vs. ) CASE NO. 81-1622
Respondent. )
Pursuant to notice the Division of Administrative Hearings by its duly designated Hearing Officer, K. N. Ayers, held a public hearing in the above styled case on 30 July 1981, at Clearwater, Florida.
For Petitioner: Thomas A. Bustin, Esquire
For Respondent: William D. Johnson, Esquire
By undated DETERMINATION the Coordinator, Office of Community Relations, City of Clearwater, Florida, found probable cause to believe that Lennox Court Apartments, Respondent, had unlawfully discriminated against Beverly Meadows, Charging Party, in refusing to amend her lease to Apartment 54, Lennox Court Apartments, to include a second person, to wit: her fiance. The Coordinator concluded that refusing to allow two single people of the opposite sex to lease an apartment constituted a prima facie violation of marital discrimination, and the fact that Ms. Meadows' fiance is black and she is caucasian constituted a prima facie case of racial discrimination.
At the hearing five witnesses were called by the Complaining Parties, two witnesses were called by the Respondent and four exhibits were admitted into evidence (two by each party). Proposed findings submitted by the parties and not included below were not supported by competent evidence or were deemed immaterial to the result reached.
Beverly Meadows was a tenant at the Lennox Court Apartments from 1975 until she left in August, 1980, some two months prior to the expiration of her lease. At the time of the incident giving rise to the charges here under consideration, Ms. Meadows occupied Apartment No. 54, a two-bedroom, two-bath
unit. The lease provided that Ms. Meadows was the sole tenant. There are 81 units at Lennox Court Apartments.
Earlier, Ms. Meadows had obtained permission for Carol Bumbar to share the lease of the apartment, and Ms. Bumbar lived in the apartment for three or four months before leaving to get a place of her own. Ms. Bumbar testified that the primary reason she moved was so that she could have her children with her. Another reason given was that people were coming to and going from Ms. Meadows' apartment all the time, and Ms. Bumbar wanted more privacy.
In March, 1980, after the DETERMINATION had been made by Ms. Jean Grogg not to renew Ms. Meadows' lease when it expired in October, 1980, Apartment No.
54 was leased to Mr. and Mrs. Koski effective 1 November 1980 pursuant to Rental Application (R. Exhibit 2).
Ms. Jean Grogg is the manager of the Lennox Court Apartments and has been in that position since October, 1978. After Ms. Bumbar moved out of Apartment No. 54, Ms. Grogg notified Ms. Meadows on August 20, 1979 (R. Exhibit 1), that she would not allow her to have any more roommates. Ms. Grogg had determined that, because of other tenants' complaints about visitors to Ms. Meadows' apartment and the condition in which Ms. Meadows kept the apartment, Ms. Meadows was not a desirable tenant and her lease would not be renewed when it expired in October, 1980. She communicated this information to Ms. Breitenfeld, who supervises several apartment complexes, including Lennox Court Apartments, owned by the same corporation.
In June, 1980, Ms. Meadows requested permission from Ms. Grogg to amend the lease to allow her to take a roommate. Ms. Grogg denied this request because of her previous determination not to renew the lease upon its expiration. Ms. Grogg was advised neither the race nor sex of the putative roommate.
Ms. Meadows then called Ms. Breitenfeld, the supervisor of Ms. Grogg, to get her permission to amend the lease to include a roommate. Ms. Meadows confessed to Ms. Breitenfeld that she had not been completely honest with Ms. Grogg but in truth the roommate she desired added to the lease was her fiance. Ms. Breitenfeld was aware that within a short time Ms. Meadows would be given the 60-day notice that the lease would not be renewed and told Ms. Meadows that when she and her fiance were married he could be added to the lease. Ms. Breitenfeld was never informed that Ms. Meadows' fiance was black.
In August, 1980, the same date the 60-day notice of non-renewal was delivered to Ms. Meadows, she moved out of Apartment No. 54 at Lennox Court Apartments.
Jackie Henry occupied a two-bedroom, two-bath apartment at Lennox Court Apartments for approximately three years until August, 1980, during which time she shared the apartment with several roommates. The last month she was there she was told she could have only one roommate. No evidence was presented that this apartment was ever rented to Jackie Henry as the sole occupant.
Ms. Meadows testified that she had numerous black friends who worked with her and who visited her at her apartment. She also acknowledged that she had received a letter from Ms. Grogg advising her that neighbors had complained about noise and guests parking in other tenants' spaces following a party given by Ms. Meadows.
Helen Betz, a black friend and working companion of Ms. Meadows, visited the latter's apartment many times and testified that sometimes people stared at her and Ms. Meadows as they walked to or from the apartment. Specifically, she recalled some workmen cleaning a vacant apartment who stared at them as they passed the apartment. The race of these workers was not disclosed.
The majority of the residents at Lennox Court Apartments are elderly ladies. There are some apartments with tenants having different last names, and at least one of these apartments is, with the knowledge of the management, occupied by two unmarried persons of the opposite sex. There are currently no black tenants at Lennox Court Apartments. No evidence was presented that any applicant was denied a tenancy because of race.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to, and the subject matter of, these proceedings.
These charges are brought pursuant to Clearwater Ordinance No. 1843, as amended. Section 7B-1 of this ordinance, in discussing the qualities of good community relations, philosophizes
". . .that our heritage has provided the moral, ethical and spiritual foundation upon which civilization is built."
Section 7B-6 establishes one objective to be "to promote and encourage fair treatment and equal opportunity for all persons regardless of race, creed, color, sex, national origin, age, handicap or marital status. . ."
Section 7D-12 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person being the owner. . . manager. . .of any place of public accommodation. . .because of the race, creed, color, national origin, age, sex, handicap, or marital status of any person directly or indirectly to refuse, or withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations. . .
Section 7B-13 establishes an exception to the above, namely, that use of public restrooms may be limited to persons of one sex.
With respect to the issue of race the evidence was uncontradicted that the denial of Ms. Meadows' request to take a roommate could not have been motivated by the race of her fiance because neither of the people who denied the request was aware of the race of the fiance. The evidence was also uncontradicted that Ms. Meadows had been advised as early as August, 1979, some ten months before her request, that she would not be allowed to have any more roommates. Her lease provided only one person would occupy the apartment. This contract could be amended only by mutual agreement between the parties. Since Respondent had already determined Ms. Meadows to be an undesirable tenant whose lease would not be renewed, it would have been unfair to the additional occupant if Respondent had allowed Ms. Meadows to take a roommate for such a short period.
The marital discrimination charge presents different problems. Apparently, the Coordinator, Office of Community Relations, takes the position that marital discrimination results when an apartment owner will rent an apartment to a married couple but will not rent the same apartment to two single people of the opposite sex. It is submitted that this is not the law, nor is it a proper interpretation of the ordinance proscribing discrimination because of marital status. Refusing to rent to someone solely because that person was married or single would constitute marital discrimination. As noted above, the policy of the Community Relations regulations is to promote the moral, ethical and spiritual foundation upon which civilization is built. An important aspect of the foundation of our society has been the family. Laws have been enacted to protect the family and to encourage matrimonial relations rather than meritricious ones. Section 798.02, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part:
If any man and woman, not being married to each other, lewdly and lasciviously associate and cohabit together. . .they shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s.
775.083.
This statute has long been interpreted to have been violated when two unmarried people live together as husband and wife. It is recognized that few, if any, people are prosecuted under this statute at the present time and state of the public attitude toward cohabitation; nevertheless, the statute is extant, and presumably one who aids and abets such conduct could be charged as an accomplice. If Ordinance No. 1843 makes it an offense to refuse to aid and abet the violation of Section 798.02, Florida Statutes, then the ordinance must be held invalid as contrary to a superior law promulgated by the State of Florida. One canon of statutory construction is that ordinances or statutes must be construed, if possible, in such a manner as to make them valid rather than to reach an interpretation that would make the ordinance or statute invalid. Accordingly, the ordinance must be construed so that it is not violated by an owner or manager of an apartment complex refusing to rent accommodations to unmarried parties who desired to cohabit as husband and wife.
Here, regardless of the interpretation placed on the ordinance, the evidence will not support a finding that Respondent refused to amend Ms. Meadows' lease to add another person because of Ms. Meadows' marital status or because of her race. The evidence was uncontradicted that the reason Respondent refused to amend Ms. Meadows' lease to add another person was because of an earlier determination not to renew Ms. Meadows' lease when it expired shortly thereafter.
From the foregoing it is concluded that Lennox Court Apartments did not refuse to amend Ms. Meadows' lease, and thereby discriminate against her, because of her marital status or her race or the race of her fiance. It is, therefore,
RECOMMENDED that these charges be dismissed and the case closed.
ENTERED this 14th day of August, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
K. N. AYERS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of August, 1981.
Thomas A. Bustin, Esquire City Attorney
William D. Johnson, Esquire
Ronald M. McElrath, Coordinator Office of Community Relations City of Clearwater
