CHESTER R. COOPER, )
vs. ) Case No. 00-3850
Respondent. )
Pursuant to notice, this cause came on for formal hearing, before Diane Cleavinger, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, in Pensacola, Florida, on November 13, 2000.
For Petitioner: R. John Westberry, Esquire
Holt & Westberry, P.A. 1108-A North 12th Avenue
For Respondent: Kevin L. O'Dea, Esquire
The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was terminated from his employment with Respondent because of his race in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Petitioner, Chester R. Cooper, a black male, was formerly employed with Respondent, Gulf Coast Treatment Center (Gulf Coast), as a Youth Care Worker. On June 30, 1999, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. On or about August 15, 2000, Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint and requested a formal hearing in accordance with Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Petitioner's request was forwarded to the Division of Administrative hearings.
At the hearing Petitioner testified in his own behalf and called three witnesses to testify. Respondent, Gulf Coast, called three witnesses to testify and offered 25 exhibits into evidence. After the hearing Petitioner and Respondent filed Proposed Recommended Orders on December 18, 2000, and
December 15, 2000, respectively.
Petitioner, Chester R. Cooper, is an African-American male. He was employed by Respondent, Gulf Coast Treatment Center, on May 19, 1998, as a youth care worker at its facility in Fort Walton Beach, Florida (assignment center). Petitioner was terminated on November 5, 1998. During his employment, Petitioner worked the "midnight shift" from 10:00 p.m. to
6:00 a.m. His supervisor was Ollie Rainwater.
Respondent operated its facility under a contract with the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). The Fort Walton Beach facility performs behavioral, medical, educational, and psychological assessments and completes a 21-day report to DJJ prior to the assignment of a each youth to a residential commitment facility.
The program director of the Center was Mikel Currie.
In November 1998, four of the five shift supervisors were African-Americans, and approximately 50 percent of the youth care workers at the Center are African-Americans.
Pursuant to the requirements of the DJJ, the Center promulgated and briefed all employees on a Use of Force Policy, which provided in relevant part, that mechanical restraints, such as handcuffs or leg cuffs, may be used upon the youths only to prevent injury or property damage. The policy prohibits the shackling of youths together and the practice of hog-tying.
Hog-tying is securing a youth's legs and hands together behind the youth's back. The policy also required that any use of mechanical restraints be reported in writing by the staff member involved within two hours of the incident. All youth care workers are provided with some training in this area.
The Employee Conduct Policy expressly prohibits the "shielding" of any employee from the consequences of misconduct and imposes a duty upon all employees to report any misconduct.
The language of this policy does not limit these reporting obligations to one's immediate supervisor. Such reports may be made to the program director or any member of the administration.
Petitioner was aware of the policy to report misconduct, but believed that he was supposed to report the misconduct to his immediate supervisor, who was the person who was actually perpetrating the misconduct involved in this case.
On November 4, 1998, Petitioner was assigned to the Boys' Unit of the Assignment Center. His shift began at 10:00 p.m., on November 4, 1998, and ended at 6:30 a.m., on November 5, 1998. Ollie Rainwater (African-American), shift supervisor, and Jimmy Coleman (African-American), youth care
worker, were the only other employees assigned to the Boys' Unit on Petitioner's shift.
Jesse Mathews (Caucasian) worked on November 3 and 4, 1998, on the second shift, from 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.
On November 3, 1998, Annette Whittlesay, a youth care worker on the female side of the facility observed Ollie Rainwater and Jesse Mathews, handcuff two youths together. However, she never reported this information to anyone in the administration.
The Boys' Unit is comprised of two residential sides, each of which is approximately 75 to 80 feet long. The residential sides form a hallway divided by double doors.
When Petitioner arrived at work on November 4, 1998, he observed Quentin Williams and Ricky Sheets handcuffed together. The handcuffing occurred when Petitioner was at the other end of the hall. The doors were closed and Petitioner did not see the actual handcuffing. The youths told Petitioner that Mr. Rainwater, along with Jimmy Coleman, handcuffed them. It took a while for Petitioner to obtain this information because the two youths were fighting each other while cuffed. During this time Petitioner sat down. Petitioner then went to find the key to the cuffs to uncuff the boys.
Upon the program director's arrival at the Center, around 5:00 a.m., on November 5, 1998, one of the youths, Quentin Williams, reported to him that he had been handcuffed together with another youth, Ricky Sheets, by Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman. Quentin Williams reported that one of his wrists and one of his ankles had been shackled to the wrist and the ankle of Ricky Sheets, and that they had fought with each other while shackled together. During this struggle, Quentin Williams had been bitten on his finger by Sheets. Quentin Williams also told Mikel Currie that Petitioner had sat in a chair and laughed at them while they struggled.
Mikel Currie sent Quentin Williams to the nurse for treatment of his finger and immediately commenced an investigation of the matter. Mikel Currie determined that no report of any use of mechanical restraints had been made by anyone from the night shift.
Mikel Currie directed each of the youths who had been shackled or had witnessed the shackling or hog-tying to prepare a written statement in their own words. In order to avoid any collusion, the youths were separated from each other as they prepared their written statements.
After the youths completed their written statements, each one was interviewed separately by Mikel Currie and Keith Williams (African-American), the first shift supervisor.
Quentin Williams told Mikel Currie and Keith Williams that he had been shackled to Ricky Sheets by Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman on two consecutive nights. He also told them that "Mr. Cooper was sitting in a chair laughing" while he and Sheets were fighting. The youth did not state that any other employee was involved in the incident.
Ricky Sheets' report was consistent with that of Quentin Williams. He identified Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman as the two staff members who had shackled him to Quentin Williams and did not state that any other employee was involved in the shackling.
Youth, Frederick Alls, confirmed that Jimmy Coleman and Ollie Rainwater had shackled Quentin Williams and Ricky Sheets together on two nights and that Ollie Rainwater had hog- tied Alls with a set of leg cuffs earlier that morning. Alls did not state that any other employee was involved in the shackling or hog-tying.
Youth, Brandon Mason, told Mikel Currie and Quentin Williams that two youths had been shackled together by Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman. He also told Mikel Currie and Keith Williams that Petitioner sat in a chair watching while Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman shackled Quentin Williams and Ricky Sheets together. Mason identified Ollie Rainwater, Jimmy Coleman, and Petitioner as the only employees involved in the shackling incidents.
Two other youths, Edward Roberson and John Croshat, were interviewed and identified Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman as the staff members who shackled the two youths together.
During the investigation, none of the six youths who were interviewed ever told Mikel Currie or Keith Williams that Jessie Mathews, a white youth care worker assigned to the evening shift (2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.) had participated in any mechanical restraints or misconduct of any nature. From the youths, Mikel Currie determined that the shackling incidents
occurred around 1:00 a.m., several hours after Jessie Mathews had left the Center. Neither Mikel Currie nor Keith Williams had any reason to suspect Jesse Mathews was involved.
Mikel Currie and Keith Williams interviewed Ollie Rainwater on the afternoon of November 5, 1998. Ollie Rainwater admitted his involvement in the shackling and hog-tying incidents of November 4 and 5, 1998. He was terminated for violations of the Center's Use of Force and Employee Conduct policies. Ollie Rainwater never claimed that Jessie Mathews, or any other white employee, had been involved in misconduct.
Mikel Currie and Keith Williams also interviewed Jimmy Coleman that same afternoon. Jimmy Coleman admitted that he was involved in the incidents on November 4 and 5, 1998. His role had been to bring the restraints to Ollie Rainwater when he ordered him to do so. Jimmy Coleman was terminated from employment.
At hearing Jimmy Coleman testified he told Mikel Currie and Keith Williams that Jesse Mathews had participated in a similar incident the day before. However, the assertion is not credible because Mikel Currie and Keith Williams both testified unequivocally that Jimmy Coleman never mentioned that Jesse Mathews, or any other white employee, had been involved. This testimony is bolstered by the interviews given by the various youths.
Mikel Currie attempted to reach Petitioner several times by telephone on November 5, 1998, but was unsuccessful. Keith Williams reached Petitioner by telephone around 1:00 p.m. on that date, as detailed in his contemporaneous memorandum of this conversation. Keith Williams asked Petitioner if he was aware of the shackling incidents and Petitioner denied any knowledge. Petitioner repeated several times that he knew nothing about the incidents. He made that statement because he did not directly see the handcuffing of the youths. He did not reveal his knowledge regarding events after the act of handcuffing.
Mikel Currie and Keith Williams did not believe Petitioner's claims that he knew nothing about the incident because the Boys' Unit is a relatively small area (150 feet in length), Ollie Rainwater and Jimmy Coleman admitted their involvement and several of the youths had stated that Petitioner had observed the shackling incident. Accordingly, Mikel Currie and Keith Williams decided to terminate Petitioner for knowingly attempting to mislead Keith Williams during the course of the investigation, failure to report the improper restraint of the youths, and humiliating the youths by laughing at them while they were shackled. Petitioner was terminated on November 7, 1998.
Contrary to his testimony, Petitioner never advised Mikel Currie, Keith Williams, or any other member of management that Jessie Mathews had any alleged involvement in the improper use of restraints. In his "Letter of Rebuttal" submitted to the Center four and one-half months after his termination, Petitioner never mentioned any involvement on the part of Jessie Mathews. He did, however, admit in this letter that he did observe the two youths shackled together while they fought.
Since Respondent did not know of Jessie Mathews' similar behavior, Jessie Mathews was not terminated or otherwise disqualified. Later, however, Jessie Mathews, the white employee involved in the November 3, 1998, handcuffing was involved in an argument with another shift supervisor.
Mr. Mathews used profanity and acted unprofessionally. He was suspended and demoted as a result of his misconduct.
During the two months following the termination of Ollie Rainwater, Jeremy Coleman, and Petitioner, a majority of the individuals hired as youth care workers at the Center were minority group members (7 African-Americans and 1 Hispanic out of 15 hirees).
Robert Cannon, a white youth care worker, was terminated by Mikel Currie on October 16, 1998, for suspicion of being under the influence of alcohol and refusing to take a drug/alcohol test. Neither Mikel Currie nor Keith Williams had
any knowledge of any prior misconduct of this nature on the part of Robert Cannon.
Tammy Curry, a white female youth care worker, was subject to an assault by a female youth on December 13, 1998. Mikel Currie placed Tammy Curry on leave while he investigated the incident. Based upon his investigation, Mikel Currie reinstated Tammy Curry because he determined that she had been punched in the face and pulled down the hallway by her hair by a youth in an unprovoked attack. Mikel Currie concluded that she had acted properly in self-defense. The youth was charged with battery and Tammy Curry was reinstated. Additionally, the Inspector General at the Department of Children and Family Services conducted its own investigation and cleared Tammy Curry of any wrongdoing.
The Robert Canon and Tammy Curry incidents are not similar to Petitioner's circumstances.
Respondent, including the unit presently known as the Okaloosa Youth Academy, actively pursues a policy of affirmative action designed to recruit minorities. As of the spring of 2000, the Center employed 138 individuals, the majority of whom (72 employees ) were African-American.
After Petitioner's termination from the Center, Petitioner sought employment to replace the income he lost from this employment.
On February 21, 2000, Petitioner began working for Correctional Services Corporation as an on-call youth worker. His earnings through the date of the hearing are $8,013.56. He earns $8.30 per hour. He averages approximately 24 hours per week.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and the parties to this action. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
In this case, Petitioner contends that he was terminated because of racial discrimination. Therefore, Petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent acted with discriminatory intent. There are two ways to establish such a discriminatory animus. First, intentional discriminatory treatment can be proven through the presentation of "direct evidence" of discriminatory intent. See Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1081 (11th Cir. 1990). Second,
absent direct evidence intentional discrimination can be proven through circumstantial evidence.
In order to present a claim of racial discrimination based upon circumstantial evidence, the claim must be evaluated using the framework set out by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Initially, Petitioner has the burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. At 802,
93 S.Ct. at 1834. Petitioner's prima facie case gives rise to a presumption of discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2747, 127 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 36 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th
Cir. 1994). If Petitioner establishes a prima facie case, Respondent has the burden of producing a legitimate, non- discriminatory reason for the challenged action. This places upon Respondent merely an intermediate burden of production. Turnes, 36 F.3d at 1060. To satisfy this burden of production, the "defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons . . . . It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff." Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254- 255, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094-95, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). The
Respondent satisfies its intermediate burden of production if it produces "admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus." Turnes, 36 F.3d at 1061- 62(quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257, 101 S. Ct. at 1095-96). If
a Respondent succeeds in carrying its intermediate burden of production, the McDonnell-Douglas, framework, along with its presumption of discrimination, drops out of the case and the
trier of fact proceeds to the ultimate issue of whether Petitioner has proven that Respondent intentionally discriminated. Id. At 1061. On the other hand, where Petitioner's prima facie case is established, but the employer fails to meet his burden of production, the unrebutted presumption of discrimination stands. Id.
"The ultimate burden of persuading the trier-of-fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Burdine,
450 U.S. at 253, 101 S. Ct. at 1093-94. The fact finders disbelief of the reasons put forward by the Respondent (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima facie
case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of Respondent's proffered reasons will permit the trier-of-fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Center, at 511. The recent
United States Supreme Court case of Sanderson v. Reeves Plumbing Products, Inc., 2000 WL 743663 (U.S. 2000) makes it clear that a prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier-of-fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated. Petitioner is not required to introduce additional, independent evidence of discrimination.
However, a reason cannot be a pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reasons articulated were false and that the discrimination was the real reason. Id. A plaintiff must do more than simply allege pretext and self-serving affirmations of his own belief that he was discriminated against in order to satisfy his burden. Earley, 907 F.2d at 1081; Elliot v. Group Medical and Surgical Serv., 714 F.2d 556, 567 (5th Cir. 1983). Rather, a Petitioner must present "concrete evidence in the form of specific facts which show that the defendant's proffered reason is mere pretext. Mere conclusive allegations and assertions will not suffice." Earley, 907 F.2d at 1081.
Under McDonnell-Douglas, Petitioner establishes a
prima facie case of discrimination by showing: (1) he belongs to a protected group; (2) he was subjected to an adverse job action; 93) his employer treated similarly situated employees outside his classification more favorably; and 94) he was qualified to do the job. McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93
S. Ct. at 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 677; Jones v. Bessemer-Carraway Medical Center, 137 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 1998).
Petitioner's race is black. As such, he belongs to a protected minority class. Petitioner was terminated from his job with the Gulf Coast Treatment Center. The termination constitutes an adverse employment action. Additionally,
Petitioner was qualified to perform the duties of his job. However, Petitioner did not establish that non-minority employees were treated more fairly than Petitioner.
As the Eleventh Circuit noted in Jones, in work-rule violation cases, it is critical that a Petitioner establish the existence of a similarly-situated employee who was treated differently.
We stress that under the Jones [vs. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1989)] formulation, no plaintiff can make out a prima facie case by showing just that [he] belongs to a protected class and the [he] did not violate [the] employer's work rule. The plaintiff must also point to someone similarly- situated, (but outside the protected class), who disputed a violation of the rule and who was, in fact, treated better.
Jones v. Bessemer-Carraway Medical Center, 137 F.3d 1306, 1311
n.6 (11th Cir.), opinion modified by 151 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir.
1998). Id. at 1311 n.6. Therefore, under the McDonnell- Douglas, framework Petitioner has not established a prima facie case of discrimination.
The burden is on Petitioner "to show a similarity between [his] conduct and that of white employees who were treated differently and not on the [defendant] to disprove their similarity." Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1541 (11th Cir.
1989); see also Weaver v. Tech Data Corp., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1258,
1270 (M.D. Fla. 1999); Eldridge v. Morrison, 970 F. Supp. 928,
936 (M.D. Ala. 1996).
Petitioner cannot point to any similarly-situated employee outside his protected class who violated the same work rule as he did and who was treated more favorably than he. In order to establish that employees are similarly-situated, Petitioner must show that he and comparable employees or employee are similarly-situated in all respects. Thus, to be deemed "similarly-situated," the individuals with whom Petitioner seeks to compare his treatment must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and engaged in approximately the same conduct, without such differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer's treatment of them for it as dissimilar. See Gray v. Russell Corp., 681 So. 2d at 312; Mannicia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1999); Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997); Jones,
137 F.3d at 1311-13.
To establish disparate treatment of a similarly- situated non-minority group member, Petitioner must also produce evidence that the decision-maker in this case was aware that a non-minority group member had engaged in conduct similar to his at the time he was terminated. See Jones v. Gerwens, 784 F.2d at 1541-42 (to establish disparate treatment, plaintiff must
show that decision-maker knew of similar misconduct by white employee and did not act to discipline the white employee for his rule violation); St. Hilare v. The Pep Boys, 73 F. Supp. 2d 1366, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 1999)(and cases cited therein); Webb v.
R&B Holding Co., 992 F. Supp. 1382, 1388 (S.D. Fla.
1998)(employee is not similarly-situated where plaintiff failed to prove employer was aware of rude behavior by white employer and no evidence existed that such behavior was reported to management); Ellis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1522,
1529 (M.D. Ala. 1996)(same holding). When the decision-maker has no knowledge of misconduct by a similarly-situated non- minority employee, disparate treatment cannot be established as a matter of law. See Jones, 874 F.2d at 1541.
Petitioner alleges that three white employees, Robert Cannon, Tammy Curry, and Jessie Mathews, were similarly-situated to him and were not terminated for alleged rule violations. The evidence clearly establishes, however, that none of these employees were similarly-situated to Petitioner.
Robert Cannon was not similarly-situated to Petitioner because the nature of his offense was different. See Jones, 874 F.2d at 1539-1540; Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1652. Robert Cannon
reported to work under the apparent influence of alcohol and refused to take a drug/alcohol test as directed by program
director Mikel Currie. Robert Cannon committed a different offense from Petitioner.
Petitioner has also failed to satisfy his burden of proving that Tammy Curry, a white female youth care worker, engaged in similar misconduct because the evidence established conclusively that Tammy Curry did not engage in any misconduct. Tammy Curry was subjected to an unprovoked attack by a female youth and was determined to have used appropriate force to defend herself while being dragged down the corridor by her hair. Tammy Curry's conduct was investigated by both the Center's management and the Inspector General of the Department of Children and Family Services and she was cleared of any wrongdoing in both investigations.
Jessie Mathews, a white youth care worker, was involved in shackling youths on an earlier shift. However, Petitioner failed to establish disparate treatment because he did not offer more credible evidence that the investigator/decision-makers, Mikel Currie and Keith Williams, or any other member of management had any knowledge of any alleged misconduct on the part of Jessie Mathews. In the absence of proof that the decision-maker was aware of similar misconduct on the part of a white employee, Petitioner cannot establish that he was subjected to disparate treatment on the basis of his race.
Even if Petitioner had established a prima facie case
in this matter, the Center has articulated a legitimate, non- discriminatory reason for the termination. It terminated the Petitioner because the investigation established that (1) he failed to report the misconduct of his co-workers; (2) he knowingly misled Keith Williams during the course of the investigation; and (3) he humiliated the shackled youths by laughing at them.
It is undisputed that Petitioner failed to report the behavior that he witnessed on November 5, 2000, in violation of Section 5 of the Employee Conduct Policy, which requires all employees to report any misconduct.
It is well-settled that anti-discrimination laws "do not require the employer to have good cause for its decision." Nix v. WLCY Radio, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984). Such laws are not meant to be a shield against "harsh" or "draconian" treatment and do "not take away an employer's right to interpret its rules as it so chooses, and to make determinations as it sees fit under these rules." Id.; see also Abel v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1339 n.5; Woodbury v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 901 F. Supp. 1560, 1565 (M.D. Fla. 1995).
The evidence further established that Petitioner misled Keith Williams when he denied knowledge of the shackling incident during his telephone interview on November 5, 1998, and
did not admit his knowledge of the later events. Although Petitioner denied his earlier denial of any knowledge at the hearing, his testimony is not credible for two reasons. Keith Williams' contemporaneous memorandum of his interview makes it clear that Petitioner consistently denied any knowledge of the shackling incident and the statements and interviews of the youths.
The foregoing reasons for termination satisfied Respondent's burden of production "to articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the [adverse employment action]." McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824.
After a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination is articulated, it is incumbent then on the Petitioner to establish, by preponderance of the evidence, that the proffered reason for the employer's action is a mere pretext for discrimination. McDonnell-Doulgas, 411 U.S. at 804. The
Petitioner must prove that the articulated reason was false and that discrimination was the true reason for the employment action at issue. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 515-516, 113 S. Ct. at 1275-52.
In attempting to satisfy his burden of proof, Petitioner argues that he did not mislead Keith Williams about his knowledge of the shackling incidents, that he had no
obligation to report because his supervisor was involved and that he did not humiliate any youths. These arguments fail to establish that the reasons articulated for Petitioner's termination were a pretext for discrimination.
Finally, Petitioner has failed to introduce any evidence of racial animus and has, therefore, failed to satisfy his burden of proving that his race was the real reason for his termination. Petitioner has produced no evidence of disparate treatment because none of the three white comparators to whom he referred were similarly-situated as a matter of fact or law.
Petitioner's assertions that he did not violate any work rule misses the mark because this is not a wrongful termination or just cause proceeding. In the context of an employment discrimination action, it is well-settled that an employer "may fire an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based upon erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not for a discriminatory reason." Jones,
151 F.3d at 1324 n. 16 (quoting Nix, 738 F.2d at 1187); see also Curry v. United Parcel Service of America, Recommended Order, pp. 24-25, DOAH Case No. 98-1772 (June 24, 1999, ALJ Ruff); Marshall v. Tarmac Florida, supra at 9.
The evidence established that, whether mistaken or not, the Center's supervisors involved in the termination decision honestly believed that Petitioner had violated the
three work rules for which he was terminated. Even if Petitioner's argument that he did not violate those rules is true, this argument fails to show that the employer's reasons for termination were a pretext for discrimination. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained:
The law is clear that, even if a Title VII claimant did not in fact commit the violation with which he is charged, an employer successfully rebuts any prima facie case of disparate treatment by showing that it honestly believed that the employee committed the violation.
Jones, 874 F.2d at 1540; see also Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1363 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999)("An employer who fires an employee under the mistaken but honest impression that the employee violated a work rule is not liable for discriminatory conduct"); Nix, 738 F.2d at 1186; Curry, supra at 24-25. Thus, the Nix and Gerwen opinions and their progeny instruct that the issue here is not whether Petitioner violated the work rules, but rather whether the Center management had an honest, good faith belief that he did.
The preponderance of the evidence establishes that the Respondent's belief that Petitioner violated the work rules was an honestly held one. Before he was terminated, a thorough investigation was conducted by Mikel Currie and Keith Williams. They interviewed six youths and the three employees who were identified by the youths as having engaged in, or witnessed, the
shackling incident. Therefore, Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he was discriminated against because of his race.
Human Relations denying the Petition for Relief in its entirety.
R. John Westberry, Esquire Holt & Westberry, P.L. 1108-A North 12th Avenue
Kevin L. O'Dea, Esquire McGlinchey Stafford
Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
