Filed: Nov. 27, 2002
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 27 2002 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk RISE E. FERGUESON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 02-7037 D.C. No. 00-CV-662-S JO ANNE B. BARNHART, (E.D. Oklahoma) Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant - Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before BRISCOE , Circuit Judge, BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge, and HARTZ , Circuit Judge. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has d
Summary: F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 27 2002 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER Clerk RISE E. FERGUESON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 02-7037 D.C. No. 00-CV-662-S JO ANNE B. BARNHART, (E.D. Oklahoma) Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant - Appellee. ORDER AND JUDGMENT * Before BRISCOE , Circuit Judge, BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge, and HARTZ , Circuit Judge. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has de..
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 27 2002
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
RISE E. FERGUESON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 02-7037
D.C. No. 00-CV-662-S
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, (E.D. Oklahoma)
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE , Circuit Judge, BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge, and HARTZ ,
Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Rise E. Fergueson appeals from the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner’s decision denying her application for Social Security disability
insurance benefits. Like the district court, we review the Commissioner’s
decision to determine whether correct legal standards were applied and whether
the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. Castellano v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs. , 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir. 1994). “The court may
not reweigh the evidence or try the issues de novo or substitute its judgment for
that of the [Commissioner].” Trimiar v. Sullivan ,
966 F.2d 1326, 1329 (10th Cir.
1992) (quotation omitted). Because we conclude that the Commissioner’s
decision was reached in accord with relevant legal standards and that substantial
evidence supports the decision, we affirm.
Ms. Fergueson applied for benefits in March 1997, alleging that she was
disabled due to bilateral hand and arm problems, right shoulder pain, left knee
pain, back pain, and narcolepsy. In May 1999, an administrative law judge (ALJ)
determined, at step five of the five-part sequential process, see 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520, that Ms. Fergueson was not disabled.
The ALJ found that Ms. Fergueson had a severe impairment secondary to
her carpal tunnel syndrome operations and related symptoms, but that the severity
of her impairment did not meet a listing requirement. Also, the ALJ observed that
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Ms. Fergueson’s testimony concerning her condition was not fully credible and
was unsupported by the clinical medical proof.
The ALJ determined that Ms. Fergueson could not return to her past relevant
work, which was light to medium in exertional level. He concluded, however, that
she retained a residual functional capacity for sedentary level work activity.
Because he found evidence of nonexertional impairments, he did not rely on the
medical-vocational guidelines (the “grids”), 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2,
conclusively. Instead, he used the grids as a framework for decision-making. In
other words, the ALJ found Ms. Fergueson to be unable to perform the full range
of sedentary work and called a vocational expert (VE) to testify to the erosion of
the occupational base. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sullivan , 987 F.2d 1482, 1487, 1492
(10th Cir. 1993); Trimiar , 966 F.2d at 1332-34.
Relying on the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ determined that
Ms. Fergueson could perform the jobs of addresser/clerical, order clerk/food
beverage clerk, and credit clerk, and that these jobs existed in significant numbers
in the national or regional economy. The ALJ therefore concluded that
Ms. Fergueson was not disabled. The Appeals Council denied review, making
the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner.
Adopting the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge, the
district court sustained the Commissioner’s decision. On appeal, Ms. Fergueson
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makes four claims of error: (1) that the ALJ’s decision contains inconsistent and
facially ambiguous findings as to her residual functional capacity (RFC); (2) that
the ALJ disregarded the opinion of her primary care physician without adequate
explanation; and (3) that the ALJ’s determination was not supported by substantial
evidence. 1
We address each contention in turn.
RFC Findings
Ms. Fergueson argues that the ALJ’s expression of her RFC does not
comport with governing legal standards, in that his RFC findings vary at different
stages in the five-step sequential evaluation process. Specifically, she notes that
the ALJ found, at step two, that she had a severe nonexertional impairment; at step
four, that she could generally perform sedentary level work; and, at step five, that
she could perform a limited range of sedentary work, due to her nonexertional
impairments. Although the ALJ’s step-four analysis certainly should have been
more detailed, see Soc. Sec. R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *3, this shortcoming
does not provide a reason to reverse the Commissioner’s determination. The
step-four conclusion, favorable to Ms. Fergueson, was that she could not perform
1
Ms. Fergueson also makes a fourth argument: that the district court
exceeded its authority by basing its decision on grounds not included in the ALJ’s
decision. Because of our determination that the ALJ’s decision may be affirmed
based on its own content, we do not reach this issue. We note, however, that an
ALJ’s decision is to be evaluated solely on the reasons stated in the decision. See
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States , 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962).
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her past relevant work. Therefore, the ALJ proceeded to step five, in which the
burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that Ms. Fergueson retains sufficient
RFC to perform work in the national economy, given her age, education, and work
experience. See Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 751 (10th Cir. 1988).
At step five, the RFC is to be “expressed in terms of, or related to, the
exertional categories when the adjudicator determines there is other work the
individual can do.” Soc. Sec. R. 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *3. The ALJ must
also assess whether the individual has the capacity to perform the full range of
work contemplated at the selected exertional level. In the instant case, the ALJ
followed the correct step-five procedure in determining Ms. Fergueson’s RFC:
that is, he decided that she could perform only sedentary work and that the range
of sedentary work was eroded by certain nonexertional impairments. We conclude
there is no reversible error in this aspect of the Commissioner’s decision.
Ms. Fergueson also asserts the ALJ’s step-five discussion is ambiguous
as to precisely what impairments are included in the RFC. The ALJ found
“nonexertional impairment(s), i.e. pain and a diminished grip strength and a
diminished capacity for repetitive gripping with het dominant hand.” II Aplt. App.
at 13. Although this finding could have been expressed more artfully, we conclude
that it is not fatally ambiguous. Contrary to Ms. Fergueson’s argument, the term
“i.e .” cannot reasonably be interpreted as referring to “either an exhaustive list of
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impairments or a longer list of unspecified impairments.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 18.
Rather, the term, an abbreviation for the Latin “ id est ,” means “that is.” It is used
to introduce an explanatory phrase. Bryan A. Garner, A Dictionary of Modern
Legal Usage 414 (2d ed. 1995). The term is readily distinguishable from “ e.g.”
which is an abbreviation for the Latin phrase “ exempli gratia ” and is used to
“introduce[] representative examples.” Id. at 307. Because the ALJ adequately
stated Ms. Fergueson’s impairments, we see no reason to set aside the RFC for
ambiguity. 2
Treating physician opinion
Ms. Fergueson’s second contention of legal error is that the ALJ failed to
give adequate weight to the opinion of her primary care physician, who stated that
Ms. Fergueson was “markedly limited in all functional areas requiring strength and
movement of the upper extremities and standing and walking on the lower
extremities.” II Aplt. App. at 11, 431. He also made more specific comments,
2
As relevant to the ambiguity issue, our task is to review the administrative
determination of the Commissioner to determine whether the correct legal
standards were applied. See White v. Barnhart , 287 F.3d 903, 905 (10th Cir.
2001) (emphasis added). We resolve the issue in favor of the Commissioner,
notwithstanding indications in the magistrate judge’s findings and
recommendations that the magistrate judge considered the RFC to include
all limitations listed in hypothetical questions posed to the VE.
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such as a notation that Ms. Fergueson had a marked limitation in the ability to feel
with both hands.
Generally, the ALJ must “give controlling weight to a treating physician’s
well-supported opinion, so long as it is not inconsistent with other substantial
evidence in the record.” Drapeau v. Massanari , 255 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir.
2001). A treating physician’s opinion is considered in relation to factors such as
its consistency with other evidence, the length and nature of the treatment
relationship, the frequency of examination, and the extent to which the opinion is
supported by objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)-(6). If the
physician’s opinion is “brief, conclusory and unsupported by medical evidence,”
that opinion may be rejected. Bernal v. Bowen ,
851 F.2d 297, 301 (10th Cir.
1988). A treating physician’s opinion that a claimant is totally disabled is not
dispositive “because final responsibility for determining the ultimate issue of
disability is reserved to the [Commissioner].” Castellano , 26 F.3d at 1029.
Here, the ALJ pointed out that the primary care physician’s opinion did not
provide an adequate discussion of or reference to any supporting clinical data.
In fact, it did not even offer a diagnosis. The ALJ gave proper weight to the
physician’s statements concerning Ms. Fergueson’s limitations.
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Evidentiary support
Finally, Ms. Fergueson argues that the ALJ’s decision with regard to
disability is not supported by substantial evidence. We conclude that the ALJ
properly held that the Commissioner met her burden at step five in the sequential
process. The medical record as a whole, the evidence concerning Ms. Fergueson’s
daily activities as a parent and housewife, the ALJ’s decision to discount
Ms. Fergueson’s testimony concerning the extent of her impairment, and the
VE’s testimony show that Ms. Fergueson could perform the occupations cited by
the ALJ in his ruling. Consequently, the evidence marshaled by the ALJ
constitutes substantial evidence in support of the Commissioner’s decision.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Senior Circuit Judge
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