STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
KATHLEEN F. WEAVER, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 89-1661
) SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE AND ) TELEGRAPH COMPANY, )
)
Respondent. )
)
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Pursuant to written notice, a motion hearing was held in this case on Respondent's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement before Diane Cleavinger, a duly designated Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings, on May 4, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Scott T. Fortune, Esq.
447 Atlantic Boulevard, Suite 2 Atlantic Beach, Florida 32233
For Respondent: E. Barlow Keener, Esq.
Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company
4300 South Bell Center Atlanta, Georgia 30373
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Whether Petitioner has settled this matter and the proceeding should therefore be dismissed.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On May 18, 1987, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR). On October 13, 1988, after conducting its initial investigation, FCHR found "No Cause" to believe an unlawful employment practice had been committed by Respondent. Subsequently, on November 2, 1988, the Petitioner filed a request for redetermination. On January 25, 1989, FCHR issued its Notice of Redetermination again finding "No Cause" to believe an unlawful employment practice had occurred. On March 27, 1989, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review. The Petition for Review was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings.
On December 18, 1991, both parties to the action voluntarily submitted the case to mediation before Jonathan Kroner, a Florida Supreme Court Mediator
certified pursuant to Rule 1.760 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The mediation was conducted in the office of the Petitioner's former attorney, Mr. Rick Kolodinsky.
As a result of the mediation, Petitioner and Respondent executed both pages of a two-page Settlement Agreement.
On January 6, 1992, Petitioner's attorney, Mr. Kolodinsky, informed the Respondent that the Petitioner had repudiated the Settlement Agreement and that a conflict existed between Petitioner and her attorney. On February 6, 1992, the Respondent filed its Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement asking that the settlement agreement be enforced and the case dismissed. On February 19, 1992, the Petitioner, represented by a new attorney, filed her Amended Memorandum Opposing the Motion to Enforce Settlement and an evidentiary hearing was scheduled.
At the hearing, Petitioner testified in her own behalf and offered the testimony of one additional witnesses. Additionally, Petitioner offered six exhibits into evidence. Respondent offered the testimony of four witnesses and offered two exhibits into evidence.
After the hearing, Petitioner and Respondent did not file formal Proposed Recommended Orders, but filed briefs on July 17, 1992 and July 20, 1992, respectively. The parties' briefs have been considered and utilized in the preparation of this Order of Dismissal. However, the briefs did not contain separate findings of fact on which evidentiary rulings could be made.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Both parties to the action voluntarily submitted the case to mediation before Jonathan Kroner, a Florida Supreme Court Mediator certified pursuant to Rule 1.760 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The mediation began around 9:00 a.m. on December 18, 1991, at the office of the Petitioner's former attorney, Mr. Rick Kolodinsky.
Both parties and their counsel were present at the mediation. Mr. Kolodinsky's paralegal was also present, as well as Ms. Weaver's daughter.
Both parties received an explanation of the purpose of the mediation from the mediator and then gave a brief synopsis of their case.
The parties were then placed in separate rooms and the mediator shuttled back and forth between the two rooms reporting and discussing the relative merits and weaknesses of each party's offer as it was made.
The parties remained separated throughout the mediation except for a mutual viewing of a video tape which demonstrated that Ms. Weaver was not being completely honest about the extent of the injury to her arm. Additionally, the parties came together at the end of the mediation after settlement had been reached in order to sign the settlement agreement and work out some minor details.
The mediation lasted until approximately 5:00 p.m.
The first offer of settlement was made by Ms. Weaver and her attorney. The first offer was over $100,000.00. Thereafter, a series of offers and
counteroffers were made throughout the day. There is no doubt that each offer made by Ms. Weaver was made with her consent. Eventually, one of the parties offered $35,000.00 dollars. Ms. Weaver agreed to the figure. There was no credible evidence that either the mediator, Southern Bell, Mr. Kolodinsky or his paralegal unduly influenced or coerced Ms. Weaver into agreeing to the
$35,000.00 figure during the time of the offer and counteroffer phase of the mediation.
After the figure of $35,000.00 was accepted by both parties, the mediator called all of the people present at the mediation into the same room so that the settlement could be reduced to writing utilizing a standard form settlement agreement. The form settlement agreement contained the style of the DOAH case as well as the DOAH case number. The agreement stated in relevant part:
Defendant agrees to pay to Plaintiff as full and complete settlement of all matters arising in this cause of action the sum of
$35,000. Plaintiff agrees to execute any Release form generally required to be executed in settlements of disputes of this nature.
Each party shall bear their respective attorney fees and costs.
The figure of $35,000.00 was handwritten in the blank provided in the form. Following the $35,000.00 figure the words "and see attached" were added. The attachment being referred to in the agreement consisted of a legal size paper containing three additional handwritten settlement terms. Page two of the Settlement Agreement states:
Attachment to Weaver
She will not reapply to S. Bell for employment.
S. Bell & K. Weaver will not disclose the terms of this settlement to anyone including Social Security except as required by court order.
This is a release/settlement of all claims arising out of any issue involved in case #89-1661 of any handicap/sex or other discrimination or tort
claim of Weaver v. S. Bell or any S. Bell employee(s).
The attachment was prepared by Mr. Kolodinsky while all parties were present in the same room. Some of the terms were added at the request of Southern Bell and some were added at the request of Ms. Weaver.
Prior to signing either page of the settlement agreement, Ms. Weaver's daughter tried to get Ms. Weaver to leave the negotiations and not finalize the agreement being prepared. Ms. Weaver declined to leave and there is no doubt that she signed both pages of the two-page Settlement Agreement and agreed to settle this case. As with the other phases of the mediation, there was no credible evidence that either Southern Bell, the mediator, Mr. Kolodinsky or his paralegal unduly influenced or coerced Ms. Weaver into signing the settlement agreement or settling this case.
After all the parties had signed the settlement agreement, Ms. Weaver left Mr. Kolodinsky's office. She indicated to her daughter that she regretted settling the case. Clearly, Ms. Weaver was aware and understood that she had settled her case.
On December 20, 1991, two days after the mediation, Ms. Weaver wrote Mr. Kolodinsky, her attorney, and explained to him that she wanted to "repudiate" the agreement because she claimed that she was under "duress", thus providing at her own initiative a rationale for such repudiation. Ms. Weaver's letter stated:
I signed those papers under pressure and duress and did not know what I was doing. I want to repudiate the agreement. I will not accept
the agreement.
One week later, on December 27, 1992, Ms. Weaver continued to demonstrate that she possessed intelligence capacity and, in particular, knowledge of the legal system when she wrote another letter to Mr. Kolodinsky threatening him with legal action:
Please let Southern Bell know my intention immediately otherwise I will have no choice but to file a grievance with the Florida Bar Association.
On January 6, 1992, Petitioner's attorney, Mr. Kolodinsky, informed the Respondent that the Petitioner had repudiated the Settlement Agreement and that a conflict existed between Petitioner and her attorney.
In this case, Ms. Weaver clearly possessed the intelligence and mental capacity to settle her case. Over the years, prior to settlement, Ms. Weaver had hired attorney Edward Hurtz to represent her in a workers' compensation case against Southern Bell. Additionally, Ms. Weaver had represented herself at a fact finding proceeding in 1987 and, in 1988, she hired attorney Cristina Favis to represent her in this FCHR action.
Moreover, in 1990, Ms. Weaver hired another attorney, Mr. Briggs, to file a petition for divorce against her husband. In that proceeding she signed an affidavit affirming that the divorce petition was true, and that Mr. Briggs was still representing. Ms. Weaver also testified that in January 1990, she signed a financial affidavit for her divorce and on September 4, 1991, she signed a settlement agreement for her divorce.
Furthermore, in the Fall of 1990, Ms. Weaver instigated a lawsuit against William Brittain. The lawsuit involved an automobile accident in Volusia County. In order to pursue the lawsuit, Ms. Weaver hired another attorney, Paul Bernadini, to represent her. Finally, in April, 1991, the Petitioner hired attorney Michael B. Wingo to represent her in a workers' compensation matter.
Indeed, as indicated in the pleadings, Ms. Weaver again demonstrated her capacity by employing her current attorney and by signing the Amended Memorandum on February 18, 1992.
Such actions are simply inconsistent with the Petitioner's claim that she lacked capacity and did not knowingly sign or settle her case.
In fact, the decisions made by Ms. Weaver before the mediation, on the day of the mediation, and after the mediation, are not the type of decisions and reasoning made by a person who is lacking in capacity, or is not sui juris.
Moreover, Ms. Weaver clearly possessed sufficient mental capacity and intelligence particularly regarding legal issues. Unlike a person who is subject to undue influence, her mind had not deteriorated to the point where she was completely dependent on Mr. Kolodinsky or anybody else. Although the Petitioner's attorney claimed during the opening statement that Ms. Weaver was taking "psychotropic medications" on the day of the mediation, there was no evidence presented at the hearing that substantiated this claim. Indeed, the Petitioner failed to present at the hearing a scintilla of medical evidence supporting her claim that she lacked capacity.
Thus, there was no evidence presented at the hearing showing that Ms. Weaver's mind was weak because of medication or that Mr. Kolodinsky knew she was on medication or even "under extreme duress" and used this knowledge to wrongfully coerce Ms. Weaver to sign the Settlement Agreement.
Even Ms. Weaver's own testimony demonstrated that she is not the type of person who is easily subjected to the influences of others including her various attorneys. Ms. Weaver testified that she makes the major decisions in her life. These decisions included hiring numerous attorneys and obtaining a divorce from her husband.
The fact that she acknowledged that she "[came] to a decision" is contrary to her allegation that Mr. Kolodinsky used duress to force her to sign against her will.
Thus, it is clear, from Ms. Weaver's letter and her conversation with Mr. Kolodinsky, that she knew she was making a "decision" and acted intelligently, understandingly, and voluntarily.
At the hearing, Ms. Weaver's reason for why she signed the Settlement Agreement was that at some point prior to time she decided to settle, Mr. Kolodinsky silently "mouthed" the words: "You will take it, or I will leave you." The reason given at the hearing was different than the reason given for repudiating the Settlement Agreement contained in Ms. Weaver's earlier letter. According to Mr. Kolodinsky, Ms. Weaver had a past reputation for authorizing settlement offers one day and repudiating the offers the next day. Mr. Kolodinsky's explanation for Ms. Weaver's action of signing the Settlement Agreement on December 18, 1991, and repudiating the agreement shortly thereafter is supported by the evidence and is the most believable reason for her actions. Such a motivation of regret or remorse by Ms. Weaver, however, is not a motivation caused by undue influence. Nor is it a reason for setting aside a settlement agreement.
Furthermore, evidence that Ms. Weaver did not protest when signing the Settlement Agreement strongly supports the position that Ms. Weaver signed the agreement of her own volition and free will. It is clear that at the time Ms. Weaver signed the Settlement Agreement that she made no indication, verbal or non-verbal, that she was forced, coerced, "browbeaten" or under undue influence by Mr. Kolodinsky or anyone else. All the witnesses that attended the mediation testified that Ms. Weaver signed the Settlement Agreement without protest.
Most persuasive was the testimony of the mediator, Mr. Jonathan Kroner, who testified that Ms. Weaver verbally agreed to Southern Bell's offer:
Q [Mr. Keener] Did Ms. Weaver agree to that
offer or demand?
A [Mr. Kroner] Yes, she did.
Q Did she do that verbally or nonverbally? A Verbally.
Q What did she say?
A We discussed it for a while, and we were back and forth and back and forth. We discussed it and she said yes. I don't recall her very exact words to say what it was, but it was a clear ascent. I do a lot of mediations where, either because of a language difficulty or capacity problem or something, it's important to be clear. I don't like mistakes happening.
The mediator also testified that he saw Ms. Weaver execute the Settlement Agreement and that he had no reason to believe that she was coerced to sign the agreement:
Q [Mr. Keener] Did you see her execute the agreement?
A [Mr. Kroner] I am just trying to picture
what she was wearing and everything that day. Yes, I did because I remember where we were sitting at the table and everything.
Q Was she physically forced to sign the agreement?
A No, absolutely not.
Q Was she coerced to sign the agreement? A Absolutely not.
Ms. Weaver's daughter had tried to get her to leave the mediation before signing the agreement. However, Ms. Weaver stayed and signed.
Thus, the evidence presented at the hearing shows that Ms. Weaver signed the Settlement Agreement of her own volition and that Mr. Kolodinsky did not apply any undue influence thereby destroying Ms. Weaver's free agency. Rather, it simply appears that the day after signing the Settlement Agreement, Ms. Weaver regretted her decision to settle and came up with different reasons at different times in an attempt to blame Mr. Kolodinsky for allegedly causing her to sign the agreement.
Likewise, the evidence presented during the hearing demonstrates that the free agency of Ms. Weaver was not destroyed on the day of the mediation and that the Settlement Agreement was executed of the Petitioner's own volition.
Moreover, as noted above, at the hearing Ms. Weaver's story changed when she claimed that the reason she signed the Settlement Agreement was because Mr. Kolodinsky silently told her "You will take it." Such a statement is not sufficient to demonstrate that Ms. Weaver's free agency was destroyed and that she did not sign the Settlement Agreement on her "own volition." Regardless of
whether Mr. Kolodinsky made such a statement, Ms. Weaver, in her own letter, admitted that she "[came] to a decision". She did not state in the letter that Mr. Kolodinsky forced or coerced her to enter into the Settlement Agreement.
Moreover, even if the statement was made, testimony regarding Ms. Weaver's behavior and lack of protest during the time she was signing the Settlement Agreement provides firm evidence that she was not being forced or coerced into signing the Settlement Agreement.
Finally, Ms. Weaver does not dispute that she signed page one of the Settlement Agreement and that all the terms and conditions were included on page one when she signed it.
Page one of the Settlement Agreement provides:
Defendant agrees to pay to Plaintiff as full and complete settlement of all matters arising in this cause of action the sum of $35,000 and see attached.
Plaintiff agrees to execute any Release form generally required to be executed in settlements of disputes of this nature.
The case number on page one of the settlement agreement is the Division of Administrative Hearings case number for this matter. Thus, it is clear that all the terms on page one were on the page when Ms. Weaver signed it.
With regard to page two of the Settlement Agreement, Ms. Weaver alleges that it was not reduced to writing when she signed it. Contrary to Ms. Weaver's testimony, Southern Bell's EEO manager, Mr. Brown, testified that he signed the Settlement Agreement immediately after Ms. Weaver and that when he signed the Settlement Agreement all the terms and conditions set forth on the page two, as shown in Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, were contained in the document.
Mr. Kolodinsky also testified that all the parties signed page two of the Settlement Agreement after the three paragraphs were added. Ms. Weaver's daughter confirmed Mr. Kolodinsky's testimony when she testified that Mr. Kolodinsky was "writing stuff down" on a yellow pad before her mother signed the document.
The testimony of Mr. Brown and Mr. Kolodinsky that all three paragraphs on page two of the Settlement Agreement were reduced to writing when Ms. Weaver signed the Agreement and the conflicting statements provided by Ms. Weaver during her deposition and the hearing, prove that when Ms. Weaver signed page two of the Settlement Agreement all the terms and conditions were reduced to writing.
Along the same line, during the hearing there was considerable testimony regarding whether the Settlement Agreement was read to Ms. Weaver or whether Ms. Weaver read the Settlement Agreement. In either event, Ms. Weaver had the opportunity to read the agreement or have it explained to her and just as with any other agreement or contract the contract is binding if it is signed.
11 Fla. Jur. Section 14, Merrill Lynch v. Benton, 467 So. 311, 313 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (contract held enforceable where customer claimed that although she signed the contract she could not read it because she did not know English) Therefore, Ms. Weaver signed the contract and should be bound by the terms and conditions regardless of whether she read or did not read the contract or whether or not the contract was read to her.
Moreover, the evidence was clear that Ms. Weaver understood the terms of the settlement agreement and even suggested a clause which was incorporated in the agreement.
In summary, regardless of whether the terms and conditions on page two of the Settlement Agreement were read to Ms. Weaver, whether she read them herself, or whether she just signed the document without reading the conditions, the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement are binding. 11 Fla. Jur. Section 14; Merrill, Lynch v. Benton, 467 So. 311, 313 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to, and the subject matter of this proceeding. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1987).
As a general rule a valid contract requires the capacity of the parties. Capacity to contract means that the party signing the contract possesses ordinary intelligence. Florida law is well-settled that:
"[M]ere weakness of mind, unaccompanied by any other inequitable incident, if the person has sufficient intelligence to understand the transaction and is left to act upon his own free will, is not a sufficient ground to set aside an agreement." [citations omitted]
Donnelly v. Mann, 68 So.2d 584, (Fla. 1953) (90 year old mother held to have capacity to enter into an agreement with her daughter because special master specifically found that the mother had sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of the transaction and acted upon her own free will).
It is the Petitioner's burden to prove her defense of lack of capacity in order to have the Settlement Agreement set aside.
Petitioner's Amended Memorandum Opposing the Motion to Enforce Settlement of Southern Bell alleged that Mr. Kolodinsky, Ms. Weaver's former attorney, had coerced her into signing the Settlement Agreement knowing that Ms. Weaver was under extreme duress and that her judgment was impaired by psychotropic drugs. Id. at p. 2. Although the Memorandum does not specifically allege that Ms. Weaver signed the Settlement Agreement because of "undue influence", it appears that it is this concept of law that the Petitioner is attempting to use to have the Settlement Agreement set aside.
To constitute "undue influence," the mind must be so controlled or affected by persuasion or pressure, artful or fraudulent contrivances or by the insidious influences of persons in close confidential relationships with the person influenced, that she is not left to act intelligently, understandingly, and voluntarily, but is subject to the will or purpose of another. 11 Fla. Jur. 2d Section 46, at p. 340. Undue influence justifying the setting aside of a contract must be such as to dethrone the free agency of the person making it, rendering her own act a product of the will of another instead of her own. Id. In addition, undue influence must amount to fear, over persuasion, force, or coercion to the extent of destroying the agency and will power of the person upon whom it is allegedly exercised. Id.
The Petitioner's allegation that she was "coerced" against her will to sign the Settlement Agreement is the Petitioner's attempt to claim the equitable defense of duress which is invoked in order to set aside contracts that are not voluntarily entered into. In the Petitioner's opening statement, her attorney summarized the allegations that the Petitioner believed would support her theory that she was coerced:
. . . it was several hours of intensive browbeating that Ms. Weaver signed the document saying I just want to get out of here, after Mr. Kolodinsky said, "if you don't sign it, I am leaving you."
In this case, the Petitioner did not show that Mr. Kolodinsky through insidious influences subjected her will to the will of Mr. Kolodinsky or that Mr. Kolodinsky's alleged influence destroyed Ms. Weaver's free agency.
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that where there is evidence that a person's mental condition had "deteriorated" to the point that the person became totally dependent on the primary beneficiary of an agreement and where the primary beneficiary received a sum of money "out of all proportion to the services provided," that undue influence of the person existed. Cripe v. Atlantic First National Bank of Daytona Beach, 422 So.2d 820, 824 (Fla. 1982). In the case at bar, the Petitioner did not present evidence showing such extensive mental deterioration, showing total dependence on a primary beneficiary of the Settlement Agreement, or showing that the primary beneficiary of the Settlement Agreement received a sum of money out of all proportion to the services provided to the Petitioner.
Along the same line, forcing a person to enter into a contract against their will is generally referred to as "duress". Duress is produced by an improper external pressure or influence practically destroying the free agency of a party so as to cause her to do an act not of her own free volition. 11 Fla. Jr. 2d Section 37 at p. 331. To establish a defense of duress a party must show that she received threats which destroyed her freedom to act. Threats which may be regarded as of such a nature to constitute duress include any wrongful threat which actually puts the victim in such fear as to compel him to act against his will. 11 Fla. Jur. 2d Section 30, at p. 333. The use of abusive and insulting language does not constitute duress. Id. at p. 334.
The Supreme Court of Florida held, in Gerken v. Streit, 66 So.2d 245,
246 (Fla. 1953), that the Plaintiff's evidence of duress was not convincing where the Plaintiff, Ms. Gerken, alleged that her husband had used duress to force her to sign over 117,000 shares of stock to the Defendant. Ms. Gerken had alleged that she transferred the stock to the Defendant Mr. Streit because she became "emotionally disturbed and shocked on account of the pressure imposed on her" after her husband told her that he would be incarcerated if she did not transfer the stock. Id. at 246.
In Herald v. Hardin, 116 So. 863 (Fla. 1928), the Florida Supreme Court held that there was no duress where the Defendant, Ms. Herald, claimed that she executed a mortgage for the Plaintiff, Mr. Hardin, because the Defendant's husband threatened to divorce her and take her children if she did not execute the document. See also Stone v. Austin, 107 So.2d 232 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958) (no duress where Defendant, Ms. Austin, claimed that she executed a property agreement because her husband threatened to leave her if she did not
sign. The court emphasized that the evidence did not show that the "free agency" of the Defendant was destroyed or that the agreement was not executed of the Defendant's "own volition")
Even if Ms. Weaver was able to prove her defense of duress or undue influence, which she is not able to do, the evidence clearly showed that Southern Bell did not have any knowledge of the influence alleged by Ms. Weaver or actively placed undue influence, duress or coercion on Ms. Weaver.
Put simply, if two parties, such as Ms. Weaver and Southern Bell, enter into an agreement and later one of the parties attempts to have the agreement set aside by claiming the defense of duress, the agreement should not be set aside if the second party had no knowledge of such duress or coercion. Gerken v. Streit, 66 So.2d 245, 247 (Fla. 1953). See also Herald v. Hardin,
116 So. 863, 864 (Fla. 1928) (the Defendant Ms. Herald executed a mortgage agreement and later claimed her husband forced her to execute the mortgage through duress. The Florida Supreme Court held that even if there were duress the agreement was binding because there was not showing that second party to the agreement, Mr. Hardin, was responsible for the any duress that the husband may have used to force his wife to sign the document)
The principle of law set forth by the Florida Supreme Court in Gerken and Hardin applies directly to the case at bar. The evidence presented showed that Southern Bell had no knowledge of the alleged duress or coercion. In addition, the witnesses testified that when Ms. Weaver signed the Settlement Agreement in front of the Southern Bell representative she did so without objection or protest.
In conclusion, it is well established under Florida law that settlement agreements are highly favored and that courts should enforce the terms of settlement agreements whenever possible. For example see, Mortgage Corp. of America v. Inland Const., 463 So.2d 1196, 1997 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), rev. denied, 475 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1985). In addition, settlement agreements are not subject to repudiation, and may be enforced summarily. See, Silva v. Silva, 467 So.2d 1065 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). Thus, because the Settlement Agreement in question was entered into without undue influence or duress and because the Petitioner is attempting to simply repudiate the settlement, the Settlement Agreement should be recognized by the Hearing Officer and this case should be dismissed.
ORDER
It is, accordingly, ORDERED:
That this case is dismissed and it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations recognize the settlement agreement and dismiss this proceeding.
DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of April, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida.
DIANNE CLEAVINGER
Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 1994.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Scott Thomas Fortune, Esquire
447 Atlantic Boulevard, Suite 2 Atlantic Beach, Florida 32233
E. Barlow Keener, Esquire Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Company 4300 South Bell Center Atlanta, Georgia 30373
Rich Kolodinsky, Esquire
1055 N. Dixie Freeway, Suite 1 New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32168 Copies furnished to:
Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations
325 John Knox Road Building F Suite 240
Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4113
Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations
325 John Knox Road Building F Suite 240
Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4113
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
ALL PARTIES HAVE THE RIGHT TO SUBMIT WRITTEN EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER. ALL AGENCIES ALLOW EACH PARTY AT LEAST 10 DAYS IN WHICH TO SUBMIT WRITTEN EXCEPTIONS. YOU SHOULD CONTACT THE AGENCY THAT WILL ISSUE THE FINAL ORDER IN THIS CASE CONCERNING AGENCY RULES ON THE DEADLINE FOR FILING EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER. ANY EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER SHOULD BE FILED WITH THE AGENCY THAT WILL ISSUE THE FINAL ORDER IN THIS CASE.
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Aug. 13, 1996 | Final Order Dismissing Petition for Relief From An Unlawful Employment Practice filed. |
| Jun. 13, 1996 | Final Order Dismissing Petition for Relief From An Unlawful Employment Practice filed. |
| Apr. 25, 1994 | CASE CLOSED. Order of Dismissal sent out. (Motion hearing, 05/04/92) |
| Apr. 07, 1994 | Order sent out. (Petitioner's Motion to Access and Distribute Attorneys Fees Denied) |
| Jan. 18, 1994 | (Petitioner) Notice of Supplemental Authority filed. |
| Sep. 01, 1993 | CC Petitioner's Notice of Supplemental Authority in Opposition to Motion to Access and Distribute Attorneys' Fees Filed by Rick Kolodinsky,Esquire filed. |
| Aug. 05, 1993 | Petitioner's Memorandum Opposing Motion to Access and Distribute Attorneys' Fees Filed by Rick Kolodinsky, Esquire filed. |
| Jul. 26, 1993 | (Petitioner) Motion to Access and Distrubute Attorneys Fees filed. |
| Sep. 21, 1992 | Order Dismissing And Closing File sent out. (matter dismissed due topetitioner's settlement of this matter) |
| Aug. 18, 1992 | Order sent out. (Petitiner's motion for 10-day enlargment of time for filing brief opposing respondent's motion to enforce settlement denied) |
| Aug. 17, 1992 | Petitioner Kathleen Weaver's Post Hearing Brief filed. |
| Aug. 13, 1992 | Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company's Motion to Strike, Or,In the Alternative, Motion to Deny Petitioner's Motion for a 20-Day Enlargement filed. |
| Jul. 24, 1992 | Petitioner's Motion for a 20-Day Enlargement of Time for Filing BriefOpposition Respondent's Motion to Enforce Settlement filed. |
| Jul. 22, 1992 | Letter to DOAH from E. Barlow Keener (re: respondent's Post-Hearing Brief) w/Certificate of Service filed. |
| Jul. 20, 1992 | Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company's Post-Hearing Brief & cover ltr filed. |
| May 22, 1992 | Transcript (Evidentiary Hearing) Vols 1-3 filed. |
| May 21, 1992 | (Respondent) Ntoice of Service w/cover ltr filed. |
| May 18, 1992 | Order Continuing Hearing sent out. (hearing rescheduled for 9/22/92;9:30am; Port Orange) |
| May 18, 1992 | Letter to SDC from Karen C. Higgins (re: request for exhibits introduced by the petitioner) filed. |
| May 01, 1992 | cc: Letter to S. Fortune from B. Keener (re: medical records; subpoena for M. Handel) filed. |
| May 01, 1992 | Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company's Motion to Quash Subpoena, or in the Alternative, Motion for Protective Order filed. |
| Apr. 10, 1992 | Letter to SDC from Scott Thomas Fortune (re: Notice of Motion Hearingdated March 17, 1992) filed. |
| Mar. 24, 1992 | Order sent out. (petitioner's Motion For Protective Order concerningDeposition of 3-16-92 is denied) |
| Mar. 17, 1992 | Notice Of Motion Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 5-4-92; 9:30a; Talla) |
| Mar. 16, 1992 | Petitioner's Motion for Protective Order Concerning Deposition of March 16, 1992 filed. |
| Mar. 16, 1992 | Southern Bell Telephone and Telegrape Company's Notice of Taking Deposition filed. |
| Mar. 13, 1992 | Petitioner's Motion for A 60-Day Continuance of Hearing Scheduled forMarch 23, 1992 filed. |
| Mar. 02, 1992 | (Petitioner) Notice of Representation filed. |
| Feb. 24, 1992 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for March 23, 1992; 9:30am;Talla). |
| Feb. 24, 1992 | Amended Kathleen Weaver's Memorandum Opposing the Motion to Enforce Settlement of Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company filed. |
| Feb. 20, 1992 | Kathleen Weaver's Memorandum Opposing The Motion to Enforce Settlement of Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company filed. |
| Feb. 10, 1992 | Order of Continuance and Rescheduling Hearing sent out. (hearing rescheduled for May 19, 1992; 9:30am; Talla). |
| Feb. 07, 1992 | Petitioner's Motion for 60-Day Continuance & cover ltr filed. |
| Feb. 06, 1992 | Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company's Motion to Enforce Settlement filed. |
| Feb. 03, 1992 | Order sent out. (Re: Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw). |
| Jan. 09, 1992 | (Petitioner) Notice of Conflict of Interest and Request to Withdraw as Counsel; Notice of Lien w/(unsigned) Proposed Order filed. |
| Nov. 21, 1991 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for Feb. 18, 1992; 9:30am; Talla). |
| Nov. 08, 1991 | Southern Bell's Response to Order Granting Continuance filed. |
| Nov. 05, 1991 | Southern Bell's Response to Order Granting Continuance w/cover ltr filed. |
| Oct. 28, 1991 | (Petitioner) Response to the Order Granting Continuance filed. |
| Oct. 15, 1991 | Order Granting Continuance sent out. (Hearing cancelled; Parties' to provide hearing dates within 10 days of the date of this order). |
| Oct. 07, 1991 | Joint Motion for Continuance filed. |
| Jun. 14, 1991 | Order of Continuance and Rescheduling Hearing sent out. (hearing rescheduled for 10/17/91; 9:30am; Talla) |
| Jun. 10, 1991 | Petitioner's Motion for Continuance of Hearing; Memorandum Support ofPetitioner's Motion For Continuance of Hearing filed. (From Cristina C. Favis) |
| Apr. 09, 1991 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 6/26/91; 9:30am; Talla) |
| Mar. 11, 1991 | Ltr. to LJS from C. Favis re: requesting scheduling of hearing date filed. |
| Mar. 08, 1991 | Order Continuing Case in Abeyance (case shall remain in abeyance for 90 days, status report due after the 90 day period) sent out. |
| Oct. 27, 1989 | Order of Continuance and Placing Case in Abeyance sent out. (Case shall be in Abey. for 90 days then a status report shall be filed) |
| Oct. 24, 1989 | Jiiont Motion for Continuance of Hearing filed. |
| Oct. 23, 1989 | Joint Motion for Continuance of Hearing filed. |
| Sep. 13, 1989 | Second Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 10/26/89; 10:00am; Port Orange). |
| Sep. 11, 1989 | Order Granting Joint Motion for Continuance of Hearing sent out. |
| Sep. 06, 1989 | Jiont Motion for Continuance of Hearing filed. |
| Jun. 09, 1989 | Respondent's Response to Court's Order Granting Motion for Continuance & Stipulation filed. |
| Jun. 08, 1989 | Letter to LJS from C. C. Favis (re: Response to Court Order) filed. |
| Jun. 05, 1989 | Respondent's Response to Court's Order Granting Motion for Continuance filed. |
| Jun. 01, 1989 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 09/26/89;10:00AM;Port Orange) |
| May 16, 1989 | Order Granting Motion for Continuance sent out. |
| May 15, 1989 | Jiont Motion for Continuance of Hearing filed. |
| Apr. 26, 1989 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 06/13/89;10:00AM;Port Orange) |
| Apr. 18, 1989 | Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company's Response to Petition for Relief From an Unlawful Employment Practice filed. |
| Apr. 18, 1989 | Notice filed. |
| Apr. 18, 1989 | CC Letter to LJS from C. C. Favis filed. |
| Apr. 06, 1989 | Initial Order issued. |
| Mar. 30, 1989 | Transmittal of Petition; Charge of Discrimination; Discriminatory Statement; Notice of Determination; Notice of Redetermination; Petition for Review; Determination; Redetermination; Notice to Commissioners of Filing of Pettion for Relief From an Unlawfu |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| May 29, 1996 | Agency Final Order | |
| Apr. 25, 1994 | Recommended Order | Settlement agreement. Case should be dismissed since case settled even though petitioner tried to repudiate agreement. |
