Filed: Feb. 11, 2000
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 98-30663 _ TIMOTHY P. COLLINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JOHN DOYLE, Individually and in his capacity as Police Chief for the City of Harahan; ET AL., Defendants, JOHN DOYLE, Individually and in his official capacity as Police Chief for the City of Harahan; CITY OF HARAHAN, Defendants-Appellants, versus CENTURY INDEMNITY COMPANY, as the successor to Insurance Company of North America; INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Defendant
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 98-30663 _ TIMOTHY P. COLLINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JOHN DOYLE, Individually and in his capacity as Police Chief for the City of Harahan; ET AL., Defendants, JOHN DOYLE, Individually and in his official capacity as Police Chief for the City of Harahan; CITY OF HARAHAN, Defendants-Appellants, versus CENTURY INDEMNITY COMPANY, as the successor to Insurance Company of North America; INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Defendants..
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 98-30663
_____________________
TIMOTHY P. COLLINS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOHN DOYLE, Individually and in his capacity
as Police Chief for the City of Harahan; ET AL.,
Defendants,
JOHN DOYLE, Individually and in his
official capacity as Police Chief
for the City of Harahan; CITY OF HARAHAN,
Defendants-Appellants,
versus
CENTURY INDEMNITY COMPANY, as the successor
to Insurance Company of North America;
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
(95-CV-620-S)
_________________________________________________________________
February 9, 2000
Before JOLLY, EMILIO M. GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:*
This section 1983 action arises out of the prosecution and
ultimate acquittal of Timothy Collins on charges of public contract
fraud and theft. Following his acquittal, Collins filed this
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
action against Harahan Police Chief John Doyle, in his individual
and official capacity, and against the City of Harahan, Louisiana,
asserting federal claims for malicious prosecution and defamation
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law claims against Doyle for
malicious prosecution, defamation, and abuse of process.1 The jury
awarded Collins nearly $600,000 in compensatory damages and
$300,000 in punitive damages against Doyle in his individual
capacity. We hold that probable cause supported the challenged
prosecution. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the district
court and vacate the damage award.
I
A
On October 31, 1990, Timothy Collins was appointed by Carlo
Ferrara, Mayor of the municipality of Harahan, Louisiana, to serve
as the Recreation Director for the City of Harahan. As director,
Collins was paid an annual salary of $19,000. One of Collins’s
many responsibilities as director was to supervise the various
sporting leagues that were organized at Soniat Playground
(“playground”). It was Collins’s duty to outfit the players.2 He
1
Collins also filed a section 1983 claim against Doyle both in
his official and individual capacities, and against the City of
Harahan for violating his “constitutional right to be free from
retaliation for freely associating with others for the common
advancement of political beliefs and ideals.” The jury returned a
verdict in favor of the defendants on this claim, and Collins has
not sought review of the jury’s verdict in this regard.
2
The record indicates and Collins’s brief acknowledges that
this was an official duty that was specifically recognized and
2
was authorized to buy the uniforms and equipment (known as
“disposables”) from local sporting goods vendors and to then make
them available for purchase by the playground’s patrons. Public
funds were not used to purchase disposables. Instead, Collins
purchased the disposables on open account or with his own private
funds. If the patrons failed to pay for the uniforms or equipment,
Collins could seek reimbursement from the Harahan Parents Club, the
playground’s booster club.3
During the summer of 1991, Collins began a summer camp program
at the playground. This program was the first such event the City
of Harahan had ever sponsored at this facility. Collins hired
local teacher Sherrie Stanton to help him run the summer camp.
Among her many duties, Stanton was responsible for registering
participants, supervising camp counselors, and collecting the
tuition from camp participants. After Stanton collected the
campers’ tuition, she turned it over to Collins. The summer camp
raised over $29,000 for the City of Harahan in 1991.
B
On May 3, 1992, Theresa Smithey, an assistant clerk for the
City of Harahan, told Harahan Chief of Police John Doyle of her
suspicions that Collins was stealing money from the City. Smithey
required by the City of Harahan.
3
Collins’s brief states that as of January 1, 1991, the
Harahan Parents Club refused to reimburse him for shortfalls in
connection with the purchasing of disposables.
3
further said that, in connection with the summer camp, Collins was
not turning in any supporting documents with the various checks
collected. Thus, Smithey said, it was very difficult for the city
to determine whether all of the money was being turned over.
Additionally, Smithey told Collins that between twenty-six and
twenty-eight campers’ checks were not deposited into the summer
camp account. Instead, the checks were being diverted to another
account.
Following the talk with Smithey, Doyle ran Collins’s name
through the police computer. He discovered that Collins had an
outstanding arrest warrant in Texas for passing bad checks. This
warrant was thought to lend support to Smithey’s allegations, and
Doyle decided to bring the matter to the attention of Mayor
Ferrara.
Doyle asked Ferrara if he had ever received any summer camp
records from Collins. Ferrara had not, despite numerous requests.
Ferrara said that he had begun an informal internal investigation
of Collins as a result of calls he had received from local
suppliers regarding outstanding recreation invoices. Mayor Ferrara
also told Doyle about an unauthorized account that Collins opened
on December 19, 1991, and closed on March 7, 1992, at the Whitney
Bank under the name “Harahan Dixie Youth Baseball.”
On May 7, 1992, Barbara Butera, the city clerk responsible for
records, gave a formal statement to the police department, stating
that Collins was not following proper accounting procedures, when
4
turning over to the City money collected from playground patrons.
Additionally, Butera gave the police copies of two letters she had
written to the mayor, noting Collins’s failure to follow City
procedure.
Further investigation revealed that a number of checks written
by playground patrons were cashed at a local Old Hickory Food
Store. Other checks were deposited into an account in the name of
Collins & Associates. These funds were used to cover fourteen NSF
checks Collins had written on this account in the days prior to
their deposit--one of which resulted in the issuing of an arrest
warrant for Collins.
Doyle also learned of several unpaid invoices from Staples
Sporting Goods (“Staples”), a company that supplied merchandise to
the Harahan Recreation Department. The unpaid balance on the
invoices were for $1,089.99, $195.00, and $196.02. Doyle further
discovered that Collins had purchased several items for the
Department from Rooster’s Team and Athletic Goods (“Rooster’s”) and
from Collins & Associates. Additional investigation revealed that
Collins had been employed by Rooster’s for some time and that
according to court records he owned a 10% interest in the company.
Furthermore, the investigation established that Collins did not
have authority from the City to purchase any goods from Collins &
Associates.
C
5
On July 21, 1992, Doyle, concluded that probable cause existed
to indict Collins for public contract fraud and theft. He then
turned the case over to the Criminal Investigation Division of the
district attorney’s office and requested that a grand jury be
convened. On December 5, 1992, Bob Long, supervising assistant
district attorney in the Screening Division, prepared a Bill of
Information4 charging Collins with two counts of public contract
fraud in violation of Louisiana Revised Statute section 14:1405 and
4
The Bill of Information charged Timothy Collins with the
following:
Count 1). . . between January 2, 1992 through January 7,
1992 with force of arms, in the parish aforesaid, and
within the jurisdiction of the Twenty-Fourth Judicial
District Court of Louisiana, in and for the Parish
aforesaid, violated R.S. 14:140 in that he did, while
employed as director of recreation for the City of
Harahan, Louisiana, use that position to secure the
expenditure of city funds to purchase sporting goods from
Collins & Associates, a business which he is the owner.
Count 2) And the District Attorney further gives the
Court to understand and be informed that January 10, 1992
through April 20, 1992 the said Timothy Collins violated
R.S. 14:140 in that he did, while employed as director of
recreations for the City of Harahan, Louisiana, use that
position to secure the expenditure of city funds to
purchase sporting goods from Roosters Team and Athletic
Goods, Inc., a Corporation of which he is a stockholder.
Count 3) And the District Attorney further gives the
Court to understand and be informed that April 1, 1991
through November 30, 1991 the Said Timothy Collins
violated R.S. 14:67 in that he did commit theft of funds
valued at in excess of $500.00, from City of Harahan.
Louisiana Revised Statute section 14:140 provides in relevant
part:
A. Public contract fraud is committed:
6
one count of theft of city funds in violation of Louisiana Revised
Statute 14:67.6 An arrest warrant was issued for Collins.
Following Collins’s arrest, he posted bond and was released.
The case against Collins was assigned to Assistant District
Attorney Wicker to prepare and try. After reviewing the evidence,
Wicker amended the Bill of Information to include seven counts.
The first two counts for public contract fraud remained the same as
in the first Bill. Wicker, however, expanded the third count for
theft,7 and added additional counts for unauthorized use of
(1) When any public officer or public
employee shall use his power or position as
such officer or employee to secure any
expenditure of public funds to himself, or to
any partnership of which he is a member, or to
any corporation of which he is an officer,
stockholder, or director.
La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14:140 (West 1999).
Louisiana Revised Statute section 14:67 provides in relevant
part:
A. Theft is the misappropriation or taking of anything of
value which belongs to another either without the consent
of the other to the misappropriation or taking, or by
means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or
representations. An intent to deprive the other
permanently of whatever may be the subject of the
misappropriation or taking is essential.
La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14:67 (West 1999).
7
Count Three was amended as follows:
Count 3) And the District Attorney further gives the
Court to understand and be informed that between April 1,
1991 and on or about November 30, 1991 the said Timothy
Collins violated R.S. 14:68 in that he did commit the
unauthorized use of sporting goods owned by Staples
7
additional sporting goods, theft of additional money, public
payroll fraud, and general malfeasance. Counts Four through Seven
of the Amended Bill of Information were subsequently dismissed or
not prosecuted due to financial and time constraints on the
district attorney’s office.
On January 15, 1993, the Amended Bill of Information was
presented to Louisiana District Court Judge Porteous for a
determination of whether the charges were supported by probable
cause. After examining the evidence, Judge Porteous found that
sufficient probable cause existed for the prosecution to go
forward. At trial, Collins was acquitted of all charges.
D
On February 22, 1995, Collins filed this section 1983 action
against Doyle individually and in his official capacity as the
Chief of Police for the City of Harahan, and against the City of
Harahan alleging malicious prosecution and defamation.8 He also
alleged state law claims against Doyle for malicious prosecution,
defamation, and abuse of process. The case was tried between
October 21, 1997 and October 31, 1997. The jury returned a verdict
against Doyle and the City of Harahan finding them liable under
Sporting Goods valued at $1,877.90 and of sums of money
in excess of $1,000 given to him by parents and coaches
of various team members playing ball through Harahan
Playground in payment for said sporting goods he obtained
from Staples Sporting Goods.
8
The complaint also named Century Indemnity Company, the City
of Harahan’s insurer, as a defendant.
8
section 1983 for malicious prosecution and defamation. The jury
also found them liable on the state law claims. The jury awarded
Collins $597,578 in compensatory damages9 and $300,000 in punitive
damages against Chief Doyle individually.10 On June 29, 1998, the
City and Doyle, in his official capacity as Chief of Police, filed
a timely notice of appeal. On July 6, 1998, Doyle, in his
individual capacity, filed a timely notice of appeal.
II
A
We begin by addressing the City of Harahan’s liability for the
actions of Chief Doyle. The law is well settled that in order to
sustain a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a
municipal defendant, the plaintiff must show the existence of an
officially adopted policy or an established custom of the
municipality that causes injury and a causal connection between
that policy or custom and the deprivation of a constitutional
right. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978); Flores v. Cameron County, Texas,
92 F.3d 258, 263 (5th Cir.
9
The jury awarded Collins $200,000 for loss of income and
earning capacity, $300,000 for emotional distress, $50,000 for loss
of reputation, and $47,578 for costs and attorney’s fees.
10
The court entered an order dated March 26, 1998, stating that
because the jury found that the actions of Chief Doyle were
“intentionally fraudulent and with knowledge of falsity and
reckless disregard,” the City’s liability for those actions are not
covered under its policy with Century Indemnity Company because
they fall within the policy’s exclusion for “fraudulent acts.”
Thus, the court rendered judgment in favor of Century, denying
coverage.
9
1996). The policies that give rise to section 1983 liability must
“be set by the government’s lawmakers, or by those whose edicts or
acts may fairly be said to represent official policy.” McMillian
v. Monroe County, Alabama, 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997). In
identifying those officials or governmental bodies who speak with
final policymaking authority for the local government, the court
must focus on the specific “action alleged to have caused the
particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue” and
determine whether the party responsible for that action is the
final policymaker in that particular area.
Id.
In determining whether the party responsible for the alleged
violation is the final policymaker, courts must consider “[S]tate
law (which may include valid local ordinances and regulations)
[which] will always direct a court to some official body that has
the responsibility for making or setting policy in any given area
of a local government’s business.” See
Flores, 92 F.3d at 263
(citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,
485 U.S. 112, 125 (1988)).
Although it is clear that the “simple labeling” of a state official
will not automatically be conclusive, in determining “who clearly
makes [municipal] policy, . . . our understanding of the actual
function of a governmental official, in a particular area, will
necessarily be dependent on the definition of the official’s
function under relevant state law.”
McMillian, 520 U.S. at 786.
Thus, the relevant federal question can be answered only after
considering the provisions of state law that define the [official
10
duties].” Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe,
519
U.S. 425, 430 n.5 (1997). Consequently, the identification of
those officials whose decision represent the official policy of the
local government unit is itself a legal question to be resolved by
the trial judge” and is thus subject to de novo review.
Flores, 92
F.3d at 263 (citing Jett v. Dallas Ind. Sch. Dist.,
491 U.S. 701,
737 (1989)).
Collins argues that Doyle was the chief policymaker for
Harahan for the purposes of Monell liability because he “personally
conducted the investigation and personally filed the C.I.D.
Report.” As a result, Collins argues, “Harahan is liable because
Doyle, as Chief of Police, personally maliciously prosecuted
Collins thereby depriving Collins of his Fourth Amendment right to
be free from malicious prosecution.” Alternatively, Collins argues
that even if pursuant to Louisiana law the sheriff is not the chief
policymaker for purposes of initiating criminal proceedings, in
this case, the district attorney was not an “impartial
intermediary” and thus the city is subject to Monell liability.
The defendant counters by arguing that “while Doyle might be
a policymaker for Harahan, he is not the policymaker for Harahan
concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular
constitutional violation at issue here.” Although the defendant
recognizes “that Doyle was the official policymaker for the City
for law enforcement,” in analyzing the City’s Monell liability for
a claim based on malicious prosecution, Doyle, under Louisiana law,
11
lacked “the authority to institute the criminal proceeding against
the plaintiff.” Thus, the defendant argues, because, under
Louisiana law, “Doyle has no power over the institution of
prosecution, he cannot create a policy for Harahan concerning the
institution of prosecution.”
We thus begin our inquiry by considering the statutory
authority of Chief Doyle. Louisiana Revised Statute section 423
provides in relevant part:
The marshal shall be the chief of police and shall be ex
officio a constable. He shall have general
responsibilities for law enforcement in the municipality,
and shall be charged with the enforcement of all
ordinances within the municipality and all applicable
state law. He shall perform all other duties required of
him by ordinances.
La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 423 (West 1999). The parties stipulated to the
fact that Doyle was the official policymaker for the city of
Harahan for law enforcement. However, this stipulation does not
specifically address the question presented by this appeal, that
is, whether Doyle has the authority to initiate criminal
proceedings and whether he is the official policymaker for those
purposes. Article 61 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
states:
Subject to the supervision of the attorney general, as
provided in Article 62, the district attorney has entire
charge and control of every criminal prosecution
instituted or pending in his district, and determines
whom, when, and how he shall prosecute.
La. Code Crim. Pro. art. 61 (West 1999). The Code makes it clear
that the district attorney, not the sheriff, has the complete
12
authority to determine who, when, and how criminal proceedings will
be brought against. Thus, relying on the strict dictates of
Louisiana law, it seems indisputable that Doyle is not the official
chief policymaker for the city of Harahan for purposes of Monell
liability.
The plaintiff, however, argues that because of the integral
role Doyle played in the prosecution of this case, the district
attorney was not an “impartial intermediary” and thus Doyle acted
in the capacity of a policymaker for purposes of Monell liability.
We have recognized that when, pursuant to established custom, the
police and the district attorney’s office have a relationship such
that the district attorney does not exercise independent judgment
in prosecuting cases, the sheriff will be considered a policymaker
for such purposes. See Hale v. Fish, 899 F.2d 390, 401 (5th Cir.
1990); Hand v. Gary,
838 F.2d 1420 (5th Cir. 1988). Here, however,
other than the Collins’s conclusionary assertions that the district
attorney was not acting as an impartial intermediary, he has failed
to point to any evidence that places Doyle in a prosecutorial role
beyond the customary duties of law enforcement officers.
The record contains uncontroverted evidence supporting the
municipality’s contention that the district attorney’s office had
complete discretion to decide whether to initiate and pursue
charges against Collins. On July 21, 1992, Doyle expressed his
concerns regarding Collins’s illegal activities to the Criminal
Investigation Division of the district attorney’s office and
13
requested a grand jury be convened. Bob Long, the supervising
assistant district attorney in the Screening Division, reviewed all
of the evidence presented by Doyle in support of his suspicions.
He then discussed the case with Assistant District Attorney Wicker.
After a complete review of the evidence, on December 3, 1992, the
district attorney issued a Bill of Information charging Collins.
Between July 21 and December 3, the only contact that Doyle had
with the district attorney’s office was in providing a videotape as
additional evidence and in sending two letters.11 The record does
not reflect that Doyle took any steps that “pressured” the District
Attorney’s office into bringing the charges against Collins. To
the contrary, the record reflects that the district attorney acted
within the bounds of an “independent intermediary.” Consequently,
because Doyle did not act in the role of an official policymaker in
the decision to prosecute Collins, he cannot be considered a
policymaker for the purpose of Monell liability.
11
The first letter dated August 5, 1992, and addressed to the
Honorable John Mamoulides, district attorney for the Parish of
Jefferson, was sent by Doyle in response to numerous requests he
had received from public officials, including the mayor, regarding
the status of the case. The second letter, dated September 9,
1992, and also addressed to the Honorable John Mamoulides, was
characterized by Doyle as “common” and extended the further
assistance of the sheriff’s department to the district attorney’s
office if it felt the underlying facts of the Collins’s case
required further development. Neither letter contained any
language regarding Doyle’s subjective belief about Collins’s guilt,
or attempted to pressure the district attorney to bring charges
against Collins.
14
In sum, because we hold as a matter of law that Doyle was not
the official policymaker for purposes of initiating the prosecution
against Collins, the City of Harahan, and Doyle, in his official
capacity, cannot be held liable under section 1983 for these
actions.12 Thus, to the extent that the judgment of the district
court imposes liability upon the City of Harahan and upon Doyle in
his official capacity, it is reversed.
B
We now turn to Collins’s claims against Doyle in his
individual capacity. Collins argues that because Doyle lacked
probable cause to believe that he was guilty of public contract
fraud and theft, his actions constitute malicious prosecution.13
12
In Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991), the Supreme Court held
that “[s]uits against state officials in their official capacity .
. . should be treated as suits against the State.”
Id. at 25
(citing Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)); see also,
Brooks v. George County, Mississippi,
84 F.3d 157, 165 (5th Cir.
1996)(stating that a “suit against [the] Sheriff in his official
capacity is treated as a claim against George County”). The Hafer
Court held, when state officers are sued for damages in their
official capacities, they “are not ‘persons’ for purposes of the
suit because they assume the identity of the government that
employs them.”
Hafer, 502 U.S. at 362. Therefore, because
Collins’s claims against the City of Harahan fail, his claims
against Doyle in his official capacity likewise fail.
13
Although it is clear that the Fourteenth Amendment will not
provide a basis for a section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution,
see Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994), we need not reach the
question of whether the Fourth Amendment can provide such a basis
to decide this case. Even assuming the Fourth Amendment provides
a basis for a section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution,
Collins’s claim fails as a matter of law. Thus, because it is not
clear whether the Fourth Amendment will support a section 1983
malicious prosecution claim, we reserve it for another day.
Compare Eugene v. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist.,
65 F.3d 1299, 1305 (5th
15
The elements of a federal claim for malicious prosecution under
section 1983 are:
1) criminal action commenced against the plaintiff;
2) that the prosecution was caused by the defendants or with
their aid;
3) that the action was terminated in the plaintiff’s favor;
4) that the plaintiff was innocent;
5) that the defendants acted without probable cause;
6) that the defendant acted with malice; and
7) that the criminal proceedings damaged the plaintiff.
Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 340 (5th Cir. 1999)(citing Hayter v.
City of Mount Vernon,
154 F.3d 269, 275 (5th Cir. 1998). Under
Louisiana law, the elements for a claim of malicious prosecution
are similar.14 See Stark v. Eunice Superette, Inc.,
457 So. 2d 291,
(La.Ct.App. 3d Cir. 1984)(quoting Jones v. Soileau,
448 So. 2d 1268
(La. 1984)). If the plaintiff fails to meet his burden with
Cir. 1995)(stating that the Fourth Amendment will provide a
sufficient basis for a section 1983 claim for malicious
prosecution), with Cook v. Houston Post,
616 F.2d 791, 794-95 (5th
Cir. 1980)(holding that “under the Constitution, appellants have no
claim cognizable under § 1983” for malicious prosecution), and Kerr
v. Lyford,
171 F.3d 330, 342-343 (5th Cir. 1999)(Jones, J.,
specially concurring)(stating that considerable doubt exists as to
whether the Fourth Amendment will provide a constitutional basis
for a malicious prosecution claim).
14
To sustain a claim for malicious prosecution under Louisiana
law, the plaintiff must establish:
(1) the commencement or continuance of an original
criminal or civil judicial proceeding; (2) its legal
causation by the present defendant in the original
proceeding; (3) its bona fide termination in favor of the
present plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause for
such proceeding; (5) the presence of malice therein; and
(6) damage conforming to legal standards resulting to
plaintiff.
Stark v. Eunice Superette, Inc., 457 So. 2d 291, (La.Ct.App. 3d Cir.
1984)(quoting Jones v. Soileau,
448 So. 2d 1268 (La. 1984)).
16
respect to any one element of his claim for malicious prosecution,
his claim fails. See Kerr, 171 F.3d at 340.
We focus first on the plaintiff’s burden of establishing that
the defendant lacked probable cause to initiate the underlying
proceeding. The plaintiff must adduce sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that, at the time the charges were initiated, the
defendant lacked sufficient “knowledge that would warrant a prudent
person’s belief that the person arrested had already committed or
was committing a crime.” Duckett v. City of Cedar Park, Texas.,
950 F.2d 272, 278 (5th Cir. 1992). Probable cause requires
“substantially less than that sufficient to support a conviction--
i.e., proof beyond a reasonable doubt--but more than bare
suspicion.” United States v. Muniz-Melchor,
894 F.2d 1430, 1438
(5th Cir. 1990). Further, the evidence must be “viewed in light of
the observations, knowledge, and training of the law enforcement
officers involved.”
Id.
In Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213 (1983), the Supreme Court
adopted a “totality of the circumstances test” to determine
probable cause in a particular circumstance.
Id. at 241. The
Court reasoned that “probable cause is a fluid concept--turning on
the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts--not
readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”
Id. at 232. Instead, the Court held, in making a determination
regarding the existence of probable cause, courts should embark on
a “practical, common-sense decision whether, given all of the
17
circumstances . . . there is a fair probability that” the person
who has been charged committed the crime charged therein. Id. at
238; see also Gladden v. Roach,
864 F.2d 1196, 1199 (5th Cir.
1989)(holding that a police officer has probable cause if, at the
time of the arrest he is in possession of such facts that would
warrant a prudent person to believe that the person charged
committed the crime). In making such a determination, the
subjective beliefs and motivation of the charging officer, even if
his conduct was malicious or otherwise improperly motivated, are
irrelevant. Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
Further, “to the extent that the facts undergirding the probable
cause determination are undisputed, [the court] may resolve the
issue as a matter of law.” Kerr v. Lyford,
171 F.3d 330, 340 (5th
Cir. 1999)(citing Blackwell v. Barton,
34 F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir.
1994); see also Dougherty v. Szivos,
209 F.2d 935, 936 (5th Cir.
1954)(stating that “[i]t is well recognized that, in an action for
malicious prosecution, the question of what circumstances amount to
probable cause is a question of law for the trial court”).
Our review of the record convinces us that Collins has not
adduced evidence sufficient to carry his burden of establishing
that Doyle lacked probable cause when he alerted the district
attorney’s office of his conclusion that Collins had violated
Louisiana law.15 Indeed, the evidence demonstrates that each of the
15
Our circuit has not had an opportunity to address the issue
of whether a showing of probable cause with respect to one count of
18
three counts of the Amended Bill of Information that were initiated
and prosecuted with the assistance of Doyle were supported by
probable cause.16 Thus, we conclude, as we must, that, as a matter
of law, Collins’s claim fails. See Dougherty, 209 F.2d at 937
(holding that “the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that
the defendant acted without probable cause,” and the failure of the
plaintiff to meet this burden will result in the entry of a
judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant).
Count One of the Amended Bill of Information charged Collins
with a violation of Louisiana Revised Statute 14:140, “in that he
did, while employed as director of recreation for the City of
an indictment that charges various criminal acts arising out of the
same transaction or occurrence is sufficient to defeat a claim of
malicious prosecution as to all of the charges stemming from those
events. This issue, however, has been addressed by at least one of
our sister circuits. In Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.
1991), the Second Circuit held:
[W]e should not allow a finding of probable cause on [one
charge] to foreclose a malicious prosecution cause of
action on charges requiring different, and more culpable,
behavior. [If that were the rule,] an officer with
probable cause as to a lesser offense could tack on more
serious, unfounded charges which would support a high
bail or a lengthy detention, knowing that the probable
cause on the lesser offense would insulate him from
liability for malicious prosecution on the other
offenses.
Id. at 100. The circumstances of this case do not require us to
resolve this question. Thus, we expressly reserve it for another
day.
16
It is important to note that we do not hold that the evidence
supporting Counts One through Three of the Amended Bill of
Information was sufficient to convict Collins of the crimes charged
therein. Rather, we hold only that probable cause existed to
charge Collins with those crimes.
19
Harahan, Louisiana, use that position to secure the expenditure of
city funds to purchase sporting goods from Collins and Associates,17
a business which he is the owner.” This conduct was alleged to
have occurred between January 2, 1992 and January 7, 1992.
That Doyle had a basis for probable cause before initiating
charges under Count One was confirmed by Collins’s own testimony at
trial. Collins admitted that he had purchased $150.45 worth of T-
shirts for Kayman Company, a sporting goods wholesaler who did not
sell directly to the public. The shirts were purchased on the
Collins & Associates’ account. He admitted that the T-shirts were
purchased for distribution during a baseball camp he was conducting
during the Christmas holidays in 1991. Collins further testified
that the T-shirts were distributed to camp participants, and that
a portion of the registration fee for the camp was used to pay for
the shirts.
Additionally, Collins testified that, to cover the cost of the
T-shirts, he wrote a check payable to himself from a bank account
he had opened. He admitted that, without the knowledge or consent
of the City of Harahan, he had opened the account to deposit the
registration fees collected for camp patrons. The check was then
deposited into the Collins & Associates’ commercial checking
account. It is important to note that Doyle was aware of the fact
that Collins did not have permission to conduct any business on
17
Collins and Associates is not a legal entity. It is the name
under which Collins conducted business.
20
behalf of the City of Harahan with Collins & Associates. This fact
was also confirmed by Collins’s testimony.
These record facts make clear that probable cause existed for
Doyle to believe that Collins was conducting City business with an
organization in which he had a proprietary interest. It is
undisputed that Collins conducted business in the name of Collins
& Associates. As we have noted, Collins bought a number of T-
shirts from a wholesaler in the name of Collins & Associates, which
were later distributed during a City-run baseball camp and paid for
from proceeds collected from the camp patrons. These facts were
known by Doyle prior to the initiation of criminal proceedings
against Collins. Thus, Collins has failed to demonstrate that
Doyle lacked probable cause to believe that he committed the crime
he was charged with in Count One of the Amended Bill of
Information.
Count Two of the Amended Bill of Information charged Collins
with violating the same section of the Louisiana Code for spending
“city funds to purchase sporting goods from Rooster Team and
Athletic Goods, Inc., a Corporation of which he is a stockholder.”
Once again, the undisputed evidence confirms the facts alleged by
Doyle prior to the initiation of this charge against Collins. The
evidence established that Collins owned “ten shares” in Rooster’s.
This evidence came from Collins’s own sworn statements made to the
United States Bankruptcy Court in 1989. In his schedule of assets
filed with the court, Collins admits to owning “10 shares of stock
21
in Rooster’s Team & Athletic Goods.” Further, Collins failed to
introduce any evidence at trial establishing that he had
transferred his interests in Rooster’s prior to 1991.
Additionally, four bills of sale were introduced into evidence
that confirmed Rooster’s made four sales during the relevant period
of time to the Harahan Recreation Department in the amounts of
$2,000, $1,362.50, $191.40, and $427.10. This evidence was
bolstered by three “Request Forms” for funds from the Department of
Recreation of Harahan to pay Rooster’s for recreational equipment
that was purchased. These request forms were each signed by
Collins and were for $2,000.00, $1,362.50, and $191.40,
respectively.
Collins does not dispute that he made the purchases in
question from Rooster’s. He argues, however, that he did not own
any stock or proprietary interest in Rooster’s. He offers evidence
of the fact that the Louisiana Secretary of State did not have any
records indicating that Collins owned 10 shares of stock in
Rooster’s. He also testified that he is no longer employed by
Rooster’s. Collins does admit, however, that on September 3, 1992,
Rooster’s purchased a stock related interest from him in the
company for $2,500.
We therefore think that it is clear that Doyle had probable
cause to believe that Collins held a proprietary interest in
Rooster’s, and that he was conducting business on behalf of the
city with Rooster’s prior to the initiation of this charge against
22
Collins. We must conclude, therefore, that Collins has failed to
meet his burden of proving a prima facie case of malicious
prosecution, and that his claim fails as a matter of law.
Count Three of the Amended Bill of Information charged Collins
with a violation of Louisiana Revised Statute 14:68, “in that he
did commit the unauthorized use of sporting goods owned by Staples
valued at $1,877.90 and of sums of money in excess of $1,000 given
to him by parents and coaches of various team members playing ball
through Harahan Playground in payments for said sporting goods he
obtained from Staples.” A review of the record shows that the
charge was supported by probable cause.
The record indicates that prior to initiating charges against
Collins, Doyle was aware that Collins was listed as the buyer and
his home address as the billing address on unpaid invoices totaling
over $1,806 for merchandise purchased from Staples.18 The
uncontradicted testimony of Collins’s own witness at trial confirms
these facts. Moreover, although a formal proceeding had not been
undertaken by Staples to recover the unpaid balance, Collins’s own
witness testified that Staples had spoken to Collins on numerous
occasions prior to the filing of these criminal charges, and that
at some point Collins stopped returning the phone calls from
Staples.
18
The record indicates that invoices were sent to Collins on
January 1, 1992, and February 1, 1992, indicating that he owed
Staples Sporting Goods in excess of $1,806 for sporting goods
purchased for the playground.
23
Doyle was also aware that Collins, by depositing and cashing
various checks, had failed to follow recognized informal city
procedures regarding payments received from playground patrons,
which funds were to be turned over to the City. Specifically, he
was aware of the fact that Collins had deposited checks written by
patrons of the playground to cover the cost of many of the items
purchased from Staples directly into his personal checking account
and that he had cashed patron’s check for these goods at the Old
Hickory Food Store in Harahan.19 Collins argues that some of these
checks were for reimbursements for disposables. Still, that does
not excuse him of the fact that a large number of the checks were
personally deposited into his account, or personally cashed at the
Old Hickory Food Store and that payment was not made to Staples for
the goods after the passage of over one year. This evidence,
together with the fact that Doyle was aware that Collins had
bounced a series of checks during this time period, and that the
checks deposited into his account were used to cover these NSF
checks, provided probable cause for him to believe that Collins had
19
The record contains undisputed evidence that Chief Doyle was
aware of the fact that Collins had cashed numerous checks written
by playground patrons for athletic equipment at the Old Hickory
Food Store in Harahan prior to the initiation of charges against
him. It is irrelevant whether the checks were payable to “Cash” or
“The City of Harahan.” The facts that are relevant are that the
checks were written by the patrons for athletic equipment, that
Collins cashed the checks, that he did not turn the money over to
the City or to Staples, and that he otherwise made no accounting to
the City.
24
committed the crime charged.20 Consequently, because Collins has
failed to demonstrate that Doyle lacked probable cause to support
this count, his federal and state malicious prosecution claims
fail.
In sum, Collins has failed to demonstrate that Doyle lacked
probable cause to believe that Collins had committed any of the
crimes charged in the Amended Bill of Information. Consequently,
Collins’s federal and state law malicious prosecution claims fail
as a matter of law.21 Thus, the judgment against Doyle, in his
individual capacity, based on malicious prosecution is reversed.
C
(1)
We now turn to Collins’s arguments in support of the jury’s
verdict against Doyle, in his individual capacity, based on
defamation. We begin by addressing his section 1983 claim.
20
It should be noted that Collins’s own testimony at trial
confirmed the fact that numerous checks written by playground
patrons were deposited into his account to cover several NSF
checks. At trial Collins testified as follows:
Q. What was the money used for in the [Collins & Associates]
account?
A. The money that was deposited into the account?
Q. Yes.
A. It was put into my account, hopefully to stop some of the NSF
charges.
Q. NSF charges were for personal expenses?
A. Yes, they were.
21
Because we hold that Collins’ malicious prosecution claims
fail as a matter of law, it is unnecessary to address the question
whether Sheriff Doyle is entitled to qualified immunity.
25
The Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976),
stated unequivocally that defamation that does not result in the
deprivation of “a life, liberty, or property interest recognized
and protected by state law or guaranteed by one of the provisions
of the Bill of Rights that has been incorporated” is not actionable
under section 1983.
Id. at 710-711; see also, Doe v. State of
Louisiana,
2 F.3d 1412, 1421 (5th Cir. 1993)(stating that
defamation is not actionable under section 1983 unless it leads to
the deprivation of a constitutionally guaranteed right). This
doctrine has become known as the “stigma plus infringement test”
and requires the plaintiff to prove that the actions of the
defendant resulted in the “deprivation of a protected interest.”
Vander Zee v. Reno,
73 F.3d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1996). If the
plaintiff fails to demonstrate the deprivation of a protected
interest resulting from the defendant’s actions, his claim fails as
a matter of law.
Id.
In his appellate brief, Collins states that “the defamatory
statements made by Doyle--the false criminal charges--resulted in
his prosecution in violation of his constitutional right to be free
from malicious prosecution.” This is the lone protected interest
cited by Collins in support of his claim for defamation under
section 1983.22 Assuming the deprivation of such a right can
22
There is some indication in the trial record and in his
appellate brief that Collins introduced evidence of the fact that
he has lost employment opportunities as a result of the actions of
Doyle in an attempt to establish a constitutionally cognizable
26
support a claim for defamation under section 1983, the actions of
Doyle, as we have previously concluded, were supported by probable
cause. Consequently, Collins has failed to satisfy the
infringement portion of the “stigma plus” test. Assuming he has
been defamed, he has not shown that the defamation infringed on a
constitutionally protected interest. Thus, Collins’s federal
defamation claim fails as a matter of law.
(2)
We now turn to the defamation claim based on state law.
Essentially for the same reasons that Collins’s malicious
prosecution claims fail, his defamation claim based on state law
fails as a matter of law. It is a long-standing canon of Louisiana
tort law that “a plaintiff cannot prevail in an action for
defamation which is combined with one for malicious prosecution
where he fails to prove malicious prosecution; and the two caused
are merged into one.” Watson v. Church’s Fried Chicken, Inc., 527
So. 2d 979, 981 (La.Ct.App. 4th Cir. 1988)(citing Dearmond v. St.
injury. The Supreme Court, however, has expressly rejected the
existence of a constitutionally cognizable injury for the damage to
the reputation of the plaintiff resulting in the loss of future
employment opportunities. See Seigert v. Gilley,
500 U.S. 226, 234
(1991)(stating that any damages flowing from an injury to the
plaintiff reputation in connection with his employment which result
in the impairment of his future ability to gain future employment,
“may be recoverable under state tort law, but is not recoverable in
a [federal civil action]” because such an injury does not flow from
the violation of a constitutionally protected right).
Consequently, this evidence will not be considered in determining
whether the actions of Doyle resulted in the depravation a
constitutional right sufficient for Collins to meet his burden
under Paul v. Davis,
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
27
Amant, 4 So. 72 (La. 1888) & Enders v. Boisseau,
27 So. 546 (La.
1900)). In Dearmond, the Louisiana Supreme Court explained the
rule as follows:
The defamation of character alleged consists in merely
making public statements that plaintiff was guilty of the
crime for which he was arrested and prosecuted upon the
affidavit of the defendant. Manifestly the slander is
merged in the prosecution, and if the prosecution is not
actionable, neither is the slander.
Dearmond, 4 So. at 72. Thus, because Collins has failed to prove
that the actions of Doyle rose to the level of malicious
prosecution, his state law defamation claim merges with his
malicious prosecution claim and fails as a matter of law.
D
Finally, we address the jury’s verdict relating to Collins’s
abuse of process claim against Doyle, which is based on state law.
In Vasseur v. Eunice Superette, Inc., 386 So. 2d 692 (La.Ct.App. 3d
Cir. 1980), the Louisiana court recognized a cause of action for
the common law tort of abuse of process. The court held:
There seems to be no reason not to recognize a
plaintiff’s right to recover for damages caused by a
defendant’s abuse of process when the facts so warrant.
Unlike malicious prosecution, however, where several
elements [must be proven] . . . there are only two
essential elements of abuse of process. . . . The
essential elements of abuse of process, as the tort has
developed, have been stated to be: First, an ulterior
purpose, and second, a wilful act in the use of the
process not proper in the regular conduct of the
proceeding.
Id. at 695.
28
The first element of an abuse of process claim, that of
ulterior purpose, “is similar to the concept of ‘malice,’ but is a
much more demanding test which would not be met by a showing of
lack of knowledge or other technical types of malice, but which is
only met when the officer is acting for a specific purpose not
authorized by law.” Taylor v. State of Louisiana, 617 So. 2d 1198,
1205 (La.Ct.App. 3d Cir. 1993). The second element, that of the
improper use of process, requires “a failure to comply with the
proper procedures or rules set out by law for conducting official
actions.”
Id. at 1205-06. The touchstone of an abuse of process
claim is whether the actions of the defendant “involves the misuse
of a process already legally issued whereby [the defendant]
attempts to obtain some result not proper under the law.”
Id.
Assuming Collins’s newly alleged ulterior purpose is true--
that Doyle wanted him removed from the position of Director of
Recreations for the City of Harahan so he could give the job to a
friend of his wife--the record still lacks any evidence to support
a claim that the process was used in an improper manner. As we
continue to note, the record indicates that probable cause existed
at the time Collins was charged with public contract fraud and
theft. Additionally, the record indicates that following Collins’s
arrest, the matter was brought to trial in a timely manner. The
only purpose of the trial that is supported by the record was to
obtain a criminal conviction. There is no evidence that Doyle
29
misused the criminal process once it was instituted. Thus,
Collins’s abuse of process claim fails as a matter of law.
III
We sum up: Collins has failed as a matter of law in his
section 1983 malicious prosecution claim to demonstrate that Chief
Doyle was the chief policymaker for purposes of initiation and
prosecuting him for the public contract fraud and theft. Thus, the
City of Harahan has no Monell liability for his actions. Further,
Collins has failed to carry his burden to demonstrate that Chief
Doyle lacked probable cause to refer the case to, and to assist,
the district attorney’s office in its prosecution. Thus, both
Collins’s federal and state law malicious prosecution claims
against Doyle fail. We hold that Collins has failed to establish
either a state or federal cause of action against Doyle based on
defamation. Finally, we hold that the abuse of process claim
cannot be sustained.
Thus, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the
damage award is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for entry of
judgment dismissing the complaint in all respects as to all
defendants.
REVERSED, VACATED, and REMANDED.
30
