STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
STATE OF FLORIDA, ) DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 95-3964
)
ANNE EVANS ETHERIDGE, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Notice was provided and on January 8, 1996, a formal hearing was held in this case. Authority for conducting the hearing is set forth in Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The hearing location was Jacksonville, Florida. The hearing officer was Charles C. Adams.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire
Department of Insurance
Division of Agent and Agency Services 8070 North West 53rd Street, Suite 103 Miami, Florida 33166
For Respondent: Judy Groover, Esquire
24 North Market Street, Suite 301-A Jacksonville, Florida 32202
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Did Respondent knowingly permit a person who had been convicted of or who had pled guilty or no contest to a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one year or more under law of any state, territory or country, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, to engage in the bail bond business as an employee of Respondent's bail bond agency? If yes, should Respondent have her limited surety agent license disciplined?
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On June 1, 1995 through Department of Insurance Case No. l0646-94-A-DEK, Petitioner brought an administrative complaint against Respondent alleging violations of Sections 648.44(7)(a) and (b), 648.45(2), 648.45(2)(e), 648.45(2)(j), 648.45(3), 648.45(3)(b), 648.46, 648.49, 648.50, 648.52 and
648.53, Florida Statutes. The one-count administrative complaint related to allegations that Respondent had employed Jack Ivey Etheridge, a/k/a John Davis, who had entered a plea of nolo contendere and was found guilty of grand theft, a felony in Case No. 80-7216CFW, in the Circuit Court, Fourth Judicial Circuit, in
and for Duval County, Florida. On June 12, 1995, Respondent requested a formal hearing to resolve the issues framed in the administrative complaint.
Subsequently, the case was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings on August 9, 1995 for a hearing officer to be assigned to conduct a formal hearing.
The parties requested that the hearing be conducted the first of the year, 1996. The hearing was held on the aforementioned date.
Prior to hearing Petitioner moved to amend the administrative complaint to add Count II pertaining to Jack Ivey Etheridge and a plea of guilty and conviction of offenses set forth at 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1342 mail fraud, a felony, on April 6, 1990, as related in the records of the United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana, Case No. CR 89-40-A-M1. An order was entered on August 30, 1995, granting the amendment to add the second count. The first amended administrative complaint also made internal changes concerning the pleading structure.
In proceedings involving Respondent and Jack Ivey Etheridge as Plaintiffs versus The State of Florida, Department of Insurance, Defendant, in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Duval County, Florida, Case No. 92-10537CA, Division CV-F, the Honorable Judge Lawrence D. Fay granted Plaintiffs' motion for injunction with respect to Count I to the first amended administrative complaint, thus prohibiting Petitioner from proceeding in that count against the Respondent. Judge Fay denied the injunction against proceeding under authority in Section 648.44(7), Florida Statutes, pertaining to convictions, guilty pleas or no contest pleas by Jack I. Etheridge which had been entered subsequent to March 27, 1984, holding that the plaintiffs in the circuit court had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Consequently Petitioner has dismissed Count I to the first amended administrative complaint and the administrative case proceeded to hearing on Count II.
In lieu of testimony Petitioner presented 10 exhibits which were admitted. Respondent testified and presented the witnesses Robert Persons, Esquire; Gary Baker, Esquire; David Fletcher, Esquire; Gregg McCaulie, Esquire and Jack I. Etheridge, Jr. Respondent exhibits 1 through 4 were admitted.
A hearing transcript was filed on January 22, 1996. The parties timely submitted proposed recommended orders. The fact finding in those proposals is discussed in an appendix to the recommended order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
At all relevant times Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as a limited surety agent, license no. 224404483. Petitioner has regulatory jurisdiction over that license. For that reason Petitioner may impose discipline should Respondent violate laws pertaining to Respondent's activities associated with the license.
Respondent is President and Director of Crews Bonding Agency, Inc., 24 North Liberty Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32222, through which business she performs insurance-related activities concerning bail bonds.
Crews Bonding Agency, Inc. was incorporated in Florida on March 31, 1988. The corporation is organized for the purpose of transacting any or all lawful business.
The corporation provides bail bonds at the Liberty Street premises. The corporation also runs a parking lot concession at that location. Both businesses were operated at times relevant to the inquiry.
On August 28, 1995, Star Legal Research, Inc. was incorporated to operate at 350 East Forsyth Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32202. That street address is the street adjacent to the Liberty Street address. The Star Legal Research business works out of the same building that Crews Bonding Agency uses. The difference being that the entrance to Crews Bonding Agency is on Liberty Street and the Star Legal Research entrance is on Forsyth Street.
A 1995-96 occupational license was issued to Star Legal Research c/o Jack I. Etheridge, Jr., Respondent's son, for the period October 1, 1995 to September 30, 1996.
Jack I. Etheridge, Jr. owns Star Legal Research.
Jack I. Etheridge, Jr. stated that the purpose for incorporating Star Legal Research was to provide work for Jack I. Etheridge, his father and Respondent's husband, in a setting in which Mr. Jack Etheridge, Jr. contends would be unassociated with Crews Bonding Agency. The attempt to disassociate Mr. Jack Etheridge from Crews Bonding Agency will be subsequently explained.
When the hearing was convened Jack I. Etheridge had been working in an office in the building where Crews Bonding Agency has its business. That employment was under the guise of Star Legal Research. The office where Jack I. Etheridge works in the building is separated from the office associated with Crews Bonding Agency by a door. Jack I. Etheridge uses a separate entrance into the office where he works. That entrance is from Forsyth Street rather than the Bonding agency entrance from Liberty Street.
The business done by Star Legal Research, according to Jack Etheridge, Jr., is one where "you can research any type of legal matters . . . that's pretty much it". Again, Jack Etheridge, Jr. states that his father, Jack Etheridge, ". . . researches legal, you know, business". Under this arrangement, Jack Etheridge is supposedly no longer affiliated with the Crews Bonding Agency in operating its parking lot or otherwise. From the record, it is unclear exactly what is meant by Jack Etheridge's performance of legal research.
At present, the bail bond business is done in the front office to the building that houses Crews Bonding Agency and Star Legal Research. That office faces Liberty Street. In addition to the office where bail bond activities are conducted and the back office which faces Forsyth Street, where Star Legal Research is housed, there is a kitchen in the building. That constitutes the rooms in that building.
Contrary to the claim by his son that Jack Etheridge is no longer affiliated with Crews Bonding Agency, Respondent identified that the present circumstances are such that Jack Etheridge helps with the Crews Bonding Agency parking lot business "if he sees a car and I don't, he will go there . . .". Respondent identified that she principally handles the parking lot when she is there at the business premises, but that on one occasion, she was in the hospital and was not available to do that work. Further, she stated that her physician did not really want her "running back and forth to the parking lot".
Respondent intends to transfer the parking lot business from Crews Bonding Agency to Star Legal Research by January 1997.
At one time, Jack Etheridge had been licensed by Petitioner as an insurance agent entitled to participate in bail bond activities.
Prior to the passage of Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), he had been convicted of a felony in Florida.
Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), stated:
No person who has been convicted of or who has pleaded guilty or no contest to any felony, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, may participate as a director, officer, manager, or employee of
any bail bond agency or office thereof or own shares in any closely held corporation which has any interest in any bail bond business.
Having a concern that Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), might disqualify him from continuing to act as an insurance agent in the bail bond business, Jack Etheridge brought suit in the Circuit Court, Fourth Judicial Circuit, In and For Duval County, Florida, Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K. Petitioner was named defendant in that suit. As a result, an order was entered stating:
The provisions of Florida Statutes 648.44(3), Fla. Stat. (1983), or its successor(s) do not and cannot be determined to effect the status of plaintiff, Jack I. Etheridge, in his individual capacity as an officer and director of F.G.C. Bonding Insurance Corporation nor his ability to continue to maintain stock ownership
of shares of F.G.C. Bonding Insurance Corporation. The provisions of this paragraph shall serve as notice to all interested parties that said
statute does not apply to Jack I. Etheridge, individually, nor in his capacity as an officer, director and stockholder in F.G.C. Bonding Insurance Corporation.
Subsequently, in a case in the United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana, Case No. CR.89-40-A-M1, Jack Etheridge pled guilty and was found guilty and convicted of the offense of mail fraud, in accordance with
18 U.S.C. 1341-2. For this offense, he was imprisoned for a period of five years and ordered to make restitution in the amount of $237,393.83. The sentence was imposed on April 6, 1990. At that time, Jack Etheridge was not licensed by Petitioner.
Respondent had separated from Mr. Jack Etheridge in 1986. She was reunited with her husband in 1989.
Respondent was aware that her husband had been convicted in Florida in state court, the offense for which he sought relief in Circuit Court Case No.
82-10537CA, Division K, and that he had committed the federal offense in Case No. CR.89-40-A-M1.
In August or September, 1992, federal probation officers came to the Crews Bonding Agency and spoke to Respondent about her husband's pending release from federal prison. In particular, those persons indicated that Mr. Jack Etheridge was going to be released in December of 1992.
In this conversation, the probation officers told Respondent that they expected the husband to work for Crews Bonding Agency in a capacity that did not involve the handling of bail. Respondent told them that her husband could not work at the agency because she did not wish to jeopardize her Florida insurance license and livelihood. This is taken to mean that she was concerned about having a convicted felon working for her at the bail bond agency.
In the conversation with the probation officers, Respondent was persuaded that the probation officers had the authority to place her husband with the bail bond agency to give the husband employment in some capacity, other than dealing with bail bond activities. The probation officers did not indicate the specific authority for requiring this placement. Respondent replied to the probation officers that her husband could run the parking lot and clean up. In offering that arrangement, Respondent operated on the assumption that the probation officers were familiar with the requirements in the Florida Insurance Regulations and Statutes.
In the conversation between Respondent and the federal probation officers, Respondent made no mention of the ruling in the Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, concerning her husband's exemption from Section 648.44(3), Florida Statutes (1983), and its effects, or any subsequent law.
After the conversation with the probation officers, and prior to her husband's release from prison, Respondent sought advice of counsel concerning the propriety of having her husband employed by Crews Bonding Agency.
Robert Persons, Esquire is corporate counsel for Crews Bonding Agency. He incorporated the business. He has done work for the business as corporate counsel, beginning in 1988. He was aware that Mr. Jack Etheridge had been incarcerated in the federal corrections system.
Before Mr. Jack Etheridge was released, Mr. Persons reviewed the previously-quoted language in Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, in response to Respondent's request for legal advice.
Respondent had told Mr. Persons that it was possible that she was going to hire her husband to run the parking lot for the Crews Bonding Agency. She wanted to know if there would be a problem with Petitioner's statutes that prohibited a bonding agency from operating with a felon working for it. Specifically, Respondent asked Mr. Persons if her husband could work in the parking lot. Mr. Persons told Respondent that his interpretation of the order was that the statutory prohibition against felons working for a bonding agency did not apply to her husband. For that reason, he did not believe that there would be a problem having the husband work at the parking lot. Moreover, he told Respondent that he did not believe that it presented a problem, in that the activities by the husband, when running the parking lot business, did not involve employment with the bail bonding operation. When he gave this advice, Mr. Persons was familiar with the parking lot concessions operation, having used the parking lot himself. He was also familiar with the bail bond business conducted by Crews Bonding Agency.
John Gary Baker, Esquire was retained to assist Mr. Jack Etheridge in meeting the terms of the federal parole granted the client. This included correspondence with the probation office in an attempt to obtain early release.
Once Mr. Jack Etheridge was released, Mr. Baker went with the client and spoke to probation officer, Diane Thomas. This conversation took place sometime in late August or early September, 1993.
Ms. Thomas told Mr. Baker and Mr. Etheridge that Mr. Etheridge needed to obtain a job as a means to meet requirements for restitution. In this conversation, Ms. Thomas inquired concerning Respondent's income in an attempt to determine the amount that Mr. Etheridge should pay in the way of restitution. Mr. Baker tried to impress Ms. Thomas with the fact that Respondent's income and business were separate from Mr. Etheridge's circumstance.
In the conversation, Mr. Etheridge told Ms. Thomas that he wished to be a bus driver. That was his profession prior to being involved in the insurance business in Louisiana, which led to his incarceration. Ms. Thomas would not agree to that arrangement. She indicated that Mr. Etheridge had to be located in a place where the probation officers could come and see him at anytime, day or night.
Ms. Thomas asked the question about whether Mr. Etheridge could work for his wife at Crews Bonding Agency, and Mr. Etheridge stated that he did not wish to work for his wife. Ms. Thomas responded to these remarks by saying that she had an order that indicated that Mr. Etheridge could work at the Crews Bonding Agency. This refers to the Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division
K. Ms. Thomas further told Mr. Etheridge that Mr. Etheridge needed to work at Crews Bonding Agency.
Before the date upon which the meeting was held with Ms. Thomas, Mr. Baker had not been acquainted with the circuit court order.
When Mr. Baker and Mr. Etheridge left the meeting with Ms. Thomas, they went to the Crews Bonding Agency office; and Mr. Etheridge produced a copy of the circuit court order. Respondent was there at that time. Mr. Baker reviewed the order and expressed an opinion to Respondent and her husband that the husband could work at Crews Bonding Agency in any capacity, other than giving out forms or advice about bail bonds. At that point, there was conversation about the husband running the parking lot. That arrangement was one which Mr. Baker stated would be acceptable and would satisfy the terms of Mr. Etheridge's probation. Moreover, Mr. Baker offered the advice that the circuit court order would allow the husband to attend to clerical matters, such as answering the telephones.
David R. Fletcher, Esquire was acquainted with Respondent. Mr. Fletcher was aware that Jack Etheridge had been incarcerated in a federal facility. Mr. Fletcher was approached by Respondent, who asked Mr. Fletcher about the Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, Division K, and the meaning of the order.
In particular, Respondent made Mr. Fletcher aware that she was concerned about the federal probation office's instructions or the condition upon which Mr. Etheridge's probation would be served as an employee at Crews Bonding Agency. Respondent told Mr. Fletcher that she was concerned that this would create a problem because of the husband's prior record, taken to mean felony record.
When Mr. Fletcher read the order, he expressed the opinion that the husband was exempt from the disqualifying provisions for felons working in a bail bond agency.
At the time the conversation was held between Mr. Fletcher and Respondent concerning the husband's status as a felon, Mr. Fletcher understood that the husband would be returning from incarceration and working at the bail bond agency as a parking lot attendant.
Respondent relied upon advice of counsel in deciding to allow her husband to work at the bail bond agency as a parking lot attendant.
As contemplated by the instructions which the probation officers gave Mr. Jack Etheridge, he took employment at the Crews Bonding Agency. His duties included running the parking lot, vacuuming the building where the bond agency was located, and answering the telephone at the bail bond agency.
When he would answer the telephone, Respondent noted that Jack Etheridge would state that he was not a bail bond agent and that the person who was calling would need to speak to the "bonds man". At times, Respondent received calls that had been patched through from the bail bond agency to another location, through efforts by Jack Etheridge. Respondent is aware that her husband took messages for the bail bond agency, as well.
Respondent observed that Jack Etheridge principally stayed in the back office, which fronts Forsyth Street, when he worked for the Crews Bonding Agency as parking lot attendant.
Specific remarks made by Jack Etheridge in receiving calls for the bonding agency would be "Crews Bonding, would you hold please". If someone needed to speak to Respondent immediately, Mr. Etheridge would state "she is busy, hold please, if you will give me your number, I will have her call you back".
Once while Jack Etheridge was employed at the Crews Bonding Agency, following release from federal prison, Ms. Thomas came to the agency to check on his status. Upon that occasion, Respondent spoke to Ms. Thomas and asked if her husband could drive a bus, instead of being employed by the bail bond agency. Ms. Thomas replied in the negative and stated that the husband had to stay with the agency and work with Respondent.
Ms. Thomas told Respondent that Mr. Jack Etheridge had to be paid a check from the bonding agency. Respondent honored that request. The reason given for requiring that Mr. Jack Etheridge be paid a check was based upon the statement by Ms. Thomas that the husband had to take evidence of the check being issued and present that to the probation office.
According to the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security, Jack Etheridge was paid $800.00 for four weeks worked in the third quarter of 1993; $2,800.00 for 13 weeks worked in the fourth quarter of 1993; $2,419.23 for
12 weeks worked in the first quarter of 1994; $2,854.61 for 13 weeks worked in the second quarter of 1994; and $3,080.00 for 13 weeks worked in the third quarter of 1994.
Jack Etheridge, Jr. observed that his father, upon taking the position as parking lot attendant, worked in the kitchen area of the premises most of the time for a period and then moved into the back office, which fronts Forsyth Street, later on.
The kitchen area is separated from the room where the bail bonding business is conducted.
The room on Liberty Street is where Respondent has traditionally conducted her bail bond business.
Jack Etheridge, Jr. never observed his father work in a bail bond capacity once the father returned from incarceration. He did observe that when a car came into the parking lot, his father would direct the driver where to park the car and then return to the building. Jack Etheridge, Jr. made these observations while working in the front office, where bail bond business was conducted, and never noted his father being in that front office. Jack Etheridge, Jr. was at the premises most every day before attending the police academy. After attending the police academy, he spends most of his time at the bail bond agency, pending employment as a policeman.
Mr. Persons goes to the location of the bail bond agency two to three times per week and uses a parking space in the parking lot. On those occasions, he sees Jack Etheridge in the parking lot. Mr. Persons has seen Jack Etheridge at the location of the Crews Bonding Agency numerous times, following Jack Etheridge's release from prison. Mr. Persons has gone to that location 150 times within two and one-half years, and it would be uncommon for Jack Etheridge not to have been at the location when Mr. Persons came by.
On some visits Mr. Persons has spent as much as 15 or 20 minutes with Respondent and her son at the bail bond agency.
On occasions when he visited the bail bond agency, he has never observed Mr. Jack Etheridge do anything related to the bail bond business, unless one considers that answering the telephone at the bail bond agency, when Respondent is unable to, constitutes bail bond business. Mr. Persons has seen Jack Etheridge put a caller on hold and then refer the call to Respondent.
The observation by Mr. Persons, where Mr. Jack Etheridge was involved with answering the telephone in the bail bond office, was not the usual circumstance.
In the past, when Mr. Persons observed the operation at the bail bond agency, the door separating the room that faces Liberty Street and the room that faces Forsyth Street was open. More recently, that door has been closed between the two rooms. Mr. Persons observed that in the more recent circumstances, Jack Etheridge was using the office that fronts Forsyth Street. Mr. Persons observed that at the time the hearing was conducted, Jack Etheridge was still maintaining the parking lot.
Mr. Persons observed that prior to the creation of the Star Legal Research business, Jack Etheridge, when not located in the parking lot, would be found in the office which fronts Forsyth Street.
In summary, under the present circumstances, it is unclear what Mr. Jack Etheridge is principally involved with at the premises primarily associated with Crews Bonding Agency and its businesses.
Following advice by Mr. Baker that it would be acceptable for Mr. Jack Etheridge to work at the bail bond agency, he has been in the Crews Bonding Agency office approximately 100 times. On almost every occasion, Jack Etheridge would be in the back room on Forsyth Street. Nine out of ten times, Jack Etheridge would be in that location when observed by Mr. Baker. The only times that Mr. Baker would observe Jack Etheridge in the front office, where the bail bonding business was being conducted, would be if other bail bond agency employees were out making a bond or something of that nature. In that instance, Jack Etheridge would be sitting in the front office, where the bail bond business is conducted; and if someone came to park their car, he would take care of that business. If someone came into the office and asked about a bail bond, Jack Etheridge would remark, "Look, Anne (Respondent) is going to be back in a half hour, she is making a bond, or Clara will be back. Come back, or you can sit over there and wait". Clara refers to another employee of the bail bond agency. Mr. Baker also observed that on the occasion on which Jack Etheridge was in the front office, he would refuse to give information about bail bonds and limit himself to handling parking duties and answering the telephone if no one else was available to answer the telephone.
Mr. Fletcher has seen Jack Etheridge at the bail bond agency location approximately twice per week, following Mr. Etheridge's release from incarceration. On these occasions, Mr. Fletcher would give Jack Etheridge keys to Mr. Fletcher's car and seek assistance in parking. In these visits to the agency, Mr. Fletcher never observed Jack Etheridge perform work as a bail bond agent. In fact, he never observed Jack Etheridge work anywhere other than in the parking lot.
Respondent and her husband brought further action in Circuit Court Case No. 82-10537CA, assigned to Division CV-F. At that time, the previous judge, who had issued the aforementioned order on March 27, 1984, was not presiding in the case. That refers to the Honorable Henry Lee Adams, Jr., who now serves as a federal district judge. The judge who presided in the reopening of the circuit court case was the Honorable Lawrence D. Fay, Circuit Judge.
On October 30, 1995, Judge Fay entered an order in Case No. 82- 10537CA, Division CV-F, enjoining consideration of Count I to the present administrative complaint, in which he ordered:
The Plaintiff's Motion for Injunction is here- by GRANTED with respect to Count I of the Administrative Complaint and First Amended Administrative Complaint filed by Defendant against Plaintiff, Anne Evans Etheridge, and Defendant shall be enjoined from proceeding against Plaintiff, Anne Evans Etheridge, as
to Count I of same in DOAH Case No. 95-3964.
Judge Fay also ruled:
The Plaintiff's Motion for Injunction is here- by DENIED with respect to the filing of any complaints under Section 648.44(7), Florida Statutes, relative to convictions, guilty pleas, or no contest pleas by Jack I. Ethe-
ridge entered subsequent to March 27, 1984. Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust adminis- trative remedies.
Based upon the orders by Judge Fay, administrative prosecution has proceeded to resolve Count II to the administrative complaint addressed in DOAH Case No. 95-3964.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over this subject matter and the parties to this action pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Given that Petitioner intends to discipline Respondent's license, it bears the burden to prove the violations alleged in Count II. In considering those allegations, the law shall be strictly construed because it is penal in nature and any ambiguities in the statutory language shall favor the accused. See Farzad v. Department of Professional Regulation, 443 So.2d 373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) and Lester v. Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, State Board of Medical Examiners, (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
Respondent is alleged to have violated the following provisions or is subject to the penalties set forth.
Sections 648.44(7)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes: (7)(a) A person who has been convicted of
or who has pleaded guilty or no contest to a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime punishable by imprisonment of 1 year or more under the law of any state, territory, or country, regardless of whether adjudication of guilt was withheld, may not participate as a director, officer, manager, or employee of any bail bond agency or office
thereof or exercise direct or indirect control in any manner in such agency or office or own shares in any closely held corporation which has any interest in any bail bond business.
Such restrictions on engaging in the bail
bond business shall continue to apply during a pending appeal.
(b) Any person who violates the provisions of paragraph (a) or any person who knowingly permits a person who has been convicted of
or who has pleaded guilty or no contest to a crime as described in paragraph (a) to
engage in the bail bond business as prohibited in paragraph (a) commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
Section 648.45(2), Florida Statutes:
The department shall deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew any license or appointment issued under this chapter or the insurance code, and it shall suspend or revoke
the eligibility of any person to hold a license or appointment under this chapter or the insurance code, for any violation of the laws of this state relating to bail or any violation of the insurance code or for any of the follow- ing causes:
* * *
(e) Demonstrated lack of fitness or trust- worthiness to engage in the bail bond business.
* * *
(j) Willful failure to comply with or will- ful violation of any proper order or rule of the department or willful violation of any
provision of this chapter or the insurance code.
Section 648.45(3), Florida Statutes:
The department may deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew any license or appointment issued under this chapter or the insurance code, or it may suspend or revoke
the eligibility of any person to hold a license or appointment under this chapter or the insurance code, for any violation of the laws of this state relating to bail or any violation of the insurance code or for any of the following causes:
* * *
(b) Violation of any law relating to the business of bail bond insurance or violation of any provision of the insurance code.
Section 648.44(7)(a), Florida Statutes, prohibits the person, who has been convicted of or who has pled guilty or no contest to certain crimes, from being employed in a bail bond agency or office. It makes no reference to the obligations associated with the employer. In this case, Respondent is the employer.
Section 648.44(7)(b), Florida Statutes, separate and apart from administrative regulatory determinations, makes it a crime punishable as a felony in the third degree for the employee to engage in the bail bond business or for the employer to knowingly permit that engagement. Should Respondent, as employer, be found to have committed the state felony of knowingly allowing her husband, a felon, as determined in the federal court proceeding, to engage in the bail bond business, then Respondent is subject to the penalties set forth at Sections 648.45(2) and (3), Florida Statutes. This is based upon the fact that by committing the felony addressed in Section 648.44(7)(b), Florida Statutes, Respondent would have been in violation of the laws of the State of Florida relating to bail. Absent such a determination, Petitioner may not utilize Section 648.44(7)(b), Florida Statutes, as a basis for disciplining Respondent's license, notwithstanding that Respondent knowingly permitted her husband to engage in the bail bond business to the extent that the husband had immediate contact with persons seeking assistance for bail-related matters. This refers to contacts in person and by telephone. Otherwise, the act of serving as parking lot attendant and vacuuming the office did not constitute engagement in bail bond business.
Because Section 648.44(7)(b), Florida Statutes, relates to a criminal offense, a person who commits the felony related to that offense cannot be tried
independently through administrative prosecution under the theory that the accused has violated a provision of the insurance code, as contemplated by the penalty provision set forth in Section 648.44(2) and (3), Florida Statutes.
Taking into account the limited nature of Jack Etheridge's contact with the bail bond business and having in mind that Respondent sought legal advice concerning the propriety of her husband's activities at the bail bond agency and the coercion directed from the federal probation officers to Respondent to allow her husband to work at the bail bond agency, Respondent is not found to have demonstrated a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the bail bond business, as contemplated by Section 648.44(2)(e), Florida Statutes.
Respondent is not found to have willfully failed to comply with or willfully violated any of the provisions of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, or the insurance code, as contemplated by Section 648.44(2)(j), Florida Statutes, for reason that no basis has been established for violating the insurance code, as explained before. Moreover, even should one consider that Respondent has violated the insurance code by activities associated with Section 648.44(7)(b), Florida Statutes, thus offending the insurance code, Respondent has not acted in a willful manner, given the advice of counsel and the circumstances related to the federal probation office.
For reasons already explained, Respondent has not violated Section 648.45(3)(b), Florida Statutes, in that she has not violated any law relating to the business of bail bond insurance or any provision of the insurance code.
Based upon the findings of fact and the conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED:
That a Final Order be entered which dismisses the First Amended Administrative Complaint.
DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of February, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida.
CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 1996.
APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-3964
The following discussion is given concerning the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law by the parties.
Petitioner's Findings:
Paragraphs 1 through 4 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 5 constitutes legal argument.
Respondent's Findings:
Paragraph 1 is subordinate to facts found.
Paragraph 2 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found.
Paragraph 4 is established through the Preliminary Statement. Paragraphs 5 and 6 are subordinate to facts found.
Paragraph 7 is subordinate to facts found, with the exception that several other local attorneys were not contacted for advice. One additional attorney was sought out for advice, Mr. Baker.
Paragraph 8, the first sentence is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The remaining sentences are subordinate to facts found.
Paragraphs 9 through 13 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 14 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 15-16 are subordinate to facts found.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance
Division of Agent and Agency Services 8070 North West 53rd Street, Suite 103 Miami, FL 33166
Judy Groover, Esquire
24 North Market Street, Suite 301-A Jacksonville, FL 32202
Bill Nelson, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner
Department of Insurance and Treasurer
The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
Dan Sumner, Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance
and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this Recommended Order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER
=================================================================
THE TREASURER OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE
BILL NELSON
IN THE MATTER OF
DOI CASE NO. 10648-94-A-DEK
ANNE EVANS ETHERIDGE DOAH CASE NO. 95-3964
/
FINAL ORDER
THIS CAUSE came before the undersigned Treasurer of the State of Florida, acting in his capacity as Insurance Commissioner, for consideration of final agency action. On June 1, 1995, a one count Administrative Complaint was filed charging the Respondent, ANNE EVANS ETHERIDGE, with violations of various provisions of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, dealing with her employment of her husband--a convicted felon-in her bail bond agency. Respondent timely filed a request for a formal proceeding in accordance with Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, and the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings.
The Administrative Complaint was subsequently amended to add a second count and to make internal changes regarding the structure of the pleading, as authorized by an order entered August 30, 1995.
Respondent and her husband, Jack Ivey Etheridge, obtained an injunction against the Department from proceeding against the Respondent on Count I of the Amended Administrative Complaint, however, the Circuit Court denied their request for injunctive relief as to Count II. The October 30, 1995, injunction was granted by the Honorable Judge Lawrence D. Fay, Circuit Court, Fourth Judicial Circuit, in and for Duval County, Florida, in Case Number 82-10537CA, Division CV-F.
Pursuant to notice, the allegations contained in the Count II of the Amended Administrative Complaint were heard before Charles C. Adams, Hearing Officer, Division of Administrative Hearings, on January 8, 1996, in Jacksonville, Florida. At the outset of the hearing, the Department voluntarily dismissed Count I of the First Amended Complaint.
After consideration of the evidence, argument and testimony presented, the Hearing Officer issued his Recommended Order on February 15, 1996 (attached hereto as Exhibit A). The Hearing Officer recommended that the Department enter a final order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint against the Respondent. The Petitioner timely filed exceptions to portions of ten findings of fact, five conclusions of law, and to the recommendation of dismissal contained in the Recommended Order.
RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S EXCEPTIONS TO FINDINGS OF FACT
Petitioner excepted to Findings of Fact set forth in paragraphs 21, 22, 23, 31, 32, 33, 37, 41, 45 and 46 in the Recommended Order to the extent that they contain references to the actions, statements or inferences of United States' probation authorities. At the hearing, the Petitioner had generally objected to testimony in this regard on the grounds that it was hearsay which did not qualify for admission under Section 120.58(1)(a)1, Florida Statutes. However, the Hearing Officer allowed the objected-to testimony regarding United States probation officials into the record, stating that he would subsequently decide how such testimony would be used. [T 52.3]. See, Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v. Unemployment Appeals Comm., 654 So.2d 292, 295-297 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), for a discussion of the so-called "residuum rule", a process where hearsay evidence is admitted during the hearing subject to a subsequent determination of its value.
Hearsay evidence may be used for the purpose of supplementing or explaining other evidence, but is not sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions. Section 120.58(1)(a)1, Florida Statutes. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Section 90.801(1)(c), Florida Statutes.
Each exception will be addressed in turn:
Finding of Fact number 21. This finding relates to actions of federal probation officials, and that those officials allegedly told the Respondent that her husband would be released from federal prison in December of 1992. [T 84.9- 85.12]. None of those federal probation officials testified at hearing. However, the testimony was not offered to prove that Respondent's husband was, in fact, to be released from federal prison in December, 1992. Instead, the testimony was intended to show that Respondent was induced to take some action -
- hire her husband at her agency -- based upon the conversation. Thus, the objection should have been overruled because the testimony is not hearsay. Hooper v. Barnett Bank of West Florida, 474 So.2d 1253, 1259 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), approved 498 So.2d 923 (Fla. 1985).
Further, even if the testimony was hearsay, it was substantially corroborated. John Gary Baker testified that Respondent's husband was released from federal prison early and that he went with Mr. Jack Etheridge to see a federal probation agent in late August or early September, 1993. [T 49.4- 49.20]. The Respondent's testimony regarding the conversation was elicited by the Hearing Officer, presumably in regard to the Respondent's willfulness if she was found to have employed her husband in violation of the Insurance Code. See, Conclusion of Law number 72. Accordingly, the exception is REJECTED.
Finding of Fact number 22. This finding relates to the same conversation described in Finding of Fact number 21. The Respondent testified that the federal probation officials told her that her husband, Mr. Jack Etheridge, was to work at her bonding agency in a capacity where he would not handle bail. [T 83.14-83.20; 85.13-85.16]. The Respondent further testified about her reply to the federal officials to the effect that her husband could not work at the agency because of the threat to Respondent's insurance license. Id. This testimony goes to the Respondent's inducement to act and is not hearsay. This exception is REJECTED.
Finding of Fact number 23. This finding relates to the same conversation with federal probation officials addressed in Findings of Fact numbers 21 and 22. It speaks to Respondent's state of mind regarding placement of her husband in her agency based upon that alleged conversation and that her agreement with federal authorities that her husband could run the parking lot and clean up. The finding also speaks to the Respondent's state of mind regarding what the federal officials knew about Florida law. As with the other findings, the statement was not offered for the purpose of proving that Respondent's husband could legally work at her agency, but is relevant to show Respondent's intent as to compliance with the Insurance Code. Accordingly, the exception is REJECTED.
Finding of Fact number 31. This finding relates to a conversation that witness John Gary Baker had with a federal probation official, Diane Thomas, in the presence of Respondent's husband. T 49]. The finding does not attempt to apply the out-of-court statements of Ms. Thomas to establish the fact that Mr. Jack Etheridge needed a job as a means to meet the federal requirements of restitution. Instead, the testimony goes to motivation for Mr. Baker to counsel the Respondent regarding the legality of Mr. Jack Etheridge's prospective employment at the agency. The exception is REJECTED.
Finding of Fact number 32. This finding also relates to the conversation that witness Mr. Baker had with a federal probation official, Diane Thomas, in the presence of Respondent's husband. [T 49]. The finding does not attempt to apply the out-of-court statements of Ms. Thomas to establish the fact that Mr. Jack Etheridge wanted to be a bus driver, but was precluded from such employment by Ms. Thomas. As with Finding of Fact 31, this testimony helps to establish the motivation for the legal advice that Mr. Baker subsequently gave to Respondent. Accordingly, the statement is not hearsay. Further, even if the statement is hearsay, it supplements or corroborates Mr. Jack Etheridge's testimony given before the Circuit Court on October 4, 1995, [TCT 32.2-32.21] which was introduced into evidence by the Petitioner. [PEX 2]. Accordingly, the exception is REJECTED.
Finding of Fact number 33. This finding relates to the conversation that witness John Gary Baker had with a federal probation official, Diane Thomas, in the presence of Respondent's husband. [T 49]. The finding does not attempt to apply Ms. Thomas' statements to establish that Mr. Jack Etheridge was legally permitted to work at Crews Bonding Agency under the terms of a Circuit Court order, and that Ms. Thomas required him do so. Accordingly, the statement is not hearsay. Further, even if the statement is hearsay, it supplements or corroborates Mr. Jack Etheridge's testimony given before the Circuit Court on October 4, 1995, [TCT 32.2-32.21] which was introduced into evidence by the Petitioner. [PEX 2]. Accordingly, the exception is REJECTED.
Finding of Fact number 37. This finding relates to conversations between Respondent and witness David R. Fletcher. [T 57.11-58.20]. The finding does not address actions or statements of federal probation officials, the basis for the exception. This exception is REJECTED.
Finding of Fact number 41. Part of this finding states "As contemplated by the instructions which the probation officers gave Mr. Jack Etheridge, he took employment at the Crews Bonding Agency." The evidence establishes that Mr. Jack Etheridge was employed at Crews Bonding Agency. [PEX 8]. While the finding that his employment was as contemplated by the instructions given by federal officials is hearsay, it supplements or corroborates Mr. Jack Etheridge's testimony given before the Circuit Court on
October 4, 1995, [TCT 32.2-32.21] which was introduced into evidence by the Petitioner. [PEX 2]. The exception is REJECTED.
Finding of Fact number 45. This finding clearly relates to statements and actions of a federal probation official, Ms. Thomas, which occurred in the presence of the Respondent, according to Respondent's testimony. The finding indicates that the conversation took place, but acknowledges that Ms. Thomas' alleged statements do not establish that Mr. Etheridge was legally obligated to work at Respondent's agency. Accordingly, the exception is REJECTED.
Finding of Fact number 46. This finding relates to statements and actions of a federal probation official, Ms. Thomas, which occurred in the presence of the Respondent, according to Respondent's testimony. The finding relates portions of that conversation, but Ms. Thomas' out-of-court statements were not offered to prove that Mr. Jack Etheridge was paid by check written on the agency. As with other findings, the testimony goes to Respondent's inducement to employ her husband. This exception is REJECTED.
RULINGS ON PETITIONER'S EXCEPTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Petitioner excepts to the Hearing Officer's Conclusions of Law number 69, 70, 71, 72 and 73.
Petitioner is correct that Conclusions of Law number 70, 71, and 72, contain scrivener's errors as to the statutes being charged in the Amended Administrative Complaint. This is corroborated by the Preliminary Statement in the Recommended Order, which contains correct citations.
In Conclusion of Law number 70, the citation to Section 648.44(2) and (3), Florida Statutes, should be to Section 648.45(2) and (3), Florida Statutes.
In Conclusion of Law number 71, the citation to Section 648.44(2)(e), Florida Statutes, should be to Section 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes.
In Conclusion of Law number 72, the citation to Section 648.44(2)(j), Florida Statutes, should be to Section 648.45(2)(j), Florida Statutes.
Accordingly, the exceptions are ACCEPTED to correct statutory citations in Conclusions of Law number 70, 71 and 72.
Petitioner excepts to Conclusions of Law number 69 and 70 as inaccurate statements of Florida law. Conclusion of Law number 69 provides as follows:
69. Section 648.44(7)(b), Florida Statutes, separate and apart from administrative regulatory determinations, makes it a crime punishable as a felony in the third degree for the employee to engage in the bail bond business or for the employer to knowingly permit that engagement. Should Respondent, as employer, be found to have committed the state felony of knowingly allowing her husband, a felon, as determined in the federal court proceeding, to engage in the bail bond business, then Respondent is subject to the penalties set forth at Sections 648.45(2) and (3), Florida Statutes. This is based upon the fact that by committing the felony addressed in Section 648.44(7)(b), Florida Statutes, Respondent would have
been in violation of the laws of the State of Florida relating to bail. Absent such a determination, Petitioner may not utilize Section 648.44(7)(b), Florida Statutes, as a basis for disciplining Respondent's license, notwithstanding that Respondent knowingly permitted her husband to engage in the bail bond business to the extent that the husband had immediate contact with persons seeking assistance for bail-related matters. This refers to contact in person and by telephone. Otherwise, the act of serving as parking lot attendant and vacuuming the office did not constitute engagement in bail bond business.
The Hearing Officer did not cite any authority for the proposition that Petitioner had to prove that Respondent had been convicted of a criminal violation of Section 648.44(7)(b), Florida Statutes, as a condition precedent to administrative action against Respondent. The Petitioner's exception notes that Section 648.57, Florida Statutes, provides that any violation of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, is a second degree misdemeanor unless a more severe criminal penalty is otherwise provided.
Section 648.46(1), Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part:
If the department determines that a violation of this chapter ... has occurred, the department may file a formal complaint against the licensee and prosecute under chapter 120.
Section 648.44(7), Florida Statutes, contains no exception from the general rule established in Section 648.46(1), Florida Statutes, but the former merely establishes a more severe penalty than is provided in Section 648.57, Florida Statutes.
The conclusion that Respondent knowingly permitted her husband to be an employee and to engage in the bail bond business to the limited extent described in the findings of fact is sufficient to establish a violation of Section 648.44(7)(a), Florida Statutes.
The Petitioner's Exception to Conclusion of Law number 69 is ACCEPTED.
Conclusion of Law number 70 contains an oblique, yet correct, statement that Section 648.44(7)(b), Florida Statutes, only provides for a criminal penalty. As noted previously, all violations of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, may be prosecuted in both the administrative and criminal contexts.
Accordingly, Petitioner's exception to Conclusion of Law number 70 is REJECTED.
Petitioner also excepts to Conclusion of Law number 72, based upon the argument submitted in opposition to Conclusions of Law number 69 and 70. The Hearing Officer concluded that Respondent did not willfully fail to comply with or violate any of the provisions of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, including Section 648.44(7)(b), Florida Statutes. In support of that conclusion, the Hearing Officer noted that even if a violation occurred, it was not willful because Respondent sought the advance advice of counsel and acted on the advice, and further, given the "circumstances related to the federal probation office".
The undisputed findings of fact show that Attorney Robert Persons, Attorney John Gary Baker and Attorney David R. Fletcher all advised Respondent that Mr.
Jack Ivey Etheridge could legally be employed in her bail bond agency in some capacity. See, Findings of Fact number 25, 28, 35-40.
Accordingly, Petitioner's conduct does not rise to the level of a willful violation of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, and this exception is REJECTED.
EXCEPTION TO RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner urges, based upon the exceptions to findings of fact and conclusions of law, that the recommended penalty in its Proposed Recommended Order be imposed instead of dismissal.
Petitioner recommended that, based upon all of the violations in Count II of the Amended Administrative Complaint, that Respondent be suspended for six
(6) months and be made to pay a penalty of $2,500.00, citing Sections 648.45 and 648.52, Florida Statutes, respectively.
Having reviewed the complete record, the exception to the Hearing Officer's recommended penalty of dismissal is ACCEPTED, based upon the conclusion that Respondent violated Section 648.44(7)(a), Florida Statutes.
Accordingly, the Hearing Officer's recommendation that the Amended Administrative Complaint be dismissed is REJECTED as an inappropriate disposition of this matter. Rather, based upon the findings of fact and modified conclusions of law, and pursuant to Sections 648.45, 648.46, 648.49,
and 648.53, Florida Statutes, the Respondent is found to have violated Sections 648.44(7)(a) and 648.45(3)(b), Florida Statutes. Those violations warrant an administrative fine of $500.00 which Respondent shall pay not later than 30 days after the rendition of this order. In addition, Respondent shall be placed on probation for a period of two (2) years. During the period of probation, Respondent shall not employ in her agency or office, or allow to participate as a director, officer or manager, or allow to exercise direct or indirect control in any manner, or allow to own stock, any person who has been convicted of or has pleaded guilty or no contest to a felony or a crime involving moral turpitude or a crime punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more under the law of any state, territory, or country, regardless 6f whether adjudication of guilt was withheld.
Upon careful consideration of the record in this matter and being otherwise advised in the premises, it is ORDERED:
The Findings of Fact set forth in the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order are adopted in full as the Department's Findings of Fact.
The Conclusions of Law numbered 65 through 68 set forth in the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order are adopted.
The Conclusions of Law numbered 71 and 72 set forth in the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order are adopted as modified to correct incorrect statutory citations.
The Conclusions of Law numbered 69, 70 and 73 are rejected.
The following substituted conclusions of law are adopted: Conclusion of Law 69.
Respondent knowingly permitted her husband to engage in the bail bond business to the extent that her husband had immediate contact with persons seeking assistance for bail-related matters. This refers to contacts in person and by telephone typical of a office receptionist. Otherwise, the act of serving as parking lot attendant and vacuuming the office did not constitute engagement in the bail bond business. Respondent's conduct violated Section 648.44(7)(a), Florida Statutes, in that Respondent's husband pleaded guilty and was convicted of mail fraud by the United States District Court, Middle District of Louisiana, and was imprisoned for five years. Conclusion of Law 70.
Section 648.44(7)(b), Florida Statutes, provides for a criminal penalty for a violation of Section 648.44(7)(b), Florida Statutes, which is an exception to the general criminal penalty provided in Section 648.57, Florida Statutes.
Respondent is not found to have violated Section 648.44(7)(b), Florida Statutes. Conclusion of Law 73.
Since Respondent has been shown by clear and convincing evidence to have violated Section 648.44(7)(a), Florida Statutes, she is also subject to discipline pursuant to Section 648.45(3)(b), Florida Statutes.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT Respondent shall pay an administrative penalty of $500.00 within 30 days of the entry of this order. Failure to pay the penalty in its entirety within 30 days, shall result in the immediate revocation of Respondent's licenses and eligibility to hold a license or appointment under the Insurance Code, without any further proceedings.
Respondent is placed on probation pursuant to Section 648.53, Florida Statutes for a period of two (2) years commencing on the date of filing of this Final Order. As a condition of said probation, Respondent shall strictly adhere to all provisions of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes and the Rules of the Department of Insurance and Treasurer.
Any party to these proceedings adversely affected by this Order is entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Review proceedings must be instituted by filing a Notice of Appeal with the General Counsel, acting as the agency clerk, at 612 Larson Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333, and a copy of the same and the filing fee with the appropriate District Court of Appeal within thirty (30) days of rendition of this Order.
DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of March, 1996.
Bill Nelson Treasurer and
Insurance Commissioner
COPIES FURNISHED TO:
Honorable Charles C. Adams Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
Judy Groover, Esquire
24 North Market Street Suite 301-A
Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Dickson E. Kesler, Esquire Department of Insurance 8070 Northwest 53rd Street Suite 103
Miami, Florida 33166
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Feb. 27, 1997 | First DCA Opinion (Affirmed) filed. |
| Apr. 09, 1996 | Final Order filed. |
| Feb. 15, 1996 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. Hearing held 01/08/96. |
| Feb. 01, 1996 | (Respondent) Proposed Recommended Order filed. |
| Jan. 30, 1996 | Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order filed. |
| Jan. 22, 1996 | Transcript filed. |
| Jan. 08, 1996 | CASE STATUS: Hearing Held. |
| Sep. 06, 1995 | Notice of Hearing sent out. (hearing set for 01/08/96; 10:00 a.m.; Jacksonville) |
| Aug. 30, 1995 | Order sent out. (motion granted) |
| Aug. 28, 1995 | Letter. to Hearing Officer from Dick Kesler re: Reply to Initial Order filed. |
| Aug. 16, 1995 | (Petitioner) Motion for Leave to File First Amended Administrative Complaint; First Amended Administrative Complaint w/cover letter filed. |
| Aug. 16, 1995 | Initial Order issued. |
| Aug. 09, 1995 | Notice Of Election Of Rights And Petition For Formal Adversarial Proceeding; Answer And Affirmative Defenses; Order; Agency referral letter; Administrative Complaint; Election of Rights filed. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Feb. 25, 1997 | Opinion | |
| Mar. 25, 1996 | Agency Final Order | |
| Feb. 15, 1996 | Recommended Order | Statute does not allow agency to independently prosecute employer for allowing felon to work with bail bond business, apart from a criminal law case. |
