RICHARD O. THOMAS, )
vs. ) CASE NO. 91-3631
) DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ) BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE ) INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT TRUST FUND, )
Respondent. )
Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings, by its duly designated Hearing Officer, Claude B. Arrington, held a formal hearing in the above-styled case on October 24, 1991, in West Palm Beach, Florida.
For Petitioner: George H. Moss, Esquire
Moss, Henderson, Van Gaasbeck, Blanton & Koval, P.A.
817 Beachland Blvd.
P. O. Box 3406 Vero Beach, Florida
For Respondent: Brian F. McGrail, Esquire
3900 Commonwealth Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida
Whether the after-the-fact permit sought by Petitioner for a single family dock that has been constructed within the Indian River Aquatic Preserve, Malabar to Vero Beach, should be granted and, if so, the conditions that should be imposed.
On November 14, 1988, Respondent issued to Petitioner a letter which authorized Petitioner "... to proceed with construction of a two-slip single- family dock as depicted on the attached drawing ...". No drawing was attached to the letter of November 14, 1988. Petitioner had attempted with considerable diligence since April 1987 to obtain from Respondent the required authorization
to construct the dock he wanted. At various stages of the permitting process, Petitioner submitted different designs for the layout of the dock. In October 1988, Petitioner was told to submit his final design. On October 27, 1988, Petitioner submitted what he considered to be his final proposal and which he considered to be the drawing referenced in the November 14, 1988, letter.
Petitioner thereafter constructed the dock pursuant to the plans he had submitted on October 27, 1988, with the exception of two platforms that he has agreed to remove. Thereafter, following an inspection in 1990, Respondent ordered Petitioner to make certain specified changes to the dock within 60 days. Respondent asserted the position that the plans referred to in the letter dated November 14, 1988, was an earlier drawing submitted by Petitioner and was not the drawing submitted October 27, 1988. Petitioner declined to make the changes and submitted the subject application, which was referred to as an after-the- fact application, to Respondent on December 26, 1990. By letter dated April 4, 1991, Respondent denied the after-the-fact application and ordered Petitioner to remove all structures from state owned submerged lands within 90 days.
Petitioner timely challenged Respondent's action and this proceeding followed.
At the formal hearing, Petitioner testified on his own behalf and presented eighteen exhibits, each of which was accepted into evidence. Respondent presented the testimony of Brian Poole and of Wilbert Holliday. Both of these witnesses are employed by Respondent's Bureau of Submerged Lands and Aquatic Preserves as an Environmental Planner and as an Environmental Supervisor, respectively. Mr. Poole was also accepted as an expert witness in the field of marine biology. Respondent's Exhibits 1-7, 9-17, and 19-22 were accepted into evidence. Respondent's remaining exhibits were not moved into evidence.
A transcript of the proceedings has been filed. At the request of the parties, the time for filing post-hearing submissions was set for more than ten days following the filing of the transcript. Consequently, the parties waived the requirement that a recommended order be rendered within thirty days after the transcript is filed. Rule 22I-6.031, Florida Administrative Code. Rulings on the parties' proposed findings of fact may be found in the Appendix to this Recommended Order.
Petitioner, Richard O. Thomas, resides at 13845 North Indian River Drive, Sebastian, Florida. Mr. Thomas is the owner of this real property, which fronts the intracoastal waterway in an area that is referred to as the Indian River Aquatic Preserve, Malabar to Vero Beach (IRAP).
Construction of docks in the IRAP requires a permit from Respondent pursuant to Section 253.77(1), Florida Statutes. A dock is presently built in front of Petitioner's property and is within the IRAP. 1/
Petitioner began applying for a permit from Respondent to construct a single-family private dock in front of his property to extend into the IRAP in April of 1987. The size of main access docks and terminal platforms are limited by Respondent primarily to protect the fragile environment found in aquatic preserves such as the light-sensitive sea grass beds and attached algae found in the vicinity of Petitioner's dock and to minimize the effect of the construction of these type facilities on those areas.
Petitioner sent a drawing of the requested dock to the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) in April of 1987. DER thereafter forwarded a copy of the drawing to Respondent. The April 1987 drawing depicted
a main access dock 200' long and 4' wide with a terminal platform in an ell shape to the south of the main access dock 16' wide and 10' long. The dock was to be elevated 4' in height with railings around the terminal platform. This drawing was not the drawing subsequently permitted by Respondent.
In June 1987, Petitioner first learned that he needed, in addition to the other permits he was seeking, a permit from Respondent. After consulting Brian Poole, an Environmental Specialist employed by Respondent, Petitioner submitted a revised drawing to Respondent on June 25, 1987. This drawing, stamped "Revised" by Respondent, was forwarded to Wilbert Holliday, an Environmental Specialist Supervisor, in Respondent's Orlando office. The June 1987 drawing depicts a main access dock 200' long and 4' wide with an ell shaped terminal platform facing south that is 6' long and 10' wide. The main access dock did not extend the length of the terminal platform.
Petitioner made numerous telephone calls between June 1987 and October 1988, to Mr. Poole and to Mr. Holliday in an effort to determine the status of his request and in an effort to have his request approved. In the interim, Petitioner received conflicting instructions from Respondent, the Army Corps of Engineers, and DER as to how long the dock would have to be. Respondent's staff wanted the dock to be 500' in length so that the boats that would be moored at the dock would not be crossing sea grass beds that were located closer to shore.
Petitioner testified that he engaged in a series of telephone conversations with Mr. Holliday concerning the pertinent permitting requirements. Pursuant to conversations with Mr. Holliday, Petitioner submitted a written request on October 17, 1988, for permission to build a dock "... no longer than 210 feet, 5 feet above mean low water, and with 1/2 inch spaces between deck planks. The platform is to be no more that 6 feet by 10 feet. The draft of the boat is to be used is no more than 18 inches. "
Between October 17 and October 20, 1988, Petitioner informed Mr. Holliday that the ell platform had to be moved from south of the main access dock to north of it due to the county's concern for his neighbor's riparian rights. During that same telephone conversation Mr. Holliday informed Petitioner that his staff was still recommending that the dock be 500 feet in length. On October 20, 1988, Petitioner wrote Mr. Holliday a letter which voiced his displeasure as to that recommendation and which provided, in part, as follows:
... I again respectfully request that the dock length be 210 ft. long with platform area 160 sq. ft. and the dock to be 4 ft. in height with spaces 3/8 inches (they will shrink to 1/2 inches.) If the 4 ft. is disallowed then I need a lower platform area to get in and out of my two boats. My wife is 5 ft. 2 in tall. If this isn't's going to fly then I have no other recourse than seek a third party opinion.
At Petitioner's request, Mr. Holliday gave Petitioner the name and number of John Peterson, an environmental specialist in Respondent's Tallahassee office. Petitioner and Mr. Peterson engaged in a lengthy telephone conversation about Petitioner's application. At the conclusion of the conversation, Mr. Peterson asked Petitioner to submit his final plan and informed Petitioner that he would be back in contact with Petitioner. A day or two after that
conversation, Mr. Holliday called Petitioner and requested that Petitioner send to him Petitioner's final plan.
On October 27, 1988, Petitioner sent to Mr. Holliday what Petitioner considered to be his final plan depicting a main access dock 4' x 210' with a 12' x 12' covered ell platform facing north. This 12' by 12' area (or 144 square feet) is the area Petitioner considers to be the terminal platform. The main access dock extended the length of the terminal platform and added to the terminal platform an area 4' wide and 12' long (or 48 square feet). The main access dock and the terminal platform were to be 5' above mean low water. Two boat slips were requested with an adjacent catwalk 3.5' above mean low water.
On November 14, 1988, Casey Fitzgerald, as Chief of Respondent's Bureau of Submerged Lands Management, sent Petitioner a letter that stated in pertinent part:
You are hereby authorized to proceed with construction of a two-slip single-family dock as depicted on the attached drawing ... .
This authorization is specifically conditioned upon the following:
The proposed dock shall be elevated +5 feet above the ordinary water line with 3/8 inch spaces between deck planks. The terminal platform area shall be elevated +3 feet above the ordinary water line.
Vessels to moor at the dock shall have a maximum running draft of 18 inches, and shall be operated in a manner that will minimize impacts to the grassbeds at the site; and
The attached general consent conditions shall be accepted and complied with. 2/ Please consider this the conditional authority sought under Section 253.77, Florida Statutes, to pursue this project.
The letter in no way waives the authority and/or jurisdiction of any governmental entity, nor does it disclaim any title interest that the State may have in this project site.
We appreciate your cooperation with our resource management objectives, and apologize for the long delay. If you have and questions, please feel free to contact me.
No drawing was attached to Mr. Fitzgerald's letter of November 14, 1988.
Petitioner thereafter constructed the dock in accordance with the plan he submitted on October 27, 1988. Construction on the dock and covered terminal platform was concluded in approximately March of 1989. The as constructed dock deviated from the plan submitted on October 27, 1988, in that Petitioner added two lowered platforms approximately 3.5' x 12' each around the north and east ends of the terminal platform to be used for access to moored boats. Petitioner concedes that these platforms were not part of the drawing of October 27, 1988, and he has agreed to remove them. Respondent calculated that the square footage of the terminal platform is 351 square feet (19' wide and 19.5' long).
Respondent's calculations included the two lowered platform areas that Petitioner has agreed to remove and the portion of the main access dock that extends the length of the terminal platform.
Petitioner made a good faith effort to follow the instructions of Respondent and to comply with the appropriate permitting procedure. He relied in good faith on the letter of November 14, 1988, and he reasonably assumed that the October 27, 1988, drawing was the one referred to in the November 14, 1988, letter. Mr. Fitzgerald did not testify at the formal hearing. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that Mr. Fitzgerald, as the bureau chief, had greater authority in permitting matters than did either Mr. Holliday or Mr. Poole. While there is no question that Petitioner was permitted to construct a dock, there is no direct evidence as to which of the several drawings Petitioner submitted had been approved by Mr. Fitzgerald. Mr. Holliday did not recall having sent the October 27, 1988, drawing to Mr. Fitzgerald. After Mr. Peterson and Mr. Fitzgerald became involved in Petitioner's application, it is not clear what involvement Mr. Holliday had, other than to ask Petitioner to submit his final plan. It is clear that Mr. Fitzgerald had information pertaining to Petitioner's application available to him when he wrote Petitioner on November 14, 1988. The most reasonable inference 3/ to be drawn from the evidence is that Mr. Fitzgerald had for his review Petitioner's complete application file, including the drawing submitted October 27, 1988, and it was to the drawing of October 27, 1988, that his letter referred.
The next contact between Petitioner and Respondent occurred June 1, 1990, when an inspection team from Respondent's field office, including Mr. Poole, visited the site and met with Petitioner. During this visit, Mr. Poole observed that the sea grass that had been visible before the dock was built had died and that underneath the structure was now white sand. Mr. Poole wrote a letter to Petitioner dated June 14, 1990, which asserted Respondent's understanding of an agreement reached during the on-site meeting of June 1, 1990, 4/ and provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
The terminal platform area will be reduced to no more than 160 square feet. This will require the removal of all the catwalks and reducing the ell-shaped platform area to 10' x 16' or any other shape so long as the size does not exceed 160 square feet.
The resulting terminal platform may be lowered to a height of +3 feet above the ordinary water line to facilitate ingress and egress from the two vessels.
The roof over the platform will be removed. ... It is our position that the roof is inconsistent with Chapter 18-20, FAC, and the adopted Indian River Malabar to Vero Beach Aquatic Preserve Management Plan. Section 18-20.004(5)(a)(2) provides for more restrictive modification for docks that fall within areas of special or unique importance, such as extensive seagrass beds. Section 18- 20.004(1)(f) requires that the structure be
necessary to conduct water dependent activities, a roof over the platform is not necessary to access the water. ...
* * *
6. You agreed to comply with the above requirements within 60 days. Your receipt of this letter will initiate the 60 day time clock.
The letter of June 14, 1990, also discussed the requirement that Petitioner remove a boat hoist and that he not moor a commercially registered vessel at the dock. These two matters were resolved by the parties and were not at issue at the formal hearing.
On October 24, 1990, James M. Marx, an Environmental Administrator with Respondent's Bureau of Submerged Lands and Preserves, sent a letter which advised that modifications to the dock in accordance with the letter of June 14, 1988, including removal of the roof, must be completed within thirty days of his receipt of the letter and that failure to do so will result in action that may result in removal of the entire structure.
On December 26, 1990, Petitioner filed an application seeking approval of the dock as constructed less the two platforms he had agreed to remove.
After the removal of the two platforms, the dock will be substantially in compliance with the drawing submitted by Petitioner on October 27, 1988.
On April 4, 1991, Michael E. Ashey, as Chief of Respondent's Bureau of Submerged Lands and Preserves, advised Petitioner by letter that his after-the- fact permit application was denied on the following grounds:
1. Section 18-20.004(5)(b)(6) (sic), Florida Administrative Code, states in pertinent part: "terminal platform size shall be no more than
160 square feet." The existing structure has a terminal platform area of 392 square feet.
2. Section 18-20.004(5)(b)(1) (sic), Florida Administrative Code, limits the width of the main access walkway to 4 feet. The existing structure includes a main access walkway and a 3' x 42'11" catwalk adjacent to the walkway. The combined width of the access walkway structure exceeds the 4' width limit of the rule.
3. Section 18-20.004(1)(f), Florida Administrative Code, states in pertinent part: "that activities shall be designed so that the structure or structures to be built in, on or over sovereignty lands are limited to structures necessary to conduct water dependent activities." The existing roof is not a necessary component to a water dependent activity.
All three of the deviations raised by Mr. Ashey's letter of April 4, 1991, were reflected on the drawing that Petitioner submitted to Mr. Holliday on October 27, 1988.
Petitioner understood that the terminal platform could not exceed 160 square feet. Petitioner believed that the terminal platform consisted only of the 12' x 12' platform that was attached to the main access dock. Petitioner did not understand that the 4' width of the adjacent main access dock would be
included in calculating the square footage of the terminal platform, nor did he understand that the two unauthorized platforms (which did not appear on his final plans of October 27, 1988) would be included in calculating the terminal platform. The term "terminal platform" is not defined by rule. By internal memorandum, to which Petitioner did not have access, a "terminal platform" is considered to be that portion of the dock which is wider than the main access dock, generally at the terminus of the dock, and the area where boats are generally moored. Neither Mr. Poole, Mr. Holliday, Mr. Fitzgerald, or Mr.
Peterson has the authority to permit the construction of a dock which contains the design of a terminal platform in excess of 160 square feet.
Mr. Holliday and Mr. Poole testified that Respondent does not mark approved plans "approved" before returning the plans to the file so there is no way to distinguish preliminary plans from approved or permitted plans. There is no plan in Respondent's files pertaining to Petitioner's application marked "approved" or "permitted".
On November 18, 1988, the date of Mr. Fitzgerald's letter to Petitioner, Mr. Fitzgerald served as the Bureau Chief, Department of Submerged Lands and Aquatic Preserves in Respondent's Tallahassee office. Mr. Holliday served as the Planning Manager of the East Central Florida field office located in Orlando. Mr. Poole served as an Environmental Specialist out of the Respondent's Melbourne office. The letter of November 14, 1988, was not routed through either Mr. Holliday or Mr. Poole.
Petitioner and other members of his family, including his mother, his aunt, and his uncle have had skin cancers in the past. Young children and babies use the dock for recreational purposes during the day. Petitioner had not, prior to the construction of the structure, discussed his desire to have the terminal platform covered with either Mr. Poole or Mr. Holliday. The first drawing reflecting that the platform would be covered was the drawing of October 27, 1988. The roof on the dock would offer those using the dock during the day protection from the sun. Respondent has permitted at least two other docks located within an aquatic preserve that were roofed. Respondent is opposed to permitting the roof because of the shading that results from a solid structure.
Neither Mr. Poole nor Mr. Holliday would have permitted the dock pursuant to the drawing of October 27, 1988, because neither believed the dock to be in compliance with his interpretation of the permitting requirements found in Chapter 18-20, Florida Administrative Code.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over this matter. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Section 253.77(1), Florida Statutes, provides:
(1) No person may commence any excavation, construction, or other activity involving the use of sovereign or other lands of the state, the title to which is vested in the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund or the Department of Natural Resources under this chapter, until such person has received from the Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund the required
lease, license, easement, or other form of consent authorizing the proposed use.
Chapter 18-20, Florida Administrative Code, contains rules that have been adopted pertinent to Florida Aquatic Preserves. Rule 18-20.001, Florida Administrative Code, expresses the agency intent and provides, in pertinent part:
The preserves shall be administered and managed in accordance with the following goals:
To preserve, protect, and enhance these exceptional areas of sovereignty submerged lands by reasonable regulation of human activity within the preserves through the development and implementation of a comprehensive management program;
To protect and enhance the waters of the preserves so that the public may continue to enjoy the traditional recreational uses of those waters such as swimming, boating, and fishing ... (Emphasis added.)
Rule 18-20.003, Florida Administrative Code, provides the following definitions pertinent to this proceeding:
(13) "Dock" means a fixed or floating structure, including moorings, used for the purpose of berthing buoyant vessels either temporarily or indefinitely.
* * *
(23) "Private residential single dock" means a dock which is used for private, recreational, or leisure purposes for a single family residence, cottage or other such single dwelling unit and which is designed to moor
no more than two boats.
* * *
(42) "Water dependent activity" means an activity which can only be conducted on, in, over, or adjacent to, water areas because the activity requires direct access to water body or sovereignty lands for transportation, recreation, energy production or transmission, or source of water and where the use of the water or sovereignty lands is an integral part of the activity.
There is no definition of the term "main access dock" or of the term "platform" contained in Chapter 18-20, Florida Administrative Code.
Rule 18-20.004, Florida Administrative Code, provides certain management policies, standards, and criteria pertinent to this proceeding. Rule 18.20.004(1), Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(1)(e) A lease, easement, or consent of use may be authorized only for the following activities:
* * *
5. creation or maintenance of private docks for reasonable ingress and egress of riparian owners;
Rule 18.20.004(1)(f), Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part, that private residential docks constructed over sovereignty lands are to be limited to structures necessary to conduct water dependent activities.
Rule 18.20.004(5)(b), Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part:
(5)(b) Private residential single docks shall conform to the following design standards and criteria:
any main access dock shall be limited to a maximum width of four (4) feet;
the dock decking design and construction will insure maximum light penetration, with full consideration of safety and practicality;
* * *
6. terminal platform size shall be no more than 160 square feet;
Petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to the relief he seeks. Rule 28-6.08(3), Florida Administrative Code. See also, Florida Department of Transportation v. J.W.C., Co., 396 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Petitioner argues, in part, that Respondent is estopped to deny his application because of his good faith reliance on Mr. Fitzgerald's letter of November 14, 1988. An executive agency of the State of Florida can be estopped only under exceptional circumstances. The elements of estoppel were described in Greenhut Construction Co., Inc. v. Henry A. Knott, 247 So. 2d 517, 524 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971), as consisting of the following:
(1) a representation by the party estopped to the party claiming the estoppel as to some
material fact, which representation is contrary to the condition of affairs later asserted by the estopped party; (2) a reliance upon this representation by the party claiming the estoppel; and (3) a change in the position
of the party claiming the estoppel to his detriment, caused by the representation and his reliance thereon.
See also, Realty Management Corporation v. Kemp, 380 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); State Department of Revenue v. Anderson, 403 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1981); Town of Longboat Key v. Mezrah, 467 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985, and Town of Largo
v. Imperial Homes, 309 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
Respondent contends that Petitioner's constructed structure could not have been permitted by Mr. Fitzgerald because the structure does not comply with the pertinent rules regulating the construction of such structures. Respondent concludes that estoppel cannot therefore be applied to authorize the subject structure.
Respondent contends that the pertinent rules governing the management of aquatic preserves do not permit the construction of a roofed platform because a roof is not necessary to a water dependent activity. The pertinent rules governing the construction of private residential docks in aquatic preserves do not forbid the construction of roofs. Respondent's contention that agency interpretation of its rules forbid the construction of roofed structures is inconsistent with previous permits and is rejected. The evidence was that at least two docks with covered terminal platforms have been permitted in aquatic preserves by Respondent under the same rules it cites to forbid construction of Petitioner's roofed dock. Respondent made no distinction between the roofed structures it had permitted in an aquatic preserve and the roofed structure that Petitioner constructed after he received Mr. Fitzgerald's letter authorizing the construction of his dock. Consequently, Respondent's contention that Mr. Fitzgerald could not have permitted a roof for Petitioner's dock is rejected.
While Rule 18-20.004(5)(b)1, Florida Administrative Code, limits the construction of a main access dock to four feet in width, the rules do not define the term "main access dock" nor do the rules forbid the attachment of lowered catwalks to the main access dock as reflected by the drawings of October 27, 1988, and as constructed by Petitioner. Consequently, Respondent's contention that Mr. Fitzgerald could not have permitted the lowered catwalks reflected on the drawing of October 27, 1988, is rejected.
Similarly, while Rule 18-20.004(5)(b)6, Florida Administrative Code, limits the construction of the terminal platform to 160 square feet, the rules do not define the area that constitutes the area to be measured as the terminal platform and the rules do not prohibit the configuration reflected on the drawing of October 27, 1988, and constructed by Petitioner. Consequently, Respondent's contention that Mr. Fitzgerald could not have permitted the extension of the main access dock the length of the terminal platform as reflected on the drawing of October 27, 1988, is rejected.
Based on the foregoing, it is concluded that Mr. Fitzgerald referred to the drawing of October 27, 1988, in his letter of November 14, 1988, that he had the authority to authorize Petitioner to construct his dock consistent with the drawing of October 27, 1988, and that his letter of November 14, 1988, authorized Petitioner to construct his dock consistent with the drawing of October 27, 1988. It is also concluded that Respondent is estopped to deny that it authorized construction of the dock pursuant to the drawing of October 27, 1988, and that it is estopped to require that Petitioner remove any portion of the dock except for the two lowered platforms on the north and east ends of the terminal platform that were not part of the drawing of October 27, 1988. It is further concluded that Petitioner should be required to remove the two lowered platforms on the north and east ends of the terminal platform.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which requires that Petitioner
platform within sixty days of the entry of the Final Order. It is further recommended that the Final Order find that the after the fact application submitted by Petitioner on December 26, 1990, is consistent with the authorization granted by the letter issued by Mr. Casey Fitzgerald on November 14, 1988. It is further recommended that the Final Order grant the after the fact application submitted by Petitioner on December 26, 1990.
CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON
1/ The dock extends from Petitioner's land eastward into the IRAP. As used herein, the length will refer to the measurement of the structure east to west. The width will refer to the measurement of the structure north to south. The height will be the measurement from the average low water mark to the underside of the structure.
2/ The general consent conditions attached to the letter of November 14, 1988, have no bearing on the resolution of the issues presented by this case.
3/ The Florida Evidence Code permits the finder of fact to draw inferences in appropriate circumstances. See Section 90.301(3), Florida Statutes. The Sponsor's Note to this provision defines "inference" as follows: "An inference is a deduction of fact that the fact-finder, in his discretion, may logically draw from another fact or group of facts that are found to exist or are otherwise established in the action."
4/ This letter, which contains references to settlement negotiations, was admitted without objection.
The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioner.
The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent.
George H. Moss, Esquire Kathleen Walsh, Esquire
Moss, Henderson, Van Gaasbeck, Blanton & Koval, P.A.
817 Beachland Blvd.
P. O. Box 3406
Brian F. McGrail Esquire Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard
Ken Plante, General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this Recommended Order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final
order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
