Filed: Aug. 27, 2012
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION File Name: 12a0952n.06 No. 11-2266 FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Aug 27, 2012 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT LEONARD GREEN, Clerk JOHN STAHL, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN SARGENT PHIL CZERNIK, ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN ) Defendant-Appellant, ) ) CATHERINE O’MEARA ) ) Defendant. ) BEFORE: ROGERS and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges, and MARBLEY, District Judge.* ROGERS, Circuit Judge. In this §1983
Summary: NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION File Name: 12a0952n.06 No. 11-2266 FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Aug 27, 2012 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT LEONARD GREEN, Clerk JOHN STAHL, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN SARGENT PHIL CZERNIK, ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN ) Defendant-Appellant, ) ) CATHERINE O’MEARA ) ) Defendant. ) BEFORE: ROGERS and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges, and MARBLEY, District Judge.* ROGERS, Circuit Judge. In this §1983 ..
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 12a0952n.06
No. 11-2266 FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Aug 27, 2012
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
JOHN STAHL, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
SARGENT PHIL CZERNIK, ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
)
Defendant-Appellant, )
)
CATHERINE O’MEARA )
)
Defendant. )
BEFORE: ROGERS and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges, and MARBLEY, District Judge.*
ROGERS, Circuit Judge. In this §1983 action, plaintiff John Stahl alleges that he was
wrongfully incarcerated for a crime he did not commit. Stahl was arrested in connection with a
series of home invasions in Michigan. Three witnesses had observed the crimes, two of which
identified Stahl as the perpetrator. Defendant Czernik led the investigation but omitted certain facts
when completing an arrest warrant application. The police arrested Stahl, but released him four
months later after another individual confessed to the crimes. Stahl sued and the district court denied
Czernik’s request for qualified immunity. Qualified immunity was warranted, however, because
there was probable cause to arrest Stahl even in light of the omitted information.
*
The Honorable Algenon L. Marbley, United States District Judge for the Southern District
of Ohio, sitting by designation.
No. 11-2266
Stahl v. Czernik
At the time of the home invasions, Stahl was living in Romulus, Michigan. As a
consequence of a lengthy period of unemployment, Stahl had started going door-to-door and offering
to perform odd jobs for his neighbors. On one occasion, he mowed the lawn of Carol Daly, whose
home was one block south of Stahl’s home. Stahl is white and has tattoos, but no tattoos on his legs.
In July 2008, Ernest Brown—Daly’s neighbor—observed a man walking from
house-to-house, ringing doorbells, and looking through windows. After knocking on Daly’s door,
the man opened a gate and walked into her backyard. Brown contacted another neighbor, Diane
Swantek, and asked her if she recognized the man in Daly’s yard. Brown and Swantek called police
after witnessing the man leave Daly’s home with a jar of money.
When a Romulus police officer arrived, Brown described the suspect as a white male who
was approximately six feet tall, and who had a tattoo of a dragon on his leg. Swantek believed the
man was between 5’8” and 5’10”, had a muscular-slim build, and had a large tattoo on his left calf.
These descriptions were recorded in a police narrative report. The responding officer also contacted
Daly, who said that Stahl matched the description provided by Brown and Swantek. Daly explained
that Stahl had been going door-to-door soliciting landscaping work and had once cut her grass.
A few days later in the same neighborhood, a man with blond hair knocked on Jacqueline
Culiver’s door. Culiver answered the door and stood face-to-face with the suspect. The man seemed
surprised that Culiver was home, stated that he had the wrong house, and ran away down the street.
There was some evidence that the man had tampered with a screen on Culiver’s door or window.
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Stahl v. Czernik
Culiver called the police and recounted the incident to an officer that responded to the scene.
Culiver described the suspect as a tall white man who had tattoos on his arms. During this
conversation, Culiver saw Stahl’s photograph on a computer screen in the officer’s vehicle. Culiver
identified Stahl as the man who had knocked on her door. An officer who was sitting in the vehicle
told Culiver that the man pictured was a suspect in earlier break-ins. The police recorded Culiver’s
description of the suspect in a police narrative, but did not mention her spontaneous identification.
Czernik, the detective assigned to the case, received the files regarding the two incidents and
was told that Stahl was a suspect. In the course of his investigation, Czernik showed a photo array
to Brown, Swantek, and Culiver. Brown and Culiver identified Stahl, but Swantek did not. Brown
testified in his deposition that, at the time of the identification, he had told the officers that he would
have been certain of the suspect’s identity if he knew whether Stahl had a tattoo on his leg.
Following these witness identifications, Czernik wrote an investigative report, but omitted
certain facts. The report did not mention that the suspect had a leg tattoo, describe the circumstances
surrounding Brown’s identification of Stahl, or state that Swantek had failed to identify Stahl. The
report also failed to note that Culiver had spontaneously identified Stahl and that the police told
Culiver that Stahl was a suspect in other break-ins. Czernik included this report in an application
for a warrant to arrest Stahl. Barbara Smith, a prosecutor, issued the warrant after reviewing the
investigation report, the police narrative reports, and the photo arrays.
Stahl, who had been arrested in Las Vegas on an unrelated charge, was transferred to
Michigan. On the advice of counsel, Stahl waived his preliminary examination and his right to
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No. 11-2266
Stahl v. Czernik
contest probable cause. Stahl was released from Wayne County Jail on February 9, 2009—more
than six months after his initial arrest—after another individual confessed to the crimes.
Stahl sued Czernik and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting a claim of false arrest and
false imprisonment. Czernik filed a motion seeking qualified immunity, which the district court
denied. Stahl v. Czernik, No. 09-14266,
2011 WL 4502862, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2011). The
district court divided its analysis into two steps: (1) whether there was a constitutional violation and
(2) whether the right was clearly established. The district court held that a constitutional violation
occurred when Czernik failed to mention the problems with the eyewitness identifications in the
warrant application: Brown’s identification was qualified, Culiver previewed Stahl’s photograph,
and Swantek did not identify Stahl. Moreover, the court held that Czernik should have consulted
Romulus Police Department records, which contained a description of Stahl at odds with the witness
descriptions. The court noted that such a discrepancy should have been included in the warrant
application. The district court also held that it was clearly established that an arrest made without
probable cause is unconstitutional. Czernik filed this interlocutory appeal.
The district court should have granted Czernik’s motion for qualified immunity because
probable cause supported Stahl’s arrest and the information Czernik omitted from the warrant
application was not material. An official is entitled to qualified immunity when he is performing
a discretionary duty, provided that his “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To evaluate whether qualified immunity applies this court evaluates whether
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No. 11-2266
Stahl v. Czernik
the official violated a constitutional right and whether the impacted right is “clearly established.”
See Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The order of this inquiry is not mandatory, nor
does a court need to reach both steps.
Id.
Czernik did not commit a constitutional violation because he had probable cause to arrest
Stahl. An arrest pursuant to a facially valid warrant is normally a complete defense to a false arrest
claim. See Baker v. McCollan,
443 U.S. 137, 143–44 (1979). Therefore, a plaintiff such as Stahl
must show that the officer recklessly or intentionally “omitted information . . . provided that the
information . . . is critical to the finding of probable cause.” Voyticky v. Vill. of Timberlake,
412 F.3d
669, 677 n.4 (6th Cir. 2005). Stahl contends that Czernik recklessly omitted four material facts from
the warrant application: (1) that Brown qualified his identification of Stahl; (2) that Culiver had
previewed Stahl’s photo prior to the photo lineup; (3) that discrepancies existed between the witness
descriptions and Romulus police records; and (4) that Swantek did not identify Stahl as the
perpetrator. The central inquiry is whether there would have been sufficient probable cause had the
warrant application included this omitted information. Sykes v. Anderson,
625 F.3d 294, 305 (6th
Cir. 2010) (citing Hill v. McIntyre,
884 F.2d 271, 275 (6th Cir. 1989)).
Probable cause supported Stahl’s arrest even if the warrant application had included the
omissions. Probable cause exists if the “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge []
are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the
circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing or is about to commit an
offense.” Crockett v. Cumberland Coll.,
316 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2003). In the qualified
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No. 11-2266
Stahl v. Czernik
immunity context, the court evaluates whether “a reasonable officer could have believed [the arrest]
to be lawful.” Hunter v. Bryant,
502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). In
general, an eyewitness identification provides sufficient probable cause to arrest a defendant, “unless,
at the time of the arrest, there is an apparent reason for the officer to believe that the eyewitness was
lying, did not accurately describe what he had seen, or was in some fashion mistaken.” Ahlers v.
Schebil,
188 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This comports with
the general notion that, since eyewitnesses’ statements are based on firsthand observations, they are
generally entitled to a presumption of reliability and veracity.”
Id.
In Stahl’s case, two eyewitnesses—Brown and Culiver—identified Stahl as the perpetrator
of the burglaries. These identifications provided sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to
support the arrest warrant. A reasonable officer would have found the identifications to be reliable
because there is no allegation that the witnesses lied, misremembered, or made a readily apparent
mistake evident at the time of the identification.
We are not persuaded that the omitted information eliminated the probable cause established
by the two witnesses. Stahl contends that the arrest warrant application should have mentioned that
Brown would have been more certain of the identification if he could see the suspect’s tattoos. Even
had this information been included, however, probable cause still would have existed. Admittedly,
the qualification diminishes the evidentiary weight of Brown’s identification, but it does not vitiate
the identification completely. Brown still positively identified Stahl as the perpetrator of the crime,
while indicating that he would be more certain of his answer if he saw the tattoo. Further, Brown’s
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No. 11-2266
Stahl v. Czernik
identification of Stahl did not occur in a vacuum. While Brown hedged his identification, Culiver
did not. According to her testimony, she had come face-to-face with the perpetrator, and
affirmatively identified Stahl. Viewing Brown’s and Culiver’s identifications in tandem, a
reasonable officer could have believed that Stahl committed the offenses in question.
We find similarly unpersuasive Stahl’s contention that probable cause did not exist because
Culiver saw Stahl’s picture before participating in the photo lineup. At the scene of the second
burglary, Culiver saw Stahl’s picture in the police cruiser without any direction or suggestion from
the police, and spontaneously identified Stahl as the perpetrator. In Mock v. Rose,
472 F.2d 619, 621
(6th Cir. 1972), this court held that an “accidental and unplanned” confrontation between a witness
and suspect that led to a “spontaneous” identification did not taint a future identification at trial. In
Stahl’s case, there is no question that Culiver accidentally saw the photograph, and that Culiver
spontaneously identified Stahl as the perpetrator of the crime. Although the photograph was on a
screen in a police cruiser, the officers gave no indication that Stahl was a suspect prior to Culiver’s
identification. Although the officers indicated that Stahl was suspected of other burglaries, these
comments would not have tainted the photo lineup. Culiver had already identified Stahl, and a
reasonably prudent person could believe that her subsequent identification was unconnected with
the police comments.
Moreover, Stahl arguably benefitted from the omission of Culiver’s initial identification from
the warrant application. A witness may view a suspect alone at a time near to the crime:
There is no prohibition against a viewing of a suspect alone in what is called a
“one-man showup” when this occurs near the time of the alleged criminal act; such
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No. 11-2266
Stahl v. Czernik
a course does not tend to bring about misidentification but rather tends under some
circumstances to insure accuracy.
Mock, 472 F.2d at 621 (quoting Bates v. United States,
405 F.2d 1104, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
Culiver saw the photograph of Stahl in isolation, but immediately after the crime occurred. Her
identification, therefore, would have been valid under the rule articulated in Mock, and would have
made it more probable that Stahl had committed the crime. Accordingly, Stahl was not prejudiced
by, but perhaps even benefitted from, the omission.
We likewise reject Stahl’s contention that probable cause would not have existed if the
warrant application had mentioned Swantek’s failure to identify Stahl. Had this failure to identify
occurred absent any other evidence, Stahl might have a valid argument. However, two other
witnesses identified Stahl as the perpetrator; therefore, Swantek’s failure to identify Stahl carried
little evidentiary weight. There are many reasons Swantek may not have been able to identify the
perpetrator—bad eyesight, bad angle, or the fact that Stahl did not commit the crime. When viewed
in light of the two other positive identifications, however, a prudent person would have concluded
that Swantek’s inability to identify Stahl was caused by a factor other than Stahl’s innocence.
Stahl argues that had Czernik investigated Romulus police records, he would have found
discrepancies between the description in the records and those of the eyewitnesses. Romulus Police
records, generated in connection with an earlier arrest for DUI, indicated that Stahl was four inches
shorter than the perpetrator described by witnesses. R. 35-8, Czernik Dep. at 56-58. Further, the
records indicate that Stahl did not have a leg tattoo.
Id. Had Czernik included these discrepancies
in his arrest warrant application, Stahl contends, the warrant would not have issued.
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No. 11-2266
Stahl v. Czernik
Stahl’s argument rests on shaky ground because Czernik had no continuing duty to
investigate. As this court said in Ahlers, “[o]nce probable cause is established, an officer is under
no duty to investigate further or to look for additional evidence which may exculpate the
accused.”
188 F.3d at 371. The Ahlers panel addressed an argument similar to Stahl’s argument, and explained
that “officers, in the process of determining whether probable cause exists, cannot simply turn a
blind eye toward potentially exculpatory evidence known to them in an effort to pin a crime on
someone.”
Id. at 372 (emphasis in original). The Ahlers panel distinguished the case before it
because, like the circumstances in Stahl’s case, the officers had completed the process of determining
whether probable cause existed and the potential exculpatory evidence was not known to them. We
explained:
In the instant matter, the officers undeniably had sufficient probable cause to sustain
[plaintiff]’s arrest with [victim]’s allegations, and Plaintiffs now wish to hold them
liable for evidence which they failed to collect and, therefore, of which they were
unaware. In this respect, then, the instant case is more analogous to that in Crisp v.
City of Kenton, No. 97-3192,
1998 WL 180561 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table
decision), where a panel concluded that a challenged arrest was supported by
probable cause. Crisp, the plaintiff in that case, argued that the officers did not have
probable cause to arrest him because there was information which, if the officers had
considered it, would have established that there was no probable cause to suspect
Crisp of criminal activity.
Id. at *4. The panel, however, rejected Crisp’s argument,
reasoning that “on the basis of the information the officers actually had, as opposed
to information they could have had if they had looked at Crisp’s identification and
believed his story, the officers certainly had sufficient information” with which to
establish probable cause.
Id. Likewise, this panel concludes that on the basis of the
information known to them, i.e., [victim]’s statement and the window of opportunity,
these Defendants established sufficient probable cause to sustain [plaintiff]’s arrest.
Although [defendant]’s investigation certainly was no model of thoroughness and left
many reasonable sources of evidence unexplored, on the basis of the facts before us,
we find that the district court properly concluded that there were no genuine issues
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No. 11-2266
Stahl v. Czernik
of material fact as to whether Defendants had sufficient probable cause to sustain
[plaintiff]’s arrest.
Id. In Stahl’s case, as discussed above, Czernik had probable cause to suspect Stahl was the
perpetrator of the robberies. Once this probable cause was established, Czernik had no duty to sift
through records of the Romulus Police Department for potentially exculpatory evidence before
applying for a warrant. Such a requirement, if generally imposed, would waste valuable time and
resources, and impede the police’s ability to make a timely arrest. Although some officers might
have conducted a more thorough investigation, this failure to find information not known to Czernik
cannot be the basis of a false arrest claim.
Even if the court were to consider the two discrepancies—the height and tattoo—probable
cause would have still existed because two witnesses identified Stahl as the culprit. In a similar case,
the Second Circuit found probable cause existed to arrest a suspect who was shorter, and of a
different skin tone, than the person described in the arrest warrant. Martinez v. City of New York,
340 F. App’x 700, 701 (2d Cir. 2009). The Martinez court determined that because the suspect and
the target of the warrant had the same name and birth date, the differences were “too minor to
preclude a finding of probable cause.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, two witnesses
identified Stahl as the perpetrator, making the difference between the height in the police report and
the witness description too minor to preclude a finding of probable cause. Moreover, unlike in
Martinez, the height discrepancies were in a police report and not on the face of the warrant itself.
Turning to the tattoos, the fact that the police records indicate that Stahl did not have tattoos as the
time of his DUI arrest did not entirely preclude his being the culprit. Stahl could have been released
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No. 11-2266
Stahl v. Czernik
from custody following his prior arrest, and that very day driven to the tattoo parlor. Had the reverse
been true—the report indicating a tattoo and the witnesses indicating no tattoo—the result might
have been different.
Stahl contends that the omissions are nonetheless material because the prosecutor who signed
the arrest warrant testified to their materiality. This argument asks us to apply the wrong standard
of review. “Smith stated that some of the reasons for denying a request for a warrant would be ‘[i]f
someone is not sure of an identification’ or ‘there are inconsistent stories that are being given.’”
Stahl,
2011 WL 4502862, at *6. Smith also testified that it is material if someone had previewed
a photograph before a photograph lineup, that if an identification mentioned tattoos it would be
material if the suspect had no tattoos, and that a non-identification of a suspect is relevant.
Id. at *6-
8. While the district court reasoned that “a reasonable jury could find that Smith would not have
issued an arrest warrant if this information had not been omitted by Czernik,”
id. at *8, this is not
the standard. “Where qualified immunity is asserted, the issue of probable cause is one for the court
since the entitlement is immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Vakilian v. Shaw,
335 F.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). In making this determination,
the court employs an objective test that is not governed by the subjective beliefs of one prosecutor.
This flows from the general rule articulated by the Supreme Court that “Defendants will not be
immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably competent officer would have
concluded that a warrant should issue; but if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on
this issue, immunity should be recognized.” Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
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No. 11-2266
Stahl v. Czernik
Further, Stahl misapprehends Smith’s testimony. When asked a series of hypothetical
questions, Smith answered that the information in the hypothetical may have been relevant.
However, Smith was not presented with the entire context of those facts. Further, she never said that
probable cause would not have existed had those facts been included in the warrant application.
With regard to the qualification Brown made about his identification, Smith testified:
Q: From reading that report, does that—would that have convinced you that
Ernest Brown had positively ID’d John Stahl as the perpetrator of the crime?
A: I wouldn’t have charged if I didn’t think that.
Q: Okay. At anywhere in that incident report, are you aware if Detective Czernik
disclosed the comment by Ernest Brown, stating that John Stahl may be the
guy but he would have to look at his legs to see the tattoos to see if it was the
guy. Was there any disclosure of that fact?
***
Q: Again, does that document [referring to Czernik’s report to Smith] indicate
that Mr. Brown limited his identification to saying, “It may be him but I
would need to see his—the tattoos on his legs.”
A: No, I didn’t see that in there.
***
Q: All right. Did Detective Czernik ever inform your office that they do not
have any records with John Stahl having tattoos on his legs?
A: Our office. Do you mean me personally?
Q: You personally, yes.
A: I don’t have any recollection of that.
Q: Okay. Would that be something that would be important; to figure out if this
is the right individual? . . . If, in making your determination of for probable
cause, would you want to know whether the person matches the identification
or the description?
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No. 11-2266
Stahl v. Czernik
A: Well, yes.
***
Q: If an officer wrote down that a person positively identified someone without
also disclosing a “maybe” or a qualifier that, “I need to see additional
information to make a decision,” is that something you would expect to be in
the police report?
A: Yes, I would hope it would be.
Q: Is that also something that could affect your decision as to whether to
recommend a warrant?
***
A: Yes.
Stahl,
2011 WL 4502862, at *6–7. Although Smith might like to know if a witness had qualified
an identification of a suspect, she never said it would have been material. She said that a
qualification could hypothetically be important, but never said it would have affected her decision
in this instance. Assessing the totality of the circumstances, as discussed above, Brown’s
qualification would not have eliminated probable cause.
Stahl similarly stretches Smith’s testimony about the alleged taint on Culiver’s identification.
Smith testified:
Q: Okay. With respect to Jacqueline Culver—Culiver, do any of these
documents [referring to those presented to Smith by Czernik] indicate that . . .
Jacqueline Culiver was shown a picture of John Stahl prior to the
photographic line-up?
A: No.
Q: Are you aware that that occurred—or at least that’s what she testified
occurred?
***
A: No, other than you telling me that—
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No. 11-2266
Stahl v. Czernik
***
Q: I want you to assume for the purposes of the question that Jacqueline Culiver
saw a picture of John Stahl on a computer screen inside a police car. Okay?
And then the next day, Detective Czernik came out and did a photographic
line-up with her where she positively ID’d John Stahl as the perpetrator of the
crime. Would have that affected the legitimacy of the photographic line-up,
in your opinion?
***
Of her identification in the line-up?
***
A: It would be a factor that you would want to know in considering that a line-up
was held subsequently; that’s one of the factors you consider.
Q: Were you ever informed that—of that event, of her seeing a photo—photo of
John Stahl?
A: No.
***
Q: What about where [a witness is] shown a photograph of the person or they
see a photograph of the person; would that be something that should be in an
incident report?
***
A: In an ideal world, yes, I would think it should have be in there.
Q: Well, how about just in the world we have; is that something you would
expect to be in there?
A: Yes.
Id. at *8. This entire line of questions implied that somehow the lineup was tainted by Culiver’s
spontaneous identification of Stahl as the perpetrator. As discussed above, this is not true, and
therefore does not cut against our analysis. Because Czernik did not violate a constitutional right,
we need not decide whether a right was clearly established. Cf.
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
The district court’s judgment is reversed.
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