USCA1 Opinion
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
____________________
No. 95-1871
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellant,
v.
AMADO FERNANDEZ VENTURA AND MILAGROS A. CEDENO,
Defendants, Appellees.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. District Judge]
___________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge,
___________
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
____________________
and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
_____________
____________________
David S. Kris, Attorney, with whom Guillermo Gil, United States
______________ _____________
Attorney, Antonio R. Bazan, Assistant United States Attorney, and Nina
________________ ____
Goodman, Attorney, were on brief for appellant.
_______
Linda Backiel with whom Carlos Ramirez Fiol was on brief for
______________ _____________________
appellees.
____________________
May 30, 1996
____________________
COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge. After deplaning at San Juan
_____________________
International Airport, defendants Amado Fernandez Ventura and
Milagros Cedeno were questioned by Customs agents and arrested
for illegally transporting money, in violation of 31 U.S.C.
5316. They filed a motion to suppress all inculpatory statements
made in the absence of Miranda warnings, which was granted. The
_______
government appealed. Having concluded that the district court
applied an erroneous legal test, we remand for reconsideration of
the suppression motion under the proper standard.
BACKGROUND
Facts
_____
Because of his frequent travel between St. Maarten and
Puerto Rico, Fernandez was on a "lookout" list kept by the
Customs Service. On November 12, 1994, after clearing
immigration, Fernandez was taken to a secondary Customs
inspection area. One agent asked Fernandez if he was carrying
any money; Fernandez responded "$8000." Another agent searched
his suitcase, discovered women's lingerie, and asked whom it
belonged to. Fernandez answered "mi mujer," which colloquially
means "my wife" or "my woman." Fernandez was directed to find
her.
Cedeno, Fernandez's girlfriend, had already cleared customs
but was still within the customs area. Fernandez, while
accompanied by an agent, located Cedeno and returned with her to
the secondary inspections area. On the way there, the agent
-2-
asked Cedeno whether she was carrying any money. She replied
that she was carrying approximately $9,000.
A search of the defendants revealed that the actual amount
in their possession was $16,166. In response to further
questioning, Fernandez revealed that the money belonged to his
money exchange company, of which he was president. The agents
then placed the couple under arrest and read them their Miranda
_______
rights.
The defendants were charged with failing to report the
transportation of monetary instruments in excess of $10,000 in
violation of 31 U.S.C. 5316, and making false statements to the
Customs Service in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001. Upon their
motion alleging a Miranda violation, the court suppressed all
_______
statements made by the defendants after Cedeno was asked whether
she was carrying any money. See United States v. Fernandez
___ _____________ _________
Ventura, 892 F. Supp. 362 (D.P.R. 1995).
_______
The District Court's Opinion
____________________________
The district court delineated four relevant inquiries for
determining whether the rule enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona,
_______ _______
384 U.S. 436 (1966), has been violated:
1. Was the person in "custody"?
2. Was the person "interrogated"?
3. Had the Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination attached?
4. Had the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached?
Under the court's analysis, a violation occurs when "each element
(custody, un-Mirandized interrogation, and attached Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights) . . . exist[s] simultaneously."
-3-
The court considered each factor. It stated that custody
"depends exclusively upon whether a reasonable person in the
defendant's position would have felt free to leave." Because
"Customs is an inherently coercive environment [in that] an
individual is never free to simply walk away," the court
concluded that defendants were in "custody." In the court's
view, "interrogation" was satisfied because "[t]he parties do not
dispute that all of the questioning conducted by Customs officers
in this case constituted 'interrogation' as defined and explained
in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)."
____________ _____
Most of the court's analysis focused on whether the rights
to silence and counsel had attached. The court held that "in the
context of Customs interrogation, these rights attach when the
questioning has ceased to be purely investigatory and has become
accusatory." Elaborating further, the court explained
[This] has both an objective and subjective element.
The objective element[] requires that officers provide
Miranda warnings when there exists probable cause to
_______
make an arrest . . . . The subjective element requires
that officers provide Miranda warnings when it is
_______
apparent that the interrogating officer's purpose in
questioning is not purely investigatory.
As applied in the Customs setting:
when the questioning extends beyond that asked of the
average Customs interrogee at either primary or
secondary inspection, we infer that the interrogation
has become sufficiently focused upon the interrogee to
require Miranda warnings.
_______
Applying the facts to these legal standards, the court
concluded that the "interrogation turned accusatorial at the time
Inspector Fisher asked Cedeno whether she was carrying any
-4-
money." At that point, the "investigation had clearly narrowed
to a particular crime with particular defendants, based on what
we infer to have been substantial, particularized suspicions."
Accordingly, the court determined, all ensuing statements
violated Miranda, and were properly suppressed.
_______
DISCUSSION
The government claims that the court's test for a Miranda
_______
violation was legally erroneous. Defendants concede that the
court's approach was novel, but argue that, taken as a whole, it
comports with settled precedent. Our task in this appeal is
straightforward: to set forth the Miranda test as derived from
_______
Supreme Court and First Circuit caselaw and assess whether the
district court followed it. Our standard of review is de novo.
__ ____
See United States v. Lewis, 40 F.3d 1325, 1332 (1st Cir. 1994).
___ _____________ _____
Miranda warnings must be given before a suspect is subjected
_______
to custodial interrogation. United States v. Taylor, 985 F.2d 3,
_____________ ______
7 (1st Cir. 1993). The custodial interrogation inquiry
necessarily demands determination of its two subsidiary
components: 1) custody and 2) interrogation. See Illinois v.
___ ________
Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990) ("It is the premise of Miranda
_______ _______
that the danger of coercion results from the interaction of
custody and official interrogation.").
The custody determination is the initial and, generally, the
central inquiry: it is "the touchstone to the need for Miranda
_______
warnings." United States v. Quinn, 815 F.2d 153, 160 (1st Cir.
_____________ _____
1987). Since Miranda, the Court has enunciated several general
_______
-5-
definitions of custody, but the ultimate inquiry is whether there
was "a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the
degree associated with a formal arrest." Thompson v. Keohane,
________ _______
116 S. Ct. 457, 465 (1995) (quotation marks and citations
omitted); Stansbury v. California, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529 (1994)
_________ __________
(per curiam) (same).1
___ ______
In order to assess the "restraint on freedom of movement," a
court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation. This test is objective: the only relevant
inquiry is "how a reasonable man in the suspect's shoes would
have understood his situation."2 Stansbury, 114 S. Ct. at 1529
_________
(quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984)). The
________ _______
subjective beliefs held by the interrogating officers or the
person being interrogated are not germane. Id.
___
Relevant circumstances include "whether the suspect was
questioned in familiar or at least neutral surroundings, the
number of law enforcement officers present at the scene, the
____________________
1 This specific formulation was first articulated in
California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam)
__________ _______ ___ ______
and Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984). It served to
_________ ______
clarify the Court's conception that Miranda applied after a
_______
"person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at
_______
444 (footnote omitted).
2 In Keohane, the Court made clear that the ultimate
_______
determination of custody is a mixed question of fact and law.
The initial examination of the "totality of the circumstances" is
factual. The second inquiry, however -- whether, objectively,
these circumstances constitute the requisite "restraint on
freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal
arrest" -- requires the "application of the controlling legal
standard to the historical facts." 116 S. Ct. at 465 & n.11.
-6-
degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect, and the
duration and character of the interrogation." United States v.
_____________
Masse, 816 F.2d 805, 809 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting United States
_____ _____________
v. Streifel, 781 F.2d 953, 961 n.13 (1st Cir. 1986)). See also
________ ___ ____
United States v. Pratt, 645 F.2d 89, 90-91 (1st Cir. 1981)
______________ _____
(discussing factors in the context of a secondary customs
search).3
Determining what constitutes custody can be a "slippery"
task. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985). Through
___ ______ ______
case by case development, however, courts have carved out certain
circumstances as legally insufficient to constitute custody.
See, e.g., Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437-40 (routine traffic stops
___ ____ ________
not subject to dictates of Miranda); United States v. Tajeddini,
_______ _____________ _________
996 F.2d 1278, 1288 (1st Cir. 1993) (routine Customs
questioning); Pratt, 645 F.2d at 90-91 (same). Indeed, in the
_____
Customs context, we have stated that questions from officials are
especially understood to be a necessary and important routine for
travelers arriving at American entry points. See Pratt, 645 F.2d
___ _____
at 90. See also United States v. Moya, 74 F.3d 1117, 1120 (11th
___ ____ _____________ ____
Cir. 1996). This understanding cuts against the potentially
coercive aspect of the Customs inquiry, and lessens the need for
Miranda warnings. In Pratt, we made clear that even
_______ _____
secondary inspection does not per se constitute custodial
___ __
____________________
3 This is not an exhaustive list. Other courts have
identified other factors significant to a custody determination.
See Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 641 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing
___ _______ _______
cases).
-7-
interrogation. We acknowledged that though "[a]ny person
required to submit to a secondary customs search may apprehend
some increased level of official suspicion[,] . . . this
perception . . . is not sufficient by itself to apply coercive
pressures equivalent to custodial questioning." 645 F.2d at 90.
There, we found that the limited and routine nature of the
questioning and short duration of the encounter militated against
requiring Miranda warnings. The line between routine Customs
_______
questioning and custodial interrogation is not easily drawn, but
it requires careful examination of all the circumstances.
The other component of custodial interrogation is, of
course, interrogation. Interrogation refers to both express
questioning and its "functional equivalent," which includes "any
words or actions on the part of the police (other than those
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301
_____________ _____
(1980) (footnotes omitted). Again the inquiry is objective: how
would the officer's statements and conduct be perceived by a
reasonable person in the same circumstances? See Taylor, 985
___ ______
-8-
F.2d at 7.4 Here, quite clearly, if defendants were in custody,
the officers' express questions constituted interrogation.5
In summary, Miranda warnings ensure that an individual
_______
subject to custodial interrogation has a "full opportunity to
exercise the privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda, 384
_______
U.S. at 467. To find custodial interrogation, the court must
first examine all the circumstances surrounding the exchange
between the government agent and the suspect, then determine from
the perspective of a reasonable person in the suspect's shoes
whether there was 1) a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest and 2)
express questioning or its functional equivalent.
We will not dwell on all the problems in the district
court's version of the Miranda inquiry, but point out a few
_______
significant errors. First, the court took the ultimate factual
and legal question -- were defendants in custody? -- and treated
it in a per se manner: because travelers "may not simply walk
___ __
____________________
4 However, an officer's knowledge "'concerning the unusual
susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion
might be an important factor in determining' what the [officer]
reasonably should have known." Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S.
____________ _____
582, 601 (1990) (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.8).
_____
5 We note that not all questioning of in-custody suspects
constitutes interrogation triggering the Miranda protections.
_______
For example, many courts recognize a "routine booking
interrogation" exception to the Miranda rule. See United States
_______ ___ _____________
v. Doe, 878 F.2d 1546, 1551 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing cases).
___
Requesting biographical information -- name, address, etc. --
____
rarely elicits an incriminating response and serves a legitimate
administrative need. Id. If, however, the officer seeks to
___
elicit information that may incriminate, the exception does not
apply. Id. We express no opinion on whether this narrow Miranda
___ _______
exception applies in the Customs setting.
-9-
away from an interrogating officer," they are in custody. This
is simply wrong. Individuals subject to routine traffic stops or
customs inspections, circumstances which are not custodial, are
rarely free to leave while being questioned by an officer. The
relevant inquiry, however, as stated above, is whether there was
an arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.
The court's further assertion that "all reasonable people
would agree that Customs is an inherently custodial setting,
regardless of the circumstances of the interrogation," is
directly contrary to our decisions in Tajeddini and Pratt and
_________ _____
runs counter to the proper approach articulated by the Supreme
Court. A custody determination requires inquiry into all
___
circumstances surrounding the interrogation. See Keohane, 116 S.
___ _______
Ct. at 465 & n.11.
Finally, we note that the court, relying on outmoded circuit
opinions, discussed certain factors, such as whether there was
probable cause to make an arrest and the officers' focus on the
defendants, which are not relevant to a Miranda inquiry. At one
_______
time, certain courts found these factors relevant, see, e.g.,
___ ____
United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 915 (5th Cir. 1979)
______________ _____
(articulating a four-factor test for custody that included these
factors), but subsequent Supreme Court decisions rejected this
approach. See, e.g., Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442 (emphasizing the
___ ____ ________
objective nature of the inquiry). Indeed, in light of these
cases, the Fifth Circuit repudiated its four-factor test,
-10-
announcing that "[p]robable cause and focus become material to
the custody inquiry only when they influence a reasonable
person's perception of the situation." United States v.
______________
Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 596-97, 597 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
__________ __ ____
(footnote omitted).
Defendants argue that the court's test, taken as a whole, is
consistent with our precedent. We disagree. Although there may
be tests which, though formulated differently, approximate the
proper standard, this is not one of them. Accordingly, we remand
this case to the district court for application of the correct
legal test. On remand, the court may take additional evidence on
the relevant factual issues. See Streifel, 781 F.2d at 962.
___ ________
The order suppressing evidence is vacated. We remand to the
____________________________________________________________
district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
____________________________________________________________
-11-
