STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF ) BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF ) PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 79-227

)

FRANCIS CLIFFORD JOYCE, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before Charles C. Adams, a Hearing Officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings. The hearing was conducted on June 18, 20 and 21, 1979, in Room 272, State Office Building, 1350 N.W. 12th Avenue, Miami, Florida.

APPEARANCES

William S. Frates, Esq., Frates, Floyd, Pearson, Stewart, Richman & Greer, One Biscayne Tower, Twenty-fifty Floor, Miami, Florida 33131, special counsel for the Petitioner. David M. Maloney, Esq., Department of Business Regulation, 725 South Bronough Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, for the Petitioner. Mr. Francis Joyce, 1015 South 17th Avenue, Hollywood, Florida 33020, Respondent.

ISSUE

The Petitioner has accused the Respondent, Francis Clifford Joyce, with a violation of Rule 7E-1.06(11)(a), Florida Administrative Code, which reads:

a) The running of a horse in a race with any narcotic, stimulant, depressant or local anesthetic is prohibited. If the stewards shall find that any narcotic, stimulant, depressant or local anesthetic has been administered or attempted to be administered, internally or externally, to a horse before a race, such stewards shall impose such punishment and take such other action as

they may deem proper under any of the rules, including reference to the Division, against every person found by them to have administered, or to have attempted to administer, or to have caused to be administered, or to have caused an attempt to to administer, or to have conspired with another person to administer, such narcotic, stimulant, depressant or local anesthetic.

If the Division laboratory shall find a positive identification of any such medi- cation, such finding shall constitute prima facie evidence that such horse raced with the medication in its system.

Under the accusation, the Respondent is made responsible pursuant to the provisions of Rule 7E-1.18(3), Florida Administrative Code, which indicates that "The trainer shall he responsible for, and be the insurer of the conditions of the horses he enters. Trainers are presumed to know the rules of the Division." Specifically, Respondent Joyce is accused under facts that allege that on October 16, 1978, the horse, Hawaiian Gardens, trained by the Respondent did race in the Second (2nd) race at Calder race course, finishing in the first (1st) position. Subsequent to the race on the same date, a urine specimen was taken from the horse, Hawaiian Gardens, and assigned sample number S 08484 A, and that specimen was allegedly analyzed by the Petitioner's laboratory. It is further alleged that on December 22, 1978, the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering laboratory reported the results of a test and that report showed that the urine sample contained Despropionyl Fentanyl, which is classified as a derivative of Fentanyl, a narcotic compound.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. This cause comes on for consideration based upon a Notice to Show Cause (Administrative Complaint) filed by the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, against Francis Clifford Joyce. At all times pertinent to the Administrative Complaint, Francis Clifford Joyce was the holder of license Nos. K-4547, K-4201 and K-2575 issued by the Petitioner to the Respondent, Francis Clifford Joyce, to operate as a horse trainer for horses racing at the various race tracks located in the State of Florida.

   
   

2. The Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the duty of the regulation of among other things, the matters pertaining to thoroughbred horse racing in the State of Florida. The authority for such regulation is found in Chapter 550, Florida Statutes, and those rules promulgated to enforce the provisions of that chapter. Included in the body of rules are Rules 7E-1.00(11)(a) and 7E-1.18(3), Florida Administrative Code, alluded to in the issue statement of this Recommended Order. These rules as set out in the issue statement shall serve as a basis for determining the facts and reaching the legal conclusions necessary to formulate a decision in this matter and official recognition is taken of the aforementioned rules.

   
   

3. The facts in this case reveal that the Respondent, Francis Clifford Joyce, was operating in his capacity as a horse trainer on October 16, 1978, at the Calder race course in Broward County, Florida. On that date, a horse for which he was the trainer, named Hawaiian Gardens, ran in the second race and finished in first place. Prior to the race, the horse, Hawaiian Gardens, had been in the custody and control of the Respondent in the sense that the horse was in the presence of the Respondent before the race. The horse was treated in the morning prior to the race by medications, ACTH, Steroids, Lasix and for Myopathy, as shown by the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence, which is a copy of the invoice of the treating veterinarian, Carl J. Meyer,

   D.V.M. The first of the medications was given around eight o'clock and further medication was given around nine or nine thirty and that medication was Lasix, which is a substance given for horses who have tendencies to bleed. Around

   eleven thirty or twelve o'clock an injection was given by Dr. Meyer for a condition which Dr. Meyer later described as Myopathy. Joyce saw the injection administered but did not question Dr. Meyer about what was in the injection.

   
   

4. The second race occurred around 1:15 p.m. and, subsequent to the race, Hawaiian Gardens was taken to the detention barn for purposes of taking a urine sample for testing to detect any narcotics. The horse entered the area of the detention barn around 2:00 p.m. The horse started a cooling down period and walk-off around 2:05 p.m. and was back in the stall at 2:25 p.m., at which point the urine sample was taken and the horse was out of the detention barn at 2:30 p.m.

   
   

5. The next day, on October 17, 1978, the Respondent inquired of Dr. Meyer about the previous day's treatment for Hawaiian Gardens. Dr. Meyer replied that he gave the horse a treatment for Myopathy, attention to the horse's nervous system. Joyce made no further inquiry of Meyer about the treatment for Myopathy.

   
   

6. The urine sample of the horse, Hawaiian Gardens, was examined by a series of tests and the urine sample revealed a positive identification of a substance known as Despropionyl Fentanyl, which is classified as a derivative of Fentanyl Citrate, a narcotic. This particular narcotic, Fentanyl Citrate, metabolizes to become Despropionyl Fentanyl, a central nervous system stimulant in horses. The trade name for Fentanyl Citrate is Sublimaze.

   
   

7. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the horse, Hawaiian Gardens, had run in the second race at Calder race course on October 16, 1978, at a time the horse had the substance, Despropionyl Fentanyl, in its system and this had resulted from Dr. Meyer's injection of Sublimaze around eleven thirty or twelve o'clock on October 16, 1978, which he fraudulently called a treatment for Myopathy. Joyce had no knowledge of Meyer's intentions nor the act of injecting the horse with Sublimaze.

   
   

   CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

   
   

8. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this action.

   
   

9. The running of the horse under the influence of the narcotic and stimulant was in violation of Rule 7E-1.06(11)(a), Florida Administrative Code, and the Respondent can be guilty of a violation of that rule in view of the language of Rule 7E-1.18(3), Florida Administrative Code, which makes the trainer responsible for his horses to the extent of being sure of the condition of the horses he enters in a race and creates the presumption that the trainer knows the rules of the Division. See also Div. of Pari-Mutuel, Etc. v. Caple, 362 So.2d 1350 (Fla. 1978).

   
   

10. The effect of the aforementioned rules and the Caple decision creates a condition of strict liability and the only question remaining is whether that concept should be applied in the case, sub judice. The Caple case, supra, at pages 1354 and 1355 contains the following language in discussing the concept of strict liability:

    
    

    * * *

    Whether a violation occurs as a result of the personal acts of the trainer, of persons under his supervision, or even of unknown

    third parties, the condition of licensure has been violated by the failure to provide adequate control, and the consequence of the default is possible suspension of the trainer's license or a fine.12/ We have no doubt that a rule which both conditions a license and establishes with specificity reasonable precautionary duties within the competence of the licensee to perform is both reasonable and constitutional.

    
    

    12. The determination of whether and to what extent the trainer is to be penalized is discretionary with the track stewards. See note 2 above. It is possible that in exceptional cases involving acts totally beyond the trainer's control where there is clear evidence that protective measures have been frustrated by force, no punitive action will be taken. In any event, administrative and judicial review are available to protect against a totally arbitrary or discriminatory exercise of the stewards' discretion, a contention not raised by Caple in this proceeding.

    
    

11. It can be seen that although the violation can occur through either the personal acts of the trainer, persons under his supervision or third parties unknown to him, the rule or rules which form the basis of the violation must do so by establishing with specificity reasonable precautionary duties and those duties must be within the competence of the licensee to perform. In this instance, it is not inappropriate to require the Respondent, Francis Clifford Joyce, to be responsible for the condition of Hawaiian Gardens at the time he was entered in the subject race on October 16, 1978, as a general proposition, but under these facts the Respondent Joyce does not have the necessary competence to second guess the actions of Dr. Meyer in Meyer's treatment rendered to the horse on October 16, 1978. Unlike the Caple situation in which the responsibility of that trainer under Rules 7E-1.06 (15) and (16), Florida Administrative Code, was to police his personal property, effects, and premises against prohibited drugs and implements and to store acceptable drugs in a secure fashion, to accept the Petitioner's theory of the injection Joyce would be expected to vouch for the professional judgment of Dr. Meyer, something he is not competent to do. Furthermore, the voluntary inquiry made on October 17, 1978, on the subject of myopathy, while it places the Respondent on notice to make further inquiry of what was given for the horse's nervous system, it created no greater competence in the Respondent concerning events of October 16, 1978.

    
    

12. Moreover, had the Respondent been placed on notice about another positive test for narcotics on the fluid sample of Hawaiian Gardens, prior to the running of die race on October 16, 1978, or other suspicious events concerning narcotics, dealing with the matters and actions of Dr. Meyer or others, then the Respondent should have investigated more carefully the reasons why this detection of these events had occurred, to include scrutiny of what the treating veterinarian was prescribing for Joyce's horse. Under that plan of action, treatments which did not seem appropriate should make the Respondent sufficiently suspicious to dismiss the veterinarian or he held accountable for

    the future improper conduct of that veterinarian. This hypothetical course of conduct following notification of a positive sample or other facts of a suspicious nature would he within the Respondent's competence to pursue and any abstinence would make him accountable. However, absent other suspicious circumstances involved in Dr. Meyer's actions in treating Hawaiian Gardens on October 16, 1978, there was no duty on the part of the Respondent to interrogate Dr. Meyer at the time Meyer was administering treatment.

    
    

13. In the present case, it is evident that Dr. Meyer injected Hawaiian Gardens on October 16, 1978, with the chemical substance, Fentanyl Citrate, which was later detected as a metabolite in the urine sample of the horse in the form, Despropionyl Fentanyl. This act of injecting the horse was unknown to the Respondent, and at a time that the injection took place, outside the Respondent's competence to detect and he held liable for. The Respondent thought that the horse was being given pre-race treatment which was authorized, when in fact this activity was subsequently determined to he related to the injection of Sublimaze.

    
    

14. After a full consideration of the facts herein, it is concluded as a matter of law that the Petitioner has failed to establish that the Respondent is guilty of a violation of Rule 7E-1.06(11)(a), Florida Administrative Code, as implemented by Rule 7E-1.18(3), Florida Administrative Code.

    
    

15. The Petitioner in this cause has submitted proposed findings of facts, conclusions of law and a recommendation. These proposals have been reviewed prior to the rendition of this Recommended Order, and to the extent that the proposals are not inconsistent with the Recommended Order herein, they have been utilized in drafting the Recommended Order; to the extent that the proposals are inconsistent with this Recommended Order, they are hereby specifically rejected.

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that the case against the Respondent, Francis Clifford Joyce, related to the incident on October 16, 1978, involving the horse, Hawaiian Gardens, be DISMISSED.

DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of August, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida.

CHARLES C. ADAMS

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(904) 488-9675

COPIES FURNISHED:

1. S. Frates, Esquire

   Frates, Floyd, Pearson, Stewart, Richman & Greer, P.A.

   One Biscayne Boulevard, 25th Floor Miami, Florida 33131

   David M. Maloney, Esquire Staff Attorney

   Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

   
   

   Mr. Francis Clifford Joyce 1015 South 17th Avenue Hollywood, Florida 33020

   
   

   ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER

   =================================================================

   
   

   STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION

   
   

   STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF PARI-MUTUEL WAGERING,

   
   

   Petitioner,

   
   

   vs. CASE NO. 79-227

   
   

   FRANCIS CLIFFORD JOYCE,

   
   

   Respondent.

   /

   
   

   FINAL ORDER

   
   

   Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held before Charles C. Adams, a Hearing Officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings. The hearing was conducted on June 18, 20 and 21, 1979, in Room 272, State Office Building, 1350 N.W. 12th Avenue, Miami, Florida.

   
   

   APPEARANCES

   
   

   William S. Frates, Esquire, Floyd, Pearson, Stewart, Richman & Greer, One Biscayne Tower, Twenty-fifth Floor, Miami, Florida 33131, special counsel for the Petitioner. David M. Maloney, Esquire, Department of Business Regulation, 725 South Bronough Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, for the Petitioner. Mr. Francis Joyce, 1015 South 17th Avenue, Hollywood, Florida 33020, Respondent.

   
   

   ISSUE

   
   

   The Petitioner has accused the Respondent, Francis Clifford Joyce, with a violation of Rule 7E-1.06(11)(a), Florida Administrative Code, which reads:

   
   

   1. The running of a horse in a race with any narcotic, stimulant, depressant

or local anesthetic is prohibited. If the stewards shall find that any narcotic, stimulant, depressant or local anesthetic has been administered or attempted to be administered, internally or externally, to a horse before a race, such stewards shall impose such punishment and take such other action as they may deem proper under any of the rules, including reference to the Division, against every person found by them to have administered, or to have attempted to administer, or to have caused to be administered, or to have caused an

attempt to administer, or to have conspired with another person to administer, such narcotic, stimulant, depressant or local anesthetic. If the Division laboratory shall find a positive identification of

any such medication, such finding shall constitute prima facie evidence that such horse raced with the medication in its system.

Under the accusation, the Respondent is made responsible If pursuant to the provisions of Rule 7E-1.18(3), Florida Administrative Code, referred to herein as the absolute insurer's rule, which provides that:

The trainer shall be responsible

for, and be the insurer of the condition of the horses he enters. Trainers are presumed to know the rules of the Division.

Specifically, Respondent Joyce is accused under facts that allege that on October 16, 1978, the horse, Hawaiian Gardens, trained by the Respondent did race in the Second (2nd) race at Calder race course, finishing in the first (1st) position. Subsequent to the race on the same date, a urine specimen was taken from the horse, Hawaiian Gardens, and assigned sample number S 03484 A, and that specimen was allegedly analyzed by if the Petitioner's laboratory. It is further alleged that on December 22, 1978, the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering laboratory reported the results of a test and that report showed that the urine sample contained Despropionyl Fentanyl, which is classified as a derivative of Fentanyl, a narcotic compound.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. This cause comes on for consideration based upon a Notice to Show Cause (Administrative Complaint) filed by the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, against Francis Clifford Joyce. At all times pertinent to the Administrative Complaint, Francis Clifford Joyce was the holder of license Nos. K-4547, K-4201, and K-2575 issued by the Petitioner to the Respondent, Francis Clifford Joyce, to operate as a horse trainer for horses racing at the various race tracks located in the State of Florida.

   
   

2. The Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, is an agency of the State of Florida charged

   with the duty of the regulation of among other things, the matters pertaining to thoroughbred horse racing in the State of Florida. The authority for such regulation is found in Chapter 550, Florida Statutes, and those rules promulgated to enforce the provisions of that chapter. Included in the body of rules are Rules 7E-1.06(11)(a) and 7E-1.18(3), Florida Administrative Code, alluded to in the issue statement of this Order. Those rules as set out in the issue statement shall serve as a basis for determining the facts and reaching the legal conclusions necessary to formulate a decision in this matter and official recognition is taken of the aforementioned rules.

   
   

3. The facts in this case reveal that the Respondent, Francis Clifford Joyce, was operating in his capacity as a horse trainer on October 16, 1978, at the Calder race course in Dade County, Florida. On that date, a horse for which he was the trainer, named Hawaiian Gardens, ran in the second race and finished in first place. Prior to the race, the horse, Hawaiian Gardens, had been in the custody and control of the Respondent in the sense that the horse was in the presence of the Respondent before the race. The horse was treated in the morning prior to the race by medications, ACTH, Steroids, Lasix and for Myopathy, as shown by the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5 admitted into evidence, which is a copy of the invoice of the treating veterinarian, Carl J. Meyer,

   D.V.M. The first of the medications was given around eight o'clock and further medication was given around nine or nine thirty and that medication was Lasix, which is a substance given for horses who have tendencies to bleed. Around eleven thirty or twelve o'clock an injection was given by Dr. Meyer for a condition which Dr. Meyer later described as Myopathy. Joyce saw the injection administered but did not question Dr. Meyer about what was in the injection.

   
   

4. The second race occurred around 1:15 p.m. and, subsequent to the race, Hawaiian Gardens was taken to the detention barn for purposes of taking a urine sample for testing to detect any narcotics. The horse entered the area of the detention barn around 2:00 p.m. The horse started a cooling down period and walk-off around 2:05 p.m. and was back in the stall at 2:25 p.m., at which point the urine sample was taken and the horse was out of the detention barn at 2:30 p.m.

   
   

5. The next day, on October 17, 1978, the Respondent inquired of Dr. Meyer about the previous day's treatment for Hawaiian Gardens. Dr. Meyer replied that he gave the horse a treatment for Myopathy to the horse's nervous system. Joyce made no further inquiry of Meyer about the treatment for Myopathy.

   
   

6. The urine sample of the horse, Hawaiian Gardens, was examined by a series of tests and the urine sample revealed a positive identification of a substance known as Despropionyl Fentanyl, which is classified as a derivative of Fentanyl Citrate, a narcotic. This particular narcotic, Fentanyl Citrate, metabolizes to become Despropionyl Fentanyl, a central nervous system stimulant in horses. The trade name for Fentanyl Citrate is Sublimaze.

   
   

7. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the horse, Hawaiian Gardens, had run in the second race at Calder race course on October 16, 1978, at a time the horse had the substance, Despropionyl Fentanyl, in its system and this had resulted from Dr. Meyer's injection of Sublimaze around eleven thirty or twelve o'clock on October 16, 1978, which he fraudulently called a treatment for Myopathy.

   
   

8. Joyce had no knowledge of Meyer's intentions nor the act of injecting the horse with Sublimaze. Joyce did understand the absolute insurer's rule and his absolute duty under it to keep his horse from running in a race with a

   narcotic or stimulant in its system. (This last sentence was not included in the findings of fact of the Hearing Officer. It is supported by the Record, Transcript P. 22).

   
   

   CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

   
   

9. The Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this action.

   
   

10. The running of the horse under the influence of the narcotic and stimulant was in violation of Rule 7E-1.06(11)(a), Florida Administrative Code, and Rule 7E-1.18(3), Florida Administrative Code, which makes the trainer responsible for his horses to the extent of being absolute insurer of the condition of the horses he enters in a race and creates the presumption that the trainer knows the rules of the Division. See also Div. of Pari-Mutuel, etc. v. Caple, 362 So.2d 1350 (Fla. 1978).

    
    

11. The effect of the aforementioned rules and the Caple decision creates a condition of strict liability. In Caple, the Florida Supreme Court held:

    
    

    To protect, the integrity of this unique [pari-mutuel wagering) industry, it is really immaterial whether 'guilt' should be ascribed either directly or

    indirectly to the trainer. The rules were designed and reasonably so, to condition the grant of a trainer's license on the trainer's acceptance of an absolute duty to ensure compliance with reasonable regulation governing the areas over which the trainer has responsibility. (Supra

    at 1354.)

    
    

12. In reaching this decision the Court quoted with approval the following:

    
    

    [I]t is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious to provide that the trainer guarantee the condition of a horse running in a race upon the results of which there is wagering. Sandstrom

    v. California Horseracing Bd., 31 Cal.2d 401, 411-12, 189 P.2d 17, 23, cert. denied, 33 S. U.S. 814, 69 S.Ct. 31,

    93 L.Ed. 369 (1948)

    
    

    Conceding that the rule . . . is harsh and may, in some instances, result in injustice to innocent people, we think the rule can be justified on the grounds of public policy, because it is the only effective means by which fraud and deceit in connection with horseracing can be minimized. State ex.rel. Morris v. West Va. Racing Commission, 133 W.Va. 179,

    202-3, 55 P.E.2d, 263, 274-75 (1949).

    Horseracing, at its best, is difficult to control, and would be practically

    impossible to regulate if every governing rule and regulation was made dependent

    for validity upon the knowledge or motives of the person charged with a violation . . . Manifestly, it would be almost impossi-

    ble to prove guilty knowledge or intent in cases of this kind, and the futility of prosecutions under a rule requiring

    probative evidence of guilty knowledge and intent would eventually leave the public interest and welfare to the mercy of

    the unscrupulous. Fogt v. Ohio State Racing Comm., 3 Ohio App. 2d 423, 426,

    210 N.E.2d 730, 733 (1965). (Supra at

    1353, 1354).

    
    

13. The Court thereupon concluded:

    
    

    Whether a violation occurs as a result of the personal acts of the trainer, of

    persons under his supervision, or even of unknown third parties, the condition of licensure has been violated by the failure to provide adequate control, and the consequence of the default is possible suspension of the trainer's license or a fine . . . . It is now well established that in areas of activity requiring strong police regulation to protect public interests, strict liability may be imposed upon persons "otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a

    public danger." United States v.Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 64 S.Ct. 134, 88 L.Ed. 48

    (1943). Horse racing is such an area of activity. Western Turf Association v.

    Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 27 S.Ct. 384

    51 L.Ed. 520 (1907) . . . . In the inter- est of protecting both the health of thoroughbred horses and the integrity

    of the sport from which the state derives revenues, the state has a valid object- ive in seeking to prevent drugging of

    race horses. An absolute insurer rule for horse trainers represents a reasonable

    and valid exercise of the state's police power to achieve that objective.

    (Supra at 1354, 1355).

    
    

14. Respondent testified that, while he was present when Dr. Meyer gave the illegal injection, he had no knowledge of Dr. Meyer's intentions nor the act of injecting Hawaiian Gardens with Sublimaze. Such knowledge, however, is not a prerequisite to the finding of a violation of the absolute insurer's rule. Respondent testified that he understood the absolute insurer's rule and his absolute duty under it to keep any horse which he trained from running in a race

    with a narcotic or stimulant in its system. While Joyce did inquire at a later date of Dr. Meyer about the injections given Hawaiian Gardens, such after the fact inquiry hardly comports with Joyce's duty under the absolute insurer's rule to be responsible for and the absolute insurer of the narcotic and stimulant free condition of any horse which he trains.

    
    

15. Consequently, in the instant matter, the horse, Hawaiian Gardens, trained by Francis Clifford Joyce, who at all times material was duly licensed by the State of Florida to operate as a trainer, ran in the second race at Calder on October 16, 1978 with Despropionyl Fentanyl, a narcotic and central nervous system stimulant, in its system. Since Rule 7E-1.06(11)(a) of the Florida Administrative Code prohibits the running of a horse in any race with any narcotic or stimulant and since regulation 7E-1.18(3) of the Florida Administrative Code makes the trainer the absolute insurer of the condition of any horse he enters, the Respondent is guilty of running an illegally drugged horse in said second race at Calder on October 16, 1978.

CONCLUSION

Francis Clifford Joyce is found to have violated Regulations 7E-1.18(3) and 7E-1.06(11)(a) of the Florida Administrative Code and shall be declared ineligible for licensing for 120 days from July 1, 1979 and fined Two Hundred Dollars ($200)

GARY R. RUTLEDGE, DIRECTOR

Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing was sent by U.S. Mail to: MR. FRANCIS CLIFFORD JOYCE, 1015 South 17th Avenue, Hollywood, Florida 33020;

W. S. FRATES, ESQUIRE, One Biscayne Tower, 25th Floor, Miami, Florida; and DAVID MALONEY, Department of Business Regulation, 219 Johns Bldg., 725 So. Bronough Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, this 12th day of September, 1979.

GARY R. RUTLEDGE, DIRECTOR

Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering

Docket for Case No: 79-000227

Orders for Case No: 79-000227