STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, ) BOARD OF PILOT COMMISSIONERS, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 84-2801
)
THOMAS A. BAGGETT, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, an administrative hearing was held before William R. Cave, Hearing Officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings on November 13, 1984, in Tampa, Florida.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: David G. Hanlon and David C. Banker
SHACKLEFORD, FARRIOR, STALLINGS, AND EVANS
Post Office Box 3324 Tampa, Florida 33601
For Respondent: C. Steven Yerrid and Margaret D. Mathews HOLLAND AND KNIGHT
Post Office Box 1288 Tampa, Florida 33601
By an administrative complaint filed July 13, 1984, petitioner seeks to revoke, suspend or otherwise discipline the license of Thomas A. Baggett as a pilot in Tampa Bay. As grounds therefor, it is alleged that on the morning of February 5, 1984, while piloting the M/V Triton C outbound from Gardinier Wharf, respondent negligently navigated the M/V Triton C outside of the prescribed limits of the ship channel in Tampa Bay, causing the M/V Triton C to run aground.
In support of the charges, petitioner presented the testimony of Lieutenant
G. Michael Maes, Investigating Officer with the U.S. Coast Guard, Marine Safety Office, Tampa, Florida; John C. Hanson, Investigator and Consultant with the Department of Professional Regulation and Board of Pilot Commissioners; and Ronald Schaefer, harbor pilot, Pensacola, Florida. Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 1-5 were received into evidence.
Respondent Thomas A. Baggett testified on his own behalf and presented the testimony of Delmar Winchester, Master, SS Marine Duval; and, Robert Park harbor pilot, Tampa Bay. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 was received into evidence.
Joint Exhibits Nos. 6 and 7 and Hearing Officer's Exhibit No. 1 were received into evidence.
Parties have submitted post hearing proposed findings of fact and proposed conclusions of law pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)4., Florida Statutes (Supp. 1984). A ruling on each proposed finding of fact has been made either directly or indirectly in this recommended order, except where such proposed findings of fact have been rejected as subordinate, cumulative, immaterial, or unnecessary.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found:
Respondent, Thomas A. Baggett has been licensed by the State of Florida as a pilot in Tampa Bay for fifteen (15) years and at all times pertinent to this proceeding was licensed by the State of Florida as a pilot.
On February 5, 1984, at about 0620 hours, while Captain Baggett was piloting M/V Triton C outbound from the Gardinier Wharf in Hillsborough County, Florida, the M/V Triton C ran aground outside the prescribed limits of CUT D in Tampa Bay on the east side.
The M/V Triton C is a Liberian bulk carrier with an approximate length and width of 576.7 feet and 81 feet, respectively, with a gross tonnage of 17,823 tons. At the time of grounding, the M/V Triton C had a forward draft of
29 feet, 11 inches and an aft draft of 30 feet and 1 inch.
The M/V Triton C was experiencing no engine or navigational equipment problem before it ran aground.
All aids to navigation, including ranges and buoys, were in place and working properly at the time of the grounding.
The M/V Triton was travelling at a speed of 11.7 knots.
Range lights, when properly aligned, provide a way for the pilot or anyone navigating a vessel to know the vessel is in the center of the channel.
On the morning of February 5, 1985, shortly before the grounding of the M/V Triton C, Captain Baggett gave orders for the turn from CUT E into CUT D, or from a heading of 198 degrees to a heading of 213 degrees. Captain Baggett ordered the wheel 20 degrees to starboard and then eased to 10 degrees. Captain Baggett then ordered the quartermaster to midship the wheel and steady the vessel on 213 degrees. He gave no instructions to the quartermaster concerning the use of the range lights for navigating the center of the channel.
At this point the confusion begins. Captain Baggett testified that the M/V Triton C steadied up on 213 degrees, an appropriate course for the transit of CUT D, while he was present and he observed the M/V Triton C as being on the ranges for about 2 minutes before going into the chart room. As he stepped back into the chart room, he glanced at the compass and observed that the vessel was on a heading of 213 degrees. Captain Baggett gave no further instructions or orders other than "hard to starboard" when he came out of the chart room 15-20 seconds later and noticed the bow swinging to port, the rudder indicator showing
20 degrees rudder and the ranges being already opened. Captain Baggett testified that upon giving the order "hard to starboard" the quartermaster pulled the wheel and went "hard to port" and the vessel almost immediately went aground.
The mate and quartermaster tell a different story. The master was below and not present on the bridge at the time of grounding. The mate testified that Captain Baggett went into the chart room while the compass was swinging through 210 degrees and before the vessel steadied up on 213 degrees, and that Captain Baggett remained in the chart room for 40 seconds to 1 minute and came out as the vessel went aground. The quartermaster testified that Captain Baggett went into the chart room immediately upon the vessel steadying up on 213 degrees, and did not stay to watch the course or range for 2 minutes. He further testified that Captain Baggett was in the chart room for 5-6 minutes; that he came out of the chart room as the vessel went aground; and, Captain Baggett gave no order of "hard to starboard".
The quartermaster at the time of the grounding was Maheswaran Gnanasundran and the mate was Siburs Ioannas. As evidenced by the depositions, both were foreign; neither spoke English and each required an interpreter at the deposition.
The master of the M/V Triton C on the day of grounding was Stamatios Stanou, a citizen of Greece, and required an interpreter for his deposition.
Captain Baggett experienced a communication problem with quartermaster Gnanasundran in the beginning of the turn out of CUT E to CUT D, and earlier with another quartermaster at the beginning of the turn out of Hilisborough A CUT into Hillsborougn C CUT who was on duty just prior to quartermaster Gnanasundran.
The M/V Triton C was at a heading of 206 degrees immediately after grounding and did not move significantly from that heading while grounded.
Both the mate and the quartermaster testified that the M/V Triton C, after steadying up, stayed on the course heading of 213 degrees during the entire time and was on the same course heading when the vessel went aground.
The mate testified that as the M/V Triton C began to run aground it began to list to the right, and its heading as it finally came to rest aground was 206 degrees.
The master of the M/V Triton C testified that the wind was out of the northwest at 15 knots, with full tide, and the current being with M/V Triton C at about 2 knots.
Captain John C. Hanson, an investigator for petitioner, testified that at the time of grounding, based on tidal information and weather reports, the wind was out of the northwest and there was an ebb tide running in a southerly direction which would tend to set the M/V Triton C in a southerly direction to the east of CUT D. Captain Hanson further testified that these conditions would have an effect on navigation.
Captain Baggett testified that there was an ebb tide in a southwest direction and that it would tend to set to the southwest but at that point in time, it would have had very little effect on the M/V Triton C. Therefore, he did not make any allowances for the tide, wind, or a combination of them.
Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 shows the mean lower low water depth outside of the confines of the channel in the area of grounding to be 24 feet to
25 feet. Captain Hanson testified that the chart was current but that the depth of the water in a Particular area could be deeper, depending upon tides and winds.
Captain Baggett testified that soundings taken on February 5, 1985, during the morning of grounding, put the depth of the water at the bow (point of grounding) and stern to be 25 feet and 37 feet, respectively and, that he visually observed, after daylight the stern of the vessel as being located in the ship channel of CUT D.
The ship channel in CUT D has an approximate width of 400 feet with shoaling on both sides.
Captain Hanson boarded the M/V Triton C 3 days after the grounding and testified that he plotted the position where the vessel went aground by taking "crossbearings of fixed structures, (no floating aids) and one radar range to one of the radar structures." Captain Hanson plotted the position of the M/V Triton C to be on the east side of CUT D, at a point 450 feet from the centerline of the CUT D approximately 1325 yards from a midpoint between buoys 1E and 2E. For an exact position see Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. The crossbearings used to locate the exact position of the M/V Triton C are shown on the chart on the right side of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. The left side of Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 is an enlargement of CUT D prepared by Captain Hanson showing the various courses the M/V Triton C could have taken from a point abeam of buoys 1E and 2E to the position of grounding based on the speed of the M/V Triton C at 11.7 knots.
Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 demonstrates that if the point of grounding was 450 feet from the centerline of the channel, as Captain Hanson testified, and, the M/V Triton C grounded on the heading of 206 degrees, then, at that heading, the stern of a vessel 576.7 feet long could not have reached the channel.
Captain Hanson's testimony concerning his method of locating the position of the M/V Triton C, the crossbearing used and the calculations went unrebutted.
With a vessel drafting 29 feet 11 inches forward and the point of grounding being 450 feet from the centerline of the channel, the depth of the water outside the confines of the channel along the heading taken by the M/V Triton C was deeper than 25 feet or the grounding would have occurred sooner and at a point closer to the east bank of CUT D.
As Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 demonstrates, the testimony of the quartermaster that the M/V Triton C steadied up on 213 degrees after making the turn from CUT E to CUT D and steered that course for five to six minutes while Captain Baggett was in the chart room is incorrect as to how long Captain Baggett was in the chart room, because the vessel would have travelled beyond the point of grounding in 5 to 6 minutes.
As Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 demonstrates, the testimony of the mate that Captain Baggett went into the chart room while the compass was swinging through 210 degrees and before the vessel steadied up on 213 degrees and that the vessel went aground within 40 seconds to 1 minute while Captain Baggett was still in the chart room is incorrect as to how long Captain Baggett was in the
chart room because the vessel could not have travelled to the point of grounding in 40 seconds to 1 minute from the time it made the turn out of CUT E into CUT D.
As Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 demonstrates, the testimony of Captain Baggett that the vessel steadied up on a heading of 213 degrees in the center of CUT D and that he viewed the ranges in line for 2 minutes before going to the chart room and that "almost immediately" upon coming out of the chart room 15 to
20 seconds later the vessel went aground was incorrect as to how long he stayed after the vessel steadied up before going into the chart room because in that time frame the turn, causing the vessel to go aground would have been so sharp the vessel would have gone aground at a heading significantly less than 206 degrees. The most believable evidence demonstrates that Captain Baggett was in the chart room 2-3 minutes prior to grounding.
Captain Baggett went into the chart room to make his time and distance calculations because light was more readily available. Captain Baggett could have made the time and distance calculations without going into the chart room.
While Captain Baggett was in the chart room, he was facing away from the chart room entrance and did not look at the rudder indicator, the ranges, or otherwise determine if his orders were being properly carried out.
Captain Baggett's expertise as a pilot was available to the mate and quartermaster while he was in the chart room had either of them been aware of a problem and requested his assistance. But, his expertise as a pilot was not totally available to the vessel due to his position in the chart room.
Where the crew is unfamiliar with the harbor and its lights and there is a language problem, courses are usually given on compass rather than instructions on the range lights.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to, and the subject matter of, these proceedings.
The Board of Pilot Commissioners has the authority to discipline a licensed pilot found guilty of negligence in performance of piloting duties. Section 310.101(5), Florida Statutes (1983).
"Failure to navigate within the prescribed limits of a channel and a casualty results", may constitute an act of negligence or inattention to duty under Rule 21SS-8.07(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code, which may be grounds for disciplinary action. Negligence, as used in Section 310.101(5), Florida Statutes (1983) has been defined as:
"The omission to do something which a responsible pilot, guided by those ordinary considerations which ordinarily regulate piloting of vessels would do, or the doing of something which a reasonable and prudent pilot would not do." Board of Pilot Commissioners v. Lerro, 3 FALR 1120-A (Final Order, April 3, 1981).
Webster's new Twentieth Century Dictionary, Second Edition, defines "inattention" as: 1. failure to pay attention; heedlessness; negligence; 2. a heedless or negligent act; "and, defines "duty" as: "4. any service, labor, function, or office required of any person; also the state of being occupied with such service; as, the duties of a motorman; on duty." It is readily apparent from the foregoing definition of "inattention" and "duty" that the term "inattention to duty" as used in Rule 21SS-8.07(1), Florida Administrative Code forms a basis for negligence as used in Section 310.101(5), Florida Statutes (1983).
Here Captain Baggett is charged with negligently navigating the M/V Triton C outside of the prescribed limits of a ship channel (CUT D) in Tampa Bay. And, more specifically, with leaving the bridge of the vessel unattended for a period of time while piloting the vessel without instructing the mate on duty concerning ranges, buoys, and other aides to navigation which would have permitted the mate to navigate the vessel within the confines of the ship channel while Captain Baggett was absent from the bridge.
The rules of admiralty govern these proceeding. Board of Pilot Commissioners v. Lerro, 3 FALR 1120-A (Final Order, April 3, 1981).
The standard of care for a pilot is higher than that of an ordinary person in matters of piloting. See Board of Pilot Commissioners v. Lerro 3 FALR 1120-A (Final Order April 3, 1981). See also M. P. Howlett, Inc. v. Tug MICHAEL MORAN, 425 F. 2d 619 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 833 (1970) and Mariblanca Navigacion S.A. v. Panama Canal Company, 298 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1962). And, although a pilot may not be liable for mere errors of judgment he is liable for damages caused by his failure to exercise the diligence which others similarly situated would ordinarily have exercised. Sociedad De Transportes Maritimos v. Panama Canal Co. 163 F. Supp. 151 (D.C.Z. 1958).
The petitioner has met its burden of showing that the M/V Triton C went aground outside the prescribed limits of CUT D in Tampa Bay while being piloted by the respondent. When a piloted vessel is grounded outside the prescribed limits of a channel there is a presumption of negligence. Maroceano Compania Nav. S.A. of Pan. v. City of Los Angeles 192 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Cal. 1961). And, the existence of such a presumption requires the respondent to prove that he was without fault or that the grounding was a result of an inevitable accident. Maroceano Compania Nav. S.A. of Pan. v. City of Los Angeles, 193 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Cal. 1961); See Bunge Corp. v. M/V FURNESS BRIDGE, 558 F. 2d 790 (5th Cir. 1977); See also Sociedad De Transportes Maritimos v. Panama Canal Co., 163 F. Supp. 151 (D.C.Z. 1958).
The evidence without contradiction shows that: (1) The M/V Trition C went aground on the east side of CUT D in Tampa Bay at a point outside the prescribed limits of the channel; (2) the vessel was experiencing no engine or navigational equipment problems; (3) all aids to navigation, including ranges and buoys, were in place and working properly; and, (4) nothing unusual was happening such as a storm or other unexpected hazards which demanded sudden judgment or sudden decision on the part of the pilot. It cannot be concluded that the grounding was a result of an inevitable accident or unexpected surprise. For the respondent to rebut the presumption of negligence he must show that he was without fault.
Here, the respondent attempts to rebut the presumption of negligence by evidence recited in paragraph 8 of the findings of fact that the quartermaster was at fault for changing the course of the vessel while the respondent was in the chart room, without any orders from the respondent, causing the vessel to run aground. The evidence in this record does not support the respondent's version of the grounding. But, even if the evidence in this record supported the respondent's version of the grounding it would not prove that the respondents was without fault. The respondent owed a duty to safely navigate the vessel through the ship channel and, this duty included being where he could observe the aids to navigation and make certain that his orders were understood and properly carried out so that the vessel would not go aground. Laessiz v. Panama Canal Company, 373 F. Supp. 263 (D.C.Z. 1974); See Cooley v. Board of Wardens for the Port of Philadelphia, 12 U.S. (1 How.) 299 (1951).
There is insufficient evidence in this record to determine if the pilot failed to properly steady the vessel up on a heading of 213 degrees causing the vessel to go aground or, since the quartermaster was not using range lights to stay in the center of the channel, the tide and wind caused the quartermaster to navigate the vessel outside the ship channel resulting in the grounding. The evidence is clear that the vessel went aground outside the ship channel, but the respondent offered no competent evidence to rebut the observation that had he been where he could observe the range lights, rudder indicator, and other aids to navigation the vessel would not have gone aground.
The respondent attempts to rebut the presumption of negligence by eliciting testimony from all the expert witnesses that going into the chart room for a short period of time, to make time and distance calculations, was reasonable and prudent. and fell within the standard of care for a pilot, and excused the respondent's inattention to duty. The experts testified that under certain limited circumstances a pilot may direct his attention to matters other than piloting the vessel. The evidence was insufficient to prove that respondent's inattention to duty, by positioning himself where he could not properly observe the ranges and other aids to navigation, for a period of time, however, short, that resulted in the vessel going aground, was reasonable and prudent, and met the standard of care for a pilot. It is concluded that the respondent has failed to rebut the presumption of negligence which attached when the vessel he was piloting ran aground outside the prescribed limits of CUT D in Tampa Bay on February 5, 1984. The claim of negligence has been proven.
The conclusions of negligence with respect to the grounding is not one of gross negligence or one of conduct demonstrating respondent to be unfit to continue as a licensed State pilot. Instead, it is a finding that respondent failed to exercise the care required of a reasonable and prudent pilot and, as a result, the M/V Triton C went aground outside the prescribed limits of CUT D in Tampa Bay on February 5, 1984.
RECOMMENDED
Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Pilot Commissioners enter a Final Order finding Captain Thomas Baggett negligent in the performance of piloting duties in violation of Section 310.101(5), Florida Statutes (1983), and Rule 21SS-8.01(5), Florida Administrative Code. For such violation, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Pilot Commissioners impose an administrative fine against Captain Baggett in the amount of $1,000.00.
DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of April, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
WILLIAM R. CAVE
Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building
2009 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32301
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of April, 1985.
COPIES FURNISHED:
David G. Hanlon and David C. Banker
SHACKLEFORD, FARRIOR, STALLINGS, AND EVANS
Post Office Box 334 Tampa, Florida 33601
C. Steven, Yerrid and Margaret D. Mathews HOLLAND AND KNIGHT Post Office Box 188 Tampa, Florida 33601
Fred Roche, Secretary
Department of Professional Regulation
130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation
130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Fred Varn, Executive Director Board of Pilot Commissioners
130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Issue Date | Proceedings |
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Apr. 17, 1985 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. |
Issue Date | Document | Summary |
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Apr. 17, 1985 | Recommended Order | Ship pilot is guilty of navigating vessel outside of established channel and subsequently running vessel aground. $1000 administrative fine. |