Judges: PerCuriam
Filed: Oct. 07, 2013
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 Submitted October 1, 2013* Decided October 7, 2013 Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge No. 13---2053 Appeal from the United States District Court for the CLIFTON---JEREL: JONES, Southern District of Indiana, Plaintiff---Appellant, Indianapolis Division. v.
Summary: NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604 Submitted October 1, 2013* Decided October 7, 2013 Before FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge No. 13---2053 Appeal from the United States District Court for the CLIFTON---JEREL: JONES, Southern District of Indiana, Plaintiff---Appellant, Indianapolis Division. v. N..
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NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 1, 2013*
Decided October 7, 2013
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge
No. 13-‐‑2053 Appeal from the United
States District Court for the
CLIFTON-‐‑JEREL: JONES, Southern District of Indiana,
Plaintiff-‐‑Appellant,
Indianapolis Division.
v.
No. 1:12-‐‑cv-‐‑1501-‐‑WTL-‐‑MJD
STATE OF INDIANA, et al., William T. Lawrence, Judge.
Defendants-‐‑Appellees.
Order
Clifton-‐‑Jerel: Jones sued the State of Indiana, the Madison Circuit Court, the Madi-‐‑
son County Sheriff’s Department, and Rodney J. Cummings, the Madison County Pros-‐‑
ecutor—all but one of them organizations rather than natural persons. The claims under
42 U.S.C. §1983 have problems under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Ser-‐‑
vices, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and when dismissing the complaint the district judge noted
* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary.
See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).
No. 13-‐‑2053 Page 2
others, including prosecutorial immunity, the Eleventh Amendment, and the statute of
limitations.
The events leading to this suit began in 1999, when in a paternity action the court
found Jones to be the child’s father and ordered him to pay child support. His failure to
obey this order led to two prosecutions for contempt of court, one in 2008 and another
in 2012; each time the court ordered Jones imprisoned. Another conviction in 2008 led to
a term of imprisonment for the crime of driving with a suspended license. Jones con-‐‑
tends that during that imprisonment officers of the Sheriff’s Department “violently”
prevented him from praying.
In this suit Jones contends that the 1999 order violated his constitutional rights. His
reasons are difficult to understand but need not be explored. To the extent that he con-‐‑
tests the merits of that order, the Rooker-‐‑Feldman doctrine establishes that federal district
courts lack subject-‐‑matter jurisdiction. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feld-‐‑
man, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). To the extent
that he attacks the prosecution and judgments imprisoning him for contempt, rather
than the child-‐‑support orders themselves, damages or collateral review could in princi-‐‑
ple be available—though the fact that Jones is not currently in custody would prevent
resort to 28 U.S.C. §2254.
According to Jones, prosecutor Cummings obstructed justice and committed other
misconduct when instituting and pursuing the contempt charges. Any request for dam-‐‑
ages from the prosecutor on account of the acts about which Jones complains is blocked
by prosecutorial immunity. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). And a request
for damages from the organizational defendants, which do not enjoy personal immuni-‐‑
ties, is blocked not only by Monell (which holds that organizations cannot be held vicar-‐‑
iously liable for misconduct by their employees) but also by the principle that states and
state agencies are not “persons” for the purpose of §1983 and equivalent statutes. See
Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
A local entity, such as the Sheriff’s Department, is a “person,” but the only relevant
acts by employees of the Sheriff’s Department occurred more than two years before suit
and therefore would have been barred by the statute of limitations, even if Jones had
sued the persons who he asserts disrupted his prayer—which he did not. The Sheriff’s
Department prevails under Monell independent of any limitations defense. But we also
agree with the district court that the suit is untimely with respect to the Sheriff’s De-‐‑
partment. Jones describes himself as too incompetent to have sued within the allowed
time, but this self-‐‑serving declaration does not authorize equitable tolling. See Behavioral
Institute of Indiana, LLC v. Hobart City, 406 F.3d 926, 932 (7th Cir. 2005); Hoosier Bancorp v.
No. 13-‐‑2053 Page 3
Rasmussen, 90 F.3d 180, 182–83 (7th Cir. 1996). He has not been adjudicated as incompe-‐‑
tent. He depicts himself as suffering travails, but personal difficulties differ from legal
incompetence.
To the extent Jones seeks relief under Indiana law, he is in the wrong court. The
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution prevents federal courts from awarding relief,
under state law, against states and their agencies. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 103–23 (1984).
Jones’s other arguments have been considered but do not require discussion.
AFFIRMED
