STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
HAAS PUBLISHING COMPANIES,
Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
Respondent.
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) Case No. 03-2683
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RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon due notice, a disputed-fact hearing was held in this case on November 20 and 21, 2003, in Tallahassee, Florida, before the Division of Administrative Hearings by its duly- assigned Administrative Law Judge, Ella Jane P. Davis.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Rex D. Ware, Esquire
Steel Hector & Davis LLP
215 South Monroe Street, Suite 601 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
For Respondent: Lynn Lovejoy, Esquire
Office of the Attorney General
107 West Gaines Street Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Is Petitioner Haas Publishing Company liable for the taxes and interest assessed under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, specifically the sales and use tax and related surtaxes,
pursuant to Section 212.031, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.070, for the audit period June 1, 1995 through May 31, 2000, and if so, to what extent?
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This case involves the assessment of sales and use tax and associated interest by Respondent, Florida Department of Revenue (DOR) against Petitioner, Haas Publishing Companies (Petitioner, Haas, or Taxpayer) for the audit period of June 1, 1995 through May 31, 2000. DOR's file or identification number(s) for this matter is Audit No(s). A0009601727-010, -015, -016, -230, and -
530. The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings on or about July 22, 2003.
By agreement, the duty to go forward was upon DOR. (Cf. Discussion of burden of proof in the Conclusions of Law.) DOR presented the oral testimony of Debra Gifford, DOR Tax Law Specialist II, and had DOR Exhibits one through seven admitted in evidence.
Petitioner's oral motion for summary recommended order, pursuant to Section 120.80(14)(b)2., Florida Statutes was denied.
Petitioner presented the oral testimony of Ken Sullender and two experts, Lee Waronker and James Volkman, and had Petitioner's Exhibits one through three admitted in evidence.
A Transcript was filed on December 16, 2003, and, by agreement of the parties, proposed recommended orders were due to be filed no later than January 16, 2003. Both parties timely filed their Proposed Recommended Orders, which have been considered in preparation of this Recommended Order.
The parties repeatedly graciously consented to a longer- than-usual time frame for rendition of this Recommended Order, due to intervening surgery and a recovery period for the undersigned.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Haas is a Delaware corporation, authorized to do business in the State of Florida. It is a subsidiary of Primedia, Inc. Haas publishes free consumer guides to apartments and homes and is paid by the apartment owners, realtors, and homeowners who advertise in the publications. One of Haas' divisions, Distributech, distributes the guides to retail stores. Haas negotiates with retailers for an appropriate site for its display of publications at each retail location. Nationwide, Haas distributes its publications from approximately 42,000 locations. Nationwide, Haas paid for the exclusive right to distribute, under contracts, in approximately 20,000 locations. Otherwise, it distributes in "free" locations.
As required by Section 72.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes, Haas has complied with all applicable registration requirements with respect to the taxes at issue herein.
DOR is the agency responsible for the administration and enforcement of Florida's tax laws, including sales and use tax and various local surtaxes.
DOR conducted an audit of Haas for the period of June 1, 1995 through May 31, 2000. The audit resulted in an assessment of sales and use tax and associated surtaxes, interest, and penalties (Assessment).
After protest and petition for reconsideration, DOR issued its Notice of Reconsideration (NOR) to Haas on May 16, 2003, wherein DOR sustained the Assessment in full, but offered to waive all penalties, without prejudicing Haas' right to challenge the remainder of the Assessment in full.
Haas accepted the Department's offer to waive all penalties in their entirety, making a payment on the Assessment at the time the Petition herein was filed. In other words, Haas paid certain uncontested amounts in order to pursue the instant challenge to the remainder of the Assessment of all taxes and all interest, and in order to take advantage of an unrelated "extended amnesty" provided by DOR. This formal proceeding followed.
The auditor who actually performed the work of the audit did not testify at the disputed-fact hearing. DOR's only witness, Ms. Gifford, did not participate in the original audit. However, Ms. Gifford reviewed the audit documents in detail and professionally consulted with the auditor and other reviewers to review the auditor's methods against the paperwork of the audit. She also reviewed the audit with input from Haas and its representative in the course of the Technical Assistance and Dispute Resolution (TADR) process, and throughout the informal challenges preceding this formal proceeding. She also reviewed all of the de novo material presented at the deposition of Haas' principal, Mr. Sullender, for purposes of her testimony. She is an expert capable of assisting the trier of fact, in that she is a Florida-licensed certified public accountant (CPA), and the undersigned is satisfied with the accuracy of her explanation of DOR's policies and procedures and of her predecessor's methodology and calculations. Also, her interpretations of rules and statutes are entitled to great weight where they purport to be the interpretation of the agency, but they do not constitute "factual" testimony and are not binding in this de novo proceeding. Ms. Gifford's analysis of case law is not entitled to that same deference.
At the disputed-fact hearing, Haas challenged both the timeliness of the audit and the methodology of the audit. It is
axiomatic that the amount assessed depends upon the methodology employed by the auditor, but DOR contended herein that because Haas protested only that an assessment had been made and because Haas had accepted all available offers of mitigation, Haas could not protest, at hearing, the amount calculated for the Assessment, whether the audit's calculations were correct, or whether the audit had been conducted in a timely manner. The following allegations of the Petition herein are relevant to these issues:
No payment made by Haas to a retailer in Florida constituted payment for a lease of real property;
No payment made by Haas to a retailer in Florida constituted payment for a license to use real property;
The payments made by Haas to retailers were for distribution rights and/or intrinsically valuable personal property rights;
The payments made by Haas to retailers were not subject to Florida sales and use taxes and other surtaxes;
Alternatively, the payments made by Haas to retailers should have been apportioned by DOR, pursuant to Section 212.031, Florida Statutes;
Some or all of the taxes that the Department claims that Haas owes have been paid by the retailers with whom Haas had agreements;
The Department was without statutory authority to impose the Assessment for taxes and interest as set forth in Exhibit A; and
The Assessment that is the subject of this proceeding is unlawful and violates the provisions of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes;
Petitioner is entitled to relief under Sections 72.011 and Section 120.80, Florida
Statutes. Section 212.031, Florida Statutes, dictates that the payments made by Haas to Florida retailers were not subject to Florida tax and therefore requires that the Assessment by DOR be stricken or modified.
The auditor sent Form DR-840, the Notice of Intent to Audit (NOI), to Haas on May 30, 2000. This item informed the Taxpayer that the period of the audit would be June 1, 1995 through May 30, 2000, and that the audit would commence before July 29, 2000 (within 60 days) unless an attached waiver was signed and returned. The audit file does not reflect a signed waiver within 60 days. Ms. Gifford, on behalf of DOR, testified that the purpose of this NOI was to warn the Taxpayer that the audit would begin within 60 days unless the Taxpayer waived the timeline and that with a waiver, the audit would begin within
120 days.
Ms. Gifford further testified that DOR considers itself limited to going back only five years from the date the auditor begins to review a taxpayer's records and that the Agency interprets Section 213.335, Florida Statutes, to require completion of the audit within one year of the initial letter.
Ms. Gifford asserted that with a waiver, DOR would interpret the several applicable statutes and rules to provide the auditor with 120 days to begin an audit to encompass the whole of June 1, 1995 to May 30, 2000. However, if an audit is
not begun within 120 days, DOR understands that the statutory audit period is not tolled and DOR usually removes the delay period from the front end (i.e., DOR starts the audit period the delayed number of days after June 1, 1995) and adds it to the back end (ends the audit period the delayed number of days after May 30, 2000) so that a five-year period of audit occurs, but the audit period starts some date later than June 1, 1995, and ends some date later than May 30, 2000. DOR considers the start of the audit to be when the auditor begins looking at records of the taxpayer.
Haas provided pertinent, but incomplete, records on August 29, 2000, which was more than 60 days and less than 90 days after the May 30, 2000, NOI. Haas requested several extensions to review work papers received from the auditor. All were honored by DOR. A lot of correspondence ensued between the auditor and Haas and between DOR and Haas' designated representative(s)/accountants, but DOR's auditor did not record any time spent on the audit file until he met with Haas or its representative on October 23, 2000, more than 120 days after May 30, 2000. On the basis of the auditor's work record/timesheet, Haas contends that October 23, 2000, which was more than 120 days after the May 30, 2000 NOI, is when the audit actually began.
Exchanges of records, work papers, and information continued, and on or about May 29, 2001, a vice-president of Haas signed and FAXED to DOR's auditor a consent to extend the statute of limitations for sales and use tax assessments through March 29, 2002. However, he did not affix the corporate seal in the designated part of the consent form. The consent form had been prepared by the auditor and mailed to Haas on or about March 25, 2001. It only listed "sales and use tax" as a reference. It did not identify any other tax, which ultimately made up the Assessment, including Charter Transit System Tax, Local Government Infrastructure Tax, Indigent Care Tax, or School Capital Outlay Tax, which, although related to sales and use tax, have separate designations. These surtax audits are based on the same facts, circumstances, and records as the sales and use tax audit herein but DOR lists and computes them separately from the sales and use tax on some of its forms.
(See Finding of Fact 19.) The validity and timeliness, vel non, of the foregoing consent to extension was not raised by Petitioner until the disputed-fact hearing.
A Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (also called an NOI) was dated September 21, 2001.
The Notice of Proposed Assessment (NOPA) was issued December 5, 2001. DOR considers this document to be the completion of the audit.
After the audit was completed, it was submitted to DOR's TADR, a dispute resolution process.
A Notice of Decision (NOD) was entered July 30, 2002.
Haas petitioned for reconsideration, alleging additional facts. By a May 16, 2003, Notice of Reconsideration (NOR), the audit was upheld.
The NOR and NOIA lump all Chapter 212, Florida Statutes' taxes together. The NOPA lists each surtax separately.
The compromise of amounts and this formal proceeding followed, as described above in Findings of Fact 5-6.
Many contracts and other records were not provided by Haas to DOR until TADR, until the informal proceedings, or until after the Petition for this formal proceeding had been filed.
Among other things, DOR had upheld the auditor's initial decision with regard to calculating Haas' 1997 tax. The auditor had not tested or sampled Haas' records for the full of the audit period in order to arrive at a tax figure for 1997. Because Haas had not provided certain records (RDAs) for 1997, Haas' figures for December 1996 were "extrapolated" by the auditor to the first six months of 1997, while the figures for January 1998 were "extrapolated" back to the last six months of 1997. Ms. Gifford felt this method constituted a legitimate
estimate of the taxes due where a taxpayer had failed to provide adequate records.
For the audit period, Haas published and distributed, free of charge to the public, apartment and home guides.
The distribution was accomplished through contracts, on a regional and national level, with major retail store chains such as K-Mart, Blockbuster, Eckerd's, and Winn-Dixie Stores.
The tax-assessment problems herein are compounded by Haas' choice not to use uniform contractual arrangements with all retailers; by its failure to designate within its contracts and/or accounting records what, if any, intangible uses it believed it was paying for; and its failure to allocate within its contracts and/or accounting records the amounts it believed it was paying for each alleged intangible use.
Some of the contracts state that there is no corporate relation between Haas and the retailer.
Haas has one major and several smaller competitors who distribute their own publications at retail store chains.
Haas' contracts with the retail store chains guarantee to Haas the exclusive right to distribute apartment and home guides from the retail stores' locations and usually include the right to use the retail chains' respective logos and trademarks in Haas' promotional/sales materials and publications. One exception is Seven-Eleven, which limits to a
greater degree use of its trademark and logo than do some of the other retailers.
Not every contract contains a reference to a retailer's trademark or logo.
Haas used its exclusive rights to distribute with certain retail store chains as an inducement to sell advertising to the apartment owners, realtors, and others who advertise in its publications. It was valuable to Haas to be able to tell potential print advertisers that its apartment/home guide was the only one allowed to be distributed from the particular retail chains. It was valuable to Haas to be able to show potential print advertisers the logo of retailers in Haas' promotional materials and publications.
In most places, the exclusive right to distribute from the specified retail locations distinguished Haas from its competitors and allowed it to charge more for its advertising than they did.
Mr. Sullender, Haas' principal, is credible that in each instance where Haas' contracts do not mention the use of trademarks and logos, each retail chain otherwise gave permission or provided Haas with its logo and trademark materials to use, as a result of the contracts. However, Haas provided nothing to DOR prior to instituting this formal case,
by which DOR could have determined that such permission had been provided outside the contracts.
Haas' right to place the retailers' logo or trademark on Haas' publication racks was a valuable right and every Haas rack displayed logos. Yet, the contracts do not obligate Haas to use the retailers' logos or trademarks, and Haas can still distribute from the racks without a logo.
The contracts made no specific allocation of payments by Haas to the retailers for use of the retailers' logos and trademarks.
The issue of whether payment for use of a logo or trademark should have been separately allocated from Haas' payment to the retailer in its contracts was not taken into consideration by DOR because this issue, in those terms, was not raised during the audit or subsequent informal protest/review procedures. However, the issue of allocation based on fair rental value of the space utilized in connection with prior audits of some of the respective retailers was raised. This is largely an issue of semantics. (See Findings of Fact 55-56.)
All except one of the contracts at issue guarantee Haas the exclusive right to distribute its publications from the particular retail chains' locations. Exclusivity of the rights accruing to Haas is singularly important to Haas' business. However, Haas has been known to charge its competitors for space
on its racks. Haas also is free to enter into partnerships with its competitors.
In order to secure the exclusive right to distribute its publications from the retail locations and the right to use the retailers' trademarks and logos, Haas pays fees to the retail store chains under the contracts.
Typically, Haas has to "outbid" at least one other competitor to obtain the foregoing exclusive rights.
The payments under the contracts were typically made "per store," per month, and did not vary depending on the location of the store within the State.
Part of Haas' negotiating strategy and ultimate success in securing exclusive use of most of its locations is the judicious use of "signing bonuses." Signing bonuses are specifically allocated in some, but not all, of Haas' contracts. In some contracts, they are directly linked to the right of exclusivity. They can be substantial amounts. However, according to Ms. Gifford, signing bonuses have never been part of DOR's Assessment in this case. (TR-62-63)
Because the exclusive right to distribute its print materials was so valuable to Haas, it paid up to $375 per month per store under one contract.
When Haas did not secure the exclusive right to distribute from a retail chain, it would not pay for the right
to distribute, but distributed its publications from "free" locations. Nationwide, this compares at 20,000 paid to 22,000 unpaid locations. (See Finding of Fact 1.)
The amount Haas paid a retail chain did not vary by particular store location within the chain nor by the size of the rack that Haas placed in a particular store. Haas' racks take up from two to four-feet worth of floor space.
Haas supplied the racks, but, in general, the retail chains had control over the size, type, and color of the racks placed in its stores and limited Haas' access to the racks. Haas was solely responsible for set-up, replenishing, and maintenance of its racks on the retailer's property.
Haas purchases liability insurance.
Haas is always assigned covered space by the retailer.
Haas considers space near an entrance/exit of the retailer's covered premises to be premium space. Retailers consider this same space to be "dead space," beyond its cash registers, which is essentially useless for display or sale of their retail goods. However, some retailers park carts or post notices in these areas.
Haas does not sell or distribute any goods of, or for, the retailer. It merely stocks its own publications in its own racks in the retailer's space. Haas has no other contact with the retailers' business.
Under the contracts, retailers have no obligation to market Haas' publications. They do not buy or sell them or pay to advertise in them. Retailers pay nothing to Haas.
If Haas uses a retailer's logo and/or trademark in Haas' own advertising or in its publications per their negotiated arrangement, it is for the purpose of promoting Haas' publications. Use of the retailers' logos and trademarks has a benefit to the retailer, but a purely incidental one, since the retail customer who picks up a Haas publication from the Haas rack has already made the decision to enter the retail store in the first place.
None of the retail chains ever attempted to charge sales or use taxes to Haas based on the payments made under the contracts.
There is no evidence that Haas or any retailer, on Haas' behalf, tendered sales or use taxes to the State on the contracts at issue herein.
Although some contracts acknowledge that a retailer is a franchisee of a third party, none of the contracts refer to the relationship between Haas and the retailer as a "franchise" or acknowledge Haas as a franchisee. Ms. Gifford did not equate Haas' use of a retailer's logo or trademark to market Haas' publications, not the retailer's goods, with all the
accoutrements of a franchise, as she understood those accoutrements.
DOR issued to a different taxpayer (not Haas) Technical Assistance Advisement No. 03A-002 (the TAA), concerning real property lease agreements. Although this advisory letter from a DOR attorney is not binding, except between DOR and the party to whom it is addressed, and although it is limited to the specific facts discussed within it, the legal conclusions therein are instructive, if not conclusive, of DOR's official interpretation of the statutes and rules it administers and of its agency policy with regard to when allocations are appropriate between intangible rights and real property rights.
TAA 03A-002 cites, with approval, paragraphs 56 through 59 of the Final Order in Airport Limousine Service of Orlando, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, DOAH Case No. 94-1790, et seq., (March 23, 1995)1/ and State ex rel. N/S Associates v. Board of Review of the Village of Greendale, 473 N.W. 2d 554 (Wisc. App. 1991), and states, "The test for isolating intangible business value is as simple as asking whether the disputed value is appended to the property, and thus transferable with the property, or is it independent of the property so that it either stays with the seller or dissipates upon sale." This TAA also states that DOR will view the
reasonableness of allocations of payments made pursuant to a lease agreement on a case-by-case basis in reference to whether the allocation is made in good faith or lacks any basis. It further cites with approval Bystrom v. Union Land Investment, Inc., 477 So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1985) ("Good faith for property tax valuation purposes will mean 'real, actual, and of a genuine nature as opposed to a sham or deception.'") The TAA anticipates that DOR would require that the taxpayer make reasonable allocations, within the taxpayer's own records, of lease payments to rent and other items not subject to tax, and that the taxpayer would also be required to otherwise maintain records adequate to establish how the taxpayer determined that each allocation was reasonable, and further, that if DOR auditors were satisfied with the taxpayer's records, an appraisal would not be required by DOR. The TAA does not foreclose the requirement of an appraisal to test the taxpayer's records. Synopsized, the TAA opines that separate payments by a tenant to a landlord for trademark, service mark, or logo rights of the landlord are subject to the tax on real property rentals unless the allocation of payments made by the taxpayer is reasonable, and further, that the allocation is not reasonable where no substantial, competent, and persuasive evidence is provided to establish the value of the trademark, service mark, or logo rights of the landlord received by the tenant and a
legitimate business purpose for the tenant to acquire those rights is not demonstrated.
Herein, Haas had not allocated rent and intangibles within its own contracts/records. It was Ms. Gifford's view that if the Taxpayer herein had not allocated the value of the trademarks, etc. and the real property value of its contracts, it was not up to DOR to do so in the course of an audit.
Nonetheless, during the protest period, DOR had considered allocating the payments made by Haas under its contracts, into taxable and non-taxable payments, by reviewing the market rate rental for the space occupied and obtaining a valuation of the identifiable intangible property. Ultimately, DOR did not use this method on the basis that Haas had not submitted sufficient records.
At hearing, Haas attempted to present evidence of the fair market value of the real estate involved and of the so- called intangible rights through an intangible property appraiser and a Florida-certified real estate appraiser.
Lee Waronker is a Florida-certified real estate appraiser who was accepted as an expert in real estate appraisal. Mr. Waronker prepared a report which made a comparison of Haas' contracts with allegedly comparable rental properties, but he only used three "comparables," none of which included racks owned by similar advertising businesses. He did
not consider what Petitioner's real competitors paid for similar space. Thus, when he arrives at an average fair rental value of Haas' space in all the retailers' locations as $25-50 per square foot, his base figures are suspect. Therefore, when he concluded that since Haas was paying an average of $355 per square foot and all the remainder of the contract payments should be allocated to intangible rights, such as trademarks and exclusivity, he was not credible or persuasive. His figures also apply only to the date of his appraisal in 2003, and admittedly would not be representative of the value of the rental property during the audit period. Therefore, his analysis that only 11.3 percent, plus or minus, of the contract prices constituted rent or a license to use is discounted and not accepted.
Petitioner also presented the testimony and report of James N. Volkman, an intangible property appraiser who was accepted as an expert in that field. Mr. Volkman obtained all of his data from either the Securities and Exchange Commission filings of eighty-three percent of the retailers involved, from Haas, or from information compiled by DOR. These are legitimate appraisal sources. He performed his appraisal within the professional standards of the Financial Accounting Standards Board. He concluded that Haas' contracts could best be described as "distribution agreements," "because they are the
means by which Haas distributes its publications" and because anyone familiar with the operations of a publisher would understand a line item on a balance sheet of a "distribution agreement" and not everyone would understand the term "license to use real property." It is noted that "distribution agreements" are not listed in the statute, but this, by itself, is not a fatal flaw. He maintained that the Haas contracts could not reasonably be characterized as a license to use real property, because the amount paid was well in excess of the fair rental value of the space.
However, as part of his analysis, Mr. Volkman did not rely on Mr. Waronker's independent real estate appraisal, but conducted his own analysis as to the amount a retailer would likely charge a party seeking to utilize the floor space taken up by the approximate size of a single Haas rack. In doing so, Mr. Volkman was admittedly outside his realm of expertise.
Mr. Volkman allocated the amounts Haas was paying as twelve percent to the "right to use real property"; twenty-four percent to "non-compete rights" (his term for exclusivity); fourteen percent to "trademark rights"; thirty-five percent to "distribution cost savings" (a term which seems to describe Haas not having to identify and mail its publications to interested persons or use a retailer's magazine rack);2/ and fifteen percent to "market penetration premium."3/ The last two calculations are
not credible and undermine the entire allocations summary he presented. The distribution cost savings figure contains too many assumptions not fully documented. Mr. Volkman also arrived at his calculation of the "market penetration premium" merely by selecting the residual percentage sufficient to make up the difference, so that his other figures added up to 100 percent of the total fee paid by Haas to retailers. His reason for doing this is not plausible. He assumed that just because the growth rate of Haas' business far exceeded the growth rate in multi- family units, it must be that Haas substantially increased its market share during the audit period due to exclusivity.
Ultimately, he could not explain the fifteen percent calculation for "market penetration" by the documents he relied on for calculating the other three categories. More damaging to the weight and credibility of his report is that Mr. Volkman did not consider Haas' signing bonuses as having anything to do with the exclusivity rights accruing to Haas. He considered the signing bonuses not to be an intangible right but only "compensation to retailers for negotiating these agreements." However, signing bonus rights seem to be the only intangible rights allocated in any of the contracts and were inherently recognized as such by DOR when it chose not to address them in the Assessment. There are also a number of other questionable portions of his report
and opinion which cause it to be discounted and not accepted here.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this cause, pursuant to Sections 72.011(1), 120.569, 120.57(1), and 120.80, Florida Statutes.
Haas alleges threshold jurisdictional flaws with the initial audit which may be summarized as follows: (1) the audit was not commenced within 120 days of May 30, 2000, so some portion of the period audited should have been adjusted; (2) DOR had only one year from May 30, 2000, to complete the audit without a timely consent to extension executed by the taxpayer; that date was not met and no valid consent was executed, so the audit itself was barred; (3) the May 29, 2001, consent to extension was invalid without the corporate seal, and thereby the entire audit should fall; and (4) the consent to extension is invalid for any taxes not specifically identified other than sales and use taxes. DOR counters that none of the foregoing theories of the case were alleged in the Petition herein and that because the Taxpayer settled a portion of the assessed debt and did not raise certain of these theories in the prior informal procedures, they cannot now be raised.
Addressing whether the threshold issues raised by Petitioner in Conclusion of Law 63 are appropriate to this forum, it is concluded that the Taxpayer's prior agreements with DOR at the time of partial payment were to the effect that no ground of challenge would be precluded by partial payment; therefore there was no waiver of de novo challenges by Petitioner as asserted by DOR. Also, statutes of limitation are jurisdictional and may be raised at any time. Finally, the Petition herein was adequate to raise all these issues.
Having concluded that the foregoing threshold issues raised in Conclusion of Law 63 are proper to this formal proceeding, attention must be paid to several statutes and rules in order to resolve those issues.
Pertinent portions of Section 213.345, Florida Statutes, state the following concerning the commencement of an audit:
. . . The department must commence an audit within 120 days after it issues a notice of intent to conduct audit, unless the taxpayer requests a delay. If the taxpayer does not request a delay and the department does not begin the audit within 120 days after issuing the notice, the tolling period shall terminate unless the taxpayer and the department enter into an agreement to extend the period pursuant to s. 213.23. (Emphasis supplied)
Pertinent portions of Florida Administrative Code Rule 12-3.0012, corresponding to the above statute, define in more detail what commences an audit:
Definitions. The following terms apply to the Department's administration of the program delegated to it by statute. These terms shall have the meaning given them in this section, except where the context clearly indicates different meaning. (1)(a) The phrase "commence an audit," means when, subsequent to the issuance of a
Notification of Intent to Conduct and Audit (DR840) or similar notification, the Department performs an audit entrance interview.
(b) The phrase "audit entrance interview" means when one of the following actions first occurs:
When the Department contacts the taxpayer to explain and discuss the specific audit plan or to discuss the nature of the taxpayer's business operations; or
When the Department requests that specific books, records, documents, or other information to be complied, provided, or made available to the Department, other than the books records, documents or other information which were requested in the attachment to the DR840; or
When the Department begins reviewing the accounts, books, or records of the taxpayer
. . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 213.23, Florida Statutes, states, in pertinent part:
Consent agreements extending the period subject to assessment or available for refund.--
. . . if, before the expiration of time prescribed in a revenue law of this state for issuance of an assessment or claim of a refund, both the department and the taxpayer have consented in writing to the issuance of an assessment or claim of a refund after such time, an assessment may be issued or a claim for refund may be made at any time prior to the expiration of the period agreed upon. The period so agreed upon may be extended by subsequent agreements made before the expiration of the period previously agreed upon.
. . . A consent agreement under this section shall operate to extend the time for issuance of an assessment, or filing of a claim for refund only for those taxes, licenses, or fees for the taxable periods specified in the agreement.
The audit herein was not untimely. The NOI was dated May 30, 2000. Information and records were received from Haas on August 29, 2000, which was within the 120-day tolling period provided by statute. Therefore, Haas' contention that DOR was only allowed to audit Haas back to December 6, 1996, five years prior to the issuance of the NOPA on December 5, 2001, is rejected.
Likewise, the consent to extend the time of the audit was executed and returned on May 29, 2001, within one year of the May 30, 2000, NOI. This was timely per statute and rule.
Petitioner Haas contended that there was no valid consent to extend the time of the audit because a corporate seal was not present on the consent form. The auditor's request for
a corporate seal was a means of insuring that whoever signed the consent had corporate authority to do so. Here, there is no dispute that the consent was signed and FAXED by Haas' vice- president on May 29, 2001, within one year of May 30, 2000. A corporate seal is not mandatory. All that is required is a signature of an officer authorized to sign. Petitioner is not entitled to have the audit period reduced and all tax and interest assessed before December 6, 1996, removed from the Assessment due to a ministerial omission of its own executive.
Haas takes the position that the May 29, 2001, consent is not valid for all related taxes prior to December 6, 1996, because the consent lumped all the taxes the parties had long been haggling over under the broad heading "sales and use taxes." This position is without merit.
Moving to substantive issues, Haas contends that the methodology whereby the auditor used Haas' 1996 and 1998 record information to calculate the 1997 tax due was not permissible at law. DOR considers the method appropriate and contends that this theory of Petitioner's case cannot legitimately be raised for the same reasons enunciated in Conclusion of Law 63.
For the reasons given in Conclusion of Law 64, it also is concluded that this substantive issue addressing DOR's 1997 tax calculation also may be resolved in this formal proceeding.
(See Finding of Fact 22 and Conclusion of Law 92 discussing and resolving this substantive issue.)
Substantively, Haas also asserts that all the payments it made under the contracts for the entire June 1, 1995 through May 31, 2000, audit period are for non-taxable intangible personal property rights, which are "akin to a franchise," whereas DOR asserts that the payments Haas made under the contracts in question represent taxable licenses to use real property. Haas further puts forth that the fees it pays to the various retailers for the space Haas uses to distribute free publications are not licenses to use limited portions of the retailers' real property, but fall under the precise wording of Section 212.031 (1) (c), Florida Statutes, which reads in pertinent part as follows:
. . . Payments for intrinsically valuable personal property, such as franchises, trademarks, service marks, logos, or patents are not subject to tax under this section. In the case of a contractual arrangement that provides for both payments taxable as total rent or license fee and payments not subject to tax, the tax shall be based on a reasonable allocation of such payments and shall not apply to that portion which is for the nontaxable payments.
DOR contends that the quoted statutory language constitutes an exemption, for which Petitioner bears a shifted burden of proof, while Petitioner contends that the statute does
not exempt intangible personal property, but rather excludes it from taxation in the first place, so that Haas owes no tax on the contract amounts. It is noted that exemptions from tax are strictly construed against the taxpayer. Section 212.21(2), Florida Statutes, states that "it is hereby declared to be the specific legislative intent to tax each and every sale, admission, use, storage, consumption, or rental levied and set forth in this chapter, except as to such sale, admission, use, storage, consumption, or rental as shall be specifically exempted there from by this chapter subject to the conditions appertaining to such exemption." See § 212.21(2), Fla. Stat.
See, e.g., State ex rel. Szabo Food Services, Inc. of North Carolina v. Dickinson, 286 So. 2d 529, 530-31 (Fla. 1973); Wanda Marine Corp. v. State Department of Revenue, 305 So. 2d 65, 69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974); Capital City County Club, Inc. v. Tucker, 613 So. 2d 443, 452 (Fla. 1993).
In the alternative, Haas asserts that the payments it has made under its contracts should be allocated, pursuant to the applicable statute, and tax only applied to the taxable portion of the payments, and further, that DOR should be required to make the appropriate allocation between the taxable and non-taxable payments, regardless of whether or not Haas' contracts did so.
It is concluded that on the substantive issues raised in Conclusions of Law 73, 75, and 77, DOR has the initial burden of showing "that an assessment has been made against the taxpayer and the factual and legal grounds upon which [DOR] made the assessment." See § 120.80(14)(b)2, Fla. Stat. However, Petitioner has the ultimate burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the factual or legal basis for the assessment is unreasonable or incorrect. See Department of Revenue v. Nu-Life Health and Fitness Center, 623 So. 2d 747, 751-52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). And see, § 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat.
When DOR has satisfied its burden of proof by establishing the factual and legal basis for the audit findings, the burden of proof then shifts to the Petitioner to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it qualified for the exemption from sales and use taxes. § 120.80, Fla. Stat. See, e.g., Department of Revenue v. G. R. Swan Enterprises, Inc., 506 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
Section 212.08, Florida Statutes, is very restrictive in the nature of the exemptions granted, and that is the statutory section that deals most with exemptions. There is nothing within that statutory section to exempt Haas from sales tax on a license to use real property. See also Green v. Surf
Club, Inc., 136 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1961).
Section 212.02, Florida Statutes, states in pertinent part as follows:
212.02 Definitions.-- The following terms and phrases when used in this chapter have the meanings ascribed to them in this section, except where the context clearly indicates a different meaning: . . . .
(2) "Business" means any activity engaged in by any person, or caused to be engaged in by him or her, with the objective of private or public gain, benefit, or advantage, either direct or indirect. Except for the sales of any aircraft, boat, mobile home, or motor vehicle, the term "business" shall not be construed in this chapter to include occasional or isolated sales or transactions involving tangible personal property or services by a person who does not hold himself or herself out as engaged in business, but includes other charges for the sale or rental of tangible personal property, sales of services taxable under this chapter, sales of or charges of admission, communication services, all rentals and leases of living quarters, other than low-rent housing operated under chapter 421, sleeping or housekeeping accommodations in hotels, or trailer camps, and all rentals of or licenses in real property, Any
tax on such sales, charges, rentals, admissions, or other transactions made subject to the tax imposed by this chapter shall be collected by the state, county, municipality, any political subdivision, agency, bureau, or department, or other state or local governmental instrumentality in the same manner as other dealers, unless specifically exempted by this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
(10) "Lease," "let," or "rental" means leasing or renting of living quarters or sleeping or housekeeping accommodations in
hotels, apartment houses, roominghouses, tourist or trailer camps and real property, the same being defined as follows:
"Real property" means the surface land, improvements thereto, and fixtures, and is synonymous with "realty" and "real estate." (Emphasis supplied)
"License," as used in this chapter with reference to the use of real property, means the granting of a privilege to use or occupy a building or a parcel of real property for any purpose. (Emphasis supplied)
(12) "Person" includes any individual, firm, copartnership, joint adventure, association, corporation, estate, trust, business trust, receiver, syndicate, or other group or combination acting as a unit and also includes any political subdivision, municipality, state agency bureau, or department and also includes the plural as well as the singular number.
Section 212.06, Florida Statutes, provides the definition of "dealer" for purposes of sales and use taxation in pertinent part as follows:
(2)(j) The term "dealer" is further defined to mean any person who leases, or grants a license to use, occupy, or enter upon, living quarters, sleeping or housekeeping accommodations in hotels, apartment houses, roominghouses, tourist or trailer camps, real property, space or spaces in parking lots or garages for motor vehicles, docking or storage space or spaces for boats in boat docks or marinas, or tie-down or storage space or spaces for aircraft at airports.
The term "dealer" also means any person who has leased, occupied, or used or was entitled to use any living quarters, sleeping or housekeeping accommodations in hotels, apartment houses, roominghouses,
tourist or trailer camps, real property, space or spaces in parking lots or garages for motor vehicles or docking or storage space or spaces for boats in boat docks or marinas, or who has purchased communication services or electric power or energy, and who cannot prove that the tax levied by this chapter has been paid to the vendor or lessor on any such transactions. The term "dealer" does not include any person who leases, lets, rents, or grants a license to use, occupy, or enter upon any living quarters, sleeping quarters, or housekeeping accommodations in apartment houses, roominghouses, tourist camps, or trailer camps, and who exclusively enters into a bona fide written agreement or continuous residence for longer than 6 months in duration which any person who leases, lets, rents, or is granted a license to use such property. (Emphasis added).
Section 212.031(1)(a),(c), and (d), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part:
(1)(a) It is declared to be the legislative intent that every person is exercising a taxable privilege who engages in the business of renting, leasing, letting, or granting a license for the use of any real property. . . .
For the exercise of such privilege, a tax is levied in an amount equal to 6 percent of and on the total rent or license fee charged for such real property by the person charging or collecting the rental or license fee. The total rent or license fee charged for such real property shall include payments for the granting of any privilege to use or occupy real property for any purpose and shall base rent, percentage rents, or similar charges. Such charges shall be included in the total rent or license fee subject to tax under this
section whether or not they can be attributed to the ability of the lessor's or licensor's property as used or operated to attract customers . . .
When the rental or license fee of any such real property is paid by way of property, goods, wares, merchandise, services, or other thing of value, the tax shall be at the rate of 6 percent of the value of the property, goods, wares, merchandise, services, or other thing of value.
(3) The tax imposed by this section shall be in addition to the total amount of the rental or license fee, shall be charged by the lessor or person receiving the rent or payment in and by a rental or license fee arrangement with the lessee or person paying the rental or license fee, and shall be due and payable at the time of the receipt of such rental or license fee payment by the lessor or other person who receives the rental or payment. (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, DOR has promulgated rules corresponding to Section 212.031, Florida Statutes. Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.070 states in pertinent part:
12A-1.070 Leases and Licenses of Real Property; Storage of Boats and Aircraft.
(1)(a) Every person who rents or leases any real property or who grants a license to use, occupy, or enter upon any real property is exercising a taxable privilege. . .
(19)(a) The lease or rental of real property or a license fee arrangement to use or occupy real property between related "persons", as defined in s. 212.02(12), F.S., in the capacity of lessor/lessee, is subject to tax.
The total consideration, whether direct or indirect, payments or credits, or other consideration in kind, furnished by the lessee to the lessor is subject to tax despite any relationship between the lessor and the lessee.
The total consideration furnished by the lessee to a related lessor for the occupation of real property or the use or entitlement to the use of real property owned by the related lessor is subject to tax, even though the amount of the consideration is equal to the amount of the consideration legally necessary to amortize a debt owned by the related lessor and secured by the real property occupied, or used, and even though the consideration is ultimately used to pay that debt.
Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a) and (b) states in pertinent part:
The tenant or person actually occupying, using, or entitled to use any real property from which rental or license fee is subject to taxation under s. 212.031, F.S., shall pay the tax to his immediate landlord or other person granting the right to such tenant or person to occupy or use such real property.
The tax shall be paid at the rate of 5 percent prior to February 1, 1988 and 6 percent on or after February 1, 1988, on all considerations due and payable by the tenant or other person actually occupying, using, or entitled to use any real property to his landlord or other person for the privilege of use, occupancy, or the right to use or occupy any real property for any purpose.
Section 212.07(8), Florida Statutes, states the following:
Any person who has purchased at retail, used, consumed, distributed, or stored for use or consumption in this state tangible personal property, admissions, communications or other services taxable under this chapter, or leased tangible personal property, or who has leased, occupied, or used or was entitled to use any real property, space or spaces in parking lots or garages for motor vehicles, docking or storage space or spaces for boats in boat docks or marinas, and cannot prove that the tax levied by this chapter has been paid to his or her vendor, lessor, or other person is directly liable to the state for any tax, interest, or penalty due on any such taxable transactions. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 213.35, Florida Statutes, states the following:
Books and records. -Each person required by law to perform an act in the administration of any law enumerated in Section 72.011 shall keep suitable books and records relating to that tax, such as invoices, bills of lading, any other pertinent records and papers, and shall preserve such books and records until expiration of the time within which the department may make an assessment with respect to that tax pursuant to Section 95.091(3). (Emphasis supplied)
Section 212.12(5)(b), Florida Statutes, states the following:
(b) In the event any dealer or other person charged herein fails or refuses to make his or her records available for inspection so that no audit or examination has been made of the books and records of such dealer or person, fails or refuses to register as a dealer, fails to make a report and pay the tax as provided by this chapter, makes a grossly incorrect report or makes a report
that is false or fraudulent, then, in such event, it shall be the duty of the department to make an assessment from an estimate based upon the best information then available to it for the taxable period of retail sales of such dealer, the gross proceeds from rentals, the total admissions received, amounts received from leases of tangible personal property by such dealer, or of the cost price of all articles of tangible personal property imported by the dealer for use or consumption or distribution or storage to be used or consumed in this state, or of the sales or cost price of all services the sale or use of which is taxable under this chapter, together with interest, plus penalty, if such have accrued, as the case may be. Then the department shall proceed to collect such taxes, interest, and penalty on the basis of such assessment which shall be considered prima facie correct, and the burden to show the contrary shall rest upon the dealer, seller, owner, or lessor, as the case may be. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 212.12(6)(b), Florida Statutes, states the following:
For the purpose of this subsection, if a dealer does not have adequate records of his or her retail sales or purchases, the department may, upon the basis of a test or sampling of the dealer's available records or other information relating to the sales or purchases made by such dealer for a representative period, . . .
Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, imposes sales tax on the privilege of engaging in specified businesses. Richard Bertran & Co. v. Green, 132 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1961). Haas is primarily in the business of publishing and distributing free
apartment and new home guides at selected retailer locations. Petitioner, therefore, is exercising a taxable privilege subject to sales and use tax under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, for the license to use a retailer's property to display its free consumer guides.
DOR met its initial burden of proof. The evidence shows that DOR made an assessment against Petitioner based upon an audit conducted pursuant to DOR's rules and standard procedures under the authority of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and that the Assessment was supported by the facts available to DOR at the time of the audit. Petitioner failed to show that DOR's audit was factually incorrect. The material facts relied upon by DOR in making its Assessment and upholding the assessment in the NOR were provided by Petitioner, and they are consistent with the facts found herein.
Petitioner tried to show that the method of conducting the audit for 1997, was faulty. However, as noted in Sections 212.12, 212.07, and 213.35, Florida Statutes, when a taxpayer does not provide all the records necessary to conduct an audit, DOR's auditor may use the best records available and may use a sampling of the records and information to estimate the tax. Therefore, Haas' position that the 1997 tax as calculated should be removed from the Assessment is not persuasive. Ms. Gifford's unfortunate choice of the word "extrapolation" notwithstanding,
an estimate based on a reasonable sample portion of the five- year audit was used by the auditor, and that is sufficient to establish DOR's prima facie case. Within the audit file, there is proof that the Taxpayer was not forthcoming with all the necessary documents and records.
That said, we at last come to the central substantive issue in this proceeding: whether DOR's audit was legally correct. Resolution of that issue turns on whether Haas' payments to retailers (signing bonuses excluded) are subject to the sales and use tax and local related surtaxes as determined by DOR.
In this particular case, Petitioner is considered the "licensee" in the license to use real property situation. However, since the Petitioner did not offer any proof either during the audit or at hearing that any retailer was responsible for the collection and submission of tax to DOR, then Petitioner is liable for the tax under Section 212.07, Florida Statutes.
"License" as has been defined, supra., is not considered a right, but a privilege to occupy land in order to do business without taking any title. Petitioner has been granted a privilege, through its contractual agreements, to use the land of the retailer (the retail store properties) in order to distribute its free publications.
No definition of "franchise" is provided under Section 199.023, Florida Statutes, relating to intangible personal property taxes or under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, sales and use tax. But see the definition of "franchise" at Section 817.416(1)(b), Florida Statutes.
Petitioner has not demonstrated that a franchisor- franchisee or concessionaire relationship existed with any retailer. Haas does not promote the retailers' businesses in any significant way. This is so even as to the manner in which Haas uses the logos and trademarks of the retailers.
Petitioner clearly is paying for the right to use real property. Haas' business does not rise or fall upon the use of the retailers' logos or trademarks, which are of mutual benefit to the retailer, as the lessor, and to Haas, as the lessee. Haas' business does rise or fall on the use of the retailer's property, its location, and its attraction of a mutual audience. If one takes away the real property aspect of the arrangement, Haas cannot operate, because it cannot distribute. If one takes away the use of the retailers' logos etc. on Haas' racks, neither Haas nor the retailer suffers any demonstrable loss. This is not the same situation as a franchisee selling a product or running a business under a franchisor's oversight or formula. Rather, the intent and purpose of the contracts is to allow Haas to exercise exclusive distribution and management privileges
over its own displays and distribution. If one takes away the use of the retailers' logos, etc., as printed in Haas' publications and promotional materials, Haas would have to convey the same information to advertisers another way, but the retailer here, unlike a franchisor, would lose nothing to speak of. Haas could perhaps simply print in its promotional materials and in its apartment/home guides a sentence or two stating that Haas' publications are the only similar publications distributed at the specific named retailers' locations.
It is tempting to resolve this case as did the Circuit Judge in American Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 764 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), who, in applying the tax on sales of tangible personal property and services to that tangible personal property held that "[t]he sale of engineering [services] was inextricably intertwined with the sales of the telecommunication equipment in the transactions" so that they were part of the sale. However, that case involved sales of tangible goods and services and is otherwise distinguishable from the one at bar, dealing with intangible rights. There is also different language in the respective statutes.
The better solution herein, given that the plain language of Section 212.031 (1)(c), Florida Statutes, requires
"[i]n the case of a contractual arrangement that provides for both payments taxable as total rent or license fee and payments not subject to tax, the tax shall be based on a reasonable allocation of such payments and shall not apply to that portion which is for the non-taxable payments," is to apply the statute as written and allocate the interests if that allocation is at all possible. The statute should not be read to mean that only if the contractual arrangement itself allocates, is allocation necessary. The statutory language clearly requires allocation in the course of an audit if that allocation can be achieved on the basis of the records provided by the taxpayer. DOR has recognized this interpretation in its TAA 03-002. As the Administrative Law Judge in Airport Limousine Service of Orlando, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue, supra., stated:
Section 212.031 imposes a sales tax for the use and occupancy of real property, but not upon payments for intangibles such as a franchise, concession, or other privilege to do business. The sales tax imposed by Section 212.031 is limited to payments for the use of real property. (Emphasis supplied)
The problem remains, however, that only the signing bonuses were allocated, in Petitioner's contracts, to the right of exclusivity. DOR did not include the signing bonuses in completing its audit. In not including the signing bonuses, DOR, in effect, created an allocation for the intangible right
of exclusivity. This allocation may not have captured all the elements of exclusivity, but Petitioner's experts' testimony at hearing did not provide a credible alternative allocation.
The Assessment must stand.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order finding the Assessment factually and legally correct and sustaining the Assessment plus interest to date.
DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
S
______ ELLA JANE P. DAVIS
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675
Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 2004.
ENDNOTES
1/ That case was a determination of the validity, vel non, of DOR proposed rules. The cited paragraphs address concessionaires in a publicly owned airport, and read:
It is easy to determine that concessionaire payments typically comprise rent or some other payment for the use and occupancy of real property plus a payment for an intangible, such as the privilege to do business with airport users. Obviously, Respondent is not required to accept the parties' labeling or allocations of these payments. But it is difficult to determine how much of a mixed payment is for the use or occupancy of real property, which is taxable (ignoring, as always, the special treatment of certain airport license payments, as well as other exemptions), and how much is for a privilege to do business, which is nontaxable. The issue is whether a "reasonable allocation" is possible between the two components in a mixed payment.
As ordered in Avis and suggested by the Straughn letter and Townsend memorandum, the allocation process should begin with finding a fair rental value. It is difficult to estimate the fair market rent for space in a large commercial airport. The universe of comparables is small due to the uniqueness of major airports. But the appraisal of airport real property is not impossible. Nonairport comparables normally exist that, with suitable adjustments, yield reasonable approximations of fair market rentals.
A real estate appraisal helps determine how much of a concessionaire's payment should be characterized as rent. However, the allocation problem can be approached at the same time from the opposite end. In appraising business assets, an accountant or business appraiser estimates the value of the concession, franchise, or other privilege to do business with airport visitors.
The business-income approach to the allocation problem is aided by analysis of the payments made by completely off-airport
car rental concessionaires in Sacramento, Minneapolis, and Dallas. These payments provide a rough approximation of the value of this intangible, even though they probably require major adjustments to reflect, among other things, differing passenger counts and demographics, as well as the costs incurred by the airport authorities in providing transportation to the off-airport sites.
2/ This figure is derived, in part, by comparing distribution and circulation expense in 1999 of another part of Haas' corporate family (see Finding of Fact 1), getting a percentage of that cost as against that entity's revenues, applying that percentage to Haas' revenues and then assuming that Haas could economically pay this amount to its distributors (retailers) in place of finding an alternative distribution method. Therefore, he concluded that Haas was passing that percentage to its retailers.
3/ By this total calculation, Haas submits that it owes only
$67,000 as opposed to approximately $552,000, in tax.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Rex D. Ware, Esquire Steel Hector & Davis LLP
215 South Monroe Street, Suite 601 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Lynn Lovejoy, Esquire
Office of the Attorney General
107 West Gaines Street Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399
James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue
104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue
204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Nov. 09, 2004 | Agency Final Order | |
| Jun. 18, 2004 | Recommended Order | Chapter 12A-1.070 requires Respondent to allocate total rent or license to use real property fee and payments not subject to tax during audit, regardless of whether Petitioner allocated these in its contracts and/or records. |
