Filed: Aug. 05, 1999
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 5 1999 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk ERIC DEVELL PETTIT, Plaintiff - Appellant, vs. No. 99-6107 (D.C. No. 98-CV-1615-R) JOHN WHETSEL; OKLAHOMA (W.D. Okla.) COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, Defendants - Appellees. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before ANDERSON, KELLY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. ** Eric Devell Pettit, an inmate proceeding pro se, brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, requesting $5.5 million in damag
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 5 1999 TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk ERIC DEVELL PETTIT, Plaintiff - Appellant, vs. No. 99-6107 (D.C. No. 98-CV-1615-R) JOHN WHETSEL; OKLAHOMA (W.D. Okla.) COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, Defendants - Appellees. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before ANDERSON, KELLY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. ** Eric Devell Pettit, an inmate proceeding pro se, brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, requesting $5.5 million in damage..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 5 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ERIC DEVELL PETTIT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
vs. No. 99-6107
(D.C. No. 98-CV-1615-R)
JOHN WHETSEL; OKLAHOMA (W.D. Okla.)
COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, KELLY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges. **
Eric Devell Pettit, an inmate proceeding pro se, brought this 42 U.S.C. §
1983 action, requesting $5.5 million in damages, against Defendants John
Whetsel and the Oklahoma County Sheriff’s Department. He alleged that
Defendants infringed his constitutional rights because (1) the state and the Daily
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1 (G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Oklahoman conspired to publish a newspaper article accusing him of trafficking
in cocaine base, and (2) he was formally charged and arraigned on the cocaine-
trafficking offense nearly two months after his arrest, in violation of the Due
Process Clause. Construed liberally, see Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110
(10th Cir. 1991), his pro se complaint also asserted that he was deprived of his
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see R. doc. 2, at 3 & Exh. 7-G, and that
Defendants imposed excessive bail and inflicted cruel and unusual punishment
upon him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See R. doc. 2, at 3 & Exhs. A-1,
F-6. The district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice.
The claim involving the newspaper article was dismissed because Mr. Pettit
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1). The district court also dismissed Mr. Pettit’s Due Process claim
under the Younger abstention doctrine. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-
54 (1971). However, the court did not specifically address his Sixth and Eighth
Amendment claims.
On appeal, Mr. Pettit reasserts all of his claims and challenges the court’s
decision to apply Younger abstention. He also seeks to supplement the record
with evidence regarding an allegedly improper search of his home. Our
jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Mr. Pettit was arrested on January 28, 1998 for trafficking in cocaine. He
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remained in jail for about two weeks before being charged only with having
outstanding traffic tickets. Just before he was to have been released, the Daily
Oklahoman published a newspaper article indicating that he was wanted for
cocaine trafficking. Only then, almost two months after his initial arrest, was he
formally charged and arraigned for the cocaine offense. He contends that his
court date was continuously postponed after his arraignment, and when he filed
his § 1983 complaint, he still had not been tried. In a motion to supplement the
record, he indicates that a state jury later found him guilty, presumably on the
cocaine trafficking charge.
The district court correctly held that Mr. Pettit’s allegations about a
conspiracy involving the state and the Daily Oklahoman did not state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. See § 1915A(b)(1). According to the
Supreme Court, a plaintiff must allege something more than defamation by a state
official to state a claim under § 1983. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711
(1976); see also Greene v. Barrett,
174 F.3d 1136, 1141 n.5 (10th Cir. 1999); Doe
v. Bagan,
41 F.3d 571, 575-76 (10th Cir. 1994). A plaintiff’s reputation is
protected by the state through its tort law; it does not implicate liberty or property
interests under the Constitution. See
Paul, 424 U.S. at 711-12. Therefore, this
claim must be dismissed with prejudice.
The district court’s abstention from deciding the Due Process claim
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pursuant to Younger was appropriate. Mr. Pettit seeks damages for constitutional
violations that allegedly occurred during the pre-trial phase of a state criminal
case pending against him when he filed his § 1983 claims and for which he has
not exhausted state appeals. Although Younger narrowly proscribes federal
injunctions and declaratory relief that interfere with on-going state criminal
proceedings, see Younger, 401 U.S. at 41 n. 2, 53-54, the Tenth Circuit has
extended the Younger doctrine to § 1983 claims for money damages. See
Parkhurst v. Wyoming,
641 F.2d 775, 777 (1981).
We recognize that a stay, rather than dismissal, of § 1983 damages claims
is the preferred remedy under certain circumstances. See id.; see also, e.g.,
Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Stroud, No. 98-3870, 1999 WL 352997, at *4-5 (8th Cir.
June 3, 1999). However, Mr. Pettit’s § 1983 claim alleging unreasonable pre-trial
delays, if successful, would call his conviction into question. Hence, the district
court properly dismissed it. See Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994).
The court also should have dismissed the § 1983 excessive bail claim pursuant to
Heck. By contending that he possessed only 4.5 grams of cocaine, rather than the
five or more grams upon which the court calculated his $50,000 bond, Mr. Pettit
essentially denies the charges against him, which he may not do in a § 1983
claim. See R. doc. 2, Exh. F-6;
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. Likewise, his
allegation that he was deprived of counsel for several months before trial, see R.
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doc 2, Exh. 7-G, implicates the validity of his conviction and cannot be brought
under § 1983. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.
Pursuant to § 1915A(b)(1), the district court also should have dismissed
Mr. Pettit’s claim that he suffered cruel and unusual punishment. Our “broad
reading of [a pro se] plaintiff’s complaint does not relieve [him] of the burden of
alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Hall,
935 F.2d at 1110. Here, Mr. Pettit fails to present a single fact tending to show
that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Because “conclusory
allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim
on which relief can be [granted],”
id., we hold that Mr. Pettit’s claim regarding
the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment is insufficient. He has made no
effort to supplement this claim. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment,
modified to indicate that the defamation and cruel and unusual punishment claims
brought under § 1983 are dismissed with prejudice, and the § 1983 claims based
on Due Process, excessive bail, and Sixth Amendment violations are dismissed
without prejudice. See Fottler v. United States,
73 F.3d 1064, 1065 (10th Cir.
1996) (“When a § 1983 claim is dismissed under Heck, the dismissal should be
without prejudice.”).
Finally, we DENY Mr. Pettit’s motions to supplement the record with
evidence of an allegedly unconstitutional search. Because Mr. Pettit failed to
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raise this issue before the district court, we cannot consider it now. See City of
Stilwell, Okla. v. Ozarks Rural Elec. Coop., 166 F.3d 1064, 1073-74 (10th Cir.
1999).
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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