STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL )

REGULATION, BOARD OF MEDICAL )

EXAMINERS, )

)

Petitioner, )

) CASE NO: 81-1502

EDWARD GORDON, M.D., )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings, by its duly designated Hearing Officer, R. L. Caleen, Jr., held a formal hearing in this case on March 4, 1982, in Miami, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Joseph W. Lawrence II, Esquire

130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

For Respondent: Andrew H. Boros, Esquire

810 Dupont Plaza Center

300 Biscayne Boulevard Way Miami, Florida 33131

ISSUES PRESENTED

Whether respondent's licence as a medical doctor should be disciplined on charges that he: (1) was convicted in a foreign country of a crime relating to the practice of medicine, (2) obtained his license to practice medicine by fraud or deceitful misrepresentation, (3) had his license acted against by the licensing authority of another state, (4) made misleading, untrue, or fraudulent representations in the practice of medicine or employed a trick or scheme in the practice of medicine, (5) engaged in unethical, deceptive, or deleterious conduct harmful to the public, (6) failed to prescribe controlled substances in good faith and in the course of his medical practice, and (7) engaged in immoral or unprofessional conduct, incompetence, negligence, or willful misconduct, all in violation of Section 458.1201, Florida Statutes (1973), and Section 458.331, Florida Statutes (1981).

BACKGROUND

By a seven-count amended administrative complaint dated April 30, 1981, petitioner Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners ("Department"), charged respondent Edward Gordon, M.D. ("respondent"), with violating Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. Specifically, it alleged that respondent violated Section 458.331(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1981), 1/ "by being convicted of a crime in a country which relates to the practice of

medicine or ability to practice medicine"; violated Section 458.331(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), 2/ "by . . . having obtained his license to practice medicine in the State of Florida by . . . material and/or fraudulent and/or deceitful misrepresentations"; violated Section 458.331(1)(b), Florida Statues (1981), 3/ "by having his license to practice medicine acted against by the licensing authority of another state"; violated Section 458.331(1)(1), Florida Statutes (1981), 4/ "by making misleading deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in the practice of medicine or employing a trick or scheme in the practice of medicine"; violated Section 458.331(1)(k), (l), (m), and (o), Florida Statutes (1981), 5/ "by engaging in unethical, deceptive, or deleterious conduct or practice harmful to the public"; violated Section 458.331(1)(h), Florida Statutes (1981), 6/ "by failing to prescribe controlled substances in good faith and in the course of his professional practice"; and violated-Section 458.331(1)(t) , Florida Statutes (1981) , 7/ "by being guilty of immoral or unprofessional conduct, incompetence, negligence, or wilful misconduct . . ."

On June 1, 1981, the Department forwarded this case to the Division of Administrative Hearings, contending that, although no election of rights had been filed by respondent, a formal hearing must be held in the absence of an agreement by the parties that there were no disputed issues of material fact. (In subsequent pleadings, respondent denied all charges and asserted affirmative defenses.)

Hearing was initially set for September 22, 1981. On the Department's motion it was continued and reset for October 21 and 22, 1981; then, on respondent's motion and without objection by the Department, it was continued and reset for January 5 and 6, 1982. In December, 1981, respondent again moved for a continuance and, without objection, hearing was reset for March 4, 1982.

At hearing, the Department called Delores Morgan, M.D., Dorris Bruce, and Kirsten Alonso (language interpreter) as its witnesses and Petitioner's Exhibit 8/ Nos. 1-5 and 7-8 were received into evidence. Respondent testified on his own behalf and Respondent's Exhibit 8/ Nos. 1-2 were received into evidence.

The parties agreed to file post-hearing proposed findings

of fact by May 20, 1982. On the Department's subsequent motion, this date was extended to May 25, 1982.

Based on the evidence presented at hearing, the following facts are determined:

FINDINGS OF FACT I.

Count I: Conviction of a Crime Relating to the Practice of Medicine

1. In 1960, respondent was a first-year medical student at Fribourg University in Switzerland. On May 11, 1960, he was tried and convicted by the Criminal Court of Sarine in Fribourg, Switzerland, of the crimes of "attempted abortion committed by a third person, attempted abortion on an unsuitable object by a third person, and violation of the law regarding the health regulations."

   He was sentenced to a ten-month prison term, minus the time of detention served while awaiting trial, with a suspended execution of sentence during five years. Respondent was also fined 500 Swiss francs, deported from Switzerland, and barred from reentry for a period of fifteen years. (Testimony of Gordon, Alonso; P-3.)

   
   

   II.

   
   

   Count II: Obtaining Florida Medical License by Fraud or Misrepresentation

   
   

2. On December 17, 1971, respondent filed with the Florida State Board of Medical Examiners a sworn application for examination and licensure as a medical doctor in the State of Florida. On his application, he responded in the negative to questions asking whether he had ever been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor. The application also contained the following statement, in bold type, above the signature line of the applicant:

   
   

   I have carefully read the questions in the foregoing application and have answered them completely, without reservations of any kind, and I declare under penalty of perjury that my answers and all statements made by me herein are true and correct. Should I fur- nish any false information in this applica- tion, I hereby agree that such act shall constitute cause for the denial, suspension, or revocation of my license to practice

   medicine and surgery in the State of Florida. (P-2.)

   
   

   On August 30, 1972, based on his application and passage of the examination, the Board of Medical Examiners issued respondent a license (license No. 24291) to practice medicine and surgery in Florida. (Testimony of Gordon; P-2.)

   
   

3. Respondent explains his failure to reveal his Switzerland conviction on his application as a "peccadillo." (Tr. 245.) Since the New Jersey Medical Board records (where he was previously licensed) reflected his Switzerland conviction, he testified that he felt the New Jersey board would have notified the Florida board of the conviction. (Tr. 245-246.)(Testimony of Gordon.)

   
   

4. By 1974, within two years after he was licensed in Florida, the Department became aware of his criminal conviction in Switzerland. In 1973 or 1974, soon after respondent opened his medical practice in North Miami Beach, a Department investigator, A. J. Stack, told him that the Department knew of his criminal conviction in Switzerland. (Testimony' of Gordon; R-2.)

   
   

   III.

   
   

   Count III: New Jersey's Action Against Respondent's Medical License

   
   

5. On September 29, 1972, the New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners issued an administrative complaint seeking to suspend or revoke respondent's New Jersey medical and surgical license on charges he sexually assaulted two female patients and dispensed amphetamines to two other patients without good medical cause. One month later, the New Jersey board supplemented its complaint by adding two additional charges: (1) that he was convicted as an abortionist in

   Switzerland in May, 1960, and (2) that he failed to complete Section 12 of the application (i.e., disclose the Switzerland conviction), thereby obtaining his New Jersey medical license by fraud. (P-4, R-2.)

   
   

6. On December 11, 1972, the New Jersey Department of Health suspended, for an indefinite period, respondent's New Jersey controlled substance registration. The suspension order states that, after being notified by certified mail, respondent failed to appear before the Department and show cause why his registration should not be suspended. No other reason is given for the suspension action. Respondent now asserts that the Department of Health did not notify him of its action to suspend his controlled substance registration. (Tr. 251-252.)(Testimony of Gordon; P-4.)

   
   

7. The charges brought against respondent by the New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners were never adjudicated on their merits. On February 27, 1973, he resigned from the practice of medicine in New Jersey and surrendered his New Jersey medical license to the Board of Medical Examiners. (Testimony of Gordon; P-4, R-2.)

   
   

8. When the New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners brought its charges against respondent, he had already obtained his Florida medical license. The Florida board of Medical Examiners learned of the New Jersey charges and respondent's resignation in May, 1973. In February, 1974, the board's counsel advised that "there is really nothing we can do unless Dr. Gordon violates the Florida laws." (R-2.) And, on May 15, 1974, the board's executive director made this notation in respondent's file:

   
   

   If he [respondent] has any trouble here in Florida we can suspend his license on the basis of the N.J. Board's action. (R-2.)

   
   

   IV.

   
   

   Counts IV, V, VI, and VII: Professional Misconduct in Treating Elizabeth Buffum

9. Respondent began to practice medicine in Florida in 1973 at North Miami Beach, Florida. In December of that year--at the request of a third party--he went to the home of Elizabeth Buffum and treated her for alcoholism.

   Thereafter, he continued to treat her for chronic alcoholism. His treatment was to limit her use of alcohol and prescribe various sedatives, such as Thorazine and Sparine, which are scheduled controlled substances. In June, 1974, he and Ms. Buffum began living together; in September they were married. From December, 1973, until Ms. Buffum left him in November, 1975, respondent continuously acted as her physician and provided treatment for her alcoholism. (P-1.)

   
   

10. Ms. Buffum was a woman of great wealth. During her marriage to respondent, she relied on respondent not only as her physician but also as her confidant and financial advisor. Extensive 9/ civil litigation which followed their broken marriage resulted in the Circuit Court of Dade County rendering a judgment in Bellman v. Gordon, Case No. 75-18967 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 1979) [affirmed, Gordon v. Gordon, 386 So.2d 1326 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1980), opinion filed July 29, 1980], finding that:

    Edward Gordon breached this fiduciary duty [to Ms. Buffum and converted her assets to his own use and the use of his family so that nearly all of her assets were divested from her.

    
    

    The court ordered the return of her assets. (P-1, P-5.)

    
    

11. In treating Ms. Buffum's alcoholism, respondent would allow her to drink limited amounts of alcohol: the thrust of his treatment program was to gradually decrease the dosages of alcohol. (Frequently, he would add water to her liquor bottles in an attempt to lessen the effects of alcohol.) He sometimes gave her an alcoholic drink to calm her, and ordinarily allowed her an alcoholic drink before evening meals. He also gave her vitamin B12 and Valium. When he thought she was having delirium tremors, he administered Thorazine. He acknowledges that, when she was in such a condition, it would have been proper to place her in the hospital, but he felt--at the time--that he could properly care for her at home. (Testimony of Gordon; P-1.)

    
    

12. Dr. Delores Morgan, a qualified expert in family practice and alcoholism treatment, testified that respondent's medical treatment of Ms. Buffum deviated from the generally accepted and prevailing medical practice in the Miami area between 1973 and 1975. She testified Benzodiazepins (including Librium and Valium), rather than Phenathiazines (including Thorazine and Sparine) should be administered to patients suffering from alcohol withdrawal symptoms, such as delirium tremors; that such patients are medical emergencies and must be hospitalized, where their progress can be monitored and a thorough physical examination can be given, including checking eletrolyte patterns, potassium deficiencies, and chemical profiles; that, rather than decreasing doses of alcohol, treatment of alcoholism requires complete abstinence; and that if an alcoholic patient refused hospitalization, he or she should have been involuntarily hospitalized pursuant to state law. These opinions of Dr. Morgan are persuasive and are expressly adopted as findings. Respondent's contrary opinions are rejected as self-serving and uncorroborated. (Testimony of Morgan.)

    
    

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

13. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this proceeding. s. 120.57(1), Fla. Stat. (1981).

    
    

14. The Department charges respondent with violating Section 458.1201(1)(b), (c), (d), (h), (k), and (m), Florida Statutes (1973), as later reenacted by Section 458.331(1)(a), (b), (c), (k), (l), (m), (o), and (t) , Florida Statutes (1981) and Section 455.227(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1981).

    
    

15. License revocation proceedings are penal in nature. Bowling v. Department of Insurance, 394 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). In such proceedings "the term `substantial competent evidence' takes on vigorous implications that are not so clearly present on other occasions for agency action under Chapter 120." Id. at 171. Violations are

    
    

    [N]ot to be found on loose interpretations and problematic evidence, but the violation must in all its implications be shown by evidence which weighs as "substantially" on a scale suitable for evidence as the penalty

    does on the scale of penalties. In other words, in a world ensnarled by false assump- tions and hasty judgments, let the prosecutor's proof be as serious-minded as the intended penalty is serious.

    
    

    Id. at 172.

    
    

16. The evidence on each charge is measured by this standard and addressed below:

    
    

    1. Count I: Conviction of a Crime.

       
       

17. In 1971, when respondent applied for his Florida medical license, Section 458.1201(1), Florida Statutes (1971), empowered the Board of Medical Examiners to deny an application or discipline a license if the applicant or licensee was found guilty of, inter alia:

    
    

    (c) Being convicted of a felony in

    the courts of this state or any other state, territory, or country. Conviction as used in this paragraph shall include a conviction

    of an offense which if committed in this state would be deemed a felony without regard to

    its designation elsewhere, or a criminal proceeding in which a finding or verdict of guilt is made or returned but the adjudica- tion of guilt is either withheld or not entered thereon;

    * * *

    (k) Violating a statute or law of this state, any other state, or the United States (without regard to its designation as either felony or misdemeanor) which statute or law relates to the practice of medicine or in part regulates the practice of medicine;

    s. 458.1201(1) , Fla. Stat. (1971)

    
    

18. In 1979, the Legislature repealed these provisions and enacted Section 458.331(1)(c) , Florida Statutes (1979), which reads:

    
    

    1. The following acts shall consti-

       tute grounds for . . . disciplinary [action]

       . . .

       (c) Being convicted or found guilty, regardless of adjudication, of a crime in any jurisdiction which directly relates to the practice of medicine or to the ability to practice medicine. Any plea of nolo contendere shall be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter.

       
       

       This 1979 provision is broader than the law in effect in 1971. For example, the 1979 provision would allow disciplinary action against a licensee convicted in a foreign country of any crime relating to the practice of medicine; to authorize disciplinary action under the 1971 statute, the conviction would have had to have been an offense which, if committed in Florida, would have been deemed a

       felony. The more narrowly drawn 1971 statute has been strictly construed by the courts.. See, Rotstein v. Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, 397 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

       
       

19. Penal statutes cannot be applied retroactively; a licensee has a right to know in advance what conduct is proscribed by the Legislature. See, e.g., Lester v. Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, 345 So.2d 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Cf., McKibben v. Mallory, 293 So.2d 48 (Fla. 1974); Gewart

    v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 166 So.2d 230 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1964). Moreover, statutes authorizing disciplinary action must be strictly construed, and any ambiguities must be construed in favor of the licensee. Lester, supra at 925. Respondent's conviction must have been a ground for denying him a license in 1971 (when he applied) and a ground for disciplining his license under existing law.

    
    

20. It is concluded that the evidence does not establish that respondent's criminal conviction in Switzerland falls within the conduct proscribed by Section 458.1201(1)(c) and (k), Florida Statutes (1971), and Section 455.331(1)(c) , Florida Statutes (1951). The reasons are twofold. First, his criminal conviction occurred prior to his obtaining his Florida medical license. A licensee may not be disciplined for misconduct which occurred before he was licensed. See generally, Laney v. Holbrook, 8 So.2d 465, 468 (Fla. 1942); Cf., State ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 295 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1974). Second, the Department failed to show that the Switzerland crime, if committed in Florida, would be deemed a felony.

    
    

    1. Count II: Obtaining License by Fraud or Misrepresentation.

       
       

21. The evidence does not establish that respondent violated Section 458.331(1)(b) , Florida Statutes (1981), 10/ [formerly Section 458.1201(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1971)]; that he obtained his license by fraud, or misrepresented a material fact by answering "no" to the question: "Have you ever been convicted of a felony? A misdemeanor." (P-2.) "Felony" means a criminal offense which, if committed in Florida, would be punishable by death or imprisonment in the state penitentiary. Rotstein, supra at 308; s. 775.18, Fla. Stat. (1971) . Every Florida crime which is not a felony is a misdemeanor. Id. Here, as in paragraph A above, the Department failed to establish that respondent's criminal offense committed in Switzerland in 1960 would have constituted either a "felony"' or misdemeanor if committed in Florida law in 1971--when respondent answered the question in his application. Consequently, it cannot be concluded that his negative answer on the application for licensure was false or a deceitful misrepresentation.

    
    

    1. Count III: New Jersey's Action Against Respondent's License.

       
       

22. Respondent is not guilty of violating Section 458.331(1) (b), Florida Statutes (1981). This statute contemplates disciplinary action beyond mere allegation; action by the New Jersey Board of Medical Examiners against respondent's license to practice medicine never matured beyond allegation. Neither can the board's acceptance of his resignation be translated into a disciplinary action. The Florida Board of Medical Examiners could not discipline a Florida licensee based solely on allegations; neither should it be able to do so here when the allegations are made by an out-of-state licensing authority. Finally, the New Jersey Department of Health's registration suspension order--based only on respondent's failure to appear at hearing--is insufficient to establish a violation of Section 458.331(1)(b) because the Department of Health is not the New Jersey medical licensing authority.

    1. Counts IV through VII: Professional Misconduct Toward Elizabeth Buffum.

    
    

23. The evidence is insufficient to establish that, in his treatment of Ms. Buffum, respondent violated Sections 458.331(1)(h)(k), (1), (m), and (o), Florida Statutes (1981). 11/ Moreover, to establish these violations--since penal statutes cannot be applied retroactively--it was incumbent upon the Department to present convincing evidence that the complained-of conduct also violated Section 458.1201(1)(b), (h), and (k), Florida Statutes (1973); this it did not do.

    
    

24. However, the evidence does establish that respondent violated Section 458.331(1)(t) , Florida Statutes (1981), 12/ and Section 458.1201(1)(m), Florida Statutes (1973), in his treatment of Ms. Buffum--by failing to practice medicine with the level of care, skill, and treatment recognized by his peers as acceptable under the circumstances.

    
    

25. Respondent raises laches as an affirmative defense. Laches may prevent or estop a party from asserting a right. It is a legal principle which is applied when there is "unreasonable delay in enforcing a right, coupled with disadvantage to another." Horowitz v. United National Corporation, 324 So.2d 189, 190 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1975). In this case, it is clear that the Department knew of respondent's 1960 conviction as early as 1974 but took no action until 1981--seven years later. By any reasonable standard of diligence, this delay is excessive. No attempt has been made to justify this delay.

    
    

26. However, respondent has not shown how this delay prejudiced him or worked to his disadvantage. Mere passage of time is insufficient reason to invoke laches. The Department's action is not, therefore, barred.

    
    

27. Penalty. Revocation of a professional license is a serious and drastic penalty which should be imposed only in the most flagrant cases. See, generally, Bowling, supra; Taylor v. State Beverage Department, 194 So.2d 321,

    329 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967); Pauline v. Borer, 274 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla. 1973). In this case, only one charge was substantiated by the evidence. Respondent has not been found guilty of any previous disciplinary infractions in Florida. Consequently, it is recommended that respondent's license to practice medicine be suspended for one (1) year.

    
    

28. The parties submitted proposed findings of fact. To the extent such findings are incorporated in this recommended order, they are adopted; otherwise they are rejected as unsupported by the necessary quantum of evidence or unnecessary to resolution of the issues presented. In its proposed findings, the Department urged that it be found that respondent, in a calculating and sinister manner, married Ms. Buffum for her money, took advantage of her alcoholic condition, and "looted" her of her assets. Bowling, supra, recognizes that such accusations, even if clearly cognizable under the Medical Practice Act, must be proven by evidence as substantial as the consequences. At hearing, Ms. Buffum did not testify, her demeanor could not be observed; the Department sought to prove these accusations by introducing a transcript from earlier civil litigation. On the other hand, respondent testified and forcefully denied these particular accusations. Respondent's denial is persuasive. These accusations involve alleged marital misconduct, they stem from accusations made by one spouse against another. In such cases, it is even more important that the evidence convincingly establish a violation of the Chapter 458, Medical Practice Act. Otherwise, the board may find its disciplinary powers being invoked in

marital disputes--disputes which the board is ill-equipped to decide and which are more appropriately resolved in other forums.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED:

That respondent's license to practice medicine and surgery in Florida be suspended for one (1) year.

DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 22nd of June, 1982 in Tallahassee, Florida.

R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building

2009 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Telephone: (904) 488-9675

FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 1982.

ENDNOTES

8/ Petitioner's and Respondent's Exhibits will be referred to as "P- ," and "R- ," respectively. Pages of the transcript will be referred to as "Tr. ."

9/ The trial took more than one year; the record consisted of 78 depositions, numerous exhibits, and 1,666 pages of trial transcript.

10/ "Having a license to practice medicine revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against, including the denial of licensure, by the licensing authority of another state, territory or country." s. 458.331(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1981).

11/ "(h) Failing to perform any statutory or legal obligation placed upon the licensed physician. . . .

"(k) Exercising influence within a patient-physician relationship for purposes of engaging a patient in sexual activity. A patient shall be presumed to be incapable of giving free, full, and informed consent to sexual activity with his or her physician.

"(l) Making deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in the practice of medicine or employing a trick or scheme in the practice of medicine when such scheme or trick fails to conform to the generally prevailing standards of treatment in the medical community.

"(m) Soliciting patients, either personally or through an agent, through the use of fraud, intimidation, undue influence, or a form of overreaching or vexatious conduct. A solicitation is any communication which directly or implicitly requests an immediate oral response from the recipient. . . .

"(o) Exercising influence on the patient or client in such a manner as to exploit the patient or client for financial gain of the licensee or of a third party which shall include, but not be limited to, the promoting or selling of services, goods, appliances, or drugs and the promoting or advertising of any prescription form of a community pharmacy unless the form shall also state 'This prescription may be filled at any pharmacy of your choice.'" s. 458.331(1), Fla. Stat. (1981).

12/ "(t) Gross or repeated malpractice or the failure to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. The board shall give great weight to the provisions of s. 768.45 when enforcing this paragraph." s. 458.331(1), Fla. Stat. (1981).

COPIES FURNISHED:

Andrew H. Boros, Esquire 810 Dupont Plaza Center

300 Biscayne Boulevard Way Miami, Florida 33131

Joseph W. Lawrence II, Esquire Department of Professional

Regulation

130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director

Board of Medical Examiners

130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional

Regulation

130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER

================================================================= BEFORE THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS

DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS,

Petitioner,

vs. CASE NO. 81-1502

EDWARD GORDON, M.D.,

License No. 24291,

Respondent.

/

FINAL ORDER OF

THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS

This matter came for final action by the Board of Medical Examiners pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)9., F.S., at a public meeting on August 7, 1982, in Palm Beach, Florida, for review of the recommended order of the hearing officer entered herein, and the exceptions filed by the Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation: and the exceptions filed by the Respond- ent, Edward Gordon, M.D. A transcript of the proceedings is available, if necessary.

FlNDINGS OF FACT

1. Following a review of the complete record, the Re- spondent's exceptions to findings of fact contained in Para- graph A of the Respondent's Exceptions to Recommended Order are rejected inasmuch as the Hearing Officer's findings of fact are supported by competent substantial evidence.

   
   

2. Following a review of the complete record, the Board hereby adopts and incorporates by reference the findings of fact of the Hearing Officer.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. The Board hereby rejects the hearing officer's con- clusion of law contained In Conclusions of Law on Count I on pages 10 and 11 of the Recommended Order that the Respondent's criminal conviction in Switzerland does not fall within the conduct proscribed by Section `53 1201(1)(c) and (k) , F. S. (1971) and Section 458.331(1)(c), F. S. (1981).

   
   

2. The Board hereby rejects the hearing officer's con- clusion of law contained in Conclusions of Law on Count II on page 11 of the Recommended Order that the Respondent did not violate Section 458.331(1)(b) or its predecessor 458.1201(1)(b), F.S., by answering "No" to the questions "Have you ever been convicted of a felony? A misdemeanor?"

3. The Board hereby rejects the hearing officer's con- clusion of law contained In Conclusions of Law on Count III on pages 11 and 12 of the Recommended Order that Respondent is not guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(b), F.S. (1981) by having his license acted against by the licensing authority of another state.

   
   

4. The Board hereby rejects the hearing officer's con- clusion of law contained in Conclusions of Law on Count IV on pages 12 and 13 of the Recommended Order that Respondent is not guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(1), F.S. (1981).

   
   

5. The Board hereby accepts the Petitioner's Exceptions to the Conclusions of Law contained In Paragraphs one (1) through four (4) of Petitioner's Exceptions to the Recommended Order and concludes that the Respondent violated Sections 458.1201(1)(c) and (k), 458.331(1)(c) , 458.1201(1)(b) 458.331(1)(a), 458.331(1)(b) and 458.331(1)(1), F.S.

   
   

6. The Respondent's exceptions to the Conclusions of Law contained in Paragraph A of the Respondent's Exceptions to Recommended Order are found to be without merit and are rejected.

   
   

7. The Board does, however, adopt the remainder of the hearing officers conclusions of law not inconsistent with the above and adopts and incorporates them herein by reference.

   
   

8. Petitioner's exceptions to the recommended penalty contained In Paragraph five (5) of Petitioner's Exceptions to Recommended Order are accepted and Respondent's exceptions to the recommended penalty contained in Paragraph

(b) of Respondent's Exceptions to Recommended Order are rejected. Accordingly, based upon a review of the complete record by the Board, the Findings of Fact and the Modified Conclusions of Law, IT IS THEREFORE

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the license to practice medicine In the State of Florida of Edward Cordon, M.D., be and hereby is revoked on each count to run concurrent with each other. This Order shall take effect on the date of filing.

DONE AND ORDERED this 13th day of August, 1982.

BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS

DOROTHY FAIRCLOTH

By Executive Director

cc: All Counsel of Record.

Edward Gordon, M.D 1685 N.E. 15th Avenue

N. Miami Beach, Florida

Andrew Boros, Esquire 8625 Biscayne Blvd.

Miami, Florida 33138

Docket for Case No: 81-001502

Orders for Case No: 81-001502