Plaintiff, Patricia Mabry, appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, 597 F. Supp. 1235, granting defendants'1 motion for partial summary judgment and dismissing her claim alleging that her termination of employment constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. Secs. 1681-1686 (1982). We affirm.BACKGROUND

The district court found and the record reveals the following relevant facts. Mabry was employed as an instructor and a coach in the physical education department at Trinidad State Junior College ("Trinidad") in Trinidad, Colorado from the 1974-75 through 1981-82 academic years. She also taught courses in speech and first aid. R. Vol. I at 116.

In December 1981, Mabry received notice from defendant Thomas Sullivan ("Sullivan"), the President of Trinidad, that she was being terminated because of a "reduction in force" resulting from a decrease in student enrollment at the college. The remaining two members of the physical education department, both male and with greater seniority than Mabry, were retained. At his deposition, Sullivan stated that a factor in his decision to terminate Mabry was that her two male colleagues were married and had children. R. Vol. II at 93-94.

After she received her notice of termination, Mabry requested and received a hearing before Trinidad's Campus Hearing Committee. Mabry exhausted the hearing procedures at Trinidad and all administrative remedies available to her. After receiving a notice of right to sue from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, she commenced an action in the district court in Colorado. Mabry alleged that her employment was terminated on the basis of her sex and/or her parental or marital status, in violation of the provisions of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e to Sec. 2000e-17 (1982), Title IX, 20 U.S.C. Secs. 1681-1686 (1982) and its implementing regulations, and section 1983, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1982).2 She also alleged that she was subjected to sex-based discrimination because of the nature and quality of the facilities at Trinidad. She sought damages, reinstatement with back pay and benefits, and attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1988 and 2000e-5(k) (1982).

In response to defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, the district court dismissed Mabry's Title IX and section 1983 claims on the grounds that the instructional program areas in which Mabry taught were not education programs or activities which receive federal financial assistance within the meaning of Title IX,3 and that the availability of complete remedial devices under Title IX precluded her remedy under section 1983. The district court also dismissed the individual State Board members on the ground that they were protected by a qualified immunity.

Mabry's Title VII claim was tried to the district court on April 2 and 3, 1985. The district court entered judgment on April 16, 1985, for defendants, finding that Mabry's termination was in accordance with the State Board's policy and the relevant Colorado statutes and "without consideration of the sex of the three physical education instructors involved...." R. Vol. I at 159; Findings of Fact No. 12. The court further concluded that "[i]llicit consideration of plaintiff's sexual identity did not occur and the reasons stated for her termination were not pretextual." Id. at 160; Conclusions of Law No. 4. Implicit in that conclusion is the finding that defendants' consideration of Mabry's marital and parental status did not amount, in this case, to sex discrimination. Mabry has limited her appeal in this court to "whether the district court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's Title IX (20 U.S.C. Sec. 1681) claim on defendants' motion for partial summary judgment." Plaintiff-Appellant's Opening Brief at 3.

In this appeal, Mabry argues that the district court erred in dismissing her Title IX claim because she participated in a program that received federal financial assistance within the meaning of Title IX. She also argues that the cause of action she asserts under Title IX is not actionable under Title VII because "the courts have held that Title VII rather than proscribing distinctions based on marital status, as in the instant case, proscribe [sic] sex discrimination resulting from a situation where an employer has applied a different requirement regarding marital status to females than to males." Plaintiff-Appellant's Reply Brief at 9-10 (emphasis original).4 We do not reach the question of whether Mabry participated in a Title IX "program," however, because her claim is actionable under Title VII, and the district court's judgment of April 16, 1985, from which Mabry took no appeal, constitutes a final determination of an essential element of her Title IX claim.

Mabry argues that her claim of discrimination based on "marital, parental head of household and wage earner status," Plaintiff-Appellant's Reply Brief at 11, is not cognizable under Title VII, but is under Title IX by virtue of 34 C.F.R. Sec. 106.57 (1986), one of Title IX's implementing regulations. She argues that an EEOC guideline regarding distinctions based on marital status shows that "Title VII does not recognize policies concerning the marital, parental or wage earner status of individuals except where such discrimination varies with the sex of the individual." Plaintiff-Appellant's Reply Brief at 9.5

The Title IX regulation on which Mabry relies has two subsections. It provides in pertinent part:

(a) General. A recipient shall not apply any policy or take any employment action:

(1) Concerning the potential marital, parental or family status of an employee or applicant for employment which treats persons differently on the basis of sex; or(2) Which is based upon whether an employee or applicant for employment is the head of household or principal wage earner in such employee's or applicant's family unit.

34 C.F.R. Sec. 106.57 (1986). If Mabry rests her argument on subsection 1, it provides no different basis for a claim than does Title VII. As Mabry noted, Title VII's implementing regulations show that the statute prohibits policies concerning marital, parental or family status that discriminate based on sex. "[A]n employer's rule which forbids or restricts the employment of married women and which is not applicable to married men is a discrimination based on sex prohibited by Title VII...." 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1604.4(a) (1986); see also id. at Sec. 800.149 (1986). Case law further reveals the scope of Title VII. For example, the policy of a religious organization that provided insurance for the "head of the household" was held to violate the statute because the term was interpreted only to mean single persons or married men. EEOC v. Fremont Christian School, 609 F. Supp. 344 (1984), aff'd, 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir.1986). Title VII was also violated when an airline applied its no-marriage rule to female stewardesses, but not to male stewards. Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991, 92 S. Ct. 536, 30 L. Ed. 2d 543 (1971).

Subsection 1 of the Title IX regulation in question similarly prohibits employment action concerning marital, parental or family status "which treats persons differently on the basis of sex " 34 C.F.R. Sec. 106.57(a)(1) (1986) (emphasis added). We cannot see how subsection 1 creates a claim not cognizable under Title VII. Under Title VII or Title IX, the potential marital or family status distinction only violates the statute if its impact is to discriminate on the basis of sex. Thus, a claim pursuant to subsection 1 that is actionable under Title IX would also be actionable under Title VII.

Subsection 2, on the other hand, would appear to prohibit employment action based on an individual's status as head of household or principal wage earner, without regard to whether the action treats persons differently on the basis of sex. Id. at Sec. 106.57(a)(2). Arguably, this regulation could create a claim under Title IX that is not cognizable under Title VII. That interpretation of subsection 2, however, by omitting any reference to sex discrimination, would extend beyond the prohibitions of Title IX. "The legislative power of the United States is vested in the Congress, and the exercise of quasi-legislative authority by governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant of such power by the Congress and subject to limitations which that body imposes." Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302, 99 S. Ct. 1705, 1718, 60 L. Ed. 2d 208 (1979).

The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather, it is "the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute." Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 [85 S. Ct. 1301, 1305, 14 L. Ed. 2d 223] (1965), quoting Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 [56 S. Ct. 397, 399, 80 L. Ed. 528] (1936).

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213-14, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1391, 47 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1976); see also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. United States, 664 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir.1981). To be valid, a regulation, such as subsection 2 of 34 C.F.R. Sec. 106.57(a), must be " 'reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation.' " Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n., 463 U.S. 582, 643, 103 S. Ct. 3221, 3254, 77 L. Ed. 2d 866 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369, 93 S. Ct. 1652, 1661, 36 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1973)). "It goes without question, of course, ... that the regulation cannot impose a standard broader than that imposed by this statute [Title IX]." Cannon v. University of Chicago, 648 F.2d 1104, 1109 n. 4 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128, 102 S. Ct. 981, 71 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1981). Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. The regulation at issue cannot, therefore, prohibit conduct which does not result in sex discrimination. Thus, Mabry cannot rely on her interpretation of subsection 2, because that interpretation imposes a standard broader than that imposed by Title IX.

Because she cannot rely on subsection 2 for her Title IX action, Mabry's only claim is that Trinidad's consideration of her marital, parental and head of household status resulted in sex discrimination against her. We are compelled to affirm the district court decision because fundamental preclusion principles bar Mabry's Title IX claim where the district court found no sex discrimination under her Title VII claim.

Issue preclusion or estoppel prevents the inconsistent determination of the same issues. Estoppel comes into play when an issue involved in a prior decision is the same issue involved in a subsequent action; the issue is actually decided in the first action after a full and fair opportunity for litigation; it was necessary to decide the issue in disposing of the first action; the later litigation is between the same parties; and the role of the issue in the second action was foreseeable in the first action. 18 Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 4416 at pp. 137-38 (West 1981). When these conditions are met, issue preclusion is required. Issue preclusion not only promotes judicial efficiency and repose but also prevents the embarrassment resulting from inconsistent determinations of the same question. Heyman v. Kline, 456 F.2d 123, 130-31 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 847, 93 S. Ct. 53, 34 L. Ed. 2d 88 (1972).

Butler v. Pollard, 800 F.2d 223, 224-25 (10th Cir.1986). In Butler, the plaintiffs brought an action seeking legal and injunctive relief on the ground that a ditch across their land which drained defendants' land constituted a trespass. Trial was bifurcated; the jury found for the defendants on the issue of damages. The district court subsequently determined that it was not bound by the jury's verdict and issued an injunction in favor of the plaintiffs. We reversed and remanded, finding that the district court erroneously denied preclusive effect to the earlier jury findings on the issue of the existence of a trespass. Similarly, in this case the district court would be bound by its earlier finding of no sex discrimination under Title VII in Mabry's termination, assuming the same legal standard applies to sex discrimination under Titles VII and IX. For the following reasons, we find the standard to be the same. Mabry's Title IX claim is therefore barred.

Both Title VII and Title IX prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. Title VII explicitly covers employment-related discrimination; Title IX has also been held to cover such discrimination. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 102 S. Ct. 1912, 72 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1982). We note that the majority of cases interpreting Title IX have involved the meaning of "federal financial assistance" or "program or activity" under the statute. Few cases to date have considered the substantive standard to be applied under Title IX. We find no persuasive reason not to apply Title VII's substantive standards regarding sex discrimination to Title IX suits.6 See A. Larson & L. Larson, Employment Discrimination, Vol. I Sec. 7.45(b) (1985).

The EEOC regulations entitled "Procedures for Complaints of Employment Discrimination Filed Against Recipients of Federal Financial Assistance," 28 C.F.R. Part 42, Subpart H (1986), direct agencies to "consider Title VII case law and EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. Parts 1605-1607, unless inapplicable, in determining whether a recipient of Federal financial assistance has engaged in an unlawful employment practice." 28 C.F.R. Sec. 42.604 (1986). In addition, there is some similarity between the language used in portions of the two titles. Title IX provides that no educational institution shall be required:

to grant preferential or disparate treatment to the members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of that sex participating in or receiving the benefits of any federally supported program or activity, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of that sex in any community.

20 U.S.C. Sec. 1681(b). This language is similar to Title VII, which provides that no employer or other entity shall be required:

to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer, ... in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community....

42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(j).

There is a well-developed body of case law concerning employment-related sex discrimination under Title VII; courts should turn to that case law for guidance if confronted with an employment-related allegation of discrimination under Title IX. We find no persuasive reason to have two separate substantive standards concerning sex discrimination in employment, to both of which recipients of federal financial assistance under Title IX must adhere in their employment practices. A few courts have so held already, either explicitly or implicitly. See O'Connor v. Peru State College, 781 F.2d 632, 642 n. 8 (8th Cir.1986) ("O'Connor recognizes that, to the degree she relies upon teaching conditions, such as course assignments, her Title IX claim merely duplicates her Title VII claim, and we are bound by the decision thereon in favor of Peru State."); Nagel v. Avon Bd. of Educ., 575 F. Supp. 105, 106 (D.Conn.1983). See also General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133, 97 S. Ct. 401, 406, 50 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1976). Indeed, Mabry's counsel, in closing argument to the district court in Mabry's Title VII action, argued that Titles VII and IX share substantive standards.7

Accordingly, Mabry's Title IX claim would be barred because the district court ruled in her Title VII action that defendants committed no sex discrimination in her termination. Mabry had a full opportunity to present her case of employment-related sex discrimination to the court in the course of her Title VII case, including any evidence that defendants' consideration of her marital or parental status resulted in sex discrimination against her or had a disparate impact on women. R. Vol. II at 93-94. There is no new evidence which she could present under Title IX which she was unable to present under Title VII. Indeed, while there has been some question whether Title IX prohibits disparate impact discrimination, as Title VII does, or requires proof of intentional discriminatory conduct, Title IX certainly sweeps no broader than Title VII. Mabry may not have one more opportunity to show unlawful discrimination, based on the identical facts presented to the court before, but this time under Title IX rather than Title VII.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.