Filed: Jul. 03, 2008
Latest Update: Mar. 28, 2017
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-4187 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. LARRY LEE SCHAFFER, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Elkins. Robert E. Maxwell, Senior District Judge. (2:02-cr-00030-REM-1) Argued: May 14, 2008 Decided: July 3, 2008 Before MICHAEL and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and Henry F. FLOYD, United States District Judge for the District of South Car
Summary: UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 07-4187 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. LARRY LEE SCHAFFER, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Elkins. Robert E. Maxwell, Senior District Judge. (2:02-cr-00030-REM-1) Argued: May 14, 2008 Decided: July 3, 2008 Before MICHAEL and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and Henry F. FLOYD, United States District Judge for the District of South Caro..
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UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4187
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LARRY LEE SCHAFFER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Elkins. Robert E. Maxwell, Senior
District Judge. (2:02-cr-00030-REM-1)
Argued: May 14, 2008 Decided: July 3, 2008
Before MICHAEL and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and Henry F. FLOYD,
United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina,
sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Michael and Judge Duncan concurred.
ARGUED: Stephen Godfrey Jory, JORY & SMITH, Elkins, West Virginia,
for Appellant. Stephen Donald Warner, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Elkins, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Sharon L.
Potter, United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
FLOYD, District Judge:
Larry Lee Schaffer (Schaffer) was charged on December 17,
2002, with various drug and firearm violations. He subsequently
filed a motion to suppress items seized during three warrantless
searches of his residence. On March 1, 2004, the district court
ruled that the first search of Schaffer’s home was valid, but
granted the motion to suppress as to the other searches.
Schaffer ultimately entered into a plea agreement with the
Government, but he reserved the right to appeal the district
court’s March 1, 2004, decision. Schaffer, a felon, pled guilty to
unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court sentenced Schaffer to
a term of probation for a period of five years with the first six
months to be served on home confinement. This appeal followed.
For the reasons explained below, we affirm the decision of the
district court.
I.
The relevant facts, as set forth in the magistrate judge’s
Report and Recommendation, are as follows:
At approximately 6:53 PM on May 29, 2002,
David Carr, a Tucker County, West Virginia 911
communications center operator and dispatcher,
received a telephone call from Nancy Schaffer.
Nancy Schaffer stated that her husband had
“threatened her with a gun earlier” and that
she had run to a neighbor’s (Mason) house
located in Sponagle Bottom, Tucker County,
2
West Virginia. Directions to the Mason
residence were provided. As a result of the
911 call, Carr notified West Virginia State
Police Trooper Robert Hogan and Deputy Surguy
of the nature and location of the call at 6:55
PM.
Hogan was working in the Canaan Valley
Area when he received the dispatcher’s call.
He knew the Schaffers because he had responded
to a domestic dispute call at their residence
within the preceding two years. While en
route to “Hambone” Mason’s house, he requested
that the dispatcher get more information. At
approximately 7:11 PM someone at the Mason
residence advised Carr that Mr. Schaffer was
last seen walking toward Parsons, West
Virginia in a black T-shirt and jeans, without
any weapon, which information Carr relayed to
the police.
Upon Hogan’s arrival, he observed Nancy
Schaffer come out of the Mason house onto the
porch. She was hysterical and trembling.
Hogan noted that her eyes were glassy and that
she smelled of alcohol. Hogan did not recall
whether she had slurred speech or whether he
had asked her any questions about her having
consumed any alcohol. Hogan questioned her to
find out if she knew where her husband was and
whether he was armed or not. Mrs. Schaffer
told Hogan that her husband had held her at
gunpoint with a Tech-9 firearm and had left
the residence in a Brown Lincoln at
approximately 5:00 PM. She also told Hogan
that she had been living at her son’s house.
According to the written statement signed by
Nancy Schaffer at approximately 7:31 PM, she
stated: “He (Larry S[c]haffer) came up to
where I was staying with my son, at the top of
Fork Mountain, and said if you don’t come down
here, we are through. I came down to Sponagle
[B]ottom at the house.”
. . .
Hogan observed that the Schaffer house,
to which he had been within the last two years
3
in response to a domestic complaint, was
located approximately 75 yards away from and
within sight of the Mason house where he and
Mrs. Schaffer were conversing. Considering
this to be an unsafe situation, Hogan escorted
Mrs. Schaffer to his police cruiser and
proceeded to take her statement. Hogan
considered Mrs. Schaffer to be “intoxicated.”
Hogan explained, however, that he considered
anyone who had consumed any part of an
alcoholic beverage to be “intoxicated,” even
if they [had only] one drink during dinner.
He further explained that, while he considered
Mrs. Schaffer to be intoxicated, he did not
consider her to be impaired. He did not
observe any slurred speech or unsteady motor
skills. During the statement process, at
approximately 7:31 PM, Mrs. Schaffer signed a
consent to search form giving Hogan permission
to enter and search the Schaffer residence.
Hogan’s reasoning for wanting to search the
Schaffer residence was to determine whether
Mr. Schaffer was hiding in the residence and
whether there were weapons located within the
residence which Schaffer could obtain.
Hogan, accompanied by Sgt. Stump, the
detachment commander, and Mrs. Schaffer,
entered the Schaffer yard through the gate in
a chain link fence and went to the door of the
house. Mrs. Schaffer secured several large
dogs at the residence before the officers went
in. Stump knew the Schaffers prior to May 29,
2002[,] as a result of having been to their
residence one time before to answer a domestic
disturbance call and as a result of his son
and the Schaffer[s’] son being friends and
having previously spent time together. As a
result Stump knew that the Schaffers were
husband and wife and [assumed that they] lived
in the house the officers were about to enter.
The officers made no inquiry of Mrs. Schaffer
relative to facts which would justify her
authority to consent to a warrantless search
of the house. Hogan knocked on the door
several times and received no answer. With
guns drawn, the [o]fficers entered the
residence. Although Hogan has no recollection
4
of who entered first or whether the door was
locked or unlocked, be testified that he knew
the officers “didn’t knock the door down.”
According to the later testimonies of Leonard
Nestor, Vickie Bodkins and Nancy Schaffer,
however, entry into the Schaffer house was
gained by breaking the door from its hinges.
Hogan and Stump then conducted a protective
sweep search of the rooms of the house seizing
several guns which were inventoried and
removed. The parties did not develop where
within the Schaffer house the guns were found.
Mrs. Schaffer tended to some dogs and parrots
within the house. She said she wanted to make
sure nothing happened to “her animals.” She
gathered and removed some personal clothing
and effects. She removed some “women’s
trinkets” from the top of a dresser in the
bedroom. Other than that, neither party
developed where within the house Mrs. Schaffer
gathered and removed personal clothing and
effects and where the clothing and personal
effects were located in relation to the guns
seized. Sgt. Stump recalled Mrs. Schaffer
requesting permission to take beer from the
refrigerator but does not recall seeing her
drink any beer. He also recalls telling her
to slow up as they progressed through the
house, in order to be sure it was safe. In
addition to the guns, Sgt. Stump noticed
photographs of Mr. and Mrs. Schaffer
throughout the house.
During or shortly following the
protective sweep search, word came through
dispatch that the Brown Lincoln had been
located.
(J.A. 194-98) (citations and footnotes omitted).
The magistrate judge suggested that Schaffer’s motion to
suppress be denied on the basis of Nancy Schaffer’s consent to
search Schaffer’s house. The district court, however, disagreed
that Nancy Schaffer had any authority to consent to the search.
5
Nevertheless, the district court denied the motion to suppress as
to the first search of Schaffer’s home on the basis of exigent
circumstances, but granted the motion as to the other searches.
II.
Schaffer contends that the district court made erroneous
findings of fact in determining that the first warrantless entry
into his residence was justified by exigent circumstances. We
review findings of fact made by a district court ruling on a motion
to suppress for clear error but review the ultimate suppression
decision de novo. United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th
Cir. 1992). We decide not whether we would have made the finding
the district court did, but whether “on the entire evidence [we
are] left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” United States v. Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395
(1948). When a suppression motion has been denied, we review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. United
States v. Grossman,
400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005).
The Fourth Amendment upholds “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Therefore, “[a]bsent exigent circumstances, [the] threshold [of
one’s house] may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.”
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). It follows then,
6
that warrantless entries into a residence are presumptively
unreasonable. United States v. Turner, 650 F.2d 526, 528 (4th Cir.
1981) (citing Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980)).
Nevertheless, a warrantless search may be conducted when the
“exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so
compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394
(1978) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “The need to
protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification
for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or
emergency.” Id. at 392 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
“The Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to
delay in the course of an investigation if to do so would gravely
endanger their lives or the lives of others.” Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967). A warrantless search, however, must
be “strictly circumscribed” by the exigency that justifies the
exception to the warrant requirement. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393.
To successfully sustain the exigent circumstances doctrine,
police officers need possess only a “reasonable suspicion” that
such circumstances exist at the time of the search or seizure in
question. United States v. Grogins, 163 F.3d 795, 797 (4th Cir.
1998). “[A] plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent law
enforcement need” can justify a warrantless search or seizure.
Illinois v. McArthur,
531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001). It is not the
7
province of this Court to engage in “unrealistic second-guessing”
of the officers’ assessment of the circumstances that they faced.
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542 (1985).
This Court has set forth five factors that district courts are
to consider when deciding whether an exigency existed at the time
a search commenced:
(1) the degree of urgency involved and the
amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant;
(2) the officers’ reasonable belief that the
contraband is about to be removed or
destroyed; (3) the possibility of danger to
police guarding the site; (4) information
indicating the possessors of the contraband
are aware that police are on their trail; and
(5) the ready destructibility of the
contraband.
United States v. Mowatt, 513 F.3d 395, 399 (2008) (citation
omitted). We have previously held that “arguably, these factors
must be supplemented by the gravity of the underlying offense, a
factor employed by the Supreme Court in the context of a
warrantless arrest.” United States v. Owens,
848 F.2d 462, 470 n.4
(4th Cir. 1988).
It bears noting here that this list is inexhaustive and no
single factor is controlling. See United States v. Reed, 935 F.2d
641, 642 (4th Cir. 1991). (“[T]here is no precise formula since
emergency circumstances will vary from case to case and the
inherent necessities of each situation must be scrutinized.”)
Instead, exigencies must be judged in light of all of the relevant
8
factors and from the totality of the circumstances known to the
officer at the time of the warrantless intrusion.
III.
The district court made the following findings of fact:
In the case at bar, the officers had
information that [Mr. Schaffer] had threatened
the victim with a gun, had abandoned his car
near his residence, and had last been seen
walking toward Parsons, but within close
proximity to his residence. The officers did
not know for certain where [Mr. Schaffer] was,
but the Court finds that, based on these
facts, the officers were objectively
reasonable in their rational inference that
[Mr. Schaffer] may have been in his house.
Further, based on the facts, there can be no
question that the officers were reasonable in
rationally inferring that [Mr. Schaffer] posed
a danger. The Court finds that it was
critical, given what the officers knew at the
time, for them to secure the premises and
ensure their own safety as well as the safety
of Mrs. Schaffer, an individual in their
protection. Therefore, the Court finds, upon
consideration of the exigencies of the
situation, that the needs of law enforcement
were so compelling, in that there was a need
to protect or preserve life or prevent serious
injury, that the first warrantless entry and
protective sweep was objectively reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment and thus lawful.
(J.A. 249.)
Schaffer specifically objects to the district court’s finding
that “the officers had information that [Schaffer] . . . ‘had
abandoned his car near the residence[,]’ and ‘had last been seen
walking toward Parsons, but within close proximity to his
9
residence.’” (Appellant’s Br. 7) (citing J.A. 249). Inexplicably,
the Government counters Schaffer’s argument with nothing more than
a statement that “[t]he United States takes the position that these
findings are well supported by the testimony presented at the two
days of suppression hearings. The District Court was not clearly
erroneous in making these findings.” (Appellee’s Br. 10)
(citations omitted). Therefore, inasmuch as the Government’s brief
is bereft of citations to the record supporting its position, we
have carefully combed the record ourselves to determine whether the
district court’s decision to deny the motion is supported by the
record. In our review, “[w]e are not limited to evaluation of the
grounds offered by the district court to support its decision, but
may affirm on any grounds apparent from the record.” United States
v. Smith, 395 F.3d 516, 519 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
There is no dispute that the officers had information that Mr.
Schaffer had threatened the victim with a gun. (Appellant’s Br. 2)
(“[O]n May 29, 2002, Mrs. Schaffer called the 911 center at 6:53
p.m. to report that her husband had held a gun to her head and
threatened to kill her.” (citing J.A. 36, 37)). In addition, the
record supports the district court’s determination that
[t]he officers did not know for certain where
[Mr. Schaffer] was, . . . the officers were
objectively reasonable in their rational
inference that [Mr. Schaffer] may have been in
his house. . . . the officers were reasonable
in rationally inferring that [Mr. Schaffer]
posed a danger. . . . [and the officers were
reasonable in their decision to] secure the
10
premises and ensure their own safety as well
as the safety of Ms. Schaffer, an individual
in their protection.
(J.A. 249.)
For instance, regarding Schaffer’s location, Hogan attested:
We weren’t aware of Mr. Schaffer’s
whereabouts, and he did have a weapon. He may
have been -- she couldn’t tell us whether, yes
or no, he was in the house, so that’s why we
went in with guns drawn and secured the house,
to make sure Mr. Schaffer wasn’t in there with
a weapon.
(J.A. 67.) Moreover, when Stump was asked if he had “any reason to
believe [Schaffer] could have been in the house[,]” Stump
responded, “I was unsure where he was, we were both unsure where he
was at the time.” (J.A. 117.)
On the issue of safety, Stump testified to the following:
Q: You were concerned for your safety?
A: Yes.
. . .
Q: So the three of you go into the house,
and what happened -- were your guns
drawn?
A: Yes.
Q: Why were your guns drawn?
A: The report and through the statement,
apparently, Mr. Schaffer had held her at
gunpoint inside the residence. We didn’t
know if he was still in there. It was
kind of a scary situation at that point,
sir.
(J.A. 117, 120-21.)
On the related question as to who entered the residence first,
the magistrate judge stated in the “Recommended Findings of Fact”
11
section of the Report and Recommendation, which we adopted, that
“Mrs. Schaffer secured several large dogs at the residence before
the officers went in.” (J.A. 197) (emphasis added). We note that
this refers to the officers entering the yard, not the house.
When queried about this issue at the suppression hearing,
Stump attested as follows:
Q: Who was with you when you first went
through the door?
A: Mrs. Schaffer -- or Trooper Hogan and
Mrs. Schaffer.
Q: So the three of you go through?
A: Yes. She was behind us two.
Q: Why was Mrs. Schaffer with you?
A: Basically, they had several dogs there,
rather large dogs. She took care of
them, made sure that they didn’t cause us
any harm as we went in the -- in the
home.
. . .
Q: Okay. Who went into the residence first?
A: I don’t recall who went first. It was
kind of both of us went very close
together. I’m not sure -- it was either
me or Hogan, Trooper Hogan.
Q: And the dogs were in the yard or in the
house?
. . .
A: I believe there might have been a couple
dogs in the yard and a dog in the house
at that point, as far as I can recall.
I’m not totally clear, sir.
(J.A. 119, 127-128) (emphasis added).
On this issue, Hogan similarly testified:
Q: [Mrs. Schaffer] secured the dogs?
12
A. -- pretty big dogs, they’re -- Mr.
Schaffer may know the types of dogs, I’m
not sure of the name of the dogs.
Q: So she went in the house with you?
A: Yes, sir. Behind us, but, yes, she did
enter the house with us.
(J.A. 67) (emphasis added).
Still, Schaffer argues that
the officers did not enter Mr. Schaffer’s
residence with any belief that an armed and
dangerous person was hiding therein. If they
truly believed that to be the situation, the
officers would not have knowingly exposed
Nancy Schaffer to danger, and would certainly
have not permitted her to walk freely from
room-to-room within the house.
(Appellant’s Br. 9.)
Although the record does establish that Nancy Schaffer went
into the residence with the officers, it is nothing more than
conjecture to state that she walked freely inside the house before
it had been secured. In fact, according to Hogan, “she was going
around just -- she was, basically, with Sergeant Stump, behind
Sergeant Stump, going around, picking through things, looking at
things.” (J.A. 68.) Moreover, although “she started collecting
clothing before [the officers] even cleared the whole house,” (J.A.
122), Stump testified that she was not ahead of the officers when
collecting her items. (J.A. 129.)
Q: Okay, and Mrs. Schaffer -- Mrs. Schaffer
goes in with you, and, as you indicated,
as you’re searching the house and
concerned about everybody’s safety, Mrs.
Schaffer is ahead of you or in different
13
rooms collecting some of her items, is
that correct?
A: Not ahead of us. I did my best to keep
her behind us, because we didn’t need her
in the house at that time, we didn’t want
her in the house at that time, she wanted
to be there; plus, if we left her out in
the car, did we know that Mr. Schaffer
wouldn’t return and do harm to her out in
the yard? It was a totally unsafe
situation, in my opinion.
(J.A. 129.)
Hogan’s testimony corroborated this testimony of Stump:
Q: So she went in the house with you?
A: Yes, sir. Behind us, but, yes, she did
enter the house with us.
Q: You, Sergeant Stump, and Nancy Schaffer,
then, entered the residence, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And, when you got inside, what did you do
as soon as you entered the front door?
Were your weapons pulled?
A: We had our weapons drawn.
Q: Why?
A: We also had our flashlights.
Q: Why?
A: For the simple fact -- I’m going back to
it again, but officer safety.
(J.A. 67.)
Certainly, Nancy Schaffer’s evident lack of fear for her
safety in no way diminishes the officer’s testimony that they
thought the circumstances to be unsafe. Simply stated, the
officers had limited options and even more limited time to consider
them.
Turning to the factors enumerated in Mowatt, inasmuch as it
was reasonable for the officers to believe that an armed man was
14
lurking around and may have already returned to his home, the first
factor, the urgency factor, favors the Government’s argument
concerning exigent circumstances. The second factor, concerning
the officers’ reasonable belief that the contraband was about to be
removed or destroyed, favors the Government to the extent that this
factor is construed to refer to the officers’ reasonable belief
that Schaffer might be in the house and he might flee. The third
factor regarding the possibility of danger to police guarding the
site also favors the Government. It was reasonable for them to
enter the house based on the circumstances that they faced to
determine if Schaffer was present and armed. Further, the fact
that they entered the house with their guns drawn demonstrates
their concern for not only their safety but also for Nancy
Schaffer.
As to the fourth factor, there is no evidence in the record as
to whether Mr. Schaffer was aware that the police were on his
trail. There is also no evidence in the record as to the fifth
factor, that the officers were concerned about the ready
destructibility of the contraband. Thus, these two factors favor
neither party. Concerning the gravity of the offense, here, the
officers were confronted with a situation in which it is
unchallenged that the officers had information that Mrs. Schaffer
had reported that Mr. Schaffer “had held a gun to her head and
15
threatened to kill her.” (Appellant’s Br. 2) (J.A. 36, 37). Thus,
this factor favors the Government.
In sum, viewing the situation from the perspective of the
officers at the scene of the first warrantless search of Schaffer’s
house, we are of the firm belief that the circumstances that the
officers faced here would cause a reasonable person to believe that
entry into Schaffer’s home was necessary to preserve life or avoid
serious injury to the officers and to Mrs. Schaffer and to prevent
the possible escape of Mr. Schaffer. Accordingly, the officers’
first warrantless entry into Mr. Schaffer’s house was appropriate.
IV.
Inasmuch as “we may affirm on any grounds apparent from the
record[,]” Smith, 395 F.3d at 519, we have made a de novo review of
the district court’s ultimate suppression decision as to the first
warrantless entry. Consequently, we hold that the record, when
considered in its entirety, supports the district court’s denial of
the motion as to that issue. Therefore, we conclude that the
district court did not err in denying Schaffer’s motion to suppress
as to the initial search of his residence. Accordingly, the
decision of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
16
