ROSEMARY M. COLLYER, District Judge.
Saddiq Abdul-Baaqiy brought this case against the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) for race discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1401 et seq. After a very lengthy and contentious discovery period, Fannie Mae moved for summary judgment on all claims. Despite the extended discovery, the Court finds that Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy has failed to locate and put forth sufficient facts and statistical evidence to survive the motion.
At summary judgment, the Court may only consider undisputed material facts. As they did during discovery, the parties have thoroughly litigated the question of undisputed facts.
Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy stated, for the first time in his August 1, 2017 amended responses to special interrogatory number 14, that in or around early 2010, Mr. Gonsalves referred to him as "boy." Ex. M, Lazerson Decl., Pl.'s Am. Resps. to Special Interrog. No. 14 [Dkt. 54-15] at 5. Fannie Mae disputes this statement and provides a declaration from Mr. Gonsalves stating that he has no recollection of ever referring to Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy as "boy" and would not use that term to refer to an individual due to its derogatory meaning. Decl. of Steven Gonsalves in Supp. of Def. Fannie Mae's Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. 54-29] ¶ 4. However, Fannie Mae also argues in its motion for summary judgment that even accepting Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy's recollection as true, summary judgment is still appropriately granted in Fannie Mae's favor.
The parties also dispute the extent to which Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy has provided statistical evidence necessary to demonstrate a discriminatory disparate impact due to his race. Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy submitted two exhibits with his opposition to Fannie Mae's motion for summary judgment, which he argues demonstrate disparate impact. See Ex. T, Opp'n, Abdul-Baaqiy Data [Dkt. 55-20]; Ex. U, Opp'n, Abdul-Baaqiy Statistical Analysis [Dkt. 55-21]. Fannie Mae accurately points out that Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy did not provide notice of the retention of an expert or serve any expert reports on Fannie Mae.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint included both individual and potential class claims of race discrimination under § 1981 and the DCHRA. See Am. Compl. This Court previously granted summary judgment to Fannie Mae on Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy's claim of disparate treatment under the DCHRA, except as it might relate to his termination. All other allegedly discriminatory acts were outside the relevant DCHRA statute of limitations. See Abdul-Baaqiy v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 149 F.Supp.3d 1 (D.D.C. 2015) (Abdul-Baaqiy I). The following claims remain:
Fannie Mae's motion for summary judgment is ripe for review.
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011). Summary judgment is properly granted against a party who "after adequate time for discovery and upon motion . . . fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court gives the non-movant the benefit of all permissible inferences that may be drawn from the facts alleged in the complaint and accepts the nonmoving party's evidence as true. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Talavera, 638 F.3d at 308. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of its position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. In addition, the nonmoving party may not rely solely on allegations or conclusory statements. Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Rather, the nonmoving party must present specific facts that would enable a reasonable jury to find in its favor. Id. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
Section 1981(b), part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, "prohibits racial discrimination in the `making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.'" Carney v. American Univ., 151 F.3d 1090, 1092-93 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)). The DCHRA prohibits an employer from failing or refusing to hire, discharging, or otherwise discriminating "against any individual, with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" "based upon the actual or perceived: race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age . . . of [the] individual." D.C. Code § 2-1402.11(a).
If a plaintiff cannot provide direct evidence of discrimination, courts apply the burden-shifting framework established long ago in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
At that point, the burden-shifting framework ends and a court must review all the evidence to determine whether a reasonable jury could infer intentional discrimination. See Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493-94 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The Court considers: "(1) the plaintiffs prima facie case; (2) any evidence the plaintiff presents to attack the employer's proffered explanation for its actions; and (3) any further evidence of discrimination that may be available to the plaintiff (such as independent evidence of discriminatory statements or attitudes on the part of the employer)." Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 992-93 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DC Code § 2-1402.68 prohibits "[a]ny practice which has the effect or consequence of violating any of the provisions of [the District of Columbia Human Rights Act]." That clause is known as the "effects clause" and practices are unlawful under it "despite the absence of any intention to discriminate, . . . if they bear disproportionately on a protected class and are not independently justified for some nondiscriminatory reason." Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 29 (D.C. 1987); see also 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants' Ass'n v. District of Columbia, 444 F.3d 673, 685 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (adopting D.C. Court of Appeals' interpretation of DCHRA).
"The DCHRA's effects clause is modeled on the federal disparate-impact doctrine that arose out of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 . . . (1971)." McCaskill v. Gallaudet Univ., 36 F.Supp.3d 145, 157 (D.D.C. 2014). The federal disparate-impact doctrine prohibits "practices" or "policies" that have the effect of discriminating against a protected group of people. A burden-shifting analysis, similar to McDonnell Douglas, is employed.
"A prima facie case of disparate impact requires the identification of a specific employment practice that, while facially neutral, nonetheless had a disproportionate adverse effect on a protected class of individuals." Anderson v. Duncan, 20 F.Supp.3d 42, 54 (D.D.C. 2013); see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 576-78 (2009). Disparate impact claims also require demonstration of causation through "statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question . . . caused" individuals to suffer the offending adverse impact "because of their membership in a protected group." Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988) (plurality opinion); see also Ricci, 557 U.S. at 587 (noting that a prima facie of disparate impact requires, "essentially, a threshold showing of a significant statistical disparity") (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982)).
If a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate that the challenged employment practices do not cause a disparate impact or that the challenged employment practices are justified by business necessity. Onyewuchi v. Mayorkas, 766 F.Supp.2d 115, 131 (D.D.C. 2011). "To maintain an employment requirement with a disparate impact, `Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.'" Smith v. Henderson, 944 F.Supp.2d 89, 107 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432); see also Gay Rights, 536 A.2d at 29 (holding that the employer must demonstrate the employment practice is "independently justified for some nondiscriminatory reason").
Should a defendant demonstrate business necessity, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that an alternative employment practice could legitimately meet the employer's needs without a similar discriminatory effect. Onyewuchi, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 131 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii)).
The DCHRA only permits claims related to discriminatory acts taken one year before the case is filed. See D.C. Code § 2-1403.16 (noting the statute of limitations runs from when the plaintiff discovered or reasonably should have discovered the discriminatory act). Because Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy's lawsuit was filed in March 2012, only claims related to allegedly discriminatory actions that took place in March 2011 or later may be remedied. Therefore, only his termination in April 2011 is relevant. As a result, Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy's disparate impact claim must relate to his termination, as the Court previously held in ruling on Fannie Mae's Motion to Dismiss, and in the alternative, for Summary Judgment. See Abdul-Baaqiy I, 149 F. Supp. 3d at 8-9. Therefore, if Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy intends to use evidence regarding the alleged disparate impact resulting from the forced-ranking policy, he must demonstrate that disparate impact in the forced-ranking policy also created a disparate impact in terminations of African-American employees.
Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy does not attempt to show a disparate impact on African-American terminations resulting from the forced-ranking policies. Instead, he specifically argues that he challenges the forced-ranking policy and presents only statistical evidence that is intended to show disparate impact from the forced-ranking evaluation process. Unfortunately, Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy did not bring this case within one year of his being subject to the forcedranking policy; therefore, as the Court previously found, his argument related to the ranking policy is irrelevant unless he can tie it to a disparate impact in termination, which he does not. The only evidence Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy provides that even references an impact on terminations is the deposition of Ms. Beverly Everson-Jones, who states that "a lot of minorities . . . got laid off during the years from probably 2009 through 2013." Ex. G, Opp'n, Dep. of Beverly Lynn Everson-Jones [Dkt. 55-7] at 64. This statement alone does not demonstrate a disparate impact in terminations after poor evaluations under the forced-ranking policy. Thus, the Court will grant summary judgment to Fannie Mae on Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy's disparate-impact claim.
However, to the extent Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy is attempting to use evidence of a disparate impact in the forced-ranking policy (about which a standalone claim cannot survive the statute of limitations analysis) to support his disparate-treatment claim, the Court will evaluate the evidence submitted.
Fannie Mae asserts that Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy has offered no admissible evidence showing a statistically significant impact of the forced-ranking policy on African Americans. Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy argues that the evidence provided sufficiently shows that African Americans were disproportionately impacted by the forced-ranking system.
Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy submits Exhibits T & U as the underlying data and statistical evidence showing a disparity between the treatment of white and African-American employees. Exhibit T appears to be employee data from Fannie Mae that shows the race and ratings of each employee for 2007 through 2010. See Ex. T, Abdul-Baaqiy Data. Exhibit U appears to be an analysis conducted using the data provided in Exhibit T. It shows the percentage of employees for 2007 through 2010 who are white versus "[b]lack/AA" and shows the distribution of ratings for each category of employees. See Ex. U, Abdul-Baaqiy Statistical Analysis. Exhibit U does not describe the calculations and provides no explanation of the meaning of the resulting numbers. Additionally, Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy has not provided information about the provenance of Exhibit U. Fannie Mae and the Court have no way of knowing who performed the calculations or who, if anyone, could testify about the results if the case proceeded to trial. Fannie Mae argues that Exhibit U is inadmissible because it was not "authenticated by and attached to an affidavit made on personal knowledge, setting forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence or a deposition." Reply at 10 (quoting Stuart v. Gen. Motors. Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 636 n.20 (8th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The District of Columbia Circuit has held, however, that "No survive summary judgment the non-moving party must `produce evidence capable of being converted into admissible evidence.' Greer v. Paulson, 505 F.3d 1306, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Gleklen v. Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., 199 F.3d 1365, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 2000)) (emphasis added); see also Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). While Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy has not explained how Exhibit U may be "capable of being converted into admissible evidence," for these purposes, the Court will assume it may ultimately be admissible if the case proceeded to trial.
Fannie Mae argues Exhibit U is not accurate or reliable and does not provide sufficient statistical analysis to allow a reasonable jury to find a disparate impact from the forced-ranking policy on African-American employees.
As to accuracy, the Court does not assume that Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy's calculations are accurate. Watson, 487 U.S. at 996. Fannie Mae impeaches the accuracy of Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy's statistical evidence by attempting to recreate his calculations and pointing to numerous errors. See Reply at 9 n.8. Its argument diminishes the weight of Exhibit U and calls into question whether it could be sufficiently explained to support a claim of disparate impact from forced rankings in evaluations that might further support Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy's disparate-treatment claims relating to his evaluations and termination. The Court must also consider whether, even if accurate, the evidence shows a true impact.
To establish causation, the plaintiff must offer statistical evidence which must "at a minimum, allege some statistical disparity, however elementary." Brady v. Livingood, 360 F.Supp.2d 94, 100 (D.D.C. 2004) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court has stated:
Watson, 487 U.S. at 994-95; see also Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2507, 2523 (2015) (noting that "[a] robust causality requirement . . . protects defendants from being held liable for racial disparities they did not create"). Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy must demonstrate that any disparity between races is not the result of mere chance. See Ricci, 557 U.S. 557.
There is not a single test to demonstrate disparate impact. See Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In Title VII disparate impact cases, plaintiffs commonly demonstrate causation by presenting evidence that the disparity in outcomes between white and minority candidates is "statistically significant," meaning that statistical analysis reflects that the odds of the disparity occurring by mere coincidence are less than 5%. Id. One demonstrates this through a determination that the "p-value," which stands for "probability," is less than .05, meaning that the probability of a result occurring by chance is less than 5%. Id.
The statistical measure of "standard deviation," is another way to show this same mathematical calculation, which measures the degree to which a set of data is dispersed. Id. Sometimes plaintiffs use a standard deviation analysis to account for the statistical significance of disparities between employees of different races. Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 339-340 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (determining that a standard deviation of 1.96 or higher established a level of statistical significance appropriate for a prima facie care of disparate impact).
Parties who allege disparate impact will also occasionally rely on what is known as the "four-fifths rule," laid out in the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, which is a non-binding set of guidelines penned by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to help employers comply with Title VII. The crux of the "four-fifths rule" is that a selection rate for any racial group that is less than four-fifths (80%) of the rate of the group with the highest selection rate is demonstrative of adverse impact. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D).
Regardless of the method of analysis used, a plaintiff must provide statistical evidence showing that members of a protected class would be disadvantaged by the alleged policy. Ramseur v. Perez, 80 F.Supp.3d 58, 77 (D.D.C. 2015). Causation will not be proved by "small or incomplete data sets and inadequate statistical techniques." Watson, 487 U.S. at 996-97.
While the D.C. Circuit may be more relaxed than other circuit courts when judging the admissibility of documents at summary judgment, the fact remains that Exhibit U has an unidentified author, contains various mathematical errors, and is unexplained by its author. Its reliability is inherently suspect. Compare Greer, 505 F.3d at 1315 ("To survive summary judgment the non-moving party must produce evidence capable of being converted into admissible evidence.") with Stuart, 217 F.3d at 636 n.20 ("To be considered on summary judgment, documents must be authenticated by and attached to an affidavit made on personal knowledge setting forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence or a deposition that meets the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).") and Orsi v. Kirkwood, 999 F.2d 86, 92 (4th Cir. 1993) ("It is well established that unsworn, unauthenticated documents cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment."). Yet Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy relies upon Exhibit U. The analysis in Exhibit U is flawed and simplistic, providing only a rudimentary assessment of the forcedranking policy without explanation or clear results. Indeed, Fannie Mae identified inaccuracies in the calculations. The isolated percentages reflected in Exhibit U provide no context and constitute "inadequate statistical techniques," Watson, 487 U.S. at 996-97, to indicate reliably the significance of Fannie Mae's forced-ranking policy.
Because Exhibit U is insufficient to demonstrate a racial disparity resulting from the forced-ranking policy, it also is insufficient to support Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy's claim that his low evaluation ratings and discharge were a result of disparate treatment.
Because the standards to evaluate a disparate-treatment claim are the same under § 1981 and the DCHRA, the Court will consider both claims together.
Fannie Mae argues that Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy has not provided sufficient evidence to rebut Fannie Mae's legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for giving Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy low evaluation ratings and terminating his employment, namely that Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy was not performing at the expected level of competency in his position and had not demonstrated improvement from one year to another. Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy responds that Fannie Mae's reason is pretextual because the evidence does not support a finding that his performance was sub-par. Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy argues that he received positive feedback from his peers and he believes he was given low ratings on his 2009 and 2010 year-end evaluations only because the policies in effect required some percentage of employees to be rated as the least performing, that is, in the lowest tier. Additionally, Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy argues that his supervisor, Mr. Gonsalves, referred to him as "boy" on one occasion, showing a discriminatory intent. The Court considers all the evidence provided by both Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy and Fannie Mae to determine whether a reasonable juror could infer intentional discrimination. See Waterhouse, 298 F.3d at 992-93; see also Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding the court considers "all the evidence, which includes not only the prima facie case but also the evidence the plaintiff offers to attack the employer's proffered explanation for its action and [any] other evidence").
Both parties submitted evidence of the feedback received by Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy during his 2009 and 2010 year-end evaluations from his supervisors and peers. See Mem. at 14-15; Opp'n at 13-14. The Court agrees that these records demonstrate that some peers stated that Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy "works well with other people in the team" and "follows through well on tasks assigned to him," while others stated that he "[n]eeds to improve quality of work" and "requires more support than he provides." 2010 Gathering Feedback for Associates of Saddiq Abdul-Baaqiy; see also 2009 Accountability Survey for Saddiq Abdul-Baaqiy at FM-AB000490-91 (stating Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy was "[a] competent and out-spoken team mate who readily offers suggestions for improvement" and that he "[a]lienated many coworkers early in the project"). Despite this positive and negative feedback, the undisputed facts show that Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy received the lowest rating on his year-end evaluations in both 2009 and 2010 and was ranked by his peers as below the 25
Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy contends that Fannie Mae's justification for the ratings it gave him is a mere pretext for discrimination because he was in a new position or had a new supervisor shortly before each evaluation. However, he provides no citations to the record or legal support to explain why such facts would support a finding that the actual reason for his low ratings was race discrimination. See Forman v. Small, 271 F.3d 285, 291 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("Consistent with the courts' reluctance to become involved in the micromanagement of everyday employment decisions, the question before the court is limited to whether [plaintiff] produced sufficient evidence of . . . discrimination, not whether he was treated fairly."). There is little space between Fannie Mae's and Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy's arguments about the reasons for his ratings. Fannie Mae argues that Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy received low ratings for two consecutive years because he was performing poorly as compared to his peers. Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy argues that he was rated poorly because his supervisors were required to put some employees in the lowest performance category. Those two arguments are not inconsistent. Neither would lead a reasonable juror to the inference that the underlying reason for Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy's low ratings and termination were his race. See Aka, 156 F.3d at 1288 n.3 (finding that pretext under McDonnell Douglas requires showing "both that the [employer's] explanation is incorrect and that the employer's real reason was discriminatory") (emphasis in original).
Additionally, Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy argues that the decision to terminate him was made prior to the 2010 year-end evaluation period and, therefore, his termination could not have been based on the poor rating on his 2010 evaluation. The record citation provided by Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy directly contradicts his argument. Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy cites Exhibit 6 of the deposition of the Director of Fannie Mae's Making Home Affordable program, Mr. Malcolm J. Blundell. Exhibit 6 is an email chain between Mr. Blundell and Ms. Cheryl Sember (a Human Resources employee at Fannie Mae). In the December 17, 2010 email, Mr. Blundell advises that Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy is under consideration to be "managed out" because he received a rating of 4 in both 2009 and 2010. See Blundell Dep. at Ex. 6 (FM AB000565). While 2010 had not ended as of December 17, it is evident from Mr. Blundell's email that Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy's 2010 performance evaluation had already been completed and he continued to show poor performance. These arguments are insufficient to lead a reasonable juror to the inference that the underlying reason for Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy's termination was his race.
The direct evidence of racial discrimination advanced by Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy is that Mr. Gonsalves once called him "boy." The Court agrees that the use of the term "boy" to refer to an African-American man can evidence racial animus, see Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006), and accepts the statement as undisputed for the purposes of Fannie Mae's motion.
However, assuming Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy's allegation about Mr. Gonsalves's statement as true, the Court finds that Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy has not met his burden of putting forth "some evidence establishing a reasonable inference that the defendant's proffered explanation [for his low performance ratings and termination] is unworthy of credence." Clifton Terrace Assocs., Ltd. v. United Techs. Corp., 929 F.2d 714, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1991). As plaintiff, Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy has the burden to either "persuad[e] the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981). Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy has done neither. Instead he relies on a single alleged derogatory comment, which is insufficient to overcome Fannie Mae's legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy's poor evaluations and ultimate termination.
"The general rule is that stray remarks, i.e., comments that are not tied to the alleged adverse employment action, might be probative of discrimination, but are not sufficient as direct evidence of discrimination." Harris v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 648 F.Supp.2d 53, 62 (D.D.C. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). Here, Mr. Gonsalves's remark was made in early 2010. Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy argues that Mr. Gonsalves's 2010 statement can lead a reasonable juror to believe that Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy's 2009 mid-year and year-end evaluations were a result of racial animus, not poor performance. The potential proximity of the remark to Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy's 2009 year-end evaluation is the only factor that leans toward a possible link between the statement and Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy's 2009 year-end rating. The sole remark alone is not sufficient for a reasonable jury to find discrimination and there is no other direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination.
Considering all the evidence, including Fannie Mae's legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons and Mr. Abdul-Baaqiy's very limited evidence of pretext and discriminatory intent, the Court finds that no reasonable jury could conclude that Fannie Mae's actions were a result of disparate treatment and will grant summary judgment to Fannie Mae on the claims of disparate treatment under the DCHRA and § 1981.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Fannie Mae's Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 54. A memorializing Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
