Filed: Apr. 23, 2009
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: Opinions of the United 2009 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 4-23-2009 City of Wilkes-Barre v. Robert Sheils, Jr. Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 08-1412 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009 Recommended Citation "City of Wilkes-Barre v. Robert Sheils, Jr." (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1489. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1489 This decision is brought to you f
Summary: Opinions of the United 2009 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 4-23-2009 City of Wilkes-Barre v. Robert Sheils, Jr. Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential Docket No. 08-1412 Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009 Recommended Citation "City of Wilkes-Barre v. Robert Sheils, Jr." (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1489. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1489 This decision is brought to you fo..
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Opinions of the United
2009 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
4-23-2009
City of Wilkes-Barre v. Robert Sheils, Jr.
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 08-1412
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009
Recommended Citation
"City of Wilkes-Barre v. Robert Sheils, Jr." (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1489.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1489
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2009 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-1412
_____________
In re: GEORGE W. COLE,
Debtor
CITY OF WILKES-BARRE,
Appellant
v.
ROBERT P. SHEILS, Jr., Trustee
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 07-cv-01238
District Judge: The Honorable James M. Munley
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 14, 2009
Before: MCKEE, SMITH, Circuit Judges
and STEARNS, District Judge*
(Filed: April 23, 2009)
OPINION
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
*The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, District Judge of the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
Under the Pennsylvania Heart & Lung Act (HLA), the City of Wilkes-Barre (City)
was obligated to pay police officer George Cole wages and medical expenses during the
period that Cole was unable to work after being severely injured in the line of duty. Cole
subsequently brought a personal injury action against the third parties responsible for his
injuries. The City then sought to recover its HLA payments by asserting a right of
subrogation against the settlement Cole won in his personal injury action. Presently, the
City appeals from a determination by the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania that Section 1720 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility
Law (MVFRL)1 bars the City from asserting a right of subrogation against Cole’s
settlement proceeds. We will vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand the case to
the District Court for further consideration consistent with this opinion.
I.
Cole was severely injured in 1996 when a Luzerne County vehicle struck his
police cruiser. He was unable to return to work for nine years. During those nine years,
the City paid Cole HLA benefits totaling $425,945.69. Meanwhile, Cole also sued
Luzerne County for the injuries he had suffered. While Cole’s personal injury action was
pending, he filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Robert Sheils, Jr., the
appellee, was appointed trustee for Cole’s bankruptcy estate. In 2005, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania approved a settlement of Cole’s
personal injury action according to which the trustee received $495,000.
In 2004, however, the City asserted a common-law right of subrogation to recover
1
75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1720.
2
its HLA payments from Cole’s personal injury settlement. The Bankruptcy Court rejected
the City’s claim. That Court concluded that Cole was immune from subrogation pursuant
to 77 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 501 and granted the trustee’s motion for summary judgment.
The City appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to the District Court under 28
U.S.C. § 158. The District Court noted that it did not necessarily disagree with the
Bankruptcy Court’s reasoning but denied the City’s appeal on a separate ground: the
District Court determined that the City’s right of subrogation was barred by Section 1720
of the MVFRL. The City now appeals from that determination.
II.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review the District
Court’s legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. Citicorp Venture
Capital, Ltd. v. Committee of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims, 323 F.3d 228, 232
(3d Cir. 2003). When applying substantive Pennsylvania law, we must defer to decisions
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not
directly addressed an issue, we must predict how that Court would rule. See Travelers
Indem. Co. of Ill. v. DiBartolo,
131 F.3d 343, 348 (3d Cir. 1997).
III.
A.
Before addressing the District Court’s determination that § 1720 of the MVFRL
bars the City from asserting a right of subrogation to recover HLA payments, we briefly
review the relevant law. The HLA provides lost wages and medical benefits to certain
public employees, such as police officers and firefighters, who face significant risks in the
3
ordinary course of their professions.2 Cunningham v. Pa. State Police, 507 A.2d 40, 43
(Pa. 1986) (“The [HLA] was created to ensure that, if these employees were injured or
otherwise disabled in the course of carrying out their hazardous duties, they would be
guaranteed continued full income until their return to duty.”). HLA benefits are thus
similar to workers’ compensation wage and medical benefits under the Workers’
Compensation Act (WCA),3 except that the HLA guarantees qualifying employees their
full income, instead of a fraction of their income, until they return to duty. Also, whereas
the WCA provides employers with a statutory right of subrogation to recover WCA
payments from an employee’s tort recovery, 77 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 671, the HLA does not.
Fulmer v. Commonwealth of Pa.,
647 A.2d 616, 619 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994).
Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recognized an equitable right of
subrogation by which a state entity may recover wages and medical benefits paid to a
2
Act of June 28, 1935, P.L. 477, as amended, 53 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 637, 638.
Section 637 of the HLA states:
(a) Any member of the State Police force . . . who is injured in the performance
of his duties . . . and by reason thereof is temporarily incapacitated from
performing his duties shall be paid by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania if
a member of the State Police force, by which he is employed, his full rate of
salary . . . until the disability arising therefrom has ceased. All medical and
hospital bills, incurred in connection with any such injury, shall be paid by the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania . . . . During the time salary for temporary
incapacity shall be paid by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania . . . any
workmen’s compensation received or collected by any such employee for such
period shall be turned over to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania . . . and paid
into the treasury thereof, and if such payment shall not be so made by the
employee the amount so due the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania . . . shall be
deducted from any salary then or thereafter becoming due and owing . . . .
3
Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 1–1031.
4
police officer injured in the line of duty. See Topelski v. Universal South Side Autos, Inc.,
180 A.2d 414 (1962); see also Phila. v. Phila. Rapid Transit Co.,
10 A.2d 434 (1940).
In 1984, however, the Pennsylvania legislature enacted the MVFRL. Sections
1720 and 1722 of the MVFRL apply to actions “arising out of the maintenance or use of a
motor vehicle.”4 Section 1720 initially barred an employer’s right of subrogation to
recover workers’ compensation payments, and Section 1722 barred an injured employee’s
right to seek workers’ compensation payments in an action against the party that caused
the injuries. Specifically, Section 1720 provided:
“In actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, there
shall be no right of subrogation or reimbursement from a claimant’s tort
recovery with respect to workers’ compensation benefits, benefits available
under section 1711 (relating to required benefits), 1712 (relating to
availability of benefits) or 1715 (relating to availability of adequate limits)
or benefits paid or payable by a program, group contract or other
arrangement whether primary or excess under section 1719 (relating to
coordination of benefits).”
75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1720 (Subrogation). Section 1722 provided:
“In any action for damages against a tortfeasor, or in any uninsured or
underinsured motorist proceeding, arising out of the maintenance or use of a
motor vehicle, a person who is eligible to receive benefits under the
coverages set forth in this subchapter, or workers’ compensation, or any
program, group contract or other arrangement for payment of benefits as
defined in section 1719 (relating to coordination of benefits) shall be
precluded from recovering the amount of benefits paid or payable under this
subchapter, or workers’ compensation, or any program, group contract or
other arrangement for payment of benefits as defined in section 1719.”
75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1722 (preclusion of recovering required benefits).
But Sections 1720 and 1722 were repealed in 1993 to the extent they relate to
4
75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 1720, 1722.
5
workers’ compensation payments (the 1993 Repeal). 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1720 (“75
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1720 is repealed insofar as it relates to workers’ compensation
payments or other benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act, pursuant to 1993, July
2, P.L. 190, No. 44, § 25(b)”); 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1722 (same as to Section 1722).
Thus, Section 1722 no longer deprives a plaintiff of the right to plead in a tort action
against the party that caused the injuries, the amount of benefits paid or payable to him,
and Section 1720 no longer deprives an employer of a right of subrogation to seek
recovery of WCA payments. Sections 1720 and 1722, and their partial repeals in 1993, do
not mention HLA benefits, however. Therefore, Pennsylvania case law must guide the
determination of whether Section 1720 bars an employer’s right of subrogation to recover
HLA payments.
B.
The District Court relied on Fulmer, 647 A.2d 616, to conclude that Section 1720
barred the City from asserting a right of subrogation against Cole’s personal injury
settlement.5 In 1987, Fulmer, a state trooper, was seriously injured in an automobile
accident. Two years later, he instituted a personal injury action against the driver who
struck his cruiser. In the meantime, the State Police had paid Fulmer HLA benefits; they
then sought to assert a right of subrogation against Fulmer’s personal injury action
5
The District Court also cited City of Pittsburgh v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal
Board (Williams), 810 A.2d 760, 762 n.5 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (holding that the
Pittsburgh Police Department did not illegally terminate an officer’s HLA benefits and
that the Police Department was entitled to a subrogation interest against the officer’s
third-party settlement), to support its reasoning. But City of Pittsburgh provides only a
conclusory note referring to Fulmer and its holding does not depend on that note.
6
recovery.
The Commonwealth Court explained that “[b]enefits received under the [HLA]
effectively replace workmen’s compensation benefits for those employees covered [by
the HLA].” Id. at 619. In view of this identity between WCA and HLA payments, the
Commonwealth Court decided that the catch-all clause of Section 1720 (“or benefits paid
or payable by a program, group contract or other arrangement”) extended to HLA
payments and that Section 1720 barred the State Police from asserting a right of
subrogation against Fulmer’s personal injury proceeds.
Id. at 620. The Court also
expressed concern for the equities of the case. It observed that allowing a right of
subrogation would prevent Fulmer from being fully compensated for his injury because
Section 1722 barred him from seeking his wage and medical benefits in a personal injury
action.
Id. Consequently, subrogation, in conjunction with the Section 1722 bar, would
have left Fulmer without full compensation for his injuries—an inequitable result.
Since the 1993 Repeal, however, Section 1722 no longer bars an employee from
seeking to recover amounts corresponding to WCA benefits in a personal injury action,
and a key rationale to Fulmer’s holding no longer exists. See id. at 618 n.3. (“[The 1993
Repeal] has no impact on [Fulmer’s] case. . . . [W]e express no opinion on the effect of
[the 1993 Repeal] on the Heart and Lung Act in a case arising after the effective date of
[the 1993 Repeal].”). Nevertheless, Fulmer does provide useful guidance insofar as it
recognized the identity between workers’ compensation and HLA benefits in the
application of Section 1720. Drawing on Fulmer, the Commonwealth Court subsequently
ruled on exactly the question presented in this appeal. In Brown v. Rosenberger,
723 A.2d
7
745, 747 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999), the Court determined that Sections 1720 and 1722 did
not bar an employer’s right of subrogation or an employee’s right to seek the amounts
corresponding to HLA payments in a personal injury action.
In Brown, a state trooper was injured when her police cruiser was struck by
another vehicle. After the accident, the State Police paid her full salary and medical
expenses as required under the HLA. The State Police recovered 66 and 2/3's of Brown’s
salary from its workers’ compensation insurance carrier and sought to recover the balance
of her salary and medical costs from the tortfeasor by right of subrogation.
The trial court relied on Fulmer to equate HLA and workers’ compensation
benefits, observing that “the clear effect of [Fulmer’s] holding was to treat Heart and
Lung Act benefits the same as workers’ compensation benefits for the purposes of the
prohibitions to subrogation and pleading as found in Sections 1720 and 1722 of the
[MVFRL].” Brown v. Rosenberger, 40 Pa. D. & C.4th 432, 439 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1998).
Recognizing that the 1993 Repeal “reinstated the right of an employer or benefit provider
and plaintiff to seek subrogation and to plead lost wages and medical benefits in any
action against a third-party tort-feasor in a motor vehicle case,” the trial court determined
that “the pre-[MVFRL] principle of equity and unjust enrichment must again operate to
allow recovery against a third-party tort-feasor for all losses sustained, and must also
allow a benefit provider to be subrogated to any recovery of benefits.”
Id. The trial court
concluded that Section 1720 did not bar the State Police from asserting a right of
subrogation:
[A]s a matter of law, the plaintiff may plead, prove and recover those amounts
8
paid to her through the Heart and Lung Act, as well as those amounts paid by
the workers’ compensation carrier. The Heart and Lung Act provider and the
workers’ compensation carrier shall have the right of subrogation to any third-
party tort-feasor.
Id. at 440. The Commonwealth Court endorsed this reasoning and conclusion to affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
Brown, 723 A.2d at 747 (“[W]e find that the issues presented
to this Court have been thoroughly reviewed and addressed in the opinion of the [trial
court]. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion . . . .”).
We agree with Brown’s reasoning, which comports, moreover, with the purpose of
subrogation as stated in Pennsylvania case law:
“[T]he rationale for the right of subrogation is threefold: to prevent double
recovery for the same injury by the claimant, to insure that the employer is not
compelled to make compensation payments made necessary by the negligence
of a third party, and to prevent a third party from escaping liability for his
negligence . . . . [S]ubrogation is just, because the party who caused the injury
bears the full burden; the employee is made ‘whole,’ but does not recover
more than what he requires to be made whole; and the employer, innocent of
negligence, in the end pays nothing.”
Hannigan v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (O’Brien Ultra Serv. Station), 860 A.2d 632,
635 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). As Fulmer recognized, HLA
and WCA wage and medical benefits are similar for the purposes of subrogation and
pleading under Sections 1720 and 1722 of the MVFRL. The HLA and WCA both ensure
that the employees they cover receive lost wages and medical benefits after suffering an
injury that prevents them from working for some period of time. Where the employee
may seek HLA benefits from a third-party in a tort action, the purpose of subrogation has
as much pertinence for HLA benefits as it does for WCA benefits. After reviewing
9
Pennsylvania case law, we conclude that Section 1722 does not bar Cole from pleading
HLA payments in his personal injury action, and Section 1720 does not bar the City from
asserting an equitable right of subrogation against Cole’s tort recovery.
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand the case to
the District Court for further consideration in accordance with this opinion.
10
