Filed: Jan. 17, 2012
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: of murder in the second degree for the death of his infant son. Again, AEDPA limits our review solely to, the issue of whether the SJC's decision affirming the trial court's, admission of the autopsy photographs involved an unreasonable, application of[] clearly established Federal law.
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 09-1059
MICHAEL LYONS,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
BERNARD BRADY,
Superintendent, Old Colony Correctional Center,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Howard and Thompson, Circuit Judges.
Paul J. McManus for appellant.
Eva M. Badway, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Martha
Coakley, Attorney General, was on brief, for appellee.
January 17, 2012
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. A Massachusetts jury convicted
petitioner Michael Lyons ("Lyons") of second-degree murder in the
death of his two week old son. Lyons timely filed a motion seeking
to reduce the verdict to involuntary manslaughter, which the trial
court granted and the Massachusetts Appeals Court ("MAC") affirmed.
However, on appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC"), the court
vacated the reduction and reinstated Lyons's original conviction
for second-degree murder. Thereafter, Lyons sought a writ of
habeas corpus in federal district court claiming a violation of his
constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment --
specifically, that the admission of autopsy photographs had
deprived him of a fair trial. The district court dismissed the
petition and Lyons appealed to this court. Before us, Lyons
challenges the dismissal of his habeas petition. Bound by the
strictures of the standard of review set forth in the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
We review the facts as described by the SJC "supplemented
with other record facts consistent with the SJC's findings."
Yeboah-Sefah v. Ficco, 556 F.3d 53, 62 (1st Cir. 2009) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
On the afternoon of June 28, 1998, Lyons's two week old
infant son was rushed to Good Samaritan Hospital and then "med
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flighted" to New England Medical Center in Boston –- he died there
as a result of "severe cerebral edema and subdural hematomas due to
shaking." Commonwealth v. Lyons, 828 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Mass. 2005).
Lyons, who was approximately five feet eight inches tall and
weighed between 275 and 300 pounds, admitted to police that he had
shaken the baby.
Id. Lyons described how he had placed his hands
underneath the baby's armpits and shaken his son.
Id. Apparently,
he did so with enough force to shake a 215 pound man.
Id.
At trial, three autopsy photographs were introduced over
Lyons's objection.
Id. at 8. The trial court instructed the
jurors that the pictures were being introduced for the limited
purpose of "draw[ing] attention to a clinical medical status or to
the nature and extent [] of the alleged victim[] in [this] case."
There were bruises on both sides of the baby's upper back muscles
just below his neck, and his body showed all the tell tale signs of
shaken baby syndrome, which "essentially destroyed his brain."
Id.
at 4. Due to the severity of the child's injuries, he would have
lost consciousness and become unresponsive "nearly instantaneously
or within a very few seconds."
Id. While Lyons admitted to
shaking his son, he claimed that he did so out of panic, in an
attempt to revive the baby, after finding the baby non-responsive.1
Id. The crux of Lyons's defense was that he had acted without
1
Five years earlier, Lyons and his wife had suffered the loss
of another infant son due to natural causes.
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legal malice and was therefore guilty of involuntary manslaughter,
not second-degree murder.2 Id.
B. Procedural History
On July 13, 2001, a state court jury found Lyons guilty
of murder in the second degree for the death of his infant son.
Lyons appealed and filed a motion pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P.
25(b)(2), seeking a reduction of the verdict from second-degree
murder to involuntary manslaughter. The Commonwealth opposed the
motion. In its Memorandum of Decision and Order, the trial court
discussed the "fine line distinguishing murder based on the third
prong of malice from . . . involuntary manslaughter." After
"[c]onsidering all the circumstances of the case at bar, [the court
was] satisfied that the degree of risk of physical harm manifested
by [Lyons's] actions was more consistent with wilful and wanton
conduct than with third-prong malice." Therefore, "[a]fter lengthy
and soul-searching deliberation, [the court] determined that
justice [would] be more nearly achieved by reducing the verdict
from murder in the second degree to involuntary manslaughter" and
2
Under Massachusetts law, the element of malice necessary for
a conviction of murder in the second degree can be satisfied by one
of three different prongs. See Commonwealth v. LaCava, 783 N.E.2d
812, 820 n.9 (Mass. 2003). Lyons was convicted based on the third
prong. Under "third prong malice," the malice element is satisfied
by "proof of circumstances in which a reasonably prudent person
would have known, according to common experience, that there was a
plain and strong likelihood that death would follow the
contemplated act."
LaCava, 783 N.E.2d at 820 n.9; see also
Commonwealth v. Vizcarrondo,
693 N.E.2d 677, 680 n.3 (Mass. 1998).
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granted Lyons's motion. The MAC affirmed the order reducing the
verdict, concluding that the trial justice had acted within her
discretion. See Commonwealth v. Lyons, 807 N.E.2d 862 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2004). Subsequently, the Commonwealth filed an application for
leave to obtain further appellate review, which the SJC granted.
Lyons, 828 N.E.2d at 4.
In a 4-3 decision, a divided SJC found that the trial
justice abused her discretion in reducing Lyons's verdict from
second-degree murder to involuntary manslaughter and reinstated the
conviction. Id. Lyons sought rehearing but was denied.
Thereafter, Lyons filed a petition in federal court for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He claimed that the
admission of the autopsy photographs violated his right to due
process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The petition
was denied. Lyons appealed and filed a motion for a certificate of
appealability ("COA"), which the district court granted on June 25,
2009.3
3
We expanded the COA in an order dated June 24, 2011 for the
purpose of allowing the parties to brief three additional issues.
Two of those issues centered around the Commonwealth's failure to
file the full state court trial transcript with the district court.
While we thank the parties for their thorough submissions,
ultimately we need not address this issue on appeal as it has no
bearing on our final determination.
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Our review of the district court's denial of habeas
relief is de novo. See Shuman v. Spencer, 636 F.3d 24, 30 (1st
Cir. 2011).
Pursuant to AEDPA, "our standard of review of the SJC's
decision depends on whether that court 'adjudicated on the merits'
[Lyons's due process] claim." Healy v. Spencer, 453 F.3d 21, 25
(1st Cir. 2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)); see also Fortini v.
Murphy,
257 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 2001) ("AEDPA's strict standard
of review only applies to a 'claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in state court proceedings.'"). If it did, we
ha[ve] no power to afford relief unless [Lyons
can] show either that the [SJC's] decision
affirming the conviction 'was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of,'
clearly established federal law as reflected
in the holdings of th[e] [United States
Supreme] Court's cases, or that it 'was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts'
in light of the state court record.4
Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 6 (2011) (per curiam) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) and (2)); see also Harrington v. Richter,
131
S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). On the other hand, "[i]f it did not, we
review de novo."
Healy, 453 F.3d at 25. Both parties agree that
Lyons included the constitutional argument in his brief to the SJC.
4
For purposes of this appeal, we are concerned only with
whether the SJC's decision involved an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law.
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And even though the SJC did not elaborate on its reasoning for
rejecting Lyons's due process claim, the SJC nevertheless addressed
the claim when it concluded "that there [was] no merit in [Lyons's]
allegations of error." Lyons, 828 N.E.2d at 4. Consequently, our
review is deferential.5 See
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85
("When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the
state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state
court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any
indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.").
Thus, the question we must answer is whether the SJC's decision
"involved an unreasonable application of[] clearly established
Federal law." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Without a doubt,
[t]his is a highly deferential standard for
evaluating state-court rulings, which demands
that state-court decisions be given the
benefit of the doubt, and that the defendant
seeking habeas show that the state court's
ruling on the claim being presented in federal
court was so lacking in justification that
there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any
possibility for fairminded disagreement.
Butler v. O'Brien, No. 10-1235, 2011 WL 6118529, at *2 (1st Cir.
Dec. 9, 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
This standard "does not demand infallibility: a state
court's decision may be objectively reasonable even if the federal
5
In their opening briefs to this court, both parties,
operating under the mistaken belief that the SJC had not discussed
Lyons's due process claim, failed to analyze the constitutional
claim under the deferential standard required by AEDPA.
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habeas court, exercising its independent judgment, would have
reached a different conclusion." Rashad v. Walsh, 300 F.3d 27, 35
(1st Cir. 2002). Consequently, a determination that the SJC's
conclusion was "unreasonable" requires "something greater than
incorrect or erroneous."
Shuman, 636 F.3d at 30. Moreover, "[i]f
it is a close question whether the state decision is in error, then
the state decision cannot be an unreasonable application."
Healy,
453 F.3d at 26. Finally, even if we conclude that the SJC's
conclusion was "unreasonable, habeas relief remains unavailable
unless [Lyons] can also show that the error had a substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."
Shuman, 636 F.3d at 30.
B. Constitutional Claim
Before getting into the merits of Lyons's claim, we must
first address a preliminary matter.
The Commonwealth asserts that we should affirm the
district court's denial of habeas relief "[b]ecause the SJC
analyzed [Lyons's] evidentiary claim pursuant to Massachusetts
state law" and "[e]rrors of state law do not provide a basis for
federal habeas corpus relief." To be sure, "[i]t is a fundamental
principle of the law of federal habeas corpus in non-death-penalty
cases that no habeas claim is stated as to state court criminal
convictions unless the alleged errors are violations of the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Kater v.
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Maloney, 459 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2006) (citing Estelle v.
McGuire,
502 U.S. 62, 67, 68 (1991)). Undeniably, "if nothing
other than questions of compliance with state law were at issue,"
id., then we would agree with the Commonwealth.6 However, that is
not the case. As previously stated, the Commonwealth concedes that
Lyons "properly raised the federal nature of his claim in his brief
to the SJC," and as
discussed supra, the SJC did consider Lyons's
constitutional claim.
See supra, Part II.A. Moreover, "[t]he
habeas petition here is framed in terms of [a] violation[] of
federal law,"
Kater, 459 F.3d at 61, specifically, a violation of
Lyons's Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial.7
Accordingly, Lyons's constitutional claim is properly before us and
entitled to due consideration.
According to Lyons, the SJC unreasonably applied clearly
established federal law when it found no error in the introduction
6
The issue before us is not, as Lyons suggests, whether the
trial court abused its discretion in admitting the autopsy photos
at trial. Similarly, the issue before us is not, as Lyons claims,
whether the SJC was correct in concluding that the admission of the
photographs was proper. Again, AEDPA limits our review solely to
the issue of whether the SJC's decision affirming the trial court's
admission of the autopsy photographs "involved an unreasonable
application of[] clearly established Federal law." 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1).
7
In other words, this is not a case where the petitioner's
"vague and unfocused references to fairness were insufficient to
draw the state court's attention away from the state-law raiment in
which the petitioner cloaked his claim and instead alert it to a
possible federal constitutional claim." Coningford v. Rhode
Island, 640 F.3d 478, 483 (1st Cir. 2011).
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of the autopsy photographs into evidence.8 Lyons argues that his
son's manner of death was not in dispute; rather, the sole issue at
trial was Lyons's intent, or mens rea, when he acted. By admitting
the gruesome and allegedly highly inflammatory autopsy photographs,
which Lyons argues are in no way probative of intent, the trial
court, he urges, so infected the proceeding with unfairness that it
deprived him "of due process and his constitutionally guaranteed
right to a fair trial."
An erroneous evidentiary ruling that results in a
fundamentally unfair trial may constitute a due process violation
and thus provide a basis for habeas relief. See Coningford v.
Rhode Island, 640 F.3d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 2011). However, to give
rise to habeas relief, "the state court's application of state law
must be 'so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent
due process . . . violation.'"
Id. (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers,
497
U.S. 764, 780 (1990)). "To be a constitutional violation, a state
8
In support of his claim that the introduction of the autopsy
photographs was wrong and denied him his constitutional right to a
fair trial, Lyons relies on Spears v. Mullin, 343 F.3d 1215 (10th
Cir. 2003), but his reliance is misplaced. Spears is both
factually and legally inapposite. See
id. at 1226-28 (photographs
showing victim's mutilated body at crime scene were not relevant at
sentencing to inquiry of whether murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel where inquiry required proof of conscious
physical suffering and victim had lost consciousness before wounds
were inflicted). Moreover, even if Spears were factually and
legally similar, AEDPA requires that the relevant legal rule be
clearly established in a Supreme Court holding rather than in
dictum or in a holding of a lower federal court. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1).
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evidentiary error must so infuse the trial with inflammatory
prejudice that it renders a fair trial impossible." Petrillo, 428
F.3d at 44 n.2; see also
Kater, 459 F.3d at 64 (in habeas context,
relevant inquiry on appeal regarding evidentiary claim of error is
"whether any error rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair that
it violated the Due Process Clause"). For habeas purposes, we then
review the state court's determination regarding the constitutional
claim under the AEDPA standards.
For starters, Lyons has failed to bring to our attention
any clearly established Supreme Court precedent holding that the
admission of autopsy photographs violates due process rights. As
such, "the broader fair-trial principle is the beacon by which we
must steer." Coningford, 640 F.3d at 485. Moreover, "[t]he
Supreme Court has defined the category of infractions that violate
fundamental fairness very narrowly."9
Kater, 459 F.3d at 61
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In affirming the trial court's admission of the
photographs, the SJC stated,
The judge admitted the photographs only after
the Commonwealth had laid a foundation
9
Some examples include Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976)
(use of suspect's post-Miranda silence against him); Blackledge v.
Perry,
417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974) (vindictive prosecution); Brady v.
Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) ("the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request . . .
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment");
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (failure to appoint
counsel in certain criminal cases).
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indicating that the photographs were relevant
to establishing the severity of the [baby]'s
injuries. [Lyons] argues that this was an
abuse of discretion because the nature,
extent, and cause of the fatal injuries were
not issues before the jury. While we agree
with [Lyons] that the photographs were
disturbing, we do not agree that they lacked
relevance. A critical issue in the case was
the amount of force used to shake the [baby].
As the nature of the injuries supported an
inference concerning the amount of force used
to inflict the injuries, the photographs were
relevant to that issue. Additionally, the
final photograph admitted, showing no injury
to the back of the [baby]'s head, was relevant
to contradict [Lyons's] testimony that the
[baby] hit his head in the bathtub.10
Furthermore, the judge appropriately mitigated
any potential prejudice by cautioning the jury
not to be affected by the nature of the
photographs and by instructing them that the
photographs were to be used only to draw
attention to a clinical medical status or the
nature and extent of the [baby]'s injuries.
Lyons, 828 N.E.2d at 9. Though Lyons may disagree with the ruling,
the SJC did weigh any unfair prejudice to Lyons against the
probative value of admitting the photos. Ultimately, the SJC
determined that while the photos were "disturbing," they were
nonetheless relevant and probative to the "critical" issue of the
amount of force used to shake the baby, as well as Lyons's
credibility.
10
On the day of the baby's death, Lyons was home alone with his
eleven year old son and the baby. According to Lyons, while he was
giving the baby a bath, the baby slipped and bumped his head on the
bathtub. Following the incident, Lyons claimed the baby seemed to
be in distress -- which led Lyons to panic and shake the baby.
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Further, the SJC deemed the trial court's limiting
instruction to the jury sufficient to mitigate any potential unfair
prejudice to Lyons. In so ruling and in finding that there was no
merit to any of Lyons's claims, the SJC implicitly determined that
Lyons's trial was not so infused with inflammatory prejudice as to
render it constitutionally unfair. This "was well within the
universe of plausible evidentiary rulings." Coningford, 640 F.3d
at 485. Given this court's highly deferential standard for
evaluating state-court rulings under AEDPA, we cannot say that the
SJC's conclusion that the admission of the autopsy photographs was
proper was so arbitrary or capricious as to be "an unreasonable
application of[] clearly established Federal law." 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the district court's dismissal of
the habeas petition is affirmed.
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