In this appeal, plaintiffs challenge the district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions for their submission of a motion in a case dismissed by the district court two years earlier. Finding error solely in the district court's imposition of sanctions upon the attorneys' law firm rather than upon the responsible attorneys, we affirm, except that we impose the sanctions on the attorneys themselves.

Plaintiffs are twenty-five dissatisfied Puerto Rico franchisees of the sandwich shop chain known as "Subway." Defendants consist of Doctor's Associates, Inc., owner and franchisor of the "Subway" chain, and several of its officers and directors. On September 14, 1988, plaintiffs, through the law firm of Woods & Woods, commenced suit against defendants in United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico alleging breach of contract, fraud and other claims arising out of their franchise agreements.

All of plaintiffs' individual franchise agreements contain clauses requiring that any claim or controversy arising out of the contract or an alleged breach thereof be settled by arbitration in Bridgeport, Connecticut. On the basis of that arbitration provision, defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Responding, plaintiffs interposed "Plaintiffs' Motion in Opposition of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss" ("the first motion") dated February 7, 1989 with a supporting memorandum of law signed by attorney Victor M. Rodriguez Baez of Woods & Woods. On May 17, 1989, agreeing with defendants' argument that the arbitration provision controlled, the district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss.

Twenty-two months later, on March 26, 1991, having sought neither reconsideration nor an appeal, and with no intervening change in the relevant law, plaintiffs submitted a motion to the district court entitled "Plaintiffs' Second Request for Change of Venue and First Request for Consolidation of Arbitration Proceedings" ("the second motion"). The memorandum of law in support of the second motion consisted entirely of argumentation from the first motion except for (1) occasional minor grammatical changes (e.g., changing "the contract was" to "the contracts were"), and (2) an appended argument requesting consolidation of plaintiffs' claims for arbitration proceedings. The second motion was signed by attorneys Harry E. Woods and Gerardo Mariani of Woods & Woods.

In response, defendants filed a motion opposing plaintiffs' second motion and seeking Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiffs' attorneys. The district court denied plaintiffs' second motion, and imposed Rule 11 sanctions directing that Woods & Woods pay part of defendants' costs for defending the second motion.1

Plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that (1) the sanctions should not have been imposed, (2) the sanctioned amount was excessive, and (3) sanctions may be imposed only against individual attorneys, not against law firms. Although we find merit in plaintiffs' final argument, we affirm the district court in all other respects.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 112 requires that an attorney make reasonable inquiry to assure that all pleadings, motions and papers filed with the court are factually well-grounded, legally tenable and not interposed for any improper purpose. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393, 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454, 110 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1990). Counsel is held to standards of due diligence and objective reasonableness. Maine Audubon Soc'y v. Purslow, 907 F.2d 265, 268 (1st Cir.1990). See also Lancellotti v. Fay, 909 F.2d 15, 20 (1st Cir.1990); Cruz v. Savage, 896 F.2d 626, 631 (1st Cir.1990); Kale v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 861 F.2d 746, 756-57 (1st Cir.1988).

District courts have broad discretion in imposing and fashioning Rule 11 sanctions. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 400, 110 S.Ct. at 2458 ("[I]n directing the district court to impose an 'appropriate' sanction, Rule 11 itself indicates that the district court is empowered to exercise its discretion."); Lancellotti, 909 F.2d at 20 ("[W]e believe the district court should determine, in the first instance, whether reasonable inquiry was made, and if not, the consequences which should ensue."); Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388, 394 (1st Cir.) ("[D]ecisions as to whether sanctions should be imposed, and if so, what form they should take, often require intensive inquiry into the circumstances surrounding an alleged violation. The trial judge, steeped in the facts and sensitive to the interplay amongst the protagonists, is ideally equipped to review those ramifications and render an informed judgment."), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 891, 111 S. Ct. 233, 112 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1990). We therefore review all aspects of the district court's Rule 11 determination under an abuse of discretion standard. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 400-01, 110 S.Ct. at 2458; Navarro-Ayala v. Nunez, 968 F.2d 1421, 1425 (1st Cir.1992). See also Maine Audubon, 907 F.2d at 268 (explaining that a party appealing Rule 11 sanctions "bears a heavy burden of demonstrating that the trial judge was clearly not justified in entering [the] order") (quoting Anderson, 900 F.2d at 393).

Plaintiffs argue that the district court used improper criteria in deciding to impose sanctions, that their motion did not warrant Rule 11 sanctions, and that the sanctions order should be overturned as an abuse of discretion. We disagree.

The district court found that plaintiffs' counsel failed to make an objectively reasonable inquiry to assure that the second motion was legally tenable. Several factors support this finding: the district court had already dismissed the case in favor of arbitration nearly two years prior to the second motion; the second motion failed to suggest any basis for the court's jurisdiction to rule on the motion in view of the dismissal; the second motion consisted of virtually verbatim argumentation from the first motion; and plaintiffs had failed to appeal or move for timely reconsideration of the order dismissing the first motion.3

We find, therefore, that the record amply supports the district court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions based on the plaintiffs' filing of its second motion, and we find plaintiffs' "abuse of discretion" claim without merit.4

Plaintiffs' next argument is that the sanctions were excessive. Rule 11 specifically states that appropriate sanctions "may include an order to pay the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Moreover, the district court has wide discretion in fashioning sanctions. See, e.g., Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 400, 110 S.Ct. at 2458; Lancellotti, 909 F.2d at 20; Anderson, 900 F.2d at 394; Unanue-Casal v. Unanue-Casal, 898 F.2d 839, 843 (1st Cir.1990); Kale, 861 F.2d at 756-58.

In its order imposing the sanctions, the district court noted that the total of 128.5 hours that defendants spent responding to plaintiffs' second motion seemed "a great deal of work to oppose one motion." It also noted that because the case had "lain dormant for two years, it is understandable that costs were high." As a result, the district court awarded defendants roughly half of the fees incurred in defending the motion. Reviewing the record carefully, we find that the sanction of $7,500 was not only within the district court's discretion but was also reasonable.5C. Imposition of the Sanctions on the Individual Attorneys

Lastly, plaintiffs argue, and defendants do not dispute, that the district court improperly imposed Rule 11 sanctions upon the law firm of Woods & Woods. Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed only upon individual attorneys who have signed sanctioned papers. Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 124, 110 S. Ct. 456, 458-59, 107 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1989). They may not be imposed upon a law firm. Id.

Elsewhere, we have avoided remanding Rule 11 cases by discerning the responsible parties and ordering that they pay the sanctions. Ballard's Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. Transue, 865 F.2d 447, 450 (1st Cir.1989) (requiring that attorney, rather than party, pay Rule 11 sanctions); Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600, 607 (1st Cir.1988) ("[T]he district court did not specify whether [sanctioned party] or their counsel should pay the counsel fees assessed. Our reading of the record indicates that the sanction should be imposed upon counsel."). Cf. Navarro-Ayala, 968 F.2d at 1428 (explaining that "this may properly be classified as one of the rare cases in which an appellate court ought to take the bull by the horns and, rather than remanding, simply select an appropriate [Rule 11] sanction"). We therefore modify the district court's order and impose the $7,500 sanctions jointly and severally upon attorneys Woods and Mariani.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's order is affirmed as modified.

Affirmed as modified. Costs to appellees.