Filed: Oct. 12, 1995
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 1995 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 10-12-1995 Deutsch v United States Precedential or Non-Precedential: Docket 95-1291 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995 Recommended Citation "Deutsch v United States" (1995). 1995 Decisions. Paper 265. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/265 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States
Summary: Opinions of the United 1995 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 10-12-1995 Deutsch v United States Precedential or Non-Precedential: Docket 95-1291 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995 Recommended Citation "Deutsch v United States" (1995). 1995 Decisions. Paper 265. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/265 This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States ..
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Opinions of the United
1995 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
10-12-1995
Deutsch v United States
Precedential or Non-Precedential:
Docket 95-1291
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995
Recommended Citation
"Deutsch v United States" (1995). 1995 Decisions. Paper 265.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/265
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 95-1291
MELVIN P. DEUTSCH,
Appellant
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Civil No. 95-01728)
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 9, 1995
Before: GREENBERG, NYGAARD and LEWIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed October 12, l995 )
MELVIN P. DEUTSCH, PRO SE
#97217-024
Metropolitan Correction Center
150 Park Row
New York, NY 10007
Appellant, Pro Se
JOHN N. JOSEPH, ESQUIRE
Office of United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250
Philadelphia, Pa 19106
Attorney for Appellee
OPINION OF THE COURT
1
2
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Melvin P. Deutsch appeals from an order that dismissed
his in forma pauperis complaint as "frivolous or malicious"
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988); the district
court determined that the relief Deutsch sought was a "trifle"
and thus not worthy of adjudication. We will affirm, but for
reasons other than those offered by the district court. We hold
that a court may dismiss an in forma pauperis claim as frivolous
if, after considering the contending equities, the court
determines that the claim is: (1) of little or no weight, value,
or importance; (2) not worthy of serious attention; or (3)
trivial.
I.
Deutsch filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis and
a complaint, alleging that prison guards took his writing pens
and never returned them. Deutsch also alleged that he had filed
a tort claim with the federal government in September 1994, but
that the government declined to offer a settlement because it
found no evidence that his pens had been taken. Deutsch then
filed this action, which the district court properly construed as
a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),
2671-2680 (1988). Deutsch requested $4.20 for his pens, plus
litigation costs, attorney's fees, and interest.
The district court granted Deutsch leave to proceed in
forma pauperis but dismissed the complaint under § 1915(d). The
district court determined that the $120 filing fee paid by every
non-indigent plaintiff has the practical effect of precluding
3
insubstantial claims seeking solely monetary damages. It
concluded that the in forma pauperis legislation was not intended
to encourage indigent plaintiffs to assert claims that a non-
indigent plaintiff would not. The district court was unable to
conclude that the case was legally or factually frivolous, or
that it was brought for a malicious purpose, but instead
determined that under the doctrine of de minimis non curat lex,0
plaintiff's claim, which is limited solely to monetary damages in
the amount of $4.20, was encompassed by the phrase `frivolous or
malicious' as used in § 1915(d). Accordingly, it dismissed the
complaint.
Deutsch filed a notice of appeal and a motion for leave
to appeal in forma pauperis. We notified the parties that we
would consider summary action pursuant to Internal Operating
Procedure 10.6. Deutsch did file a summary action response. We
will consider this appeal on the district court record and the
United States Attorney's response.0
0
"The law does not care for, or take notice of, very small or
trifling matters. The law does not concern itself about
trifles." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 431 (6th ed. 1990).
0
The U.S. Attorney's Office responded to our notification that
we would take summary action on this appeal by directing our
attention to United States v. Bradley, 892 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied,
495 U.S. 909,
110 S. Ct. 1935,
109 L. Ed. 2d 298
(1990). We will take notice of the Bradley opinion because, in
that case, Deutsch lied to a district court, claiming that he was
an attorney and that he should be permitted to enter an
appearance as trial counsel for a criminal defendant. Deutsch is
not, and never has been, an attorney. After considering the
situation, the court of appeals felt compelled to issue a
warning: "Deutsch is a con man, a fraud, a phony, a humbug, a
mountebank--in short, an impostor. . . . Judges should be on the
lookout for Mr. Deutsch, whose persistence suggests that he may
4
II.
(a) Jurisdiction
We have held that an order dismissing a complaint
without prejudice is not final under § 1291, and thus not
appealable. Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d
Cir. 1976) (per curiam). In Borelli, we recognized that an
exception to this jurisdictional rule exists if the plaintiff
either cannot cure the defect that led to dismissal or elects to
stand on the dismissed complaint.
Id. at 951-52.
Here, the district court failed to specify whether the
§ 1915(d) dismissal was with or without prejudice, and there is
no indication in the opinion accompanying the dismissal order
that the court expected Deutsch to file a curative complaint.
Although the filing of a paid complaint has not been prejudiced,
we will review the order appealed pursuant to § 1291. The
district court's order is in essence final, because an in forma
pauperis plaintiff must be afforded appellate review of a
determination that he is required to pay all or a portion of the
court costs and filing fees to file a claim, either because he
does not qualify for in forma pauperis status or because his
complaint is frivolous. See Roberts v. United States Dist.
Court, 339 U.S. 844, 845,
90 S. Ct. 954,
94 L. Ed. 2d 1326 (1950)
(per curiam) (order denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis is
final, collateral order that is appealable under § 1291); see
also Sinwell v. Shapp,
536 F.2d 15, 16 (3d Cir. 1976).
have other marks in sight."
Id. at 634-35; see also United
States v. Ziegenhagen,
890 F.2d 937, 939 n.7 (7th Cir. 1989).
5
Alternatively, if the plaintiff has expressed an intent
to stand on the dismissed complaint, or if it appears that the
plaintiff could do nothing to cure the complaint's defects, then
the order is likewise appealable under § 1291. Riley v. Simmons,
45 F.3d 764, 770 (3d Cir. 1995); Presbytery of N.J. Orthodox
Presbyterian Church v. Florio,
40 F.3d 1454, 1461-62 n.6 (3d Cir.
1994). Here, it appears that Deutsch could not cure the defect
that led to dismissal because the relief he sought was determined
to be too small an amount to survive § 1915(d) scrutiny.
Accordingly, we conclude the order is appealable under § 1291.
(b) Standard of Review
We apply a deferential abuse of discretion standard
when reviewing a district court's decision to dismiss an in forma
pauperis complaint under § 1915(d). Denton v. Hernandez, 504
U.S. 25, 33,
112 S. Ct. 1728,
118 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1992). However,
even within this narrow scope of review, to the extent that the
district court, in the course of its frivolousness determination,
engaged in the choice, application, and interpretation of legal
precepts, our review is plenary. See Louis W. Epstein Family
Partnership v. Kmart Corp.,
13 F.3d 762, 766 (3d Cir. 1994)
(citing Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co.,
669 F.2d
98, 102 (3d Cir. 1981)).
III.
The district court relied on the maxim de minimis non
curat lex and concluded that Deutsch's complaint was "frivolous
or malicious" within the meaning of § 1915(d). The Supreme Court
has recognized that "the venerable maxim de minimis non curat lex
6
. . . is part of the established background of legal principles
against which all enactments are adopted, and which all
enactments (absent contrary indication) are deemed to accept."
Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue v. Wrigley, 505 U.S. 214, 231, 112 S.
Ct. 2447,
120 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1992). Given the importance of the
maxim de minimis non curat lex in American jurisprudence, it is
clear that the district court's reliance on that maxim was well-
intended. We conclude, nonetheless, that the plain meaning of
the term "frivolous" authorizes the dismissal of in forma
pauperis claims that, like Deutsch's, are of little or no weight,
value, or importance, not worthy of serious consideration, or
trivial. A dismissal based upon the maxim de minimis non curat
lex would encompass claims beyond the parameters of § 1915(d),
and is unnecessary to the determination that Deutsch's complaint
should be dismissed. We will affirm on the narrower ground that
the complaint was frivolous within the meaning of § 1915(d).0
The in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, "is
designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access
to the federal courts." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324,
109 S. Ct. 1827,
104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989) (emphasis added) (citing
Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
335 U.S. 331, 342-43,
69
S. Ct. 85,
93 L. Ed. 43 (1948)). Specifically, Congress enacted
the in forma pauperis statute to ensure that administrative court
costs and filing fees, both of which must be paid by everyone
0
Because our discussion is confined to the "frivolous" standard,
we need not decide whether Deutsch's complaint was also
"malicious" within the meaning of § 1915(d).
7
else who files a lawsuit, would not prevent indigent persons from
pursuing meaningful litigation. Denton, 504 U.S. at 31; Jones v.
Zimmerman,
752 F.2d 76, 78-79 (3d Cir. 1985). To that end,
§1915(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Any court of the United States may authorize the
commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit,
action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal
therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or
security therefor, by a person who makes affidavit that
he is unable to pay such costs or give security
therefor.
See also Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 441,
82 S. Ct.
917,
8 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1962).
Congress was also concerned, however, that indigent
persons could abuse this cost-free access to the federal courts.
Denton, 504 U.S. at 31;
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324. ("When
Congress opened the door to in forma pauperis petitions, it was
concerned that the removal of the cost barrier might result in a
tidalwave [sic] of frivolous or malicious motions filed by
persons who gave no pause before crossing the threshold of the
courthouse door."). McTeague v. Sosnowski, 617 F.2d 1016, 1019
(3d Cir. 1980). Thus, Congress sought to empower the courts to
dismiss the abusive filings0 that could result from the absence
of a cost barrier by including § 1915(d), which authorizes a
court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint "if satisfied
0
We note parenthetically that Melvin Deutsch has filed 20 civil
actions since 1992. Nevertheless, given the basis on which we
are affirming the district court's order, we need not decide
whether he has abused his right of access to the courts by
repeated, frivolous filings.
8
that the action is frivolous or malicious." See Denton, 504 U.S.
at 31.
As the in forma pauperis legislation, which was first
enacted in 1892, begins its second century, it is clear that
Congress' use of the term "frivolous" in § 1915(d) has left the
federal courts with an imprecise standard for determining whether
an in forma pauperis complaint abuses the federal legal system.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has found that
the brevity of § 1915(d) and the generality of its
terms have left the judiciary with the not
inconsiderable task of fashioning the procedures by
which the statute operates and of giving content to
§1915(d)'s indefinite adjectives. Articulating the
proper contours of the § 1915(d) term `frivolous,'
which neither the statute nor the accompanying
congressional report defines, presents one such task.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324-35 (footnote omitted). Like the other
courts of appeals, we have established procedures by which § 1915
is to operate.0 Here, we must consider the contours of
0
In this Circuit, leave to proceed in forma pauperis is based on
a showing of indigence. Roman v. Jeffes,
904 F.2d 192, 194 n.1
(3d Cir. 1990). We review the affiant's financial statement,
and, if convinced that he or she is unable to pay the court costs
and filing fees, the court will grant leave to proceed in forma
pauperis.
Id. Thereafter, the court considers whether the
complaint is "frivolous or malicious" within the meaning of §
1915(d).
Id. We also recognize that "extreme circumstances"
might justify denying an otherwise qualified affiant leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. Lockhart v. D'Urso,
408 F.2d 354, 355
(3d Cir. 1969) (per curiam). Although we have not delineated the
circumstances that might be sufficiently "extreme" to justify
denial, we remain open to the possibility that an affiant may
someday warrant invocation of this exception to the usual
procedure. Cf. In re Sindram,
498 U.S. 177, 180,
111 S. Ct. 596,
112 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1991) (per curiam) (barring abusive petitioner
from in forma pauperis status when seeking extraordinary writs
and stating that "the Court has a duty to deny in forma pauperis
status to those individuals who have abused the system.").
9
§1915(d)'s frivolous standard to address whether the court is
authorized to dismiss an in forma pauperis claim if it determines
that the controversy under the claim is trifling.
Preliminarily, we note that the Supreme Court has
already defined some contours for the frivolous standard. For
example, a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory
may be dismissed as frivolous under § 1915(d). Neitzke, 490 U.S.
at 327; Roman v. Jeffes,
904 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1990).
Accordingly, we held in Abdul-Akbar v. Watson,
901 F.2d 329, 334-
35 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 806,
111 S. Ct. 237,
112
L. Ed. 2d 196 (1990), that a prisoner's in forma pauperis complaint
alleging that prison officials had violated his right of access
to the courts was not legally frivolous because the district
court could not conclude that the allegations turned on an
indisputably meritless legal theory. Section 1915(d) also
authorizes the dismissal of a complaint as factually frivolous if
a court determines that the contentions are clearly baseless.
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325, 328. In Denton, the Supreme Court held
that "a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the
facts alleged rise to the level of the wholly irrational or the
wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable
facts available to contradict
them." 504 U.S. at 33.
The Supreme Court has only begun, with Neitzke and
Denton, to define § 1915(d)'s frivolous standard. See Adams v.
Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he term `frivolous' []
connotes discretion because, as a practical matter, it is simply
not susceptible to categorical definition. Although the Supreme
10
Court has loosely defined frivolous claims, . . . it has declined
to fashion too precise a rule."); White v. White, 886 F.2d 721,
724 (4th Cir. 1989). More specifically, Neitzke and Denton do
not preempt us from considering whether § 1915(d)'s use of the
term "frivolous" includes trivial claims, because neither opinion
places the contours of the frivolous standard beyond the purview
of further judicial inquiry.
"Where, as here, the resolution of a question of
federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we
look first to the statutory language and then to the legislative
history if the statutory language is unclear." See Toibb v.
Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162,
111 S. Ct. 2197, 2199,
115 L. Ed. 2d
145 (1991). Accordingly, we turn to the issue on appeal, which
requires that we look to both the language of § 1915(d) and the
congressional intent underlying its enactment. Blum v. Stenson,
465 U.S. 886, 896,
104 S. Ct. 1541, 1548,
79 L. Ed. 2d 891 (1984).
We recognize that, as an interpreting court, we must begin with
the "assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language
accurately expresses the legislative purpose." FMC Corp. v.
Holliday,
498 U.S. 52, 57,
111 S. Ct. 403, 407,
112 L. Ed. 2d 356
(1990) (quoting Park `N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.,
469
U.S. 189, 194,
105 S. Ct. 658, 661,
83 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1985)).
The Supreme Court has determined that the meaning of
"frivolous" in § 1915(d) is "indefinite." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at
325 ("neither the statute nor the accompanying congressional
reports [define frivolous]"); see H.R. Rep. No. 1079, 52d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1892); see also Mallard v. United States Dist. Court,
11
490 U.S. 296, 302,
109 S. Ct. 1814,
104 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1989)
(referring to the Report of the House Judiciary Committee as
generally "unilluminating"). When a term is defined neither by
the statutory text nor its legislative history, we must construe
it in accordance with its ordinary and natural, or plain,
meaning. See Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, Dep't
of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, ___ U.S. ____,
114 S. Ct. 2251,
2255,
129 L. Ed. 2d 221 (1994) (citing Smith v. United States, 508
U.S. ____,
113 S. Ct. 2050, 2055,
124 L. Ed. 2d 138 (1993). Thus,
in determining whether the Congress used "frivolous" to authorize
the dismissal of trifling or trivial claims, we must look to the
plain meaning of "frivolous," consonant, of course, with the
general legislative purposes served by the in forma pauperis
statute. See
Mallard, 490 U.S. at 300-02.
"Frivolous" means "of little or no weight, value, or
importance; paltry; trumpery; not worthy of serious attention;
having no reasonable ground or purpose." The meaning of
"frivolous" was the same in the 1890s, when the in forma pauperis
statute was first enacted, as it is today. THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 556 (1987); see also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 535 (2d
ed. 1982) ("(1) unworthy of serious attention; trivial; (2)
inappropriately silly"); THE NEW CENTURY DICTIONARY 618 (D. Appleton-
Century Co. 1927) ("of little or no weight, worth, or importance;
paltry or trivial; not worthy of serious notice; characterized by
lack of seriousness or sense; given to trifling or levity.").
Commonly used synonyms for frivolous include "impractical,"
"insignificant," "minor," and "trivial." The plain meaning of
12
"frivolous" indicates that Congress intended §1915(d) to
authorize a court to dismiss a complaint when it determines that
the action is, inter alia, "of little or no weight, value, or
importance," "not worthy of serious attention," or "trivial."
In Neitzke, the Supreme Court began the task of
defining the frivolous standard by looking to its definition of a
legally frivolous appeal set forth in cases not dealing with
applications of § 1915(d).0 In Denton, the Supreme Court again
looked to the legal sense of "frivolous" when it refined the
standard that governs the dismissal of factually frivolous
claims. See 504 U.S. at 32-33. Significantly, because there is
no indication in the statute or the legislative history that
"frivolous" was used in § 1915(d) in a legal sense only--thus
excluding from consideration the term's other meanings in common
usage--we must presume that Congress did not intend to define
0
The Court stated in Neitzke that
[t]he Courts of Appeals have, quite correctly in our
view, generally adopted as formulae for evaluating
frivolousness under § 1915(d) close variants of the
definition of legal frivolousness which we articulated
in the Sixth Amendment case of Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738[,
87 S. Ct. 1396,
18 L. Ed. 2d 493] (1967).
There, we stated that an appeal on a matter of law is
frivolous where `[none] of the legal points [are]
arguable on their merits.'
490 U.S. at 325. We think it would be unwise to construe this
ambiguous statement, albeit one proffered by the Supreme Court,
as indicative of an intent to limit the Courts of Appeals to
these variants of the Neitzke question: i.e., "whether a
complaint that fails to state a claim under [Fed. R. Civ. P.]
12(b)(6) is necessarily frivolous within the meaning of
§1915(d)." 490 U.S. at 324. We do not infer that the Court
would deem unacceptable those formulae developed for evaluating
frivolousness in other contexts.
13
"frivolous" in a manner that would immure the concept it defines
from the remainder of the it's plain meaning. See Connecticut
Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54,
112 S. Ct. 1146,
117
L. Ed. 2d 391 (1992) ("[C]ourts must presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it
says there."); United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises Inc., 489
U.S. 235, 241-42,
109 S. Ct. 1026,
103 L. Ed. 2d 290 (1989).
Looking to the context in which "frivolous" is used in
§ 1915(d), we find further support for viewing the term with a
broad sense of its plain meaning. See Reno v. Koray, ___ U.S.
____, 115 S. Ct. 2021, 2025,
132 L. Ed. 2d 46 (1995) (drawing
meaning of a word from the context in which it is used.);
Ardestani v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
502 U.S. 129,
135,
112 S. Ct. 515, 519,
116 L. Ed. 2d 496 (1991); Hudson United
Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
43 F.3d 843, 848 n.11 (3d Cir.
1994). Section 1915(d) is phrased so that a finding that an
action is frivolous is conjoined as an alternative to a finding
that an action is malicious. A court that considers whether an
action is malicious must, in accordance with the definition of
the term "malicious," engage in a subjective inquiry into the
litigant's motivations at the time of the filing of the lawsuit
to determine whether the action is an attempt to vex, injure or
harass the defendants.
The frivolous standard, by contrast, as the Supreme
Court impliedly recognized in Neitzke and Denton, requires that a
court also assess an in forma pauperis complaint from an
objective standpoint in order to determine whether the claim is
14
based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or clearly
baseless factual contention. See Denton, 504 U.S. at 34;
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. We presume that, in accordance with
Congress's intent to empower the courts with broad discretion to
dismiss the abusive filings that would result from the absence of
a cost barrier (see
Denton, 504 U.S. at 33), the conjunction of
the objective "frivolous" standard as an alternative to the
subjective "malicious" standard indicates Congress's desire to
grant the judiciary a sufficient scope of power to maintain
meaningful control over the filing of in forma pauperis
complaints.
In accordance with this broad grant of authority,
Congress presumably intended the courts to consider the plain
meaning of "frivolous" when analyzing a claim, because a crabbed
or contrived interpretation would not serve a court when it
evaluates whether an in forma pauperis complaint abuses the legal
system. Indeed, by way of negative inference, we know that
Congress did not express concern that one could abuse the legal
system only by filing legally frivolous claims; rather, Congress
was concerned that there would be many varieties of abuse
resulting from the absence of a cost barrier. Thus, we conclude
that under § 1915(d), a court may also properly focus on whether
the action is frivolous in the sense that it is: (1) of little or
no weight, value, or importance; (2) not worthy of serious
consideration; or (3) trivial.
This interpretation of § 1915(d)'s frivolous standard
is consistent with the goals of the in forma pauperis
15
legislation, and we are confident that giving effect to the
entire plain meaning of "frivolous" will not produce "a result
demonstrably at odds with the intention of the drafters." Griffin
v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571,
102 S. Ct. 3245,
3230,
73 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1982). Indeed, in our view it would be
anomalous to conclude that the in forma pauperis legislation,
while seeking to "assure equality of consideration for all
litigants[,]" Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. at 447, would
also seek to encourage an indigent litigant such as appellant to
pursue suit upon a trivial claim that a paying litigant would not
file, because common sense and the practical effect of having to
pay $120 in filing fees to recover $4.20 would in effect preclude
the suit. Thus, a plain-meaning interpretation of "frivolous"
serves the drafters' intentions quite well: § 1915(d) authorizes
a district court to dismiss trivial claims brought to the courts
simply because, upon the grant of in forma pauperis status, there
is no longer the ordinary economic disincentive to doing so. See
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
At the time § 1915 was enacted, Congress recognized
that "a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by
the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive
to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive
lawsuits." Denton, 504 U.S. at 31 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324). In recent years,
however, it has become clear that the absence of a cost barrier
is, as Congress feared it would be, the primary reason indigent
litigants do not refrain from filing frivolous lawsuits. See,
16
e.g., Zatko v. California, 502 U.S. 16, 16-17,
112 S. Ct. 355,
116 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1991) (per curiam) ("[I]n forma pauperis
petitioners lack the financial disincentives--filing fees and
attorney's fees--that help to deter other litigants from filing
frivolous petitions[.]"); In re Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U.S.
13, 14,
111 S. Ct. 1572,
114 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1991) (per curiam)
(noting lack of economic disincentives and amending Supreme Court
Rule 39 so that the Court can deny in forma pauperis status to
those who submit "frivolous or malicious" filings); Lumbert v.
Illinois Dep't of Corrections,
827 F.2d 257, 259 (7th Cir. 1987);
Phillips v. Mashburn,
746 F.2d 782, 784-85 (11th Cir. 1984);
Franklin v. Murphy,
745 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1984); Anderson
v. Coughlin,
700 F.2d 37, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1983). Although § 1915
was enacted to remove the cost barrier that kept indigent persons
from the federal courts, Congress did not intend that the courts
ignore, particularly when applying § 1915(d), Congress' concern
that absence of an economic disincentive could lead to litigation
that abuses the system.
The Supreme Court has determined that § 1915(d) "is
designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of
judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that
paying litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs
of bringing suit[.]" Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; see Roman v.
Jeffes,
904 F.2d 192, 195 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990); Adams v. Rice,
40
F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Congress enacted § 1915(d) in order
to prevent abuse of the judicial system by parties who bear none
of the ordinary financial disincentives to filing meritless
17
claims."); White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 724 (4th Cir. 1989)
("[Section] 1915(d) seeks to forestall frivolous pro se lawsuits
that would not be brought by paying litigants."). In essence,
§1915(d) represents Congress's attempt to codify its awareness
that paying litigants, unlike indigent litigants, consider the
economic feasibilities of suing before filing a lawsuit. When
one must pay the expenses of pursuing litigation, one will first
consider whether the costs of suing will be greater than the
benefits to be gained. See Lumbert, 827 F.2d at 259; Evans v.
Croom,
650 F.2d 521, 524 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S.
1153,
102 S. Ct. 1023,
71 L. Ed. 2d 309 (1982). If it seems that
the cost/recovery differential will be too great, the reasonable
paying litigant will be dissuaded from filing.
Neitzke, 490 U.S.
at 328.0
The absence of an economic disincentive has developed
into a major concern for the federal courts since the explosion
of in forma pauperis prisoner litigation began almost thirty
years ago. We have been, and remain, cognizant that "the cost in
0
In Neitzke, the Supreme Court distinguished § 1915(d)'s
standard for dismissal from that of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
finding that
[t]his conclusion follows naturally from § 1915(d)'s
role of replicating the function of screening out
inarguable claims which is played in the realm of paid
cases by financial considerations. The cost of
bringing suit and the fear of financial sanctions
doubtlessly deter most inarguable paid claims, but such
deterrence presumably screens out far less frequently
those arguably meritorious legal theories whose
ultimate failure is not quite apparent at the outset.
490 U.S. at 328.
18
time and personnel to process pro se and in forma pauperis
pleadings requires some portion of the court's limited resources
and ties up these limited resources to the detriment of other
litigants." Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d at 332; see also In
re McDonald,
489 U.S. 180, 184,
109 S. Ct. 993,
103 L. Ed. 2d 158
(1989) (per curiam) ("Every paper filed with the Clerk of this
Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some
portion of the institution's limited resources.").0 Of course,
both paying litigants and in forma pauperis litigants with
meaningful claims continue to suffer from the drain on human and
economic resources that results from meritless suits. ("[There
are] problems in judicial administration caused by the surfeit of
meritless in forma pauperis complaints in the federal courts, not
the least of which is the possibility that meritorious complaints
will receive inadequate attention or be difficult to identify
0
The Supreme Court has begun to bar abusive petitioners from
receiving in forma pauperis status. See, e.g., In re Whitaker,
___ U.S. ____, 115 S. Ct. 2,
130 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1994) (per curiam)
(barring abusive petitioner from proceeding in forma pauperis
when seeking extraordinary relief); In re Anderson, 511 U.S.
____,
114 S. Ct. 1606,
128 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1994) (per curiam)
(same); In re Sassower, ___ U.S. ____,
114 S. Ct. 2,
126 L. Ed. 2d
6 (1993) (per curiam) (barring abusive petitioner from proceeding
in forma pauperis in non-criminal matters when seeking
extraordinary relief and certiorari review); Martin v. District
of Columbia Court of Appeals, ___ U.S. ____,
113 S. Ct. 397, 397,
121 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992) (per curiam) (barring abusive petitioner
from receiving in forma pauperis status to file petitions for
writs of certiorari); Zatko v.
California, 502 U.S. at 18
(denying in forma pauperis status to two abusive petitioners); In
re Demos,
500 U.S. 16,
111 S. Ct. 1569,
114 L. Ed. 2d 20 (1991)
(per curiam) (barring abusive petitioner from proceeding in forma
pauperis when seeking extraordinary relief); In re Sindram,
498
U.S. 177, 179-80,
111 S. Ct. 596,
112 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1991) (per
curiam) (same).
19
amidst the overwhelming number of meritless complaints.").
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 326. Free v. United States,
879 F.2d 1535,
1536 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Litigation in federal court is not a free
good, and litigation by prisoners places heavy burdens not only
on the courts themselves but on other litigants, whose cases are
shoved further back in the queue."); Savage v. Central
Intelligence Agency, 826 F.2d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 1987) ("Not even
the cause of prisoners' rights is helped by the flood of trivial
suits that distracts judicial attention from the occasional
meritorious one."); Raymon v. Alvord Indep. School Dist., 639
F.2d 257, 258 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981) ("Each litigant who
improperly seeks federal judicial relief for a petty claim forces
other litigants with more serious claims to await a day in
court."). The legislation does contemplate providing access to
indigent persons, but "cost-free" is a misnomer, because the
taxpayers must pay to support the system, both with money and in
the sense that they receive diminished services from the courts.
See Free, 879 F.2d at 1539 (Coffey, J., concurring).
In Adkins v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S.
331,
69 S. Ct. 85,
93 L. Ed. 43 (1948), the Supreme Court
interpreted several provisions of the in forma pauperis statute.
In the Court's unanimous opinion, the most important
consideration for the Court in analyzing § 1915 was the financial
impact that those seeking the benefits of the in forma pauperis
statute would have on the financial interests of the taxpaying
public. For example, in the context of an indigent appellant's
request to have superfluous matters printed for inclusion in the
20
record on appeal, the Court stated that "[w]e do not think that
the court was without power to protect the public from having to
pay heavy costs incident to the inclusion of `wholly unnecessary'
matters in an in forma pauperis appeal." Id. at 337.
Furthermore, the Court added:
We know of few more appropriate occasions for use of a
court's discretion than one in which a litigant, asking
that the public pay costs of his litigation, either
carelessly or willfully and stubbornly endeavors to
saddle the public with wholly uncalled-for expense.
Id. The lesson to be drawn from Adkins is that the courts must
not forget that the public has a legitimate financial interest at
stake under the in forma pauperis statute, and that the
judiciary's role is not only to consider, but to protect, the
public's interest in assuring that the in forma pauperis
legislation does not serve wasteful ends.
In addition to authorizing a court to dismiss abusive
claims when those claims are appropriately classified as
"frivolous or malicious," § 1915(d) also serves the frequently
overlooked purpose of providing the courts with a vehicle for
conserving scarce judicial resources and assuring that resources
are used in the most just manner possible. See Adams, 40 F.3d at
74 ("[Section 1915(d) is] a statutory provision whose purpose is
to conserve judicial resources[.]"); see also Green v. McKaskle,
788 F.2d 1116, 1120 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Section 1915 provides free
access to the courts. Care must be taken to ensure that such
access is not abused."); Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d at 43,
(Section 1915 "demands that attention be paid to the conservation
21
of scarce judicial resources."). It is our view that § 1915(d)
was not intended to allow indigent persons cost-free access to
the federal courts such that the courts' resources could be
depleted by complaints that paying litigants would not file.0 The
important goal of assuring equality of consideration for all
litigants is not furthered when the courts allow such trivial
claims to drain their limited resources.
In sum, we conclude that Congress intended the court to
look to the plain meaning of "frivolous" in § 1915(d). We hold
that § 1915(d) authorizes a court to dismiss an in forma pauperis
claim if it determines that the claim is of little or no weight,
value, or importance, not worthy of serious consideration, or
trivial.
IV.
To find that an in forma pauperis litigant's claim is
trivial, a court must be satisfied that the record supports a
finding that a reasonable paying litigant would not have filed
the same claim after considering the costs of suit. Accordingly,
the court must first find the actual amount in controversy under
the claim presented0 and determine whether the amount in
0
Courts sometimes require in forma pauperis plaintiffs to pay a
portion of court costs and filing fees. Jones v. Zimmerman, 752
F.2d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1985); see Walker v. People Express
Airlines, Inc.,
886 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 832,
111 S. Ct. 97,
112 L. Ed. 2d 68 (1990). We commend
such procedures. Although we believe that requiring partial
payment remains a sound solution, it is not necessary that
district courts rely exclusively on partial payment, particularly
when § 1915(d) authorizes the dismissal of claims that are filed
because there is no economic disincentive.
0
We are mindful that some litigants request large sums for a
monetary remedy. That a complaint requests a large sum in
22
controversy is less than the expense of the court costs and
filing fees. If the court so determines, then the claim is a
candidate for dismissal as frivolous under § 1915(d).0
The court must next determine whether the litigant has
a meaningful nonmonetary interest at stake under the claim, such
that service of the complaint and an allocation of the court's
resources for its adjudication is warranted, despite the fact
that the claim is economically trivial. If, in addition to
finding that the amount of damages in controversy is less than
the court costs and filing fees, the court is satisfied that
there is no other meaningful interest at stake, then the suit is
frivolous within the meaning of § 1915(d).
The relevant guidepost for a district court is whether
a reasonable paying litigant would have paid the court costs and
filing fees to bring the same claim. We do not, however, confine
the courts to rigid formulae when determining whether a claim is
sufficiently "meaningful" to survive dismissal as frivolous. Cf.
damages should be of no moment when a district court inquires as
to whether a claim is economically trivial. See Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507,
98 S. Ct. 2894,
57 L. Ed. 2d 895
(1978) ("Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by
federal courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading.")
0
Related litigation expenses (e.g., attorney's fees, the threat
of sanctions), which along with court costs and filing fees
enhance the economic disincentive for the paying litigant, must
not be considered in determining whether the amount in
controversy under the claim is economically trivial. The in
forma pauperis statute is concerned only with clearing the hurdle
created by court costs and filing fees. Denton, 504 U.S. at 27
(Section 1915 "allows an indigent litigant to commence a civil or
criminal action in federal court without paying the
administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit.");
Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 324. Accordingly, a court must not factor in other
litigation expenses when making this initial determination.
23
Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 157-58 (3d Cir. 1993) ("Section
1915(d) gives district courts broad discretion to determine
whether appointment of counsel is warranted, and the
determination must be made on a case-by-case basis."), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ____, 114 S. Ct. 1306,
127 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1994).
Nevertheless, the courts should be cognizant of several
considerations.
We recognize emotions are intensified in the insular
life of a correctional facility and that prisoners often must
rely on the courts as the only available forum to redress their
grievances, even when those grievances seem insignificant to one
who is not so confined. A court must therefore take into account
the unique nature of each claim presented and the extent to which
the claim is "meaningful" to one in the litigant's situation.
Hence, in determining whether a claim is meaningful, a court must
protect the right of indigent persons to have access to the
courts. See In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1982).
A court must also consider whether the litigant is
filing the litigation to pursue a non-meaningful activity, such
as harassment or entertainment, or merely to hone litigation
skills. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 326-327,
92 S. Ct. 1079,
1084,
31 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1972) (per curiam) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) ("[Inmates are] in a different litigating posture
than persons who are unconfined. The inmate stands to gain
something and lose nothing from a complaint stating facts that he
is ultimately unable to prove. Though he may be denied legal
relief, he will nonetheless have obtained a short sabbatical in
24
the nearest federal courthouse.") (footnotes omitted); Lumbert v.
Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 827 F.2d 257, 259 (7th Cir. 1987)
("the problem of [frivolous litigation] is even more acute when
the indigent plaintiff is a prison inmate, because the costs of a
prisoner's time are very low."); Savage v. Central Intelligence
Agency, 826 F.2d 561, 563-64 (7th Cir. 1987) ("No rational system
of government burdens its highest courts with a class of
litigation dominated by petty cases typically brought for their
nuisance value by persons on whose hands time hangs heavy.").
In sum, a court must balance the equities and dismiss
the claim only if it is satisfied that the claim is of little or
no weight, worth, or importance; not worthy of serious attention;
or trivial. We do not intend to exhaust the considerations
relevant to assessing whether a claim is trivial. We are
confident that the district courts will be able to weigh the
contending equities, exercise their discretion, and identify
those claims that properly survive this frivolousness inquiry.
See Denton, 504 U.S. at 33 ("[F]rivolousness is a decision
entrusted to the discretion of the court entertaining the in
forma pauperis petition," and reviewed only for abuse of that
discretion employed in sorting the wheat from the chaff.).
Finally, we emphasize that our holding should not be
construed to derogate a court's obligation to consider a pro se
complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21,
92 S. Ct. 594,
30 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1972) (per curiam). Moreover, we
are not suggesting that a complaint's factual contentions should
not be weighed in the plaintiff's favor.
Denton, 504 U.S. at 32.
25
Indeed, we stress that, if a court is in doubt as to whether the
actual amount in controversy is economically trivial, or in doubt
as to whether the claim is meaningful, then the plaintiff must be
given the benefit of that doubt, for we do not intend that courts
use monetary worth as an excuse to brush legitimate grievances
aside.
V.
Reading Deutsch's pro se complaint with the requisite
latitude, we agree with the district court that his claim against
the United States is appropriately considered under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (the "FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680
(1988). Cognizable claims under the FTCA include those that are
[1] against the United States, [2] for money damages,
... [3] for injury or loss of property, ... [4] caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government [5] while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, [6] under
circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp v. Meyer, ___ U.S.
____, ____, 114 S. Ct. 996, 1001,
127 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1994) (claim
against United States is cognizable under the FTCA if it alleges
the six elements outlined above). Before commencing an action
under the FTCA, a claimant must have first presented the claim,
in writing and within two years after its accrual, to the
appropriate federal agency, and the claim must have been denied.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a). To be properly presented to the
federal agency, the damages claim must be for a sum certain. 28
26
C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (1987). The requirements that a claimant timely
present a claim, do so in writing, and request a sum certain are
jurisdictional prerequisites to a suit under the FTCA. Corte-
Real v. United States, 949 F.2d 484, 485-86 (1st Cir. 1991)
(citations omitted).
Deutsch alleged that he submitted his claim to a
federal agency for consideration, and that the agency declined to
offer a settlement. Weighing Deutsch's allegations in his favor
for purposes of a § 1915 analysis, it appears that he satisfied
the FTCA exhaustion requirement. A review of the complaint also
suggests that the six elements for a cognizable FTCA claim are
present. See Meyer, 114 S. Ct. at 1001. Deutsch's claim is
against the United States for money damages, and he has accused
several prison guards, presumably government actors, of
committing the alleged wrong while acting in the scope of their
employment. Significantly, the FTCA does not set a minimum
required amount in controversy that must be sought as relief in
order to maintain jurisdiction. Free v. United States,
879 F.2d
1535, 1536 (7th Cir. 1989). Therefore, it appears that Deutsch
has a claim that, on its face, is cognizable in federal court
under the FTCA.
Deutsch's claim is, however, frivolous beyond question
within the meaning of § 1915 (d), and he must pay the court costs
and filing fees if he wishes to file it. First, the amount of
damages in controversy under the complaint is $4.20, an amount
less than the $120 payment required for the court costs and
filing fees. Second, irrespective of the trivial amount in
27
controversy, the allegations proffered in the complaint suggest
that there are no interests at stake beyond the recovery of the
$4.20; hence, there is no other meaningful interest at stake. We
are satisfied that Deutsch's claim is undoubtedly one that the
reasonable paying litigant would not file.
We find that several facts contribute to a
determination that this claim is trivial. Preliminarily,
Deutsch's complaint should cause a district court to wonder
whether Deutsch is interested in recovering the damages
requested, or whether he is simply honing his already overused
litigation skills. See note 4, supra. In addition, an opinion
by the Seventh Circuit's Court of Appeals provides an
enlightening discussion of Deutsch's past litigation experiences.
See note
2, supra.
Aside from the fact that we are satisfied that
Deutsch's claim lacks meaning to him as a frequent filer of
frivolous complaints, we find that a court's obligation to guard
its resources counsels dismissal of this claim. Indeed, this
claim lacks meaning from the court's point of view such that
dismissal would be warranted even if the claim were brought by a
litigant who had never before filed an in forma pauperis suit in
federal court. Significantly, the reasonable paying litigant
would not find justification for the expense of filing suit in a
moral or other non-monetary victory over the defendant. The
appellant is no longer incarcerated at the facility where the
alleged wrong occurred, and, quite obviously, he has another pen.
Moreover, the public simply should not be paying for an indigent
28
litigant to pursue in federal court a claim that the paying
litigant is practically barred from pursuing. Although we will
not establish a bright line for determining when a claim seeking
an amount of damages that is insufficient to warrant forgiveness
of the court costs and filing fees, we find that this claim for
$4.20 is certainly insufficient.
In sum, Deutsch may seek to recover for the loss of his
pens by pursuing remedies afforded by the prison and the agencies
of the federal government. After exhausting those remedies,
however, Deutsch will have to pay court costs and filing fees if
he wishes to sue for his loss in federal court because his claim
is "frivolous" under § 1915(d). We note that the district
court's dismissal of Deutsch's complaint under § 1915(d) did not
preclude his filing a paid complaint making the same allegation.
See Denton, 504 U.S. at 34.
VI.
Deutsch's motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis
will be granted. However, for the foregoing reasons, the
district court's order will be summarily affirmed.
29
