USCA1 Opinion
September 28, 1992
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No. 92-1342
CHRISTINE STOWELL, ETC., ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
H. ROLLIN IVES, ETC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Selya, Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
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James R. Crotteau, with whom Pine Tree Legal Assistance,
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Inc. was on brief, for appellants.
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J. Paterson Rae and Hugh Calkins on joint brief for Robert
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Avanzato, Michelle Turcotte, Maine Civil Liberties Union, and
Maine Chapter of the National Organization for Women, amici
curiae (in support of the appeal).
Christopher C. Leighton, Deputy Attorney General, State of
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Maine, with whom Michael E. Carpenter, Attorney General, and
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Thomas D. Warren, Deputy Attorney General, were on brief, for
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appellee.
Richard A. Olderman, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil
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Division, U.S. Dept. of Justice, with whom Stuart M. Gerson,
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Assistant Attorney General, Barbara C. Biddle, Attorney,
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Appellate Staff, and Richard S. Cohen, United States Attorney,
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were on brief, for the United States, amicus curiae (in support
of the judgment below).
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SELYA, Circuit Judge. Once the wheat is shaken from
SELYA, Circuit Judge.
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the chaff, this apparently complex appeal can be resolved by
deciding a threshold question (albeit one that has not previously
been confronted by the courts of appeals). Consequently, we
affirm the district court's entry of judgment for the defendant
on the basis that a recipient of benefits under the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC), 42 U.S.C.
601-615 (1988 & Supp. I 1989), cannot bring an action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. 1983 (1988) to enforce the terms of 42 U.S.C.
1396a(c)(1) (1988).
I. BACKGROUND
I. BACKGROUND
Since this matter turns on a discrete question of
redressability, our burden of exegesis is considerably reduced.
We content ourselves, therefore, with sketching the contours of
the preliminary inquiry, forgoing detailed exposition of the
facts and substantive issues.
We start with section 1396a(c)(1), a statute enacted on
July 1, 1988 as part of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act.
The statute reads in pertinent part:
[T]he Secretary [of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services]
shall not approve any State plan for medical
assistance if
(1) the State has in effect [AFDC]
payment levels that are less than the payment
levels in effect under such plan on May 1,
1988.
42 U.S.C. 1396a(c)(1).
On February 21, 1992, Christine Stowell brought suit
for declaratory and injunctive relief in Maine's federal district
2
court. She invoked 42 U.S.C. 1983, named a Maine state
official as a defendant,1 and claimed that Maine had violated
section 1396a(c)(1). The claim rested on the premise that
economy measures implemented by the Maine legislature had gone
too far, resulting in a de facto reduction of AFDC payment levels
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below those in effect on May 1, 1988. The State contested
Stowell's standing to sue and, moreover, asserted that payment
levels had been increased rather than decreased.2 On Stowell's
motion, the trial court certified a plaintiff class which it
described as follows:
All families in the State of Maine who would
be eligible for AFDC benefits and/or
supplemental payments under 42 U.S.C.
602(a)(28) under the AFDC payment levels in
effect in Maine on May 1, 1988 and who would
receive a smaller total AFDC plus
supplemental 602(a)(28) payment under the
AFDC payment levels proposed to be effective
March 1, 1992 than they would have received
under the May 1, 1988 payment levels.
Stowell v. Ives, 788 F. Supp. 40, 40 n.1 (D. Me. 1992).
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In time, the case was submitted to the district court
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1Stowell sued H. Rollin Ives, in his capacity as
Commissioner of the Maine Department of Human Services. Since
Maine is the real party in interest, we will sometimes refer to
Ives as "the State." Stowell also sued a federal official, the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
("Secretary"). However, she dropped the Secretary from the case
prior to the entry of judgment below. Thus, although the
Secretary filed an amicus brief and argued before us in support
of the judgment, he is not a party to this appeal.
2The parties' differing views as to the practical effect of
Maine's regulations stem from their differing interpretations of
the term "payment levels." See Stowell v. Ives, 788 F. Supp. 40,
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41-42 (D. Me. 1992). Because we do not reach the merits, we
express no opinion on the proper resolution of this interpretive
conundrum.
3
on a stipulated record. The court ruled that the amended
complaint failed to state a cause of action cognizable under
section 1983. Id. at 44. This appeal ensued.
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II. DISCUSSION
II. DISCUSSION
Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for
"the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and [federal] laws." 42 U.S.C. 1983.3 A
prospective plaintiff may bring suit under section 1983 not only
for a state actor's violation of his or her constitutional rights
but also to enforce federal statutory law in the face of
infringing state officialdom. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S.
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1, 4-8 (1980).
Nevertheless, not every violation of federal law gives
rise to a section 1983 claim. See Golden State Transit Corp. v.
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Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989). Exceptions include
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situations where "Congress has foreclosed such enforcement . . .
in the enactment itself" or where "the statute [does] not create
enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning
of 1983." Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360, 1366 (1992)
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(quoting Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Auth., 479
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U.S. 418, 423 (1987)); accord Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496
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U.S. 498, 508 (1990). Because 42 U.S.C. 1396a(c)(1) does not
expressly outlaw section 1983 actions, the first of these
exceptions is inapposite here. Accordingly, we focus the lens of
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3For ease in reference, we will henceforth use "rights" as a
shorthand abbreviation for "rights, privileges, or immunities."
4
our perlustration on the second exception, bent on determining to
what extent (if at all) section 1396a(c)(1) creates any
enforceable rights.
A.
A.
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Prior to 1992, cases such as Wilder v. Virginia Hosp.
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Ass'n, 479 U.S. 418 (1990), Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
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Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), and Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397
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(1970), guided judicial inquiry into whether a federal law did,
or did not, create a right falling within the ambit of section
1983. Under that framework, a court's first duty was to satisfy
itself that "the [statutory] provision in question was intend[ed]
to benefit the putative plaintiff." Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509
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(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). If no such
benefit could be gleaned, the court's inquiry ended. If,
however, the court perceived an intended benefit, then it was
bound to find that the provision created an enforceable right
unless one of two conditions obtained: either (1) the statute,
fairly read, "reflect[ed] merely a congressional preference for a
certain kind of conduct rather than a binding obligation on the
governmental unit," or (2) the interest asserted by the putative
plaintiff was so "vague and amorphous" that enforcement would be
"beyond the competence of the judiciary. . . ." Id. (citations
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and internal quotation marks omitted). Accord Playboy Enters.,
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Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 906 F.2d 25, 32 (1st Cir.), cert.
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denied, 111 S. Ct. 388 (1990).
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5
During the last term, the old regime fell on hard
times. The Court decided Suter, 112 S. Ct. 1360, a case which
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shed new light on this fuliginous area of the law. Although some
respected jurists believe that Suter effected a sea change in the
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Court's approach to section 1983, e.g., id. at 1371 (Blackmun,
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J., dissenting) ("In my view, the [rationale of the Suter
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majority] is plainly inconsistent with this Court's decision just
two years ago in Wilder . . . ."), we think it is much too early
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to post epitaphs for Wilder and its kin. For one thing, Suter
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offered no analytic framework to replace the structure erected in
the Court's previous decisions. For another thing, the Suter
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Court, while weakening earlier precedents in certain important
respects, was careful not explicitly to overrule them. Indeed,
the majority relied on those precedents as pertinent authority.
See, e.g., Suter, 112 S. Ct. at 1366-68 (citing, inter alia,
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Wilder, Pennhurst, and Wright). Because we believe that it is
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both prudent and possible to synthesize the teachings of Suter
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with the Court's prior precedents, we examine appellants' claims
under the Wilder framework as reconfigured by the neoteric
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principles announced in Suter.
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B.
B.
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AFDC and Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. 1396-1396u (1988 &
Supp. I 1989), as amended by Acts of Nov. 5, 1990 and Dec. 19,
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1989, 42 U.S.C.S. 1396-1396u (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992), the
programs at issue here, are part of the Social Security Act.
Both endeavors represent examples of cooperative federal-state
6
social service programs which, though federally funded in whole
or in part, are administered by the States. See Alexander v.
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Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 n.1 (1985) (Medicaid); Doucette v.
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Ives, 947 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir. 1991) (AFDC). "Although
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participation in [such programs] is voluntary, participating
States must comply with certain requirements imposed by the
[federal statutes] and regulations promulgated by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services." Wilder, 496 U.S. at 502; see also
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King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).
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To be sure, "the Supreme Court has implicitly and
explicitly held that rights under various provisions of the
Social Security Act are enforceable under section 1983." Lynch
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v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504, 510 (1st Cir. 1983). But that
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generality, without more, does not boost the appellants' stock.
Suter reminded us that each provision of the Social Security Act
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"must be interpreted by its own terms." Suter, 112 S. Ct. at
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1367 n.8. In performing this tamisage, the abecedarian principle
is that statutory interpretation always starts with the language
of the statute itself. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v.
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Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557-58 (1990); Consumer Prod. Safety
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Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). A court
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should "assum[e] that the ordinary meaning of [the statutory]
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose," see
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Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2036
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(1992), and should "resort to the legislative history and other
aids of statutory construction only when the literal words of the
7
statute create ambiguity or lead to an unreasonable result."
United States v. Charles George Trucking Co., 823 F.2d 685, 688
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(1st Cir. 1987) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
accord Barnhill v. Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 1386, 1391 (1992); Toibb
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v. Radloff, 111 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (1991).
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We discern no ambiguity here. In order to establish
the existence of a right redressable under section 1983, a
plaintiff must allege that a particular statute (or federal
constitutional provision) imposes an obligation upon the State.
See Wilder, 498 U.S. at 509-10; Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 19;
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Playboy Enters., 906 F.2d at 32. This statute imposes none.
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Rather, it simply and forthrightly provides, in haec verba, that
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"the Secretary shall not approve any State plan for medical
assistance" if the State has reduced AFDC payment levels below
the level prevailing on May 1, 1988. 42 U.S.C. 1396a(c)(1).
By its express terms, section 1396a(c)(1) obliges the federal
government, in the person of the Secretary of Health and Human
Services not the State to take action. The statute could
scarcely be clearer.
Moreover, there is nothing unreasonable about
Congress's choosing to work its will in this way. States are not
obligated by federal law to sponsor medical assistance plans or
to accept federal funds for this purpose. See 42 U.S.C. 1396
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(1988); see also Wilder, 496 U.S. at 502. Thus, section
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1396a(c)(1), without mentioning state officials at all,
effectively gives them a choice: they may either maintain AFDC
8
benefits at or above the May 1, 1988 payment levels, or they may
reduce benefits. If they choose the former course and we
emphasize, at this juncture, that Maine adamantly insists that it
has maintained (or increased) AFDC payment levels the State's
medical assistance plan retains eligibility for continued federal
funding. If state officials choose the latter course, however,
continued federal funding will be jeopardized. In that event, it
becomes the Secretary's task, in due season, to implement
Congress's directive by withholding approval of the State's
medical assistance plan. The State's role under the statute is
purely procedural.
Phrased another way, section 1396a(c)(1) provides
incentives not commands to the States. That Congress would
name a federal intermediary (the Secretary) to implement these
federally created incentives is not surprising. The potential
reasons for such a delegation are multifarious. They include the
advantage of uniform interpretation, the yen to develop and
harness administrative expertise in the area, and the
desirability of maintaining an agent capable of face-to-face
discussions with state officials. Structuring the statute in
this fashion may neither suit plaintiffs' preference nor advance
their litigating position but there is nothing unreasonable,
absurd, or irrational about the model.
In a nutshell, then, a straightforward reading of the
statutory text ends this case. In Suter, the Court held that an
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intended recipient of programmatic benefits could not sue under
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section 1983 if the federal statute merely required that the
State submit a plan to a federal agency satisfying certain
criteria, because such a "requirement only goes so far as to
ensure that the State have a plan approved by the Secretary which
contains [the listed criteria]." Suter, 112 S. Ct. at 1367.4
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Thus, Suter instructs that, when a provision in a statute fails
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to impose a direct obligation on the States, instead placing the
onus of compliance with the statute's substantive provisions on
the federal government, no cause of action cognizable under
section 1983 can flourish. Compare Clifton v. Schafer, ___ F.2d
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___, ___ (7th Cir. 1992) [1992 WL 164048 at *6-*7] (adopting
substantially identical view of Wilder/Suter interface in
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delineating scope of AFDC recipient's right to sue under section
1983 in order to enforce provisions of 42 U.S.C. 602(a)(4)
(1988)). So it is here.
C.
C.
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Our holding today finds additional support in a line of
cases dealing with a closely related issue: implied private
rights of action. We are cognizant that the tests utilized in
ascertaining whether a section 1983 cause of action exists and
those utilized in determining the propriety of an implied right
of action are "analytically distinct." See Playboy Enters, 906
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4In order to facilitate comparison with the statutory
provision before us today, we note that 42 U.S.C. 671(a), the
statute which was before the Suter Court, read as follows: "In
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order for a State to be eligible for payments under this part, it
shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which" satisfies
certain criteria.
10
F.2d at 31. However, these two legal theories bear a family
resemblance. See Victorian v. Miller, 813 F.2d 718, 720 n.3 (5th
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Cir. 1987) ("Section 1983 . . . allows private parties to enforce
federal laws against a special class of defendants state and
municipal actors in much the same way that implied rights of
action permit private enforcement of federal statutory
obligations against any party, public or private."); Samuels v.
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District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
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(similar); Polchowski v. Gorris, 714 F.2d 749, 751 (7th Cir.
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1983) (stating that the inquiry concerning a putative cause of
action under section 1983 "resembles the analysis used to
determine whether a private cause of action may be implied from
an enactment of Congress"); see also Wilder, 496 U.S. at 526
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(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (remarking on the "significant area
of overlap" between the two theories).5
In the context of implied rights of action, the Supreme
Court has held that "there 'would be far less reason to infer a
private remedy in favor of individual persons' where Congress,
rather than drafting the legislation 'with an unmistakable focus
on the benefitted class,' instead has framed the statute simply
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5The major difference between the two doctrines concerns the
way in which Congress's intent must be manifested. There is a
presumption against implied rights of action a presumption that
will endure unless the plaintiff proffers adequate evidence of a
contrary congressional intent. The presumption works exactly the
other way in the section 1983 milieu; it is assumed that Congress
meant to allow such suits an assumption which persists unless
the defendant musters adequate evidence of Congress's prohibitory
intent. See Victorian, 813 F.2d at 721; Samuels, 770 F.2d at
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194; Boatowners & Tenants Ass'n, Inc. v. Port of Seattle, 716
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F.2d 669, 674 (9th Cir. 1983).
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as a . . . command to a federal agency." Universities Research
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Ass'n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 772 (1981) (quoting Cannon v.
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University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-92 (1979)). The Seventh
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Circuit has transposed this reasoning to section 1983 claims.
See Polchowski, 714 F.2d at 751. We think the soil is hospitable
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to such transplantation. A statute does not create rights
redressable under section 1983 when it is essentially
administrative in nature and imposes an obligation exclusively
upon federal officials, not upon state actors.
D.
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Though their craft is irreparably holed, appellants
struggle gamely to stay afloat. We briefly address their more
buoyant authorities. First and foremost, appellants cling
tenaciously to a footnoted example of the Suter Court. See
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Suter, 112 S. Ct. at 1369 n.12. But, had appellants looked
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closely, they would have discerned that, from their standpoint,
footnote 12 is more a hungry shark than a life raft.
In this respect, appellants' argument hinges on their
attempt to analogize section 1396a(c)(1) to 42 U.S.C. 672(e)
a statute identified by the Court as the sort of statutory
provision that would support a section 1983 action. Suter, 112
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S. Ct. at 1369 n.12. In point of fact, section 1396a(c)(1) is
identical, in relevant respects, not to section 672(e) but to
section 671(a)(15) the statutory provision that the Suter
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Court, in footnote 12, was contrasting with section 672(e). The
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Court deemed it noteworthy that section 671(a)(15) requires
12
"submission of a plan to be approved by the Secretary" while
section 672(e) provides that "[n]o Federal payment may be made"
unless certain conditions are met. Id. In other words, the
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Suter Court distinguished between cases in which, on the one
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hand, a statutory provision is, in effect, a communication to a
specific federal official whose approval is required prior to
disbursement of federal funds (section 671(a)(15)), and cases in
which, on the other hand, a statutory provision is, in effect, a
communication from Congress to those States that elect to apply
for earmarked funds (section 672(e)). Provisions of the former
sort such as those at issue here and in Suter will not
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support a section 1983 action.
The other authorities cited by appellants to buttress
their contention that a right enforceable under section 1983 is
inherent in section 1396a(c)(1) are equally inapposite. Without
exception, those cases concern statutes that pin hard-and-fast
obligations on the States. In Wilder, for example, the Court
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concluded that the Boren Amendment, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(13)(A),
could support the maintenance of a section 1983 action. But, as
the Wilder Court found, the Boren Amendment requires States
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participating in the Medicaid program to devise reimbursement
rates vis-a-vis health-care providers which "the State finds are
reasonable and adequate" to meet the cost which must be incurred
by efficiently and economically operated facilities. Wilder, 496
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13
U.S. at 512 (quoting previous version of 42 U.S.C.
1396a(a)(13)(A)).6 Similarly, in Rosado, the Court dealt with a
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statutory provision that mandated the States to reevaluate their
need equations and adjust levels of need accordingly. See
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Rosado, 397 U.S. at 412. As we have explained, no comparable
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obligation is imposed on the States by section 1396a(c)(1).
III. CONCLUSION
III. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. Having pegged our analysis of
this case on the Wilder framework, visualized through the Suter
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prism, we conclude that, because the Secretary is the only
government official, federal or state, directly bound by the
requirements of section 1396a(c)(1), appellants cannot bring
their suit within the ambit of section 1983.
Affirmed.
Affirmed.
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6The earlier version, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1982 ed.,
Supp. V), mirrors the present version in all respects material to
the case at hand.
14
