Filed: Mar. 18, 1993
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 92-8230 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus WILLIAM ROBERT RICH, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas _ ( May 21, 1993 ) Before GOLDBERG, JOLLY, and WIENER, Circuit Judges. E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge: The question in this case is whether an individual's affirmative response to a police officer's request to "have a look in" the individual's autom
Summary: IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT _ No. 92-8230 _ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus WILLIAM ROBERT RICH, Defendant-Appellee. _ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas _ ( May 21, 1993 ) Before GOLDBERG, JOLLY, and WIENER, Circuit Judges. E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge: The question in this case is whether an individual's affirmative response to a police officer's request to "have a look in" the individual's automo..
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 92-8230
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WILLIAM ROBERT RICH,
Defendant-Appellee.
__________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Texas
__________________________________________________________________
( May 21, 1993 )
Before GOLDBERG, JOLLY, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:
The question in this case is whether an individual's
affirmative response to a police officer's request to "have a look
in" the individual's automobile is the equivalent of a general
consent to search the automobile and its contents, including the
individual's luggage. With some reluctance, but drawing from
precedent, we hold that the search does not violate the Fourth
Amendment. We thus reverse the district court's suppression of the
seized contraband.
I
We write today because the light bulb for the license plate on
William Robert Rich's pickup truck burned out. Thus, at 11:35 p.m.
on the night of January 16, 1991, Texas Department of Public Safety
Trooper August Crais stopped Rich on Interstate 35 in Williamson
County to issue him a warning citation for the burned-out bulb.
In response to the trooper's request for his driver's license,
Rich volunteered that he was travelling to Mesquite to purchase
some automobiles. Trooper Crais asked Rich how long he would be
staying in Mesquite, and Rich replied that he would be there "just
for the day." Crais told Rich of the reason for the stop, and
asked Rich for proof of insurance on the pickup. While Rich
returned to the truck to get the insurance papers, Crais radioed
Rich's driver's license number in to the police dispatcher, and
requested a license check, a criminal history check, and a check
for outstanding warrants. He returned to the truck where Rich was
fumbling through an envelope, still searching for his insurance
card.
Trooper Crais then walked up to the driver's side of the
pickup truck. He shined his flashlight into the open driver's side
window. He noticed a travel bag on the passenger side floorboard,
some clothes hanging up on the passenger side, a hat on the
passenger seat, and two suitcases that were behind the seat in the
extended cab portion of the pickup. He also detected the odor of
fabric softener, which he knew was often used by narcotics
smugglers to mask the scent of marijuana. Crais returned to where
Rich was standing and again asked him how long he planned on
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staying in Mesquite; this time, Rich replied that he would be there
"a couple of days." When Rich handed Crais the insurance papers,
Crais saw that Rich's hands were trembling so much that the papers
rattled.
After taking the insurance papers, Trooper Crais returned to
his patrol car to obtain the results of the license and warrant
checks. The dispatcher informed him that the police computer was
malfunctioning and that no checks could be run at that time. Crais
returned to Rich, who asked if there was a problem. Crais told him
that the computer was down, and that he had been unable to conduct
a license check. After asking Rich to stand by the patrol car,
Crais again approached the pickup truck and attempted to look
through its back window, which was tinted. Crais was trying to
determine what was underneath the two suitcases in the extended cab
portion of the truck, but was unable to see through the tinting on
the window. He again detected the odor of fabric softener
emanating from the truck.
Trooper Crais then walked back to Rich and asked him whether
he had any narcotics or weapons in the vehicle. Rich replied that
he did not. Crais then asked Rich, "Can I have a look in your
truck?" Rich looked at the ground while fumbling through his
envelope. He did not respond. Crais repeated his question. Again
Rich did not respond. For the third time, Crais asked Rich if he
could look in the pickup, and then said "I either need a yes or a
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no." Rich said yes, and Crais instructed him to go stand back near
the patrol car.
Trooper Crais opened the driver's side door, unlocked the
passenger side door with the electric lock mechanism, walked around
to the passenger side door and opened it. He immediately pulled
out one of the suitcases resting behind the passenger seat and
opened it. The suitcase contained marijuana packed in fabric
softener tissues. Crais returned the suitcase to the truck and
walked back to Rich, who was standing near the patrol car; Rich
said, "You got me, didn't you?" Crais replied, "Yes." He then read
Rich his Miranda warnings and arrested him. Ninety-two pounds of
marijuana were eventually taken from the truck. Crais's report
noted the time of arrest as 11:40 p.m., so apparently no more than
five minutes elapsed from the time of the initial stop until the
arrest.
After indictment, Rich moved to suppress. He asserted several
constitutional claims, including the violation of his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court
excluded evidence of Rich's criminal history as irrelevant, and
granted the motion on the grounds that the search of the suitcase
exceeded the scope of the consent given by Rich. The government
appeals, arguing that the district court erred in concluding that
the scope of Rich's consent to search the truck did not include an
unlocked suitcase that was in plain view inside the vehicle. The
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government also argues that the court further erred in refusing to
admit the relevant evidence of Rich's criminal history. We now
reverse the district court's decision to suppress the evidence.
II
Two distinct inquiries must be undertaken in analyzing an
individual's consent to a search: whether his consent was
voluntarily given, and whether the search was within the scope of
his consent. United States v. Coburn,
876 F.2d 372, 374 (5th Cir.
1989). Because the district court determined that the scope of the
consent was exceeded, he did not rule on the voluntariness of the
defendant's consent. Thus, our review is limited to the scope of
the defendant's consent.1
The Supreme Court has instructed us on the standard for
determining the scope of consent. "The standard for measuring the
scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of
`objective' reasonableness...." Florida v. Jimeno, U.S. ,
,
111 S. Ct. 1801, 1803-04 (1991). The key inquiry focuses on
what the "typical reasonable person [would] have understood by the
1
The government also urges us to reverse the district
court's exclusion of evidence of Rich's prior criminal history
from the suppression hearing. We decline to do so, because the
standard for measuring the scope of a suspect's consent is
objective reasonableness; the suspect's particular knowledge
about the criminal justice system based upon his prior
experiences is irrelevant to such a determination. Such
knowledge could be important, however, when determining whether a
suspect's consent was voluntary. We have no doubt that the
district court will address this issue when it considers the
voluntariness of Rich's consent on remand.
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exchange between the officer and the suspect."
Jimeno, 111 S. Ct.
at 1804 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez,
497 U.S. 177, 183-84,
110
S. Ct. 2793, 2798-2802 (1990)). Objective reasonableness is a
question of law that is reviewed de novo. United States v. Ibarra,
965 F.2d 1354, 1357 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (7-7 decision);
United States v. Harrison,
918 F.2d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 1990).
The factual circumstances surrounding the consent may be
important in determining the nature of the consent and how a
reasonable officer would have understood the consent.
Ibarra, 965
F.2d at 1357. The trial court's factual findings must be accepted
unless they are "clearly erroneous or influenced by an incorrect
view of the law." United States v. Muniz-Melchor,
894 F.2d 1430,
1433-34 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 923,
110 S. Ct. 1957
(1990); United States v. Lanford,
838 F.2d 1351, 1354 (5th Cir.
1988).
III
The government does not dispute any of the district court's
factual findings, but instead contests the court's conclusion as to
how a reasonable person would understand the trooper's request to
"look in" Rich's pickup. The government relies principally upon
Florida v. Jimeno. In that case, the police officer overheard the
defendant, Jimeno, arranging what seemed to be a drug transaction
over a public telephone. The officer followed the defendant's car,
and stopped him after he committed a traffic violation. The
officer then told the defendant that he had reason to suspect that
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narcotics were in the car, and requested Jimeno's permission to
search the car. Jimeno consented to the search, and the officer
found a kilogram of cocaine in a closed paper bag that was located
on the passenger side floorboard.
Jimeno argued that the scope of his consent to search the car
did not extend to the search of a closed paper bag found within the
car. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that "it was objectively
reasonable for the police to conclude that the general consent to
search respondent's car included consent to search containers
within that car which might bear drugs." Jimeno, U.S. at ,
111 S.Ct. at 1804. The government argues that in the instant case,
it was similarly reasonable for Trooper Crais to conclude that an
affirmative response to his request to "look in" Rich's pickup
included consent to "look in" closed containers found inside the
truck.
Rich first argues that Trooper Crais's request to "have a look
in" the truck was--under the objectively reasonable standard--only
a request to "see inside" the vehicle. Rich argues that this
interpretation is strengthened by the fact that Crais had
previously attempted to "see inside" but was foiled by the truck's
tinted window. Somewhat similarly, the district court based its
decision to suppress the evidence in part on the failure of the
officer to use the more precise term "search" in his request.
We decline the defendant's invitation to establish a list of
specific terms from which an officer must select the most
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appropriate for each individual situation and/or defendant. To so
hamper law enforcement officials in their everyday duties would be
an unjustifiable extension of the Fourth Amendment's requirement
that searches be "reasonable." Several other circuits have held
that a request to "look in" or "look through" a vehicle is the
equivalent of a request to "search" the vehicle.2 We take this
opportunity to establish a similar rule for our own circuit: it is
not necessary for an officer specifically to use the term "search"
when he requests consent from an individual to search a vehicle.
We hold that any words, when viewed in context, that objectively
communicate to a reasonable individual that the officer is
requesting permission to examine the vehicle and its contents
constitute a valid search request for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Thus, in the light of the factual circumstances in this case, we
hold that Trooper Crais's request to "have a look in" Rich's truck
effectively communicated to Rich that Crais was asking for his
consent to search the vehicle. Rich had observed Crais shining
his flashlight not only into the tinted window but into the open
driver's side window of the truck and studying the truck's interior
2
See, e.g., United States v. Espinosa,
782 F.2d 888, 892
(10th Cir. 1986) (removal of back seat and rear quarter panel of
vehicle after permission was given to "look through" vehicle held
to be within the scope of consent); United States v. Harris,
928
F.2d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir. 1991) (search of unlocked zippered
luggage found in trunk of vehicle after permission was given to
"look" in vehicle to make sure there weren't any illegal drugs,
weapons, or other contraband held to be within the scope of
consent).
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for at least thirty seconds; thus Crais had already "seen inside"
the truck and an objectively reasonable person would assume at this
point that Crais was requesting permission to look further.
Rich further argues that the facts in the instant case are
inapposite to those presented in Jimeno, because there the officer
expressly informed the defendant that he wanted to search the car
for drugs. Jimeno reaffirmed the notion that "[t]he scope of a
search is generally defined by its expressed object." Jimeno,
U.S. at , 111 S.Ct. at 1804 (citing United States v. Ross,
456
U.S. 798,
102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982)). Here, Rich asserts, the general
request to search his truck was unaccompanied by an express
declaration of the item or items that were being sought; thus, it
was not objectively reasonable for the officer to assume that Rich
had consented to the search of his luggage. In other words, Rich
argues that because he did not know that the officer was searching
for drugs, his general consent to search the vehicle could not be
interpreted as extending to any "containers within that car which
might bear drugs." Jimeno, U.S. at , 111 S.Ct. at 1804.
Indeed, the district court judge decided to suppress, in part,
because he concluded that Trooper Crais did not tell Rich that he
wanted to search the vehicle for illegal drugs.
We do not agree with the district court. To the extent that
this determination involves a factual finding on the part of the
district court, we find that it is clearly erroneous. When the
conversation between Crais and Rich is considered in toto, it is
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indisputable that Rich knew that the object of Crais's search was
illegal weapons or narcotics. As the district court found, after
the defendant handed his insurance papers to the officer, Trooper
Crais asked him if he had any narcotics or weapons in the vehicle;
the defendant answered "no." The officer then asked, for the first
of three times, if he could "have a look in" the defendant's truck;
the defendant did not respond to this inquiry. In the light of the
fact that the entire scenario was played out in a matter of
minutes--Trooper Crais's report stated that he pulled Rich over at
11:35 p.m., and that Rich was placed under arrest at 11:40 p.m.--it
is unreasonable to assume a period of silence ensued that was long
enough to disassociate the two sentences from each other. The
district court's factual findings reconstruct the conversation as
follows:
TROOPER CRAIS: Do you have any narcotics or weapons in
your truck?
DEFENDANT RICH: No.
TROOPER CRAIS: Can I have a look in your truck?
We think that Trooper Crais's request to search the defendant's
truck--certainly when taken in this context--was a request to
search the truck for illegal narcotics or weapons. Obviously the
officer's concern was focused on the possibility of the presence of
such contraband; his search request was similarly focused. Again,
we are unwilling to dictate to law enforcement officials the timing
pattern of their conversations with suspects; if, as a result of
the verbal exchange, an objectively reasonable individual would
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understand the object of the officer's search, then the object of
the search has been sufficiently delineated for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. We are convinced that such delineation took
place in this case.
The defendant additionally argues that Jimeno rests on the
premise that "[a] suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the
scope of the search to which he consents." Jimeno, U.S. at
, 111 S.Ct. at 1804. He argues that he cannot claim the benefit
of this Jimeno rationale because he was unable to observe the
search as it was being conducted; thus, he did not have the
opportunity to avail himself of the right to object to or limit the
search of his luggage. He says that the search took place on the
passenger side of the vehicle on the sloping shoulder of the
interstate, and that he was standing (at the instruction of Trooper
Crais) on the driver's side of the patrol car, which was parked
several feet behind the truck. Even if he had been able to see
what Trooper Crais was doing, he argues, the search took place so
rapidly that he would not have had time to object to it.
The district court made no findings that support Rich's claim
that his view was too limited or that things happened too fast for
him to withdraw or limit his consent. Even if Rich was unable to
see what was going on, however, we are unwilling to read Jimeno to
hold, as Rich suggests, that enforcement officials must conduct all
searches in plain view of the suspect, and in a manner slowly
enough that he may withdraw or delimit his consent at any time
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during the search. When the court stated that "[a] suspect may of
course delimit as he chooses the scope of the search to which he
consents," it meant that Rich, knowing the contents of the vehicle
and its various containers at the time he gave his consent, had the
responsibility to limit the scope of the consent if he deemed it
necessary to do so. Rich knew what containers were in the truck
when he gave his consent to search; he had the ability at that time
to impose any restrictions he saw fit on the scope of that consent.
The fact that the search was not conducted in a manner that made it
conducive or even possible for Rich to later withdraw or limit his
consent does not automatically make that search violative of the
Fourth Amendment. Under the facts of this case, we find that the
scope of Rich's consent was not violated by this lack of
opportunity to limit or withdraw his consent.3
In suppressing the evidence, the district court additionally
relied upon the officer's failure to request specifically to search
the suitcase. The Supreme Court in Jimeno, however, foreclosed the
possibility of such a failure ever rising to the level of a Fourth
Amendment violation. The Court stated:
Respondent argues, and the Florida trial court agreed
with him, that if the police wish to search closed
containers within a car they must separately request
3
The situation where a suspect clearly withdraws or delimits
his general consent to a search before an officer has begun the
search, or a specific portion of the search, is not before us.
We express no opinion on such a situation. In the instant case,
Rich never attempted to withdraw or delimit his consent at any
point prior to or during the search.
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permission to search each container. But we see no basis
for adding this sort of superstructure to the Fourth
Amendment's basic test of objective reasonableness.
(Citation omitted.)
Jimeno, U.S. at , 111 S.Ct. at 1804.
Thus, we find that the Supreme Court's decision in Jimeno
dictates both the controlling law and its application to the facts
in this case. There, the Court held that "if [a suspect's] consent
would reasonably be understood to extend to a particular container,
the Fourth Amendment provides no grounds for requiring a more
explicit authorization." Jimeno, U.S. at , 111 S.Ct. at
1804. We think that under the facts of this case, it was
objectively reasonable for Trooper Crais to conclude that Rich's
consent to search the vehicle included his consent to search
containers found within the vehicle that could hold illegal
narcotics or weapons, the expressed object of Trooper Crais's
search. The suitcase that Trooper Crais searched was such a
container. Thus, the district court erred in holding that the
scope of Rich's consent did not extend to his luggage.
IV
We therefore reverse the district court's decision granting
the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, because it was
based on the erroneous determination that Rich's consent to search
his vehicle did not include consent to search his luggage, which
was inside the vehicle. Because the district court did not
determine whether Rich's consent was voluntarily given, we must
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remand this case to the district court for this primarily factual
determination, and for such other proceedings that may
appropriately follow.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED,
and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent
with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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