to a
number of questions. The Petitioner had not told Hughes or Clark about his intention to make a presentation to the Board and they heard about it from employees of the District.
At the June 20 meeting, the Petitioner asked to make a presentation to the Board about a question of whether he was to be represented by the LCTA. He then made a presentation which initially charged that the LCTA had failed to represent him in his seven year effort to attain a job with the District. The Petitioner's presentation lasted about eight minutes, and approximately 90 percent of it concerned allegations that the Board had discriminated against him by denying him interviews and employment in a full-time position. He also complained about Giordano and Onkle's failure to respond to questions asked by him. During the presentation, the Petitioner did not indicate that he was attempting to appeal his grievance. At the meeting it was decided that the questions posed in the Petitioner's memo would be considered at the Board's meeting on July 9.
The Petitioner did not attend the Board's meeting on July 9 due to an illness in his family. However, in anticipation of his attendance, Giordano brought a copy of the "Stipulation of Agreement" disposing of the Petitioner's grievance. By letter dated June 10, the School Board's attorney, C. Graham Carothers, advised the Petitioner that the Board had reconsidered the matters raised in Weaver's June 18 memo. The Board had determined that the Petitioner was a member of the bargaining unit represented by the LCTA and that any grievance that he had must proceed through the contractually based grievance procedure, rather than direct presentation to the Board.
On August 19, the Petitioner filed a second grievance. In his August
19 grievance, he sought the following relief: (1) answers to the questions raised in his June 18 memo to the Board and June 25 letter to Carothers, (2) pay for the duration of the alleged oral contract extending his employment to March 15, and (3) an explanation as to why he had been denied employment on a full- time basis. Prior to that time the Petitioner had not requested the LCTA to represent him in his contention that he had been persistently denied employment with the Board. When the grievance was filed, the Petitioner was no longer a District employee. Giordano and Carothers met and agreed that the new grievance was an attempt to expand upon the prior one to include a new issue, i.e., the duration of the contract. Giordano felt that this would contravene the settlement and on September 4 he disposed of the grievance on that basis. The disposition did not address the Petitioner's contention concerning his denial of a position because Giordano considered that this issue had to be raised in the grievance procedure covering classified employees.
About September 10, the Petitioner consulted with Clark about the August grievance. At that time the Petitioner told Clark that he had received Giordano's denial and he asked the LCTA to represent him in the matter. Clark told the Petitioner that the LCTA would not represent him because he was not a member of the LCTA or the bargaining unit. The LCTA took no action on the Petitioner's behalf in the second grievance. The Petitioner followed up his verbal request with a written request for LCTA representation dated September
The Petitioner stated that the School Board had determined that he was a member of the bargaining unit. Clark did not respond to the request because he felt that his verbal response was sufficient.
The Petitioner never asked the LCTA to file a grievance or any other type of action against the School Board on the grounds of racial discrimination in its hiring practices.
The LCTA processed the Petitioner's grievance dated April 13, 1985, in the same manner as it processed all grievances, and in processing that grievance it did not deviate from its standard procedures. The LCTA has processed the grievances of white and black members and non-members in the same manner as it processed the Petitioner's grievance dated April 13, 1985. There was no evidence presented at the hearing that the LCTA in any manner protected the School Board in its alleged discrimination against the Petitioner by denying the grievance filed by the Petitioner in August of 1985.
There was no evidence presented at the hearing that grievances of similarly situated white members or similarly situated white non-members were processed by the LCTA in any way that differed from the way in which the LCTA processed the Petitioner's grievance. There was no evidence that the LCTA failed to process the Petitioner's grievance in a proper manner because of his race. And there was no evidence of any conduct from which it can be inferred that the actions of the LCTA were based on race. In the final analysis, the Petitioner's own testimony shows that the actual conduct he is complaining about is not the LCTA's discrimination against him, but rather the LCTA's failure to do anything to remedy or prevent alleged racial discrimination by the School District.
The LCTA's failure to process the Petitioner's August 19, 1985, grievance was legitimate, non-discriminatory, and authorized by statute. The LCTA acted reasonably and without discriminatory motivation in declining to process the Petitioner's August 19, 1985, grievance.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and on the applicable legal principles, I make the following conclusions of law.
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and the parties to this proceeding. Sec. 12a.57(1), Fla. Stat.
Section 760.10(3), Florida Statutes, reads as follows:
It is an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization:
To exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status.
To limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or adversely affect any individual's status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status.
To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section.
The LCTA is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 760.10(3), Florida Statutes. The School Board of Leon County is an employer within the meaning of Section 760.10(3), Florida Statutes.
The statutory language quoted above is modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000(e-2). Accordingly, the Florida courts have adopted the proof standards made applicable to the comparable federal statute and the standard for judging the Petitioner's proof is similar to that of a Title VII Plaintiff. In essence, it is intent upon the Petitioner to establish a prima facie case by showing: (1) that he belongs to a racial minority, (2) that the labor organization failed to process or inadequately processed a meritorious grievance, (3) that the labor organization had an obligation to provide representation, (4) that despite the obligation the labor organization denied representation, and (5) that similarly situated white non-members were treated differently. Donaldson v. Taylor Products Division of Tecumseh, 620 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1980). Only if the Petitioner meets this initial burden is the burden then shifted to the respondent labor organization to articulate the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action. Thereafter, if the Respondent carries this burden, the Petitioner is then required to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the reasons offered by the labor organization were pretextural. School Board of Leon County v. Hargus, 400 So.2d 103 (1st DCA 1981), citing McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 93 So.2d 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 688 (1973). Using these standards it is clear that the Petitioner failed to establish a prima facie violation of 760.10, Florida Statutes.
To present a prima facie case, the Petitioner must present facts which "raise an inference of discrimination only because we presume those acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors." Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The prima facie case serves to eliminate the most common non-discriminatory reasons for the Petitioner's disparate treatment. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 358 and n.44, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977)
Petitioner has not established that his race was in any way a factor in the complained of actions taken by the Respondent. The evidence in this case simply fails to establish that the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner because of race. Accordingly, it is concluded that the Petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. In any event, even if the Petitioner had succeeded in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the Respondent has articulated and substantiated legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons for the actions complained of by the Petitioner, and the Petitioner has presented no persuasive evidence that the articulated reasons are a pretext for discrimination because of his race.
The Respondent processed the Petitioner's grievance dated April 13, 1985, in good faith and in a non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory manner. The grievance was processed to a successful conclusion, and the Respondent obtained for the Petitioner the requested relief as set forth in the grievance document and in accordance with the settlement terms authorized by the Petitioner.
The LCTA did not discriminate against the Petitioner by failing to process the August 19, 1985, grievance. Pursuant to Section 447.401, Florida Statutes, the certified bargaining agent is absolved of any obligation to process grievances for unit employees who are not members of the employee organization. Labor organizations have no statutory duty to represent people who are neither members of the bargaining unit nor members of the organization. Coats v. Jacksonville City Employees, Local Union 301, 6 FPER 11213 and Fiorello v. AFSCAE, 8 FPER 13384 (1982)
On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is recommended that a Final Order be issued dismissing the Petition For Relief filed by Dr. James J. Weaver.
DONE AND ORDERED this 17th day of April, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida.
M. M. PARRISH Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building
2009 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 1987.
APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3715
The following are my specific rulings on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by all of the parties.
Findings proposed by Petitioner
(The numbers below correspond to the numbers of the paragraphs of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner.)
Accepted.
Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence.
Accepted.
Rejected as constituting legal conclusions or argument rather than findings of fact.
Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence and as irrelevant to the issues in this case.
(There are two paragraphs numbered "5.") Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence and as irrelevant to the issues in this case.
Rejected as procedural details which do not need to be included in the findings of fact.
Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence and as irrelevant in any event.
Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence and as irrelevant in any event.
Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence and as irrelevant in any event.
Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence and as irrelevant in any event.
Rejected as constituting argument rather than proposed findings.
Rejected as constituting argument rather than proposed findings.
Accepted.
Accepted.
Accepted.
Accepted in substance.
Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence.
First sentence is accepted. Second sentence is rejected as irrelevant.
Accepted in substance.
Rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Also rejected as contrary to facts established in matters officially noticed.
Rejected as constituting argument. To the extent this paragraph purports to propose facts, it is also rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence and as contrary to facts established in matters officially noticed.
Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as contrary to facts established in matters officially noticed.
Rejected as constituting argument. To the extent this paragraph purports to propose facts, it is also rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence and as contrary to facts established in matters officially noticed.
Rejected as contrary to greater weight of the evidence.
Rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence.
Rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence and as contrary to facts established in matters officially noticed.
Rejected as constituting argument. To the extent this paragraph purports to propose facts, it is also rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence and as contrary to facts established in matters officially noticed.
Rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence.
Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as contrary to facts established in matters officially noticed.
Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as contrary to facts established in matters officially noticed.
First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as argument. Second sentence also rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence.
Rejected as argument. Also rejected because the argument is not warranted by the evidence and, in any event, concerns a triviality.
First sentence is rejected as argument. Second sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as contrary to facts established in matters officially noticed.
First sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as contrary to facts established in matters officially noticed. Second sentence is rejected as subordinate and unnecessary. Last sentence is accepted.
Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as contrary to facts established in matters officially noticed.
Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as contrary to facts established in matters officially noticed.
Rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence.
There is no paragraph 33.)
Accepted.
Accepted in substance.
Accepted in substance.
Accepted in substance.
Rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence.
Rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Also rejected as irrelevant.
Rejected as not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence.
Rejected as constituting conclusions of law rather than findings of fact.
Rejected as constituting conclusions of law rather than findings of fact.
Rejected as constituting conclusions of law rather than findings of fact.
Rejected as constituting conclusions of law rather than findings of fact.
Unnumbered paragraph at bottom of page 21 and all of page 22: Rejected as constituting argument or conclusions of law rather than findings of fact.
Findings proposed by Respondent
(The numbers below correspond to the numbers of the paragraphs of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent.
Accepted in substance.
Accepted in substance.
Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence.
Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence.
First two sentences accepted. Last two sentences rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence.
Accepted in substance.
Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Also rejected as subordinate and unnecessary.
Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Also rejected as subordinate and unnecessary.
Accepted in substance.
Accepted in substance.
Accepted in substance.
Accepted in substance.
Accepted in substance.
Accepted in substance.
Rejected as irrelevant or subordinate and unnecessary.
Accepted in substance.
Accepted in substance.
Accepted in substance.
Accepted in substance.
Accepted in substance.
Accepted in substance.
Accepted in substance.
Accepted in substance.
Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence.
First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as constituting subordinate and unnecessary details.
Accepted in substance.
Accepted in substance.
Accepted in substance.
Accepted in substance.
Accepted.
Accepted.
Accepted.
Accepted in substance.
Accepted in substance.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Dr. James J. Weaver
3535 Roberts Avenue, Box 290
Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Pamela L. Cooper, Esquire 911 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations
325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
Dana Baird, General Counsel
Florida Commission on Human Relations
325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Apr. 17, 1987 | Recommended Order (hearing held , 2013). CASE CLOSED. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Jun. 09, 1987 | Agency Final Order | |
| Apr. 17, 1987 | Recommended Order | Petitioner failed to prove that labor organization had engaged in unlawful employment practice. |
