Filed: Sep. 10, 2020
Latest Update: Sep. 10, 2020
Summary: Case: 18-31086 Document: 00515559197 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/10/2020 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED September 10, 2020 No. 18-31086 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Jaylon Sewell, Plaintiff—Appellant, versus Monroe City School Board; Brent Vidrine, Superintendent; Roosevelt Rankins, Dean; W R Berkley Corporation; Whitney Martin, Individually and as Former Principal of Neville High School, incorrectly named as Whitney Morton, Defendants—A
Summary: Case: 18-31086 Document: 00515559197 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/10/2020 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED September 10, 2020 No. 18-31086 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Jaylon Sewell, Plaintiff—Appellant, versus Monroe City School Board; Brent Vidrine, Superintendent; Roosevelt Rankins, Dean; W R Berkley Corporation; Whitney Martin, Individually and as Former Principal of Neville High School, incorrectly named as Whitney Morton, Defendants—Ap..
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Case: 18-31086 Document: 00515559197 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/10/2020
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
September 10, 2020
No. 18-31086 Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Jaylon Sewell,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Monroe City School Board; Brent Vidrine,
Superintendent; Roosevelt Rankins, Dean; W R Berkley
Corporation; Whitney Martin, Individually and as
Former Principal of Neville High School, incorrectly
named as Whitney Morton,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:17-cv-01466
Before Barksdale, Stewart, and Costa, Circuit Judges.
Gregg Costa, Circuit Judge:
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is not meant to resolve
disputed facts or test the merits of a lawsuit. It instead must show that, even
in the plaintiff’s best-case scenario, the complaint does not state a plausible
case for relief. In this case, the district court dismissed a high school
student’s claims of discrimination. Mindful of our obligation to accept his
complaint’s factual allegations as true and assess whether those facts permit
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a reasonable inference that the school board is liable, we affirm in part and
reverse in part.
I.
Because this case is only at the pleading stage, the following comes
from the plaintiff’s allegations.
On the first day of school at Monroe’s Neville High School, Dean of
Students Roosevelt Rankins asked teachers to send students with dyed hair
to his office. All the students sent to Rankins’s office were African American
males. One was Jaylon Sewell, who wore a “two toned” blonde hairstyle.
Rankins and Principal Whitney Martin did not let Sewell attend class that day
because of his hair.
Monroe City School Board’s dress code prohibited “hair dyed
outlandish colors.” Still, many students of all races, male and female, wore
dyed hair to school. Students sported blonde, purple, and red colors as well
as fiery-colored hair tips. Some African American female students wore
multicolored weaves in their hair. Nevertheless, Neville High did not
discipline anyone other than Sewell for violating the hair policy during the
2016–17 school year.
On the second day of school, Sewell’s mother, Bonnie Kirk, met first
with Martin and then with superintendent Brent Vidrine. Kirk told both that
she believed school administrators were discriminating against Sewell
because he is an African American male.
When Sewell returned to school, Rankins “ridiculed” him “every
other day” by calling him a “thug” and a “fool.” At one point, Rankins
asked Sewell if he “was gay with ‘that mess’ in his head.” Rankins also
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discouraged other students from talking with Sewell. 1 Sewell became
“depressed” and “sad.”
In November, school officials suspended Sewell. Sewell alleges that
Rankins “encouraged” a female student to “lie” and accuse him of sexual
assault. Rankins told Sewell that he “wouldn’t be getting in so much trouble
if his hair were not that color.” Martin soon recommended Sewell for
expulsion. When Kirk spoke to Martin about her recommendation, Martin
mentioned Sewell’s hair too. School officials provided Kirk with
documentation about the suspension and expulsion just two days before
Sewell’s expulsion hearing. Kirk filed a complaint with the U.S. Department
of Education’s Office of Civil Rights.
After the hearing, the board’s expulsion committee voted not to expel
Sewell. The committee’s chair explained that it chose not to suspend Sewell
because the timing of events was suspicious; school officials did not complete
expulsion documentation until four days after the alleged assault and did not
deliver the documentation to Kirk until ten days after that.
In the spring, media reports, including one in the New York Daily
News, reported on what had happened to Sewell. The media attention led to
school officials’ “ostracizing” and “ridicul[ing]” him “even more.” Sewell
was “distraught and traumatized.”
Kirk filed this lawsuit in November 2017; Sewell has since turned 18
and has been substituted as the plaintiff. The amended complaint alleges
claims under Title VI, Title IX, section 1983, section 1981, and the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), as well as claims under
Louisiana law. It names as defendants the Monroe City School Board,
1
Sewell’s complaint makes conclusory allegations that Martin ridiculed him too.
Because those allegations lack details, we focus on Rankins’s conduct.
3
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Superintendent Vidrine, Dean Rankins, Principal Martin, and the school
board’s insurer. Attached and incorporated by reference is the Department
of Education report detailing its investigation of Kirk’s complaint. See Ferrer
v. Chevron Corp., 484 F.3d 776, 778 (5th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that a
complaint can incorporate exhibits by reference (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
10(c)).
The defendants responded with a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim. The district court, adopting a recommendation of the magistrate
judge, granted the motion on all claims.
II.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim concerns the “formal
sufficiency of the statement of the claim for relief,” not a lawsuit’s merits.
Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 81 F.3d 1395, 1401 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated
on other grounds,
113 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1997). So when reviewing such a
motion, we assume that the facts the complaint alleges are true and view
those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Id. The complaint
survives if it “contain[s] sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Although this
framework is one-sided, the issue “is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately
prevail but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims.”
Doe, 81 F.3d at 1401. The other side will have its say later.
III.
While there were numerous claims before the district court, this
appeal concerns just a few. Sewell does not appeal the dismissal of his
FERPA and Louisiana state law claims. And although his briefs mention the
claims under sections 1981 and 1983, the barebones page of his opening brief
devoted to those claims is not enough to prosecute an appeal. United States
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v. Green, 964 F.2d 365, 371 (5th Cir. 1992). In addition, Sewell appeals the
dismissal of his Title VI and IX claims only as to the Monroe City School
Board. That makes sense as claims under those statutes may be brought only
against the institution receiving federal funds, not employees of those
institutions. See Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm.,
555 U.S. 246, 257
(2009).
Title VI and Title IX seek to stamp out discrimination in programs
receiving federal funds and ensure that federal resources do not support
discriminatory practices. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,
286 (1998). Part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI prohibits race
discrimination in all programs receiving federal funds. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
Enacted eight years later, Title IX was modeled after Title VI and bans sex
discrimination in educational programs receiving federal funds. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a). We interpret these kindred statutes in the same fashion. See
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi.,
441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979).
Sewell brings claims under both statutes because he thinks school
officials mistreated him not just because he is African American or male, but
because he is both. The district court interpreted his complaint to raise three
theories of liability: intentional discrimination, harassment or hostile
environment discrimination, and retaliation. Because the school board does
not contest that characterization of Sewell’s claims, we follow the district
court’s lead.
A.
We start with intentional discrimination. This classic claim is the
most straightforward: the school board, as a federal funding recipient, cannot
intentionally treat students differently on the basis of race or sex. Sewell’s
claim is of the selective enforcement variety. See Plummer v. Univ. of Houston,
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860 F.3d 767, 777 (5th Cir. 2017). He says he was punished for dying his hair
while female students and students of other races were not.
A threshold issue stops his claim in its tracks—it was untimely. Title
VI and Title IX are subject to state statutes of limitations for personal injury
actions. King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir.
2015); Griffin v. Round Rock Indep. Sch. Dist.,
82 F.3d 414,
1996 WL 166999,
at *1 (5th Cir. 1996) (unpublished per curiam). In Louisiana, the relevant
prescription period is one year. See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3492; cf.
Heath v. Bd. of Supervisors for S. Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll.,
850 F.3d 731,
739 (5th Cir. 2017) (applying the Louisiana law to section 1983 claim).
Sewell’s mother filed suit on his behalf on November 8, 2017. So his
action was timely for claims that accrued on or after November 8, 2016. A
claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury
giving rise to the claim. King-White, 803 F.3d at 762. Sewell’s complaint
alleges three injuries: missing class on the first day of school, suffering verbal
abuse from Rankins throughout the school year, and getting suspended. The
second injury goes to his harassment claim. The third, he says, was
retaliation for complaining about school officials’ discriminatory conduct.
Only the first represents the kind of discrete adverse action characteristic of
an intentional discrimination claim. Because that injury occurred on August
15, 2016, it lies outside the prescription period. Sewell’s intentional
discrimination claim cannot make it out of the starting gate.
B.
By contrast, Sewell’s harassment claim has some legs. As the district
court recognized, it does not trip over a statute-of-limitations problem. That
is because of the continuing violation doctrine. Whereas an intentional
discrimination claim focuses on a specific discriminatory act, a hostile
environment claim arises from the “cumulative effect of individual acts,”
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some of which “may not be actionable on [their] own.” Nat’l R.R. Passenger
Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002). That means that “the filing clock
cannot begin running with the first act, because at that point the plaintiff has
no claim; nor can a claim expire as to that first act, because the full course of
conduct is the actionable infringement.”
Heath, 850 F.3d at 737 (citation
omitted). If “an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period,
the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a
court for the purposes of determining liability.”
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117.
The doctrine applies here. 2 Sewell’s complaint alleges a pattern of
verbal abuse beginning the first day of school and continuing at least through
March 2017, when news media began covering his story. Because some acts
contributing to a hostile environment allegedly took place within the
prescription period, Sewell’s harassment claim was timely.
In addition to the claim being timely, Sewell’s claim must be plausible
to get past Rule 12. Rankins harassed Sewell if his verbal abuse was based on
Sewell’s sex and/or race and was “so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive” that it deprived Sewell of an educational benefit. Davis Next
Friend LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999).
The school board is liable for that harassment if it knew about the abuse and
2
The continuing violations doctrine is primarily associated with Title VII
harassment claims. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115–17. Titles VI and IX rely on Title VII
hostile environment caselaw. Fennell v. Marion Indep. Sch. Dist.,
804 F.3d 398, 409 (5th
Cir. 2015) (applying Title VII caselaw to Title VI hostile environment claim); Carder v.
Cont’l Airlines, Inc.,
636 F.3d 172, 180 (5th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that Title IX borrows on
Title VII principles). And the continuing violations doctrine is an accrual principle of
federal law that applies based on the cumulative nature of a hostile environment claim.
Heath, 850 F.3d at 740 (applying the doctrine to such claims brought under section 1983);
see also Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharmacy of Union Univ.,
633 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2011)
(applying the doctrine to Title IX).
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was deliberately indifferent. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290–91. Assuming what
Sewell alleges is true, he has stated a claim.
First, it is plausible that Rankins’s harassment of Sewell stemmed
from a discriminatory view that African American males should not have
two-toned blonde hair. Most obviously, Rankins treated Sewell differently
from students who were not black males. On the first day of school, only
African American male students were sent to Rankins’s office. And even
though white students and black female students wore a variety of dyed
hairstyles, Sewell was the only student punished during the school year for
violating the hair policy. 3 Rankins’s verbal abuse also tied Sewell’s hair to
his race and sex. Rankins asked if Sewell “was gay with ‘that mess’ in his
head,” which could imply animus toward males who do not conform to
stereotypical notions of masculinity. See E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co.,
731 F.3d 444, 456–60 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (explaining that epithets
targeting homosexuals can support inference of gender-based stereotyping).
And he called Sewell a “thug,” a term that could be race-neutral or racially
charged, depending on context. See Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
546 U.S. 454,
456 (2006) (recognizing that the word “boy” may not always be benign
depending on “context, inflection, tone of voice, local custom, and historical
usage”); Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr.,
476 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir.
2007) (describing use of phrase “ghetto children” as “perhaps racially
inappropriate”); Gaston v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi.,
2019 WL 398688, at *6
3
In concluding that this differential treatment was not discriminatory, the
magistrate’s report relied on the burden-shifting framework of McDonnel Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). But that is an evidentiary framework for viewing evidence at
the summary judgment stage. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,
534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002);
Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch,
924 F.3d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 2019). It does not apply
at the pleading stage, which asks only whether the allegation of discrimination is plausible.
Id.
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(N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2019) (noting that a “[school principal] called another
teacher a ‘thug,’ which of course is a racially-charged word”); Lloyd v.
Holder, 2013 WL 6667531, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2013) (listing “thug” as
example of “facially non-discriminatory terms [that] can invoke racist
concepts . . . already planted in the public consciousness”). At the pleading
stage, Sewell is entitled to the latter characterization. In addition, the
Department of Education interviewed school officials about the first-day-of-
school incident and observed that “the District did not advance a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its different treatment of” Sewell. It
concluded that the evidence established violations of Title VI and Title IX.
A federal agency’s finding of discrimination may not be definitive on the
subject, but it certainly supports the plausibility of Sewell’s claims. See
Johnson v. Halstead,
916 F.3d 410, 418–19 (5th Cir. 2019) (recognizing that
the findings of an investigative report can support the plausibility of a hostile
environment claim).
Second, the harassment may well have been so severe, pervasive, and
offensive that it denied Sewell an educational benefit. To satisfy this
requirement, the harassment must have had a “concrete, negative effect” on
Sewell’s education. Fennell, 804 F.3d at 410 (citations omitted). According
to Sewell, Rankins verbally “ridiculed” him “every other day” for much of
the school year. Rankins also discouraged other students from talking to
Sewell. And he tried to convince a student to concoct an allegation that
Sewell sexually assaulted her. The abuse left Sewell “depressed,” “sad,”
“isolated,” “distraught,” and “traumatized.” On at least one occasion, he
called his mother from school, crying. Cf.
id. (explaining that plaintiff who
“suffered from anxiety and required alternative study arrangements” was
deprived of an educational benefit). Intense verbal abuse that comes from an
authority figure—like a school administrator—and persists for most of the
school year can constitute a hostile educational environment. See Hayut v.
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State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 748–49 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding triable issue
when student was humiliated, had difficulty concentrating, and could not
sleep as a result of in-class sexual harassment from professor, even though
her academic performance did not suffer); see also Sanches v. Carrollton-
Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist.,
647 F.3d 156, 166 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Peer
harassment is less likely to support liability than is teacher-student
harassment.”).
Third, it is plausible that the school board knew about the harassment.
The school board had knowledge if a district official with authority to address
the discrimination did. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. Superintendent Vidrine fits
the bill (if not others as well). After stating that Sewell “was subject to
repetitive harassment, intimidation and bullying,” the complaint alleges that
Kirk “complained” to several school district officials, including Vidrine. It
also alleges that Kirk filed a grievance with the school board. Viewing these
allegations in the light most favorable to Sewell, Vidrine knew about the
harassment.
Not only did Vidrine know about the harassment, but he also could
have done something about it. For an official’s knowledge to be imputable to
a school board, he must be vested with power to supervise the harassing
employee and to take action that would end the harassment. Rosa H. v. San
Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648, 660 (5th Cir. 1997). Louisiana law
gives superintendents administrative authority over school personnel,
including the power to hire, place, and dismiss staff, La. Stat. Ann.
§ 17:81(A)(2)–(4), (6); discipline teachers
, id. § 17:443; and direct school
principals
, id. § 17:414.1. Vidrine could have stopped Rankins by directing
Martin, disciplining Rankins, or dismissing Rankins. His knowledge was thus
the school board’s knowledge.
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Finally, the allegation is that despite knowing of the harassment, the
board did little to ensure Sewell was safe. A funding recipient’s response to
known acts of discrimination is deliberately indifferent when it is “clearly
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.
Deliberate indifference is a tall hurdle: if the recipient responds reasonably to
a risk of harm, it will not be liable—even if harm ultimately comes to pass.
Fennell, 804 F.3d at 410. According to Sewell’s complaint, however, the
board did nothing after Vidrine promised to “talk with” Rankins and Martin
when Kirk complained to him on the second day of school. It offered no
response to the verbal abuse that continued and intensified throughout the
school year, much less a reasonable one. See Vance v. Spencer Cty. Pub. Sch.
Dist.,
231 F.3d 253, 262 (6th Cir. 2000) (affirming Title IX verdict when
defendants presented “no evidence” of remedial measures other than
district officials “talking to” harassing student). Doing nothing is the classic
case of indifference.
Sewell’s harassment claims under Title VI and Title IX thus survive
the pleading stage. Of course, the evidentiary support for these claims may
be challenged at summary judgment, and if it can pass that hurdle, at trial.
Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 766–67. For now we have only the complaint, and we
assume the factual allegations in it to be true. Under that assumption, Sewell
has “alleged sufficient facts to ‘nudge[] [his] claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible.’”
Id. at 768 (first alteration in original) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547).
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C.
Sewell’s retaliation claims do not fare so well. 4 A retaliation plaintiff
must show that the funding recipient or its representatives took an adverse
action against him because he complained of discrimination. Sanches, 647
F.3d at 170. That typically means the funding recipient itself signed off on
the adverse action. E.g. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ.,
544 U.S. 167,
171–72 (2005) (school board terminated teacher’s coaching duties after he
complained about unequal treatment of girls’ basketball team). But Sewell’s
claim is different. He says that Rankins—not the school board—retaliated
against him for complaining about the verbal abuse by trumping up the sexual
assault charge that got him suspended and recommended for expulsion.
When a case does not involve the funding recipient’s “official policy,” Title
VI and Title IX require deliberate indifference.
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290; see
also Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley,
911 F.3d 674, 695–96 (4th Cir. 2018)
(recognizing claim of deliberate indifference to student-on-student
retaliatory harassment).
Sewell has not pleaded deliberate indifference to Rankins’s retaliatory
conduct. On the contrary, once board officials became aware of the
questionable circumstances surrounding Sewell’s suspension and
recommended expulsion, they rejected it. The decision was not deliberately
indifferent to possible retaliation; it helped put a stop to it. We affirm the
dismissal of Sewell’s retaliation claim.
4
Title IX encompasses retaliation claims. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544
U.S. 167, 171 (2005). So we assume without deciding that Title VI does too. See Bhombal
v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 809 F. App’x 233, 238 (5th Cir. 2020) (unpublished per curiam).
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***
The dismissal of Sewell’s harassment claims under Title VI and Title
IX against Monroe City School Board is REVERSED. The district court’s
judgment is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
13
