STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

PALM BEACH COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

)

CASSANDRE LAWRENCE, )

)

Respondent. )

Case No. 01-2850

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

The parties having been provided proper notice, Administrative Law Judge John G. Van Laningham of the Division of Administrative Hearings convened a formal hearing of this matter in West Palm Beach, Florida, on November 27, 2001, as scheduled. The hearing was adjourned that same day.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Alan M. Aronson, Esquire

Office of the Chief Counsel for the School Board

Palm Beach County School Board

3318 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406

For Respondent: Cassandre Lawrence, pro se

902 42nd Street

West Palm Beach, Florida 33407 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has just cause to terminate Respondent’s employment as an educational support

employee, where Respondent has confessed to a felony shoplifting charge as part of a deferred prosecution agreement pursuant to which criminal charges will be dismissed if Respondent satisfactorily complies with the agreement.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

In a Notice of Suspension Without Pay and Recommendation for Termination From Employment dated June 29, 2001, the Superintendent of Schools for the School District of Palm Beach County, Florida notified Respondent Cassandre Lawrence that he intended to urge the Palm Beach County School Board (the "Board") to (a) suspend her without pay effective July 11, 2001, and (b) to terminate her employment, effective 15 days after the Board's decision or, alternatively, following an administrative hearing if timely requested. The superintendent based his recommendation on allegations that Respondent had pleaded guilty to a felony crime of retail theft and had failed to timely notify the District of her conviction.

The Board accepted the superintendent's recommendation at its regular meeting on July 11, 2001. Respondent timely requested a formal administrative hearing, and, on July 18, 2001, the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings.

The Administrative Law Judge assigned the case issued a Notice of Hearing on July 25, 2001, that set the final hearing

for November 27, 2001, in West Palm Beach, Florida. Prior to that date, the case was transferred to the undersigned, who convened the final hearing on November 27 as scheduled. The Board appeared through counsel, and Respondent appeared pro se.

The Board presented two witnesses, both District employees: Carl Holeva, Manager of Personnel Compliance; and Paul Lachance, Director of Professional Standards. In addition, the Board introduced ten exhibits into evidence, numbered 1-4, 4-A, 5, 6, and 8-10. Respondent testified on her own behalf, presented no additional witnesses, and offered no exhibits.

The final hearing transcript was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 24, 2001. Following instructions given at the conclusion of the hearing, the Board timely filed its proposed recommended order on January 22, 2002. Respondent did not timely file a proposed recommended order per se, but she did submit a letter dated January 20, 2002, which was received for filing on February 11, 2002. A copy of Respondent’s letter was transmitted to the Board’s counsel together with a Notice of Ex-Parte Communication issued February 13, 2002.

The undersigned has considered the parties’ respective post-hearing submissions.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow.

1. At all times material, Respondent Cassandre Lawrence (“Lawrence”) was employed in the Palm Beach County School District (the “District”) as a paraprofessional (teacher’s aide), a position which she had held for approximately six years before the events that gave rise to the instant proceeding.1 Lawrence was working at Northmore Elementary School during the 2000-01 school year.

2. On December 26, 2000, Lawrence and a female companion were arrested at the Boynton Beach Mall on shoplifting charges. Lawrence was charged with grand retail theft, which is a third degree felony.

3. Pursuant to Board Rule 6Gx50-3.13,2 all District employees must report any arrests, convictions, “commitment[s] to a pretrial diversion program,” or pleas of any kind within 48 hours after the reportable event.3 At the time of Lawrence’s arrest, however, the District’s schools were closed for Christmas vacation, so she did not report the incident immediately.

4. Instead, on January 9, 2001——Lawrence’s first day back at work after the holidays——Lawrence submitted to the District’s

   Chief Personnel Officer a written disclosure of her arrest, which stated:

   On December 26, 2000 I was shopping in the Boynton Beach Mall with a friend.

   Unknowingly, she put some items in my shopping bag. I was falsely arrested. My friend has admitted doing so [sic]. I felt that being an employee of the School Board that [sic] I should report this matter.

   This matter would be dissolved [sic] very soon. I have never been in any trouble or accused before. This situation has really been bothering me. After this matter has been straightened out I will be forwarding you the necessary paper work.

   
   

   Lawrence’s statement was provided to the District’s Office of Professional Standards on January 10, 2001. That office opened a case file on Lawrence.

5. On March 29, 2001, Lawrence reached an agreement with the state attorney that provided for her referral to a pretrial intervention program (“PTI”). See Section 948.08, Florida Statutes (governing pretrial intervention programs). This agreement was reduced to writing on April 3, 2001, when the parties executed a contract they called the Deferred Prosecution Agreement (“Agreement”).

6. Under the Agreement, the state attorney promised, in return for Lawrence’s agreement to abide by conditions specified in the Agreement, to defer the prosecution of Lawrence for a period of 18 months from the date of April 3, 2001. Further, the state attorney agreed that if Lawrence complied with the

   conditions of the Agreement, then “no criminal prosecution concerning [the shoplifting] charge [would] be instituted[.]” By signing the Agreement, Lawrence expressly waived her constitutional rights to a speedy trial.

7. On the same day she executed the Agreement, and in consideration thereof, Lawrence signed this statement:

   I, Cassandre Lawrence freely and voluntarily admit that I am guilty of the allegations [of grand theft] contained in [the charging document].

   
   

   (This statement will be referred to hereafter as the “Confession.”)4

8. Sometime shortly afterwards——the evidence does not reveal the exact date——Lawrence reported to the District that she had entered into a PTI pursuant to the Agreement. As a result, on April 19, 2001, Mr. Holeva of the District's Office of Professional Standards met with Lawrence, her attorney (who participated by telephone), and her union representative,5 to investigate the circumstances surrounding the shoplifting charge against Lawrence. In this meeting, Lawrence acknowledged that, to enter into a PTI, she had signed the Confession wherein she admitted guilt to the felony theft charge——a so-called “435 offense.”6

9. Following this interview, the Office of Professional Standards referred Lawrence’s case to the Case Management Review

   Committee (the “Committee”). The Committee is composed of a dozen senior District employees who are responsible for determining whether probable cause exists to discipline an employee suspected of having engaged in misconduct.

10. Upon review, the Committee determined that Lawrence had violated Board Rule 6Gx50-3.13 by failing to timely report her arrest and later referral to a PTI within 48 hours after these respective events had occurred. (Yet, it should be noted, Lawrence had not concealed the material facts, nor had she attempted to mislead the District.) However, the Committee considered Lawrence’s purported failures strictly to follow the notification rule to be, collectively, a minor infraction that, without more, would have warranted at most a written reprimand.

11. Much more important, the Committee found that Lawrence was guilty of a “435 offense.” Because the District’s settled policy and consistent practice is to terminate any employee who has committed a “435 offense,” the Committee recommended that Lawrence’s employment be terminated.

12. The Superintendent accepted the Committee’s recommendation that Lawrence be fired. By letter dated June 29, 2001, the Superintendent notified Lawrence that he would recommend to the Board at its July 11, 2001, meeting that she be suspended without pay pending dismissal.

13. The Board subsequently accepted the Superintendent’s recommendation. Lawrence has been suspended without pay since on or about July 11, 2001.

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

14. The Division of Administrative Hearings has personal and subject matter jurisdiction in this proceeding pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

15. Generally speaking, "[i]n accordance with the provisions of s. 4(b) of Art. IX of the State Constitution, district school boards [are empowered to] operate, control, and supervise all free public schools in their respective districts and may exercise any power except as expressly prohibited by the State Constitution or general law." Section 230.03(2), Florida Statutes.

16. The district superintendent is responsible for recommending the placement of school personnel and requiring compliance and observance by all personnel of the laws, policies, and directives of the school district. The superintendent has the authority to recommend to the school board that a district employee be dismissed from employment. See Section 230.33(7)(e), Florida Statutes.

17. "Under Florida law, a school board's decision to terminate an employee is one affecting the employee's substantial interests; therefore, the employee is entitled to a

    formal hearing under section 120.57(1) if material issues of fact are in dispute," for a school board is "a state agency falling within Chapter 120 for purposes of quasi-judicial administrative orders." Sublett v. District School Board of Sumter County, 617 So. 2d 374, 377 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).

18. A district school board employee against whom a dismissal proceeding has been initiated must be given written notice of the specific charges prior to the hearing. Although the notice "need not be set forth with the technical nicety or formal exactness required of pleadings in court," it should "specify the [statute,] rule, [regulation, policy, or collective bargaining provision] the [school board] alleges has been violated and the conduct which occasioned [said] violation." Jacker v. School Board of Dade County, 426 So. 2d 1149, 1151 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)(Jorgenson, J. concurring).

19. Once the school board, in its notice of specific charges, has delineated the offenses alleged to justify termination, those are the only grounds upon which dismissal may be predicated, and none other. See Lusskin v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 731 So. 2d 67, 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Cottrill v. Department of Insurance, 685 So. 2d 1371, 1372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Klein v. Department of Business and Professional

    Regulation, 625 So. 2d 1237, 1238-39 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Delk v. Department of Professional Regulation, 595 So. 2d 966, 967 (Fla.

    5th DCA 1992); Willner v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, 563 So. 2d 805, 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), rev.

    denied, 576 So. 2d 295 (1991).

    
    

20. At hearing, the school board has the burden to prove the allegations contained in the notice of specific charges by a preponderance of the evidence, unless the collective bargaining agreement covering the bargaining unit of which the employee is a member prescribes a more demanding standard of proof. See McNeill v. Pinellas County School Board, 678 So. 2d 476, 477 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)("The School Board bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, each element of the charged offense which may warrant dismissal."); Sublett v. Sumter County School Board, 664 So. 2d 1178, 1179 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Neither party here has pointed to or offered in evidence any contractual provision that would require the Board to satisfy a stricter standard of proof.7

21. Where, as here, the employee whose discharge is sought is an "educational support employee," the school board must also act in accordance with the provisions of Section 231.3605, Florida Statutes, which provides:

    1. As used in this section:

       
       

       1. "Educational support employee" means any person employed by a district school system who is so employed as a teacher assistant, an education paraprofessional, a member of the transportation department, a

          member of the operations department, a member of the maintenance department, a member of food service, a secretary, or a clerical employee, or any other person who by virtue of his or her position of employment is not required to be certified by the Department of Education or district school board pursuant to s. 231.1725. This section does not apply to persons employed in confidential or management positions.

          This section applies to all employees who are not temporary or casual and whose duties require 20 or more hours in each normal working week.

          
          

       2. "Employee" means any person employed as an educational support employee.

          
          

       3. "Superintendent" means the superintendent of schools or his or her designee.

       
       

       (2)(a) Each educational support employee shall be employed on probationary status for a period to be determined through the appropriate collective bargaining agreement or by district school board rule in cases where a collective bargaining agreement does not exist.

       
       

       1. Upon successful completion of the probationary period by the employee, the employee's status shall continue from year to year unless the superintendent terminates the employee for reasons stated in the collective bargaining agreement, or in district school board rule in cases where a collective bargaining agreement does not exist, or reduces the number of employees on a districtwide basis for financial reasons.

          
          

       2. In the event the superintendent seeks termination of an employee, the district school board may suspend the employee with or without pay. The employee shall receive written notice and shall have the opportunity to formally appeal the

       termination. The appeals process shall be determined by the appropriate collective bargaining process or by district school board rule in the event there is no collective bargaining agreement.

       
       

       (Emphasis added).

       
       

22. Lawrence is an "educational support employee," within the meaning of Section 231.3605(1)(a), Florida Statutes, who has completed the probationary period and is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 231.3605(2)(b), Florida Statutes, her employment may be terminated "for reasons stated in the collective bargaining agreement."

23. An examination of the Union Contract reveals that a bargaining unit member covered by the contract may be disciplined, dismissed, demoted, or suspended for “just cause” as governed by “applicable State Statutes.”

24. Lawrence, whose job entails the instruction and supervision of young children, did not take issue with the Board’s assertion that she is an employee required by law to be screened pursuant to Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. It is concluded that Lawrence is a covered employee under that chapter.

25. Under both the more lenient “Level 1 screening standards” and the more stringent “Level 2” standards, felony theft is a disqualifying offense. See Sections 435.03(2)(r) and

    435.04(2)(w), Florida Statutes. When a covered employee is found guilty of a disqualifying offense, his or her employer must either terminate the employee, transfer the employee to a position for which background screening is not required, or grant the employee an exemption from disqualification. Section 435.06(2), Florida Statutes.

26. It is concluded that conviction of a disqualifying “435 offense” constitutes “just cause” for dismissal under the Union Contract.

27. At this point, a few words about the Board’s rationale for terminating Lawrence’s employment are in order. First, the Board’s position does not depend on whether Lawrence actually committed the crime with which she was charged. Indeed, the Board made no attempt at hearing to prove that Lawrence actually stole merchandise from a merchant in the Boynton Beach Mall on December 26, 2000, other than to introduce her Confession.

28. Second, Lawrence’s reasons for signing the Confession are irrelevant to the Board. Thus, regarding the Confession, the Board offered no evidence at hearing to rebut Lawrence’s explanation for having admitted guilt——which was, recall, that she had done so not because she was in fact guilty but, on the advice of counsel, to avoid the expense and uncertainty of a trial.

29. Third, the Board has not relied on Lawrence’s alleged technical violations of the notice requirements of Board Rule 6Gx50-3.13 as grounds for termination. To the contrary, the Board made clear at hearing that these were minor infractions for which an employee would not be fired.

30. In sum, then, the Board’s decision to discharge Lawrence rests entirely on the undisputed fact that she signed the Confession, an act which the Board describes as a “guilty [plea] in her best interest.”

31. The dispositive question is whether Lawrence pleaded

    
    

    guilty to the felony shoplifting charge.

    
    

32. In answering this question, the starting point is Chapter 435, Florida Statutes, wherein the legislature clearly expressed its intent that no covered employee (such as Lawrence) be either:

    1. found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, or

       
       

    2. entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to,

    
    

    any disqualifying offense (such as felony theft). See Sections 435.03(2) and 435.04(2), Florida Statutes.

33. Also important is Board Rule 6Gx50-3.12, which authorizes the Board to discharge any District employee who has been convicted of, among other crimes, a disqualifying offense under Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. This Rule defines the term

    “conviction” to mean “a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or trial regardless of whether adjudication is withheld.”

34. The word “plea” is a term of art in criminal law.

    
    

    Legally speaking, a plea is not precisely the same thing as a confession or admission. As the former Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals explained:

    A confession only relates to a set of facts and, therefore, requires only a knowledge of the factual situation. A guilty plea is something more; it is an admission of all the elements of the crime charged. . . .

    While all guilty pleas are confessions, not all confessions are guilty pleas.

    
    

    United States v. Robertson, 582 F.2d 1356, 1368 (5th Cir. 1978)(en banc).

35. A confession is not conclusive evidence of guilt; hence, a confession alone would not support a criminal conviction. See Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S.Ct. 582, 583 (1927). In contrast,

    A plea of guilty . . . is itself a conviction. Like a verdict of a jury it is conclusive. More is not required; the court has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence.

    
    

    Id.

    
    

36. Earlier in this Order, the undersigned denominated

    
    

    Lawrence’s signed admission of guilt the “Confession.” That label was deliberately chosen, reflecting the legal conclusion,

    hereby stated, that Lawrence confessed to the crime; she did not plead guilty. (That Lawrence referred to her Confession as a “plea” in her hearing testimony is, of course, not determinative of the legal characterization of her action.) As is clear from the Agreement’s plain language, Lawrence waived her right to a speedy trial, not her right to a trial.

37. The bottom line is, Lawrence has not been convicted of the charge stemming from her December 2000 arrest at the Boynton Beach Mall. Rather, she has agreed to abide by certain terms and conditions in return for the state’s promise to drop the felony charge against her if she complies. If the state attorney elects to resume the criminal prosecution of Lawrence,

    e.g. because she breaches the Agreement, then “the state must prove the charges against [her] just as if no [deferred prosecution] agreement had existed.” See State v. Fitzgerald, 640 So. 2d 214, 216 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

38. As of this writing, the criminal charge against Lawrence is still pending (unless the state attorney agreed to shorten the period of deferred prosecution——but no evidence in the record suggests that such has occurred). If the criminal prosecution were reinstated, Lawrence might plead guilty to a crime (though perhaps a lesser offense which would not be a disqualifying “435 offense”), she might be convicted after a trial, or a jury of her peers might find her not guilty. At

    this point, speculating about possible outcomes serves no useful purpose, except to underscore that, for all that has transpired, Lawrence theoretically could be acquitted of the felony charge upon which the Board would base her termination, were the criminal case to proceed to trial.

39. Because Lawrence did not enter a plea of guilty or nolo contendere,8 and because she was not found guilty as the result of a trial, she clearly has not been “convicted” of a crime as the term “conviction” is defined for purposes of Board Rule 6Gx50-3.12.9 It is equally clear that Lawrence was not “found guilty” as that term is used in Sections 435.03(2) and 435.04(2), Florida Statutes.10 Therefore, she is not subject to exclusion from employment pursuant to Section 435.06, Florida Statutes.

40. For these reasons, the Board does not, at the present time, have just cause to terminate Lawrence’s employment.

41. This does not mean, however, that Lawrence should get off scot-free. The Confession is significant, because therein Lawrence admitted (for whatever reasons) having committed an act involving dishonesty, which is a serious matter. With just cause, the Board can and should discipline Lawrence for her admitted conduct.

42. The appropriate punishment for Lawrence is suspension from employment without pay until the criminal charge is dropped

    pursuant to the Agreement or Lawrence is acquitted of the charge, should she be prosecuted therefor. As soon as either of these events occurs, Lawrence should be reinstated to her previous position, subject to a 90 calendar day probationary period during which she may be discharged without recourse. (Of course, after reinstatement Lawrence should not be summarily fired for past conduct, i.e. the subject arrest.) If, however, Lawrence is found guilty of, or pleads guilty (or nolo contendere) to, the felony theft charge that has been brought against her, then the Board will have just cause to terminate her employment, and should do so.

43. As for Lawrence’s alleged violations of Board Rule 6Gx50-3.13(2), it is concluded that the Board has established, at most, one technical infraction relating to Lawrence’s failure to report her arrest within 48 hours after the occurrence. (The allegation that she also failed to timely report her commitment to a PTI was not established by a preponderance of evidence.) Because it is unclear on the face of the Rule whether or not the brief reporting period is tolled during District-wide holidays and vacations, however, it was not unreasonable for Lawrence to wait until returning to work after Christmas break to report her arrest. More important is that Lawrence clearly did not attempt to conceal the facts or mislead the District; she certainly satisfied the spirit of Board Rule 6Gx50-3.13 if not the strict

letter thereof. Under these circumstances, it is concluded that Lawrence should not receive any additional punishment based on what can fairly be called a trifle. De minimis non curat lex.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a final order that suspends Lawrence from employment without pay effective July 11, 2001, such suspension to continue until the court has dismissed the felony theft charge pending against her or until she is acquitted of the charge, whichever first occurs. The final order should further provide that Lawrence shall be reinstated to her prior position, subject to a 90 calendar day probationary period, immediately upon the expiration of the suspension period. Finally, the final order should state that if Lawrence is prosecuted for and convicted of, or pleads guilty (or nolo contendere) to, the pending charge, she will be discharged from employment with the District.

DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 2002.

ENDNOTES

1/ A paraprofessional is a non-instructional employee working in a classroom setting with students.

2/ None of the Board Rules cited in this Order are printed in the Florida Administrative Code, but all were introduced into evidence at hearing. The Board’s rules should be on file with the Secretary of State's Office. See Rule 6G-1, Florida Administrative Code.

3/ On May 18, 1999, Lawrence executed a document styled “Self- Reporting of New Arrests and Convictions Affidavit” (which all District employees are required to sign) in which she acknowledged being aware of, and promised to comply with, the Board’s self-reporting requirements.

4/ Lawrence’s unrebutted testimony was that she signed the Confession, on the advice of counsel, solely in consideration of the Agreement——which allowed her to avoid the expense and uncertainty of a trial——and not because she had committed the crime of shoplifting. In fact, at hearing Lawrence vigorously maintained her innocence of the criminal charge. For reasons that will become clear, it is not necessary to decide whether

Lawrence actually committed the crime with which she has been charged. The trier, however, accepts Lawrence’s testimony in this regard to this extent: Whatever reasons motivated her, Lawrence did not sign the Confession because she believed herself to be morally culpable for the alleged crime.

5/ Lawrence is protected under the Agreement Between the School District of Palm Beach County, Florida and the Association of Educational Secretaries and Office Professionals dated July 1, 2000 – June 30, 2003 (the “Union Contract”).

6/ The term reflects the fact that Chapter 435, Florida Statutes, lists numerous crimes that will disqualify a perpetrator from certain public occupations. Among these “435 offenses” are theft, robbery, and related crimes “if the offense is a felony.” See Sections 435.03(2)(r) and 435.04(2)(w), Florida Statutes.

7/ Where the district school board, through the collective bargaining process, has agreed to bear a more demanding standard, it must honor, and act in accordance with, its agreement. See Chiles v. United Faculty of Florida, 615 So. 2d 671, 672-73 (Fla. 1993)("Once the executive has negotiated and the legislature has accepted and funded an agreement [with its employees' collective bargaining representative], the state and all its organs are bound by that [collective bargaining agreement] under the principles of contract law."); Hillsborough County Governmental Employees Association v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority, 522 So. 2d 358, 363 (Fla. 1988)("[W]e hold that a public employer must implement a ratified collective bargaining agreement with respect to wages, hours, or terms or conditions of employment . . . ."); Palm Beach County School Board v. Auerbach, No. 96-3683 (Fla. DOAH February 20, 1997) (Recommended Order)("Long-standing case law establishes that in a teacher employment discipline case, the school district has the burden of proving its charges by a preponderance of the evidence. . . . However, in this case, the district must comply with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, which

. . . requires the more stringent standard of proof: clear and convincing evidence.").

8/ A plea of nolo contendere has the same effect as a guilty plea in the criminal case in which it is entered. See Peel v. State, 150 So. 2d 281, 291 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963), cert. denied, 380

U.S. 986 (1965).

9/ The Board was obviously aware of the difference between a guilty plea and commitment to a pretrial diversion program, because it specifically referenced both in Rule 6Gx5—3.13(2). Clearly, had the Board intended to treat commitment to a pretrial diversion program as the equivalent of a conviction, it could easily have done so.

10/ Not to belabor the point, but the term “found guilty” in the context of the subject statutes plainly refers to a finding by the trier of fact upon evidence presented at trial. The term cannot inferentially include situations where, as here, the accused merely has confessed to a crime, because the statutes specifically exclude from employment persons who, in the alternative to being “found guilty,” have entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere. The latter proviso would be mere surplusage if “found guilty of” equaled “confessed to,” for guilty pleas are a subset of all confessions; thus, in other words, whenever an accused pleads guilty, he necessarily has confessed to the crime.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Alan M. Aronson, Esquire Office of the Chief Counsel

for the School Board

Palm Beach County School Board

3318 Forest Hill Boulevard, Suite C-302 West Palm Beach, Florida 33406

Cassandre Lawrence 902 42nd Street

West Palm Beach, Florida 33407

Honorable Charlie Crist, Commissioner Department of Education

The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400

Dr. Arthur C. Johnson, Superintendent Palm Beach County School Board

3340 Forest Hill Boulevard Room C316

West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5869

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.

Docket for Case No: 01-002850

Orders for Case No: 01-002850