Filed: Mar. 02, 2004
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: PEDRO COSME-ROSADO;-4-, supported facts set forth in Serrano's statement.of material facts.Plaintiffs filed a complaint in [a Puerto Rico court] as, to destroying access to their property by defendant, Serrano.summary judgment for Serrano on the due process claim.the district court.
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 02-1600
PEDRO COSME-ROSADO; LYDIA ESTHER ROSADO-FIGUEROA;
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP COSME-ROSADO; MARIA TERESA-COSME;
PEDRO ORLANDO COSME-RODRIGUEZ; YARITZA COSME-RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
ALFREDO SERRANO-RODRIGUEZ, AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF
NARANJITO; 3-C CONSTRUCTION; CRISTINO CRUZ; JANE DOE, 98CV1491;
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP, CRUZ-CRUZ,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Lynch and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Antonio Bauza Torres for appellants.
Laura Lis López-Roche, Assistant Solicitor General, with whom
Roberto J. Sánchez Ramos was on brief for appellee Alfredo Serrano-
Rodriguez.
March 2, 2004
HOWARD, Circuit Judge. Seeking monetary damages and
prospective injunctive relief, several landowners brought a federal
lawsuit against the mayor of Naranjito, Puerto Rico, for alleged
violations of rights secured under the federal Constitution and
commonwealth law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The
district court granted summary judgment for the mayor on all
federal claims and dismissed the commonwealth claims without
prejudice, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), upon finding that the
landowners had failed to comply with Local Rule 311.12 and had
therefore admitted the veracity of the mayor's version of material
facts. The landowners now challenge the court's application of
Rule 311.12. We affirm.
I.
We sketch the procedural history, reserving for later a
more detailed recitation of the pertinent facts.
On May 5, 1998, plaintiffs-appellants Pedro Cosme-Rosado,
Lydia Esther Rosado-Figueroa, Maria Teresa-Cosme, Pedro Orlando
Cosme-Rodriguez, and Yaritza Cosme-Rodriguez ("Plaintiffs") –- all
landowners and members of the New Progressive Party in Puerto
Rico –- filed a complaint in federal court against defendant-
appellee Alfredo Serrano-Rodriguez ("Serrano") -- the president of
-2-
the local chapter of the Popular Democratic Party and the mayor of
Naranjito, Puerto Rico.1 The complaint alleged, inter alia, that:
[S]ince 1992 and up until 1998, defendant
Alfredo Serrano2 has hostigated [sic] and
threatened Plaintiffs that he would destroy
all the belongings, home, and peace of
Plaintiffs [and that] he would throw them out
of their house and would appropriate [sic]
their land with the excuse of building a
parking lot because they were and are members
of the New Progressive Party and have so
expressed publicly[;] . . .
[Serrano and others] entered in a
conspiracy . . . and began using heavy
machinery and destroyed the access of
Plaintiffs to their home and property[; and]
[Serrano's] actions under color of law were
arbitrary, capricious, politically motivated,
and without due process . . . [in violation
of] the First, Fifth and/or Fourteen[th]
Amendments of the Constitution . . . .
On these bases, the plaintiffs sought, inter alia, (1) a permanent
injunction restraining Serrano from "further violating the rights,
privileges and immunities guaranteed to Plaintiffs under the
Constitution"; (2) "compensatory damages to each plaintiff in the
amount of one million dollars"; and (3) "punitive and exemplary
1
Although the complaint named several defendants, Serrano was
the only defendant who answered. Because the remaining defendants
failed to respond, the district court entered a default judgment
against them on September 30, 1999. This appeal involves only
Serrano.
2
Although the complaint originally named Serrano in both his
official and personal capacities, the plaintiffs later voluntarily
dismissed their claims against Serrano in his official capacity.
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damages to each plaintiff in the amount of two hundred and fifty
thousand dollars."
On March 24, 2000, Serrano filed a motion for summary
judgment and a separate statement of uncontested facts complete
with several citations to the record. On April 14, 2000, the
plaintiffs responded by filing an opposition to Serrano's motion
together with a sparsely cited statement of material facts and a
sworn statement in support thereof.
On March 22, 2002, the district court granted Serrano's
motion.3 The court's decision was based on an application of Local
Rule 311.12,4 which required both the moving and nonmoving parties
to file a separate statement of material facts "properly supported
by specific references to the record." D.P.L.R. 311.12. See Pedro
Cosme-Rosado v. Alfredo Serrano-Rodriguez, 196 F. Supp. 2d 117, 119
(D.P.R. March 22, 2002). Because the court determined that the
plaintiffs had failed to provide a supported factual basis for
their claims against Serrano, it deemed admitted the properly
3
Although the court's memorandum of decision refers to
multiple defendants, see Pedro Cosme-Rosado v. Alfredo Serrano-
Rodriguez, 196 F. Supp. 2d 117, 125 (D.P.R. March 22, 2002)
(listing the various defendants and later noting that, "[f]or the
foregoing reasons, the Court grants defendants' motion for summary
judgment" (emphasis added)), there is no indication in the record
that the court ever lifted the default judgment against the
remaining defendants. See supra n.1.
4
The District of Puerto Rico amended its local rules in
September 2003. However, because this lawsuit was brought prior to
the effective date of those amendments, we refer throughout to the
pre-amended version.
-4-
supported facts set forth in Serrano's statement. See id. at 120
n.1. Based on those facts, it discerned no genuine issue as to (1)
the due process claim, see
id. at 122; (2) the political
discrimination claim, see
id. at 123; or (3) Serrano's entitlement
to absolute immunity, or, alternatively, qualified immunity, see
id. at 124-25.
II.
The plaintiffs now challenge the entry of summary
judgment on their due process and political discrimination claims.
In so doing, they argue that the district court erred in concluding
that they had failed to comply with Local Rule 311.12. Because we
discern no error either in the court's application of the Rule or
in its conclusion that there existed no genuine issue for trial on
the merits as to either claim, we affirm without addressing the
immunity issue.
A. Local Rule 311.12
The District of Puerto Rico has adopted a local rule
requiring a party who moves for summary judgment to submit, in
support of the motion, a "separate, short, and concise statement of
the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is
no genuine issue to be tried and the basis of such contention as to
each material fact, properly supported by specific reference to the
record." D.P.L.R. 311.12. Once a movant complies with this
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directive -- as Serrano did here5 – the same rule then obligates
the plaintiffs, as the opposing party, to submit a "separate,
short, and concise statement of the material facts as to which it
is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried,
properly supported by specific reference to the record." Id.
(emphases added); accord Corrada Betances v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc.,
248 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2001).
We have consistently upheld the enforcement of this rule,
noting repeatedly that "parties ignore [it] at their peril" and
that "failure to present a statement of disputed facts, embroidered
with specific citations to the record, justifies the court's
deeming the facts presented in the movant's statement of undisputed
facts admitted." Ruiz Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir.
2000) (citing prior cases); accord Morales v. A.C. Orssleff's EFTF,
246 F.3d 32, 33 (1st Cir. 2001).
As noted above, the plaintiffs argue that the district
court erred in concluding that they had not complied with Local
Rule 311.12. For support, they point to (1) the "Factual
Background" section contained within their opposition memorandum
and (2) the separate statement of material facts (and sworn
statement in support thereof) filed along with it.
5
The district court's conclusion in this regard is not
challenged on appeal.
-6-
Because the plaintiffs invite us to look to the "Factual
Background" section contained within their opposition memorandum as
proof that the district court erred in applying Local Rule 311.12,
we note at the outset that the rule has been interpreted as a
requirement that the nonmovant file a statement of material facts
separate from -- and annexed to –- the opposition memorandum. See
Vargas-Ruiz v. Golden Arch Dev., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 450, 458
(D.P.R. June 30, 2003) ("[A] party opposing a motion for summary
judgment is . . . required to file as an annex to the opposition
motion: a separate, short, and concise statement of the material
facts . . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis
retained)); accord Tavarez v. Champion Prods., Inc., 903 F. Supp.
268, 270 (D.P.R. Nov. 1, 1995). In any event, the plaintiffs'
"Factual Background" section fails to provide the allegations and
citations necessary to controvert the dispositive facts set forth
in Serrano's statement.6 We thus turn to the plaintiffs' statement
of material facts.
The district court correctly determined that the
plaintiffs' statement of material facts failed to comply with Local
Rule 311.12: Out of twelve paragraphs of allegations, only two
cite to the record.7 Moreover, within these two paragraphs, there
6
See infra nn. 9 & 11 and accompanying text.
7
Citations to the record (in the form of exhibits) are
provided for the following "material facts":
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exists only one (arguably) material allegation –- and the
accompanying citation merely points the court generally to a
thirty-page deposition without providing any page numbers. This is
not enough. See Morales, 246 F.3d at 35 ("[I]n his submissions to
the district court, plaintiff made only a general reference to [a
witness's] testimony without pinpointing where in that 89-page
deposition support for that reference could be found. This is
precisely the situation that Local Rule 311.12 seeks to avoid.").8
Accordingly, the "uncontested" facts pleaded by Serrano were
properly deemed admitted, see D.P.L.R. 311.12 ("All material facts
set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving
party shall be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by the
statement required to be served by the opposing party."), and
summary judgment rightly followed. See Tavarez, 903 F. Supp. at
[1] After taking office in 1993, [Serrano] made good on
his word. Harassing increased. On January 17, 1995,
Plaintiffs filed a complaint in [a Puerto Rico court] as
to destroying access to their property by defendant
Serrano. Serrano complied partially. Exhibit 3.
[2] By August 10, 1998, Serrano had not placed [the
Puerto Rico court] in a position to adjudicate [the
plaintiffs'] just compensation. Exhibit 7. Finally, on
February 17, 1999, Serrano stipulated a just compensation
to [the plaintiffs], Exhibit 8, and on February 26,
Serrano's attorney filed a stipulation. Exhibit 9. A
year after the filing of the instant case.
8
Given the purposes behind Rule 311.12, we reject the
assertion that a plaintiff's sworn statement (attesting to the
accuracy of the facts alleged in the proffered Rule 311.12
document) can serve as an adequate substitute for the requisite
citations to the record.
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270 ("Although [failure to comply with Local Rule 311.12] does not
signify an automatic defeat, it launches the nonmovant's case down
the road toward an easy dismissal."). We briefly explain, in the
context of each claim.
B. The Procedural Due Process Claim
In order to establish a procedural due process claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs must show that (1) they have
a property interest as defined by state law; and (2) Serrano,
acting under color of state law, deprived them of that property
interest without constitutionally adequate process. See Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982); see also Mimiya
Hosp., Inc. v. U.S. Dept. Of Health and Human Services,
331 F.3d
178, 181 (1st Cir. 2003) ("It is well established that 'individuals
whose property interests are at stake are entitled to notice and an
opportunity to be heard.'" (quoting Dusenbery v. United States, 534
U.S. 161, 167 (2002))).
Here, no such claim was established. Nowhere do the
plaintiffs even allege that they were deprived of process due them
under the Constitution.9
9
The closest that the plaintiffs come to creating such an
issue is the following allegation (and accompanying citation) in
the "Factual Background" section of the opposition memorandum:
By March 20, 1997, Serrano had been ordered by a [Puerto
Rico court] to comply with [the] court's order and that
municipality could not evict Plaintiffs from their
property. Exhibit 5. Court admonished Serrano that a
year had elapsed and that Serrano had not placed Court in
-9-
The summary judgment papers indicate that there was
sufficient process: in February 1993, the plaintiffs received a
letter from Serrano in which the City stated an interest in
expropriating their properties;10 on July 21, 1994, the Municipal
Assembly notified the plaintiffs that the City was interested in
expropriating their property and summoned them to voice their
concerns at a public hearing to be held the next day; a public
hearing was, in fact, held, and Cosme-Rosado was in attendance; on
August 10, 1994, the Municipal Assembly approved an ordinance
authorizing the Municipality to begin expropriation proceedings;
the Puerto Rico Planning Board also approved the expropriation; on
June 6, 1996, a Puerto Rico court determined that the defendants
had complied with all the legal requirements needed to expropriate
their properties and ordered the expropriation; and, on February
17, 1999, the plaintiffs finally recovered their properties' value
pursuant to a settlement agreement. Given these uncontested facts,
a condition to allow Plaintiffs to recover their
properties' value. By that time, Serrano [and another
defendant] had produced intense damage and irreparable
[sic] to Plaintiffs.
At most, this allegation establishes that Serrano may have
been in contempt for failure to comply with a scheduling order -–
a failure that, given the uncontested facts set forth in the text,
is inadequate to establish a genuine issue as to the due process
claim that ultimately was filed in federal court.
10
The plaintiffs admitted the preceding fact in their own
papers. All others are derived from Serrano's "Statement of
Uncontested Facts."
-10-
we cannot conclude that the district court erroneously granted
summary judgment for Serrano on the due process claim.
C. The Political Discrimination Claim
In order to establish a claim of political
discrimination, the plaintiffs initially bear the burden of showing
that (1) they engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; and
(2) this conduct was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor behind
Serrano's decision to expropriate their properties. See Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977); see also Collins v. Nuzzo,
244 F.3d 246, 252 (1st Cir.
2001). If the plaintiffs had met that burden –- which they did
not -- Serrano would then have been obligated to demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that the expropriation would have
occurred even in the absence of the plaintiffs' protected conduct.
See Mt.
Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
The district court's "review of the record reveal[ed]
that the plaintiffs' . . . case [was] very weak." Pedro Cosme-
Rosado, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 119. We agree. While the plaintiffs
established that they are members of and active participants in the
New Progressive Party -- the rival of the Popular Democratic Party
to which Serrano belonged –- they failed to establish a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether their party membership was a
substantial factor behind the expropriation of their properties.
-11-
As the district court observed, "the only piece of
evidence that the plaintiffs proffer[ed] in support of the alleged
political discrimination is Pedro Cosme's deposition, which states
that Mayor Serrano voiced his intention to rid the town of NPP
activists." Id. at 123. Presented with a similar situation in
Figueroa-Serrano v. Ramos Alverio,
221 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2000),11
we held that such a "meager showing is patently insufficient to
generate a genuine issue of material fact on a causal connection
between the political affiliation of the plaintiffs and the
adverse . . . actions alleged." So too, here, where the
plaintiffs' noncompliance with Local Rule 311.12 and the admitted
facts -– most notably, the approval of the expropriation by both
the Puerto Rico Planning Board and the Municipal Assembly together
with the state court order of expropriation –- has resulted in
their patent failure to establish that the properties were
expropriated for other than lawful purposes.
III.
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of
the district court.
11
In Figueroa-Serrano, the plaintiffs claimed that the mayor's
alleged statement that he intended to rid the Municipality of NPP
employees, coupled with the competing political persuasions of the
plaintiffs and defendants, constituted enough evidence of a First
Amendment violation to withstand a motion for summary judgment.
See 221 F.3d at 8. The district court rejected the plaintiffs'
political discrimination claim because it was based solely upon
conclusory statements and lacked any specific evidence, and we
upheld this analysis. See
id.
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