Stat. at 225.
        The legislative record makes clear that Congress’s purpose in preventing
persons under 21—including 18-to-20-year-olds—from purchasing handguns
from FFLs was to curb violent crime. Essentially, then, the federal laws at issue
are safety-driven, age-based categorical restrictions on handgun access.
C.      Whether the Challenged Federal Laws Burden Conduct Protected
        by the Second Amendment
        Having placed the challenged federal laws in their proper context, we now
consider whether the laws—which combine to prevent 18-to-20-year-olds from
purchasing handguns from FFLs—burden conduct that is protected by the
Second Amendment.



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                                  No. 11-10959

      1.    Founding-Era Attitudes
      As the Supreme Court recognized in Heller, the right to keep and bear
arms has never been 
unlimited. 554 U.S. at 626
; see also Robertson v. Baldwin,
165 U.S. 275
, 281 (1897) (observing that the right to keep and bear arms, like
other rights “inherited from our English ancestors” and protected by the Bill of
Rights, has “from time immemorial, been subject to certain well-recognized
exceptions, arising from the necessities of the case”). Since even before the
Revolution, gun use and gun control have been inextricably intertwined. The
historical record shows that gun safety regulation was commonplace in the
colonies, and around the time of the founding, a variety of gun safety regulations
were on the books; these included safety laws regulating the storage of gun
powder, laws keeping track of who in the community had guns, laws
administering gun use in the context of militia service (including laws requiring
militia members to attend “musters,” public gatherings where officials would
inspect and account for guns), laws prohibiting the use of firearms on certain
occasions and in certain places, and laws disarming certain groups and
restricting sales to certain groups. See Adam Winkler, Gunfight: The Battle over
the Right to Bear Arms in America 113–18 (2011); Saul Cornell & Nathan
DeDino, A Well Regulated Right: The Early American Origins of Gun Control,
73 Fordham L. Rev. 487, 502–13 (2004).       It appears that when the fledgling
republic adopted the Second Amendment, an expectation of sensible gun safety
regulation was woven into the tapestry of the guarantee.
      Noteworthy among these revolutionary and founding-era gun regulations
are those that targeted particular groups for public safety reasons. For example,
several jurisdictions passed laws that confiscated weapons owned by persons
who refused to swear an oath of allegiance to the state or to the nation. See
Cornell & DeDino, 73 Fordham L. Rev. at 507–08. Although these Loyalists
were neither criminals nor traitors, American legislators had determined that

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                                   No. 11-10959

permitting these persons to keep and bear arms posed a potential danger. 
Id.
(“The law demonstrates 
that in a well regulated society, the state could disarm
those it deemed likely to disrupt society.”); see also Winkler, Gunfight, at 116
(concluding that “[t]he founders didn’t think government should have the power
to take away everyone’s guns, but they were perfectly willing to confiscate
weapons from anyone deemed untrustworthy,” a group that included law-abiding
slaves, free blacks, and Loyalists); Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second
Amendment Limitations and Criminological Considerations, 60 Hastings L.J.
1339, 1360 (2009) (“[F]rom time immemorial, various jurisdictions recognizing
a right to arms have nevertheless taken the step of forbidding suspect groups
from having arms. American legislators at the time of the Bill of Rights seem
to have been aware of this tradition . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
      In the view of at least some members of the founding generation,
disarming select groups for the sake of public safety was compatible with the
right to arms specifically and with the idea of liberty generally. See Saul
Cornell, Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, the Second
Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory,
16 Const. Comment. 221, 231–36 (1999) (discussing Pennsylvania Anti-
Federalists’ support for a high level of gun regulation). Shortly after the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention for the original Constitution, for example, the
Anti-Federalist minority recommended the following amendment: “That the
people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own
state, or the United States . . . and no law shall be passed for disarming the
people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public
injury from individuals.” 
Id. at 233 (emphasis 
added) (quoting The Address and




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                                       No. 11-10959

Reasons of Dissent of the Minority, in The Documentary History of the
Ratification of the Constitution 588, 617–24 (St. Historical Soc’y of Wis., 1976)).12
       These categorical restrictions may have been animated by a classical
republican notion that only those with adequate civic “virtue” could claim the
right to arms. Scholars have proposed that at the time of the founding, “the
right to arms was inextricably and multifariously linked to that of civic virtu
(i.e., the virtuous citizenry),” and that “[o]ne implication of this emphasis on the
virtuous citizen is that the right to arms does not preclude laws disarming the
unvirtuous citizens (i.e., criminals) or those who, like children or the mentally
imbalanced, are deemed incapable of virtue.” Kates & Cramer, 60 Hastings L.J.
at 1359–60.13 This theory suggests that the Founders would have supported
limiting or banning “the ownership of firearms by minors, felons, and the
mentally impaired.” See Don B. Kates, Second Amendment, in 4 Encyclopedia
of the American Constitution 1640 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986) (emphasis
added); see also United States v. Emerson, 
270 F.3d 203
, 261 (5th Cir. 2001)
(inferring from scholarly sources that “it is clear that felons, infants and those
of unsound mind may be prohibited from possessing firearms” (emphasis
added)).



       12
          Additionally, William Rawle—“a prominent lawyer who had been a member of the
Pennsylvania Assembly that ratified the Bill of Rights,” 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 607—maintained
that although the Second Amendment restrained the power of Congress to “disarm the people,”
the right to keep and bear arms nonetheless “ought not, . . . in any government, to be abused
to the disturbance of the public peace.” William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the
United States of America 125–26 (William S. Hein & Co. 2003) (2d ed. 1829).
       13
          See also Robert E. Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, 49 Law &
Contemp. Probs. 125, 130 (Winter 1986) (“[T]he philosophers of republicanism were not blind
to the desirability of disarming certain elements within their society . . . . Arms were ‘never
lodg’d in the hand of any who had not an Interest in preserving the publick Peace . . . .’”
(quoting J. Trenchard & W. Moyle, An Argument Shewing, That a Standing Army Is
Inconsistent with a Free Government, And Absolutely Destructive to the Constitution of the
English Monarchy (London 1697)).

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                                     No. 11-10959

       Notably, the term “minor” or “infant”—as those terms were historically
understood—applied to persons under the age of 21, not only to persons under
the age of 18. The age of majority at common law was 21, and it was not until
the 1970s that States enacted legislation to lower the age of majority to 18. See,
e.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 847 (9th ed. 2009) (“An infant in the eyes of the law
is a person under the age of twenty-one years, and at that period . . . he or she
is said to attain majority . . . .” (quoting John Indermaur, Principles of the
Common Law 195 (Edmund H. Bennett ed., 1st Am. ed. 1878))); 
id. (“The
common-law rule 
provided that a person was an infant until he reached the age
of twenty-one. The rule continues at the present time, though by statute in some
jurisdictions the age may be lower.” (quoting John Edward Murray Jr., Murray
on Contracts § 12, at 18 (2d ed. 1974))); see generally Larry D. Barnett, The Roots
of Law, 15 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 613, 681–86 (2007).                       If a
representative citizen of the founding era conceived of a “minor” as an individual
who was unworthy of the Second Amendment guarantee, and conceived of 18-to-
20-year-olds as “minors,” then it stands to reason that the citizen would have
supported restricting an 18-to-20-year-old’s right to keep and bear arms.
       2.     Nineteenth-Century Legislators, Courts, and Commentators
       Arms-control legislation intensified through the 1800s, see Cornell &
DeDino, 73 Fordham L. Rev. at 512–13, and by the end of the 19th century,
nineteen States and the District of Columbia had enacted laws expressly
restricting the ability of persons under 21 to purchase or use particular firearms,
or restricting the ability of “minors” to purchase or use particular firearms while
the state age of majority was set at age 21.14 See, e.g., State v. Quail, 
92 A. 859
,


      14
         1856 Ala. Acts 17; 16 Del. Laws 716 (1881); 27 Stat. 116–17 (1892) (District of
Columbia); 1876 Ga. Laws 112; 1881 Ill. Laws 73; 1875 Ind. Acts 86; 1884 Iowa Acts 86; 1883
Kan. Sess. Laws 159; 1873 Ky. Acts 359; 1890 La. Acts 39; 1882 Md. Laws 656; 1878 Miss.
Laws 175–76; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1274 (1879); 1885 Nev. Stat. 51; 1893 N.C. Sess. Laws 468–69;
1856 Tenn. Pub. Acts 92; 1897 Tex. Gen. Laws 221–22; 1882 W. Va. Acts 421–22; 
1883 Wis.

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                                       No. 11-10959

859 (Del. 1914) (discussing indictment for “knowingly sell[ing] a deadly weapon
to a minor other than an ordinary pocket knife”); State v. Allen, 
94 Ind. 441
(1884) (discussing prosecution for “unlawfully barter[ing] and trad[ing] to
Wesley Powles, who was then and there a minor under the age of twenty-one
years, a certain deadly and dangerous weapon, to wit: a pistol, commonly called
a revolver, which could be worn or carried concealed about the person”);
Tankersly v. Commonwealth, 
9 S.W. 702
, 702 (Ky. 1888) (discussing indictment
for selling a deadly weapon to a minor); see also Rene 
E., 583 F.3d at 14 
(“During
this period and soon after, a number of states enacted similar statutes
prohibiting the transfer of deadly weapons—often expressly handguns—to
juveniles.”).    By the early 20th century, three more States restricted the
purchase or use of particular firearms by persons under 21.15 By 1923, therefore,
twenty-two States and the District of Columbia had made 21 the minimum age
for the purchase or use of particular firearms.16
       Meanwhile, “19th-century courts and commentators,” 
Heller, 554 U.S. at
603
,    maintained       that    age-based      restrictions     on    the    purchase      of
firearms—including restrictions on the ability of persons under 21 to purchase

Sess. Laws 290; 1890 Wyo. Sess. Laws 1253. Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming had Second
Amendment analogues in their respective constitutions at the time they enacted these
regulations.
       15
        Okla. Stat. ch. 25, art. 47 §§ 1-3 (1890) (though not admitted as State until 1907);
1923 N.H. Laws 138, 139; 1923 S.C. Acts 207, 221. Oklahoma and South Carolina have
Second Amendment analogues in their respective constitutions.
       16
          From the mid-19th century through the early 20th century, twenty-one other States
imposed age qualifications on the purchase or use of certain firearms. As one early 20th
century commentator wrote of the state legislation: “The acts are quite consistent in refusing
to allow the issue of licenses to young persons or criminals, and in punishing persons who sell
or put into possession of the forbidden classes the forbidden weapons.” J. P. Chamberlain,
Legislatures and the Pistol Problem, 11 A.B.A. J. 596, 598 (1925).
        Today—as 
mentioned supra
, Section I.B.—all fifty States (and the District of Columbia)
have imposed minimum-age qualifications on the use or purchase of particular firearms.
Thirty-five States have Second Amendment analogues in their respective constitutions.

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                                   No. 11-10959

firearms—comported with the Second Amendment guarantee. To illustrate,
Thomas Cooley—a “judge and professor” “who wrote a massively popular 1868
Treatise on Constitutional Limitations,” 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 616—agreed 
that
“the State may prohibit the sale of arms to minors” pursuant to the State’s police
power. Thomas M. Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 740 n.4 (5th
ed. 1883) (citing State v. Calicutt, 
69 Tenn. 714 
(1878)). Cooley recognized the
validity of imposing age qualifications on arm sales, despite his acknowledgment
that the “federal and State constitutions provide that the right of the people to
bear arms shall not be infringed.” 
Id. at 429.
      In 
the 1878 case that Cooley referenced, the Tennessee Supreme Court
upheld a conviction under a state law making it a misdemeanor to sell, give, or
loan a pistol to a minor, 
Calicutt, 69 Tenn. at 714–15
, when the age of majority
was set at 21. The defendant argued that the law violated the state’s Second
Amendment analogue, reasoning that because “every citizen who is subject to
military duty has the right ‘to keep and bear arms,’ . . . this right necessarily
implies the right to buy or otherwise acquire, and the right in others to give, sell,
or loan to him.” 
Id. at 716. In 
rejecting the defendant’s challenge, the court
explained that the “wise and salutary” legislation was passed to “prevent crime”
and suppress “the pernicious and dangerous practice of carrying arms,” and was
not “intended to affect, and [did] not in fact abridge,” the right to keep and bear
arms. 
Id. at 715–17. Likewise, 
in Coleman v. State, 32 Al. 581, 582–83 (1858),
the Alabama Supreme Court upheld a conviction for violating a state law
making it a misdemeanor to sell, give, or lend a pistol to a male minor, when the
age of majority was set at 21.
      3.     Conclusion
      We have summarized considerable evidence that burdening the conduct
at issue—the ability of 18-to-20-year-olds to purchase handguns from FFLs—is
consistent with a longstanding, historical tradition, which suggests that the

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                                  No. 11-10959

conduct at issue falls outside the Second Amendment’s protection. At a high
level of generality, the present ban is consistent with a longstanding tradition
of targeting select groups’ ability to access and to use arms for the sake of public
safety. See Winkler, Gunfight, at 116; Cornell & DeDino, 73 Fordham L. Rev.
at 507–08.    More specifically, the present ban appears consistent with a
longstanding tradition of age- and safety-based restrictions on the ability to
access arms. In conformity with founding-era thinking, and in conformity with
the views of various 19th-century legislators and courts, Congress restricted the
ability of minors under 21 to purchase handguns because Congress found that
they tend to be relatively immature and that denying them easy access to
handguns would deter violent crime. Compare Kates & Cramer, 60 Hastings
L.J. at 1360 (reflecting founding-era attitude that minors were inadequately
virtuous to keep and bear arms), and 
Calicutt, 69 Tenn. at 716–17 
(referring to
prohibition on firearm sales to minors as “wise and salutary” legislation
designed to “prevent crime”), with Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 901(a)(6), 82 Stat. 197,
226 (1968) (reflecting concern that handguns had been “widely sold by [FFLs] to
emotionally immature, or thrill-bent juveniles and minors prone to criminal
behavior”).
      This reasoning finds support in United States v. Rene E., in which the
First Circuit canvassed sources similar to ours and upheld the constitutionality
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(x), which prohibits persons under age 18 from possessing
handguns and prohibits transfers of handguns to such persons, with 
exceptions.
583 F.3d at 16
. The court inferred that “[t]here is some evidence that the
founding generation would have shared the view that public-safety-based
limitations of juvenile possession of firearms were consistent with the right to
keep and bear arms,” and that “[i]n this sense, the federal ban on juvenile
possession of handguns is part of a longstanding practice of prohibiting certain
classes of individuals from possessing firearms—those whose possession poses

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                                         No. 11-10959

a particular danger to the public.” 
Id. at 15. The 
court rested its holding that
the statute was constitutional on “the existence of a longstanding tradition of
prohibiting juveniles from both receiving and possessing handguns.” 
Id. at 12.
However, 
because the line between childhood and adulthood was historically 21,
not 18, the First Circuit’s conclusion that there is a “longstanding tradition” of
preventing persons under 18 from “receiving” handguns applies with just as
much force to persons under 21.
       To be sure, we are unable to divine the Founders’ specific views on
whether 18-to-20-year-olds had a stronger claim than 17-year-olds to the Second
Amendment guarantee. The Founders may not even have shared a collective
view on such a subtle and fine-grained distinction. The important point is that
there is considerable historical evidence of age- and safety-based restrictions on
the ability to access arms. Modern restrictions on the ability of persons under
21 to purchase handguns—and the ability of persons under 18 to possess
handguns—seem, to us, to be firmly historically rooted.
       Nonetheless, we face institutional challenges in conducting a definitive
review of the relevant historical record. Although we are inclined to uphold the
challenged federal laws at step one of our analytical framework, in an abundance
of caution, we proceed to step two. We ultimately conclude that the challenged
federal laws pass constitutional muster even if they implicate the Second
Amendment guarantee.17


       17
          Before we scrutinize the challenged federal laws, however, we address one final scope
issue: Appellants’ contention that a right to purchase firearms from FFLs must vest at age 18.
Appellants offer two arguments in favor of this contention. We reject both.
        Appellants first argue that 18-to-20-year-olds have a Second Amendment right to
purchase firearms from FFLs because, at the time of the founding, 18-to-20-year-olds were
assigned to serve in the militia and militia duty necessarily implies the right to purchase
firearms. The 1792 Militia Act provided that “each and every free able-bodied white male
citizen of the respective States, resident therein, who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years,
and under the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall severally and
respectively be enrolled in the militia.” Militia Act § 1, 1 Stat. 271. But Appellants’ militia-

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                                        No. 11-10959

D.     Whether to Apply a More or Less Demanding Level of Scrutiny
       Assuming that the challenged federal laws burden conduct within the
scope of the Second Amendment, we must evaluate the laws under a suitable
standard of constitutional scrutiny. A law that burdens the core of the Second
Amendment guarantee—for example, “the right of law-abiding, responsible
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home,” 
Heller, 554 U.S. at
635—would 
trigger strict scrutiny, while a less severe law would be
proportionately easier to justify. See Heller 
II, 670 F.3d at 1257
; Masciandaro,



based attack on the federal laws at bar is unavailing. First, the right to arms is not co-
extensive with the duty to serve in the militia. See 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 589–94 
(decoupling the
former from the latter). Second, if the right to arms and the duty to serve in the militia were
linked in the manner that Appellants declare, then Appellants’ argument proves too much.
In some colonies, able-bodied sixteen-year-olds were obligated to serve in the militia, and yet,
Appellants assure us that they are not challenging restrictions on handgun possession by or
sales to persons under age 18. E.g., Act of Apr. 3, 1778, ch. 33, 1778 N.Y. Laws 62 (assigning
to militia “every able bodied male person [with exceptions] from sixteen years of age to fifty”).
Third, in some colonies and States, the minimum age of militia service either dipped below age
18 or crept to age 21, depending on legislative need. Compare An Act for the Better Regulating
[of] the Militia, ch. 20, §§1, 4, 1777 N.J. Acts 26 (setting minimum age at 16 in 1777), with An
Act to embody, for a limited Time, One Thousand of the Militia of this State, for the Defence
of the Frontiers thereof, ch. 24, §§ 3-4, 1778 N.J. Acts 58, 58-69 (setting minimum age at 21,
but reserving right to accept age 16-21, in 1778). Such fluctuation undermines Appellants’
militia-based claim that the right to purchase arms must fully vest precisely at age 18—not
earlier or later. Indeed, the 1792 Militia Act gave States discretion to impose age
qualifications on service, and several States chose to enroll only persons age 21 or over, or
required parental consent for persons under 21. E.g., An Act to regulate the Militia, § 2, 1843
Ohio Acts 53, 53 (setting minimum age at 21). And this is all not to mention the anachronism
at play: we no longer have a founding-era-style militia.
        Appellants also argue that a Second Amendment right to purchase firearms from FFLs
vests at age 18 because the age of majority is now 18. True, in the 1970s, States lowered the
age of majority for most purposes from 21 to 18. But “majority or minority is a status,” not a
“fixed or vested right.” Jeffrey F. Ghent, Statutory Change of Age of Majority as Affecting Pre-
existing Status or Rights, 
75 A.L.R. 3d 228 
§ 3 (1977). The terms “majority” and “minority”
lack content without reference to the right at issue. Seventeen-year-olds may not vote or serve
in the military, while 18-year-olds may. Twenty-year-olds may not purchase alcohol (by state
statute), purchase lottery tickets in some States (e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 5-515(a)), purchase
handguns in some States (by state statute), or purchase handguns from FFLs (by federal
statute)—while 21-year-olds may. Neither the Twenty-Sixth Amendment nor state law setting
the age of majority at 18 compels Congress or the States to select 18 as the minimum age to
purchase alcohol, lottery tickets, or handguns.

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                                  No. 
11-10959

638 F.3d at 470
; 
Chester, 628 F.3d at 682
. The latter, “intermediate” standard
of scrutiny requires the government to show a reasonable fit between the law
and an important government objective.
      Unquestionably, the challenged federal laws trigger nothing more than
“intermediate” scrutiny. We have demonstrated that this federal scheme is not
a salient outlier in the historical landscape of gun control. And unlike the D.C.
ban in Heller, this ban does not disarm an entire community, but instead
prohibits commercial handgun sales to 18-to-20-year-olds—a discrete category.
The narrow ambit of the ban’s target militates against strict scrutiny.
      Indeed, Heller’s observation that longstanding prohibitions on firearm
possession by felons and the mentally ill are presumptively 
valid, 554 U.S. at
626
, 627 n.26, entails that the Second Amendment permits “categorical
regulation of gun possession by classes of persons.” 
Booker, 644 F.3d at 23
; see
also 
Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640
, 641 (inferring from Heller that “statutory
prohibitions on the possession of weapons by some persons are proper” and
noting that “[c]ategorical limits on the possession of firearms would not be a
constitutional anomaly”).    Like the federal bans targeting felons and the
mentally ill, the federal laws targeting minors under 21 are an outgrowth of an
American tradition of regulating certain groups’ access to arms for the sake of
public safety. Compare Kates & Cramer, 60 Hastings L.J. at 1360 (arguing that
the founding generation sought to disarm the unvirtuous, including minor
children, felons, and the mentally ill), with S. Rep. No. 90-1501, at 22 (1968)
(stating that the purpose of the 1968 Act was to curb crime by keeping “firearms
out of the hands of those not legally entitled to possess them because of age,
criminal background or incompetency”). To the extent that the ban on handgun
sales to minors under 21 is analogous to longstanding, presumptively lawful
bans on possession by felons and the mentally ill, see 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 626
, 627
n.26, the ban at bar should trigger an “intermediate” level of scrutiny. Cf.

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                                    No. 11-10959

Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 
555 U.S. 353
, 358 (2009) (“Restrictions on speech
based on its content are ‘presumptively invalid’ and subject to strict scrutiny.”).
      Moreover, as with felons and the mentally ill, categorically restricting the
presumptive Second Amendment rights of 18-to-20-year-olds does not violate the
central concern of the Second Amendment. The Second Amendment, at its core,
protects “law-abiding, responsible” citizens.       See 
Heller, 554 U.S. at 635
(emphasis added). Congress found that persons under 21 tend to be relatively
irresponsible and can be prone to violent crime, especially when they have easy
access to handguns. See Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 901(a)(6), 82 Stat. at 197, 225
(1968) (referring to “emotionally immature, or thrill-bent juveniles and minors
prone to criminal behavior”); cf. 
Chester, 628 F.3d at 682
–83 (applying
intermediate scrutiny to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), the federal domestic-violence-
misdemeanant firearm possession ban, and holding that misdemeanant-
plaintiff’s claimed “right to possess a firearm in his home for the purpose of
self-defense” was “not within the core right identified in Heller—the right of a
law-abiding, responsible citizen to possess and carry a weapon for self-defense”).
      Granted, 18-to-20-year-olds may have a stronger claim to the Second
Amendment      guarantee     than    convicted     felons   and   domestic-violence
misdemeanants have. Culpable criminal conduct has not put 18-to-20-year-olds
in the cross-hairs of the ban at bar. Still, unlike bans on felons, the mentally ill,
and domestic-violence misdemeanants, this ban does not severely burden the
presumptive Second Amendment rights of the targeted class’s members. While
the former bans extinguish the Second Amendment rights of the class members
by totally preventing them from possessing firearms, this ban is not so extreme.
      First, these federal laws do not severely burden the Second Amendment
rights of 18-to-20-year-olds because they impose an age qualification on
commercial firearm sales: FFLs may not sell handguns to persons under the age
of 21. Far from a total prohibition on handgun possession and use, these laws

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                                  No. 11-10959

resemble “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale
of arms,” which Heller deemed “presumptively lawful.” 
See 554 U.S. at 626–27
& n.26. It is not clear that the Court had an age qualification in mind when it
penned that sentence, but to the extent that these laws resemble presumptively
lawful regulatory measures, they must not trigger strict scrutiny.
      Second, these laws do not strike the core of the Second Amendment
because they do not prevent 18-to-20-year-olds from possessing and using
handguns “in defense of hearth and home.” See 
id. at 628–30, 635; 
cf. Heller 
II,
670 F.3d at 1255–58 
(applying intermediate scrutiny to D.C. registration
requirements that “make it considerably more difficult for a person lawfully to
acquire and keep a firearm, including a handgun, for the purpose of self-defense
in the home—the ‘core lawful purpose’ protected by the Second Amendment,” but
that do not “prevent[] an individual from possessing a firearm in his home or
elsewhere, whether for self-defense or hunting, or any other lawful purpose”).
Under this federal regulatory scheme, 18-to-20-year-olds may possess and use
handguns for self-defense, hunting, or any other lawful purpose; they may
acquire handguns from responsible parents or guardians; and they may possess,
use, and purchase long-guns. Accordingly, the scheme is sufficiently bounded
to avoid strict scrutiny.
      Third, these laws demand only an “intermediate” level of scrutiny because
they regulate commercial sales through an age qualification with temporary
effect. Any 18-to-20-year-old subject to the ban will soon grow up and out of its
reach. It is useful to compare this case with United States v. Yancey, in which
the Seventh Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), the illegal-drug-user firearm
possession ban, was “far less onerous” than the firearm-possession bans on
felons and the mentally ill because “unlike those who have been convicted of a
felony or committed to a mental institution and so face a lifetime ban, an
unlawful drug user like [the defendant] could regain his right to possess a

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                                   No. 11-10959

firearm simply by ending his drug abuse.” 
621 F.3d 681
, 686–87 (7th Cir. 2010).
Similar logic applies here. The temporary nature of the burden reduces its
severity. Consequently, we hold that these laws deserve what we have dubbed
an “intermediate” level of scrutiny.
E.      Whether These Laws Survive “Intermediate” Scrutiny
        In applying “intermediate” scrutiny, we determine whether there is a
reasonable fit between the law and an important government objective; that is,
the government must show that the law is reasonably adapted to an important
government interest. See 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98
; accord 
Chester, 628 F.3d
at 683
; see also 
Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 470
. We conclude that the challenged
ban passes constitutional muster under “intermediate” scrutiny.
        The government has put forth evidence that, through the 1968 Act,
Congress sought to manage an important public safety problem: the ease with
which young persons—including 18-to-20-year-olds—were getting their hands
on handguns through FFLs.         As 
discussed supra
, Section III.B, Congress
conducted a multi-year investigation that revealed a causal relationship between
the easy availability of firearms to young people under 21 and the rise in crime.
See Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 901(a)(6), 82 Stat. 197, 225–26 (1968) (identifying a
“causal relationship between the easy availability of firearms other than a rifle
or shotgun and juvenile and youthful criminal behavior”); 
id. § 901(a)(2), 82 
Stat.
at 225 (identifying “ease with which” young persons could “acquire firearms
other than a rifle or shotgun” as a “significant factor in the prevalence of
lawlessness and violent crime in the United States”). Indeed, at a hearing held
in connection with Congress’s inquiry, a law enforcement official reported, “The
greatest growth of crime today is in the area of young people, juveniles, and
young adults. The easy availability of weapons makes their tendency toward
wild, and sometimes irrational behavior that much more violent, that much
more deadly.”         Federal Firearms Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to

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                                  No. 11-10959

Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong.
57 (1967) (testimony of Sheldon S. Cohen).
      The legislative record illustrates that Congress was concerned not only
with “juveniles” under the age of 18, but also with “minors” under the age of 21.
See S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 79 (1968) (“The clandestine acquisition of firearms
by juveniles and minors is a most serious problem facing law enforcement and
the citizens of this country.”) Congress’s investigation had shown that “juveniles
account for some 49 percent of the arrests for serious crimes in the United
States,” while “minors account for 64 percent of the total arrests in this
category.” S. Rep. No. 90-1097, at 77. Specifically, “minors under the age of 21
years accounted for 35 percent of the arrests for the serious crimes of violence
including murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault,” and 21 percent of the
arrests for murder. See 114 Cong. Rec. 12279, 12309 (1968) (statement of Sen.
Thomas J. Dodd, Chairman, Sen. Subcomm. on Juvenile Delinquency).
      The legislative record also demonstrates that Congress was particularly
concerned with the FFL’s role in the crime problem. The investigation had
revealed that FFLs constituted the central conduit of handgun traffic to young
persons. See Federal Firearms Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate
Juvenile Delinquency of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 67 (1965)
(testimony of Sheldon S. Cohen) (“The vast majority, in fact, almost all of these
firearms, are put into the hands of juveniles by importers, manufacturers, and
dealers who operate under licenses issued by the Federal Government . . . . The
way to end this dangerous practice is to stop these federal licensees from selling
firearms to juveniles and this is one of the major things that [the proposed
legislation] would do.”); Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 901(a)(6), 82 Stat. at 226 (finding
that concealable firearms had been “widely sold by federally licensed importers
and dealers to emotionally immature, or thrill-bent juveniles and minors prone
to criminal behavior”); 

Stat. at 225 (concluding that “only

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                                       No. 11-10959

through adequate Federal control over interstate and foreign commerce in these
weapons, and over all persons engaging in the business of importing,
manufacturing, or dealing in them, can this grave problem be properly dealt
with, and effective State and local regulation of this traffic be made possible”).18
       Additionally, the legislative record reflects Congress’s concern with the
“particular type of weapon that is predominantly used by the criminal” and that
is “principally used in the commission of serious crime”—i.e., the “handgun.”
S. Rep. No. 89-1866, at 4–7 (1966). The handgun’s size made it easy to carry and
conceal, which in turn made it susceptible to “clandestine acquisition,” S. Rep.
No. 90-1097, at 79, and “criminal use,” S. Rep. No. 89-1866, at 4.
       Overall, the government has marshaled evidence showing that Congress
was focused on a particular problem: young persons under 21, who are immature
and prone to violence, easily accessing handguns, which facilitate violent crime,
primarily by way of FFLs. Accordingly, Congress restricted the ability of young
persons under 21 to purchase handguns from FFLs. See 18 U.S.C § 922(b)(1).
       We find that the government has satisfied its burden of showing a
reasonable means-ends fit between the challenged federal laws and an important
government interest. First, curbing violent crime perpetrated by young persons
under 21—by preventing such persons from acquiring handguns from
FFLs—constitutes an important government objective. See, e.g., Schall v.
Martin, 
467 U.S. 253
, 264 (1984) (“The ‘legitimate and compelling state interest’
in protecting the community from crime cannot be doubted.”).

       18
          See also 
Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 825 
(“From this outline of the Act, it is apparent
that the focus of the federal scheme is the federally licensed firearms dealer, at least insofar
as the Act directly controls access to weapons by users. Firearms are channeled through
dealers to eliminate the mail order and the generally widespread commerce in them, and to
insure that, in the course of sales or other dispositions by these dealers, weapons could not be
obtained by individuals whose possession of them would be contrary to the public interest.”);
United States v. Rybar, 
103 F.3d 273
, 280 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Omnibus Act channelled [sic]
all interstate traffic through licensees and prohibited licensees from transferring them to
persons under 21 or living out-of-state.”).

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                                     No. 11-10959

       Second, Congress selected means that were reasonably adapted to
achieving that objective. Congress found that the ease with which young
persons under 21 could access handguns—as opposed to other guns—was
contributing to violent crime, and also found that FFLs—as opposed to other
sources—constituted the central conduit of handgun traffic to young persons
under 21. Congress, in turn, reasonably tailored a solution to the particular
problem: Congress restricted the ability of persons under 21 to purchase
handguns from FFLs, while allowing (i) 18-to-20-year-old persons to purchase
long-guns, (ii) persons under 21 to acquire handguns from parents or guardians,
and (iii) persons under 21 to possess handguns and long-guns. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(b)(1), (c)(1); see 
also supra
, Section I.B.19
       Alternatively, Congress could have prohibited all persons under 21 from
possessing handguns—or all guns, for that matter. But Congress deliberately
adopted a calibrated, compromise approach. See 114 Cong. Rec. at 12309 (Sen.
Dodd) (“At the most [the relevant provisions] could cause minor inconveniences
to certain youngsters . . . by requiring that a parent or guardian over 21 years
of age make a handgun purchase for any person under 21.”); see also S. Rep. 90-
1097, at 79 (stating that “a minor or juvenile would not be restricted from
owning, or learning the proper usage of [a] firearm, since any firearm which his
parent or guardian desired him to have could be obtained for the minor by the
parent or guardian”); accord S. Rep. No. 89-1866, at 58.
       Since 1968, the means-ends fit between the ban and its objective has
retained its reasonableness. The threat posed by 18-to-20-year-olds with easy
access to handguns endures. In 1999, for example, one senator noted:




      19
         As discussed, it was not until 1994 that Congress prohibited persons under 18 from
possessing handguns and prohibited transfers of handguns to them, with exceptions. See Pub.
L. No. 103-322, § 110201, 108 Stat. 1796, 2010 (1994) (adding 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)).

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                                 No. 11-10959

      Firearms trace data collected as part of the Youth Crime Gun
      Interdiction Initiative (YCGII) paint a disturbing picture of crime
      gun activity by persons under 21. In the most recent YCGII Trace
      Analysis Report, the age of the possessor was known for 32,653, or
      42.8 percent, of the 72,260 crime guns traced. Of these 32,563 guns,
      approximately 4,840, or 14.8 percent, were recovered from 18-20
      year-olds. Indeed, the most frequent age of crime gun possession
      was 19 years of age, and the second most frequent was 18 years of
      age.
      At the same time, according to the 1997 Uniform Crime Reports, the
      most frequent age arrested for murder was 18 years of age, and the
      second most frequent was 19 years of age. Those aged 18-20
      accounted for 22 percent of all arrest[s] for murder in 1997.
145 Cong. Rec. 7503 (1999) (statement of Sen. Charles Schumer); see also 145
Cong. Rec. 18119 (1999) (“Studies show that one in four gun murders are
committed by people aged 18 to 20.”) (statement of Rep. Grace Napolitano).
      Furthermore, a 1999 report by the U.S. Department of Treasury and the
U.S. Department of Justice found that “[i]n 1997, 18, 19 and 20 year olds ranked
first, second, and third in the number of gun homicides committed”:
      Of all gun homicides where an offender was identified, 24 percent
      were committed by 18 to 20 year olds. This is consistent with the
      historical pattern of gun homicides over the past ten years.
      Among murderers, 18 to 20 year olds were more likely to use a
      firearm than adults 21 and over. More specifically, in 1997, 74
      percent of the homicides committed by 18 to 20 year old offenders
      involved firearms. In contrast, only 61 percent of homicides
      committed by offenders 21 or over involved firearms. The under-21
      offender age groups showed a significant shift toward the use of
      firearms in committing homicides by the mid-1980’s. By the 1990’s,
      these offender groups were using firearms to commit homicides
      more than 70 percent of the time. Although the proportion of 18 to
      20 year olds who use firearms to commit homicides has declined
      since the1994 peak, it remains higher than levels recorded before
      1990. Similarly, in non-lethal crimes, including assault, rape, and
      robbery, 18 to 20 year old offenders were more likely to use guns
      than both younger and older offender age groups. For non-lethal
      crimes of violence from 1992 to 1997, in cases where the weapon and

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                                       No. 11-10959

       age of offender were identified, 15 percent of 18 to 20 year old
       offenders used a firearm, in contrast to 10 percent of adult
       offenders, and 5 percent of offenders 17 and under.
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury & U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Gun Crime in the Age Group
18–20, at 2 (June 1999) (citations ommitted); see also 
id. at 3 (“Handguns
comprised 85 percent of the crime guns known to be recovered from 18 to 20 year
olds” in twenty-seven cities participating in the study).
       Recent data confirm that preventing handguns from easily falling into the
hands of 18-to-20-year-olds remains critical to public safety. An FBI Uniform
Crime Report for 2009 shows that persons aged 19, 18, and 20 accounted for the
first, second, and third highest percentages of arrests, respectively, for any age
up to age 24 (after which data are reported by age group). U.S. Dep’t of Justice
& Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 2009, Table 38:
A r r e s t s              b y        A g e          ( S e p t .             2 0 1 0 ) ,
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_38.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2012)
(“2009 CIUS Report”) (reflecting: age 18 (4.8%); age 19 (5.0%); and age 20 (4.6%).
In 2009, 18-to-20-year-olds accounted for over 19% of all murder and
non-negligent manslaughter arrests, 14% of all arrests for forcible rape, almost
24% of all robbery arrests, and 12% of all aggravated assault arrests, see 
id.,
even though they 
comprised only about 4.3% of the population.20, 21


       20
          The government in its summary judgment brief calculated the population figure by
dividing the total estimated population in December 2009 for ages 18,19, and 20 (4,344,942
+ 4,484,666 + 4,415,714) by the total estimated population for all ages in that month
(308,200,409). See U.S. Census Bureau, Dep’t of Commerce, Population Estimates: National
Population            Estimates           for     the    2000s         (June      2010),
http://www.census.gov/popest/data/national/asrh/2009/2009-nat-res.html (last visited Oct. 18,
2012); see also U.S. Census Bureau, Dep’t of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United
States: 2012, Table 11: Resident Population by Race, Hispanic Origin, and Single Years of Age:
2009 (131 ed. 2012), http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0011.pdf (last
visited Oct. 18, 2012) (estimating the total population—as of July 1, 2009—as 307,007,000, and
the population of persons aged 18, 19, and 20 as 4,389,000, 4,484,000, and 4,340,000,
respectively, which yields a 4.3% population figure for 18-to-20-year olds).
        The 2009 CIUS Report was not an aberration. Similar to the 2009 report, the 2010

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                                       No. 11-10959

       Nonetheless, Appellants counter that the emergence of unlicensed, private
gun owners who are selling handguns to young adults undermines the
reasonableness of the fit between the federal scheme and its objective. We
decline Appellants’ invitation to strike down these laws, under intermediate
scrutiny, on the ground that they do not completely prevent young adults from
accessing handguns and committing violent crimes. It is well-settled that “a
statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther
than it did, that a legislature need not strike at all evils at the same time, and
that reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.” Buckley v. Valeo, 
424
U.S. 1
, 105 (1976) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Congress
designed its scheme to solve a particular problem: violent crime associated with



CIUS Report shows that 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds accounted for the three highest percentages
of arrests for any age up to 24 (after which data are reported by age group); and, like the 2009
report, the 2010 report shows that 18-to-20-year-olds accounted for a disproportionately high
percentage of arrests for violent crimes. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Bureau of
Investigation, Crime in the United States 2010, Table 38: Arrests by Age (Sept. 2011),
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10t
bl39.xls (last visited Oct. 10, 2012) (reflecting: age 18 (4.6%); age 19 (4.9%); age 20 (4.7%)).
       21
          We add that Congress’s finding that minors under 21 are prone to violent crime,
especially with guns-in-hand, is entitled to some deference. “Congress is far better equipped
than the judiciary” to make “predictive judgments” and “amass and evaluate the vast amounts
of data” bearing upon “complex” and “dynamic” issues. See Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC,
512 U.S. 622
, 665–66 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
       Furthermore, even putting aside deference, modern scientific research supports the
commonsense notion that 18-to-20-year-olds tend to be more impulsive than young adults aged
21 and over. See, e.g., Brief for the Am. Med. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Neither Party, Miller v. Alabama, 
132 S. Ct. 2455 
(2012) (Nos. 10-9646, 10-9647), 
2012 WL
121237
, at 19–20 (“The brain’s frontal lobes are still structurally immature well into late
adolescence, and the prefrontal cortex is ‘one of the last brain regions to mature.’ This, in
turn, means that ‘response inhibition, emotional regulation, planning and organization . . .
continue to develop between adolescence and young adulthood.’” (citations omitted)); Lawrence
Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 Child Dev.
28, 40–41 (2009) (“[C]hanges in impulse control and planning are mediated by a ‘cognitive
control’ network . . . which matures more gradually and over a longer period of time, into early
adulthood.”).

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                                   No. 11-10959

the trafficking of handguns from FFLs to young adults. Because Congress’s
intended scheme reasonably fits that objective, the ban at bar survives
“intermediate” scrutiny.
                              *           *         *
      We therefore hold that the challenged federal laws are constitutional
under the Second Amendment. Heller does not cast doubt on them.
                         IV. Equal Protection Claim
      We also reject Appellants’ contention that the ban violates the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment. “[E]qual protection analysis
requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classification
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to
the peculiar advantage of a suspect class.” Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 
427 U.S.
307
, 312 (1976). First, we have demonstrated that the challenged laws do not
impermissibly interfere with Second Amendment rights. Second, “age is not a
suspect classification.” Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 
528 U.S. 62
, 83 (2000).
      Unlike race- or gender-based classifications, which require a “tighter fit
between the discriminatory means and the legitimate ends they serve,” the
government may “discriminate on the basis of age without offending” the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection “if the age classification in question
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” 
Id. at 83–84. “[W]hen
conducting rational basis review,” a court “will not overturn” the legislation
“unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to
the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only
conclude that the government’s actions were irrational.” 
Id. at 84 (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted). “[B]ecause an age classification is
presumptively rational, the individual challenging its constitutionality bears the
burden of proving the facts on which the classification is apparently based could
not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker.” 
Id.

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                                No. 11-10959

at 84 (internal quotation marks omitted).
     For the same reasons that the challenged laws are reasonably adapted to
an important state interest, 
see supra 
Section III.E, the laws are rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. Appellants have failed to show that
Congress irrationally imposed age qualifications on commercial arms sales.

     AFFIRMED.




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