david d. eastman, jack m. skelding|Department of Business an... -- eLawyers

Judges: LARRY J. SARTIN
Agency: Department of Business and Professional Regulation
Latest Update: Mar. 26, 1986

Summary: On November 7, 1985, the Petitioner, the Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc., filed two Petitions to Determine the Invalidity of an Existing Rule with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Both Petitions sought a determination that certain rules of the Respondent, the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes are invalid. In one of the Petitions the Petitioner challenged the validity of Rules 7D-30.02, 7D-30.04, 7D-30.06, 7D-31.01(2), 7D- 31.01(4), 7D 31-01(5), 7D-31.01(12), 7D-32.01 and 7D-32.02, Florida Administrative Code. This Petition has been assigned case number 85-3858RX by the Division of Administrative Hearings. The other Petition contains a challenge to the validity to Rule 7D-32.02, Florida Administrative Code. This Petition has been assigned case number 85-3859RX by the Division of Administrative Hearings. The Petitioner has alleged that the challenged rules constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority and are arbitrary and capricious. By agreement of the Petitioner and Respondent, the requirement that the final hearing of these cases be held within thirty days after the Petitions were filed was waived and the final hearing was set to commence on December 20, 1985. Prior to the commencement of the final hearing, the Petitioner and Respondent filed a Stipulation Between the Parties in which the Petitioner and Respondent stipulated to certain facts, listed witnesses to be called, stipulated to the admission into evidence of certain exhibits, and requested official recognition of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, Chapters 7D-30, 7D-31 and 7D-32, Florida Administrative Code, and certain Notices. The request for official recognition contained in the Stipulation Between the Parties was granted at the final hearing. The Petitioner also voluntarily dismissed its challenge to the validity of Rule 7D- , Florida Administrative Code, as set out in paragraph 3 a of its Petition filed in case number 85-3858RX and Rule 7D-30.04, Florida Administrative Code, as set out in paragraph 3 b of its Petition filed in case number 85-3858RX. Subsequent to the filing of the Stipulation Between the Parties, the Federation of Mobile Home Owners of Florida, Inc., filed a Petition to Intervene. A bearing was held by telephone on the Petition to Intervene on December 17, 1985. It was agreed to by the parties that if the Intervenor was allowed to intervene the Intervenor would participate in these proceedings in a limited fashion. In particular, it was agreed that the Intervenor could cross-examine witnesses, make legal arguments and file a proposed final order. It was also agreed that the Intervenor would be bound by the Stipulation Between the Parties, would present no evidence in these proceedings and would not engage in discovery. Subsequent to the telephone hearing the Petition to Intervene was granted. At the final hearing, the Petitioner presented the testimony of Mr. Frank Williams, Mr. Neal Kullman, Mr. Richard Friedman and Mr. Bernard Covington. Petitioner's Exhibits 1-22 were received into evidence. The Respondent presented the testimony of Dr. Faye Mayberry and offered three composite exhibits. Respondent's Exhibits 1-3 were accepted into evidence. At the commencement of the final hearing, the cases were consolidated, sua sponte. At the conclusion of the final hearing, the parties agreed to submit proposed final orders within 15 days after receipt of the transcript of the final hearing. The parties subsequently waived the time requirement for the issuance of a final order under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1985), and were granted an extension of time to file their proposed final orders. The parties have filed proposed final orders which contain proposed findings of fact. A ruling on each proposed finding of fact has been made either directly or indirectly in this Final Order. Additionally, attached to this Final Order is an Appendix which indicates where proposed findings of fact which have been accepted have been made in this Final Order and why proposed findings of fact which have not been accepted have been rejected. The Appendix is hereby incorporated as a part of the Findings of Fact portion of this Final Order.Petitioner failed to prove rules governing prospectus requirements for manufactured housing rentals were invalid.

85-3858

STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

FLORIDA MANUFACTURED HOUSING ASSOCIATION, INC.,		) )
		)
Petitioner,		)
		)
vs.		) CASE	NOS.	85-3858RX
		)		85-3859RX
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF		)
BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF		)
FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS		)
AND MOBILE HOMES,		)
		)
Respondent,		)
and		)
		)
FEDERATION OF MOBILE HOME OWNERS	OF	)
FLORIDA, INC.,		)
		)
Intervenor.		)

)

FINAL ORDER

Pursuant to written notice a formal hearing was held in these eases before Larry J. Sartin, duly designated Hearing Officer of The Division of Administrative Hearings, on December 20, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: David D. Eastman, Esquire

Jack M. Skelding, Esquire

Haben, Parker, Skelding, Costigan, McVoy & Labasky

Post Office Pox 669

318 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302

For Respondent: John C. Courtney, Esquire

Robin H. Conner, Esquire Department of Business Regulation

725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

For Intervenor: John T. Allen, Jr., Esquire

John T. Allen, P.A. 4508 Central Avenue

St. Petersburg, Florida 33711 STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On November 7, 1985, the Petitioner, the Florida Manufactured Housing Association, Inc., filed two Petitions to Determine the Invalidity of an Existing Rule with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Both Petitions sought a determination that certain rules of the Respondent, the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes are invalid.

In one of the Petitions the Petitioner challenged the validity of Rules 7D-30.02, 7D-30.04, 7D-30.06, 7D-31.01(2), 7D- 31.01(4), 7D 31-01(5), 7D-31.01(12), 7D-32.01 and 7D-32.02,

Florida Administrative Code. This Petition has been assigned case number 85-3858RX by the Division of Administrative Hearings.

The other Petition contains a challenge to the validity to Rule 7D-32.02, Florida Administrative Code. This Petition has been assigned case number 85-3859RX by the Division of Administrative Hearings.

The Petitioner has alleged that the challenged rules constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority and are arbitrary and capricious.

By agreement of the Petitioner and Respondent, the requirement that the final hearing of these cases be held within thirty days after the Petitions were filed was waived and the final hearing was set to commence on December 20, 1985. Prior to the commencement of the final hearing, the Petitioner and Respondent filed a Stipulation Between the Parties in which the Petitioner and Respondent stipulated to certain facts, listed witnesses to be called, stipulated to the admission into evidence of certain exhibits, and requested official recognition of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, Chapters 7D-30, 7D-31 and 7D-32, Florida Administrative Code, and certain Notices. The request for official recognition contained in the Stipulation Between the Parties was granted at the final hearing. The Petitioner also voluntarily dismissed its challenge to the validity of Rule 7D-

, Florida Administrative Code, as set out in paragraph 3 a of its Petition filed in case number 85-3858RX and Rule 7D-30.04, Florida Administrative Code, as set out in paragraph 3 b of its Petition filed in case number 85-3858RX.

Subsequent to the filing of the Stipulation Between the Parties, the Federation of Mobile Home Owners of Florida, Inc., filed a Petition to Intervene. A bearing was held by telephone on the Petition to Intervene on December 17, 1985. It was agreed to by the parties that if the Intervenor was allowed to intervene the Intervenor would participate in these proceedings in a limited fashion. In particular, it was agreed that the Intervenor could cross-examine witnesses, make legal arguments and file a proposed final order. It was also agreed that the Intervenor would be bound by the Stipulation Between the Parties, would present no evidence in these proceedings and would not engage in discovery.
Subsequent to the telephone hearing the Petition to Intervene was granted.

At the final hearing, the Petitioner presented the testimony of Mr. Frank Williams, Mr. Neal Kullman, Mr. Richard Friedman and Mr. Bernard Covington. Petitioner's Exhibits 1-22 were received into evidence.

The Respondent presented the testimony of Dr. Faye Mayberry and offered three composite exhibits. Respondent's Exhibits 1-3 were accepted into evidence.

At the commencement of the final hearing, the cases were consolidated, sua sponte.

At the conclusion of the final hearing, the parties agreed to submit proposed final orders within 15 days after receipt of the transcript of the final hearing. The parties subsequently waived the time requirement for the issuance of a final order under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1985), and were granted an extension of time to file their proposed final orders.

The parties have filed proposed final orders which contain proposed findings of fact. A ruling on each proposed finding of fact has been made either directly or indirectly in this Final Order. Additionally, attached to this Final Order is an Appendix which indicates where proposed findings of fact which have been accepted have been made in this Final Order and why proposed findings of fact which have not been accepted have been rejected. The Appendix is hereby incorporated as a part of the Findings of Fact portion of this Final Order.

ISSUE

Whether Rules 7D-30.04, 7D-30.06, 7D-31.01(2), 7D-31,01(4), 7D-31.01(5), 7D-31.01(12), 7D-32.01 and 7D-32.02, Florida
Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority and are arbitrary and capricious?

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The following findings of fact were stipulated to and are hereby adopted:
  1. The following is a Florida non-profit corporation, whose address is 115 N. Calhoun Street, Tallahassee, Florida. The FMHA is organized and maintained for the benefit of its members, which includes approximately
    950 mobile home park owners and operators. A substantial portion of these members own or operate parks which contain 10 or more lots and therefore are subject to regulation by the Division of Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Department of Business Regulation.
  2. The Division of Land Sales,
    Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Department of Business Regulation is delegated the authority pursuant to Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, to regulate mobile home parks, including the powers to enforce and ensure compliance with the provisions of the Chapter and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, including the authority to impose a civil penalty against a mobile home park owner for any violation of the Chapter, or a rule or regulation of the Division.
  3. Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, was enacted by the Florida Legislature as Chapter 84-80, was signed by the Governor and filed in the office of the Secretary of State on June 4, 1984.
  4. Rules 7D-30, 7D-31, and 7D-32, Florida Administrative Code, are rules of the
    Division of Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes, Department of Business Regulation, which were properly adopted in accordance with Chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
2. The Petitioner is a trade association the members of which are engaged in business in the mobile home industry in the State of Florida.
3. The Petitioner has members who are mobile home manufacturers, retailers, equipment suppliers and servicers, owners and operators of mobile-home rental parks, developers of mobile home parks and subdivisions, insurance firms and lending institutions.
4. The Petitioner has 1,020 members who develop mobile home parks and subdivisions or are owners and operators of mobile home rental parks. As stipulated to by the parties, approximately 950 of the Petitioner's members are owners and operators of mobile home rental parks. The Petitioner's members are involved in the rental of between 300,000 and 350,000 mobile home spaces.
5. A substantial number of the Petitioner's members are subject to regulation by the Respondent pursuant to Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1985), the "Florida Mobile Home Act."
6. In July of 1984, subsequent to the effective date of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1985), the Bureau of Mobile Homes was created as a part of the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes. Dr. Faye Mayberry has been, and continues to be, the Chief of the Bureau of Mobile Homes.
7. Following the enactment of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1985), the Bureau of Mobile Homes concluded that there was a need to clarify certain portions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1985), and a need to establish procedures necessary for the filing of prospectuses and other documents. Therefore, the Bureau initiated a process to determine what rules needed to be adopted. The Bureau also received numerous inquiries from mobile home owners and mobile home park owners concerning Chapter 723.
8. The Bureau first looked at Chapter 723 in-house and looked at the nature of inquiries it had received and then drafted a conceptual approach to part of the rules.
9. The conceptual draft, at the invitation of the Bureau, was reviewed by representatives of the Petitioner and the Intervenor. A meeting was held with the Respondent to discuss the conceptual approach. The Respondent left the meeting with the impression that the conceptual approach was not that far off.
10. Following its discussions of the conceptual approach with the Petitioner and Intervenor, the Respondent drafted rules pursuant to Chapter 723.
11. Four workshops, in three locations in Florida, were conducted to receive public input on the draft rules. Advance notice of the workshops was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly. Representatives of the Petitioner had notice of, and participated in, the workshops.
12. Subsequent to the public workshops, in October of 1934, the Respondent published proposed rules under Chapters 7D-30 and 7D-31, in the Florida Administrative Weekly. In November of 1984, the Respondent published proposed rules under Chapter 7D-32.
13. After publication of the proposed rules in the Florida Administrative Weekly, requests for a public hearing were received by the Respondent and public hearings were held. Representatives of the Petitioner attended these hearings and had an opportunity to provide input on the content of the proposed rules.
14. Revisions were made to the proposed rules based upon suggestions from the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee and comments made by the public during the hearings held by the Respondent. The revisions were published in the Florida Administrative Weekly in January of 1985.
15. As revised, the rules contained in Chapters 7D-30 and 7D-31, Florida Administrative Code, became effective on January 10, 1985. The rules contained in Chapter 7D-32. Florida Administrative Code, became effective on February 6, 1085.
16. The Joint Administrative Procedures Committee did not file any challenge to the rules after they became effective.
17. A substantial amount of input and work went into adopting Chapters 7D-30, 7D-31 and 7D-39, Florida Administrative Code.
18. The Petitioner had notice of the promulgation of the rules at issue and has been involved in the development and distribution of information it believed was necessary to assist its members in complying with the requirements of Chapter 723. The Petitioner has distributed memoranda, conducted seminars, distributed prospectuses and communicated with representatives of the Respondent in an effort to assist its members in complying with the requirements of Chapter 723. The Petitioner provided definitions of terms for use in prospectuses and notices required by Chapter 723 and for use in complying with the Respondent's rules.
19. The Petitioner has attempted to assist its members in preparing a prospectus which could be filed with the Respondent and would meet the requirements of Chapter 723. Toward this end, the Petitioner prepared a sample or model prospectus and conducted a seminar on the model prospectus on December 17, 1984. The seminar was conducted in Orlando, Florida, and was attended by over 600 people.
20. In the model prospectus the Petitioner provided three alternative methods of providing for future rental increases to be included in a prospectus.
21. The model prospectus discussed at the December 17, 1984 seminar was for use by those mobile home parks with 100 or more rental spaces.
22. The Petitioner also prepared a model prospectus for mobile home parks with 26 to 99 rental spaces which it distributed in June of 1985. This model prospectus was sent to all members of the Petitioner.
23. A large number of the Petitioner's members used the model prospectus prepared by the Petitioner.
24. Information provided to members by the Petitioner was developed by the Petitioner based in part upon its discussions with the staff of the Respondent.
25. The Petitioner received questions from its members concerning certain aspects of the Respondent's rules and Chapter 723 which the Petitioner attempted to answer.
26. A substantial number of the Petitioner's members advertise their mobile home parks.
27. Mr. Neil Kullman is a member of the Petitioner and is the President of Florida Leisure Communities. Florida Leisure Communities owns and operates 3 mobile home parks in Florida.
28. Florida Leisure Communities waits for the Respondent to approve advertising materials it files with the Respondent because it has decided that it does not want to risk using an advertisement which may be found to be defective by the Respondent. Florida Leisure Communities does not wait for approval of its advertisements by the Respondent because it believes that it is required to do so by the Respondent's rules. Time delays have been experienced in getting advertisements approved.
29. A substantial number of the Petitioner's members have rental agreements in existence at mobile homes parks which have anniversary dates or renewal dates which would allow increases in rent. Most of the rental agreements have renewal dates or anniversary dates of July 1 or January 1.
30. The Petitioner provided information to its members in March of 1985 and August of 1985 concerning the Petitioner's understanding of what constitutes an effective notice of lot rental increase.
31. In explaining how members can provide a concise explanation of the reason for a proposed lot rental increase, the Petitioner told its members the following in a memorandum distributed in March of 1985:
  1. You need only to provide a concise explanation of the reason for the proposed change. Be brief! You should only include a list of factors (for rent increases), or a short plain statement for the change in
    services or rules or regulations.
  2. Important! As for rent increases, the rule limits the factors you may consider to those specifically identified in the prospectus. If the homeowners go to mediation or arbitration, or to court, then only those factors identified in the prospectus can be used to justify the reasonableness of the increase. Also, you should only place on the notice of increase the category of factor used to determine the rent increase level. For example:
  1. Operating costs;
  2. Prevailing market rent;
  3. Prevailing economic conditions; or
  4. Consumer Price Index (CPI).
  Be sure to list only those factors which are necessary to fully justify the rent increase.
32. In August of 1985 the Petitioner provided the following guidance to its members with respect to how to provide a concise explanation of the reason for a lot rental increase:
  
  4. You need only to provide a concise explanation of the reason for the proposed increase. Be brief! You should only include a list of factors, or a short plain statement of the reason or reasons for the increase. For example, a response might be: "The reasons for the increase are increased operating costs, prevailing market rent, and prevailing economic [sic] conditions, as set forth in the prospectus." You need not to go [sic] into great detail as to the specific costs which may have increased during the course of the year which you may want to take into consideration, or do you need to explain what is intended to mean [sic] by prevailing market rent or prevailing economic conditions. You need only to include a concise explanation of the reasons for the increase.
33. The recommendation of the Petitioner to its members concerning how to provide a concise explanation of an increase in lot rental was basically that the member refer to factors which

might cause a rental increase as provided in the member's prospectus. In the model prospectus recommended by the Petitioner to its members in June of 1985, the Petitioner recommended that the following explanation of the manner in which lot rental could be increased should be used by its members:

is as follows:

Increase in Lot Rental

The manner in which lot rental will be increased,

Definitions. As used in this Section VIII:
1. "Lot rental" means all sums paid
  or to be paid by the mobile home owner in consideration of leasing or renting a mobile home lot or lots in the Park. Such sums include any and all rents, special use fees, pass-through charges, installation and set-up charges, and other fees, charges and assessments imposed by the Owner.
2. "Special use fees" mean those separately itemized amounts for specific services or privileges which are charged in addition to rent, including, but not limited to, such charges as guest fees, pet fees and entrance fees.
3. "Pass-through charges" are defined as those amounts, other than special use fees, which are itemized and charged separately from the rent and which represent the mobile home owner's share of costs charged to the Park Owner by any state or local government or utility company.
Notice of Increase. The mobile home owner shall be notified of any increase in the lot rental at least 90 days prior to the effective date of such increase.
Lot Rental-Increases.
1. General. The lot rental and each of the categories of charges current Iv or hereafter comprising a part of the lot rental are subject to periodic increases by the Owner. However, except for increases resulting from the imposition of pass-through charges, the lot rental will not be increased more frequently than annually, except for initial tenancies which commence after the beginning of the annual rental term.
2. Factors Affecting Increases.

Factors which may affect the level of increases in lot rental are as follows:

Increased costs, which refers to any increases experienced by the Owner since the delivery of notice of the last increase in the lot rental in the total costs arising out of the ownership, operation and management of the Park.
Prevailing Market Rent--Refers to the lot rental imposed in mobile home parks comparable to this Park, or the lot rental willingly paid from time to time by new residents of this Park. A park will be deemed comparable if it is located in the same general vicinity as this Park, and offers similar densities, amenities and services.
Prevailing Economic Conditions--are intended to refer to those factors which bear on the economic viability of a real estate investment and which would be considered by a prudent businessman in establishing the base rent and other charges or any increase in the amount thereof. These factors may include:
1. the costs attendant to the replacement of this Park in the economic environment existing at the time of any rental increase, including land acquisition costs, construction costs, and losses associated with the operation of a park prior to full occupancy, and the level at which the lot rental must be established in order that the Park Owner will realize a reasonable return on the costs referred to in this clause (1);
2. the level of interest rates and other financing charges associated with construction, interim and permanent financing; (3) the availability of alternative forms of real estate investment capital; (4) the levels of the Consumer Price Index, defined as the United States Department of Labor, Consumer Price Index,
U.S. City Average--All Urban Consumers, 1967 100, or, in the event of the
discontinuation of publication of the Consumer Price Index, then an alternative index which has been reasonably related to the Consumer Price Index in evaluating economic conditions, and which has been, or can reasonably be expected to be, generally accepted as a replacement index for the Consumer Price Index; (5) the level at which the lot rental must be established in order that the Owner will realize a reasonable return on the "Owners's Equity"; for this purpose, the "Owner's Equity" refers to the fair market value of the Park from time to time, less existing mortgage indebtedness;
(6) other economic factors which might reasonably be expected to affect-either the value of the Park, the rate of return available to the Owner of the Park at the existing level of rent, the present value of the real estate investment in the then current economic conditions, and which would be taken into consideration by a prudent businessman in considering the amount of rental increase required in the Park in order
-to realize a rate of return similar to other at risk real estate ventures from the then current value of the Park.
To the extent permitted by law, the mobile home owner may also be required to bear, in the form of increases in the lot rental, the costs incurred by Owner in installing capital improvements or performing major repairs in the Park.

Additional Considerations

The reasons for the increase in lot rental or other fees and charges will be set forth in the notice of increase. Only those factors set forth in the notice will be relied upon by the Park Owner as justification for the rent increase.

The Park Owner reserves the right to amend this Prospectus or any Exhibit thereto from time to time to the extent permitted by

law to conform with changes in relevant statutory provisions or changes in relevant rules of the Department of Business Regulation, or any other agency having jurisdiction over the operation of this mobile home park.

An increase in one or more of the above- described factors may result in an increase in the mobile home owner's rent or other charges.

Tenants assuming the remaining portion of a tenancy as prescribed by Section 723.059(3), F.S., are hereby notified that upon the expiration of the assumed tenancy, the Park Owner expressly reserves the right to increase lot rental amount in an amount deemed appropriate by the Park Owner with such increase being imposed in the manner disclosed in the Prospectus delivered to the initial recipient.

A number of the Petitioner's members used the notice of lot rental increase recommended by the Petitioner and the portion of the prospectus quoted in finding of fact 33.
The Respondent advised some of the Petitioner's members that the notice recommended by the Petitioner was deficient under the Respondent's rules. The notice was deficient because the Respondent determined that the notice did not provide a concise explanation of the reason for a lot rental increase.
The notice used by several members of the Petitioner stated that the reason for the increase was "prevailing market conditions and economic conditions." The Respondent notified members that used this explanation that it was deficient. The Respondent also told those members that "the explanation must include the specific changes in the factors described in the prospectus under prevailing market conditions and economic conditions which were the reasons for the change."
The Petitioner challenged the Respondent's interpretation of its rules concerning notices in Leon County Circuit Court. The Court advised the parties to work things out following a preliminary injunction hearing.
Representatives of the Petitioner and the Respondent met and discussed the problem with the Petitioner's notice and the Respondent subsequently indicated that several examples of a concise explanation for lot rental increases proposed by the Petitioner were acceptable.
The method of increasing rent provided in existing rental agreements at various mobile home parks varies.
Because existing tenants have different anniversary dates or renewal dates, if notice of a lot rental increase affecting some tenants is given to all tenants of a park, it is more costly to the park owner. It is possible, however, to mail one notice of rental increase to all tenants of a park at the beginning of each year.
Florida Leisure Communities has filed a prospectus for all three of its mobile home parks in Florida. The prospectuses have been approved by the Respondent.
At the Colonnades, a Florida Leisure Communities park,
156 lots have been completed and 19 of those lots have been occupied. Improvements to be made by Florida Leisure Communities are specified in the prospectus for the parks. In order to keep pace with market conditions and provide different improvements, a new prospectus has to be filed with the Respondent.
At Brittany Estates, another Florida Leisure Communities park, after a prospectus had been distributed to all tenants, a tornado destroyed 50 mobile homes. Most of the tenants of the 50 homes voluntarily terminated their leases.
Mr. Bernie Covington is vice-president and director of the parks of Angeles Real Estate Management Company (hereinafter referred to as "Angeles"). Angeles owns and operates 13 mobile home parks in Florida.
Angeles has filed a prospectus for Heritage Village, a
436 site park. The prospectus had not been approved or distributed as of the date of the hearing of these cases.
Heritage Village owns and operates its own sewage treatment plant and water system. Heritage Village will be required, however, to tie into the County's water and sewage system at substantial costs.
Existing leases with tenants of Heritage Village allow the park to pass the impact fees ($1,250.00 for sewage and
$1,149.00 for water, per site) and the cost of tieing into the force main ($30,000.00 to $35,000.00) on to the tenants. The cost of tieing into the force main may not be passed on to the tenants under the Respondent's rules, however.
Angeles has also filed a prospectus for Pleasant Living Mobile Home Park which has 218 tenants. The prospectus had not been approved or distributed as of the date off the final hearing of these cases. Angeles would now like to provide a secure area for storage of boats, RVs and cars and charge a fee for this service. The prospectus being reviewed by the Respondent, however, does not indicate that a secure area will be provided.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Jurisdiction
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the parties to, and the subject matter of, these proceedings. Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1985).
1. Introduction
In 1984 the Florida Legislature enacted the "Florida Mobile Home Act," Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. Chapter 84-80, 1984 Laws of Florida. The Act was signed by the Governor and filed in the Office of the Secretary of State on June 4, 1984.
Pursuant to Section 723.006(6), Florida Statutes (1985), the Respondent has been given broad discretion to implement, enforce and interpret Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1985), by rule. Section 723.006(6), Florida Statutes (1985), provides:

The division is authorized to promulgate rules, pursuant to chapter 120, which are necessary to implement, enforce, and interpret this chapter.
The Respondent, through the Bureau of Mobile Homes, a bureau within the Respondent, concluded that there was a need for rules to implement, enforce and interpret Chapter 723 based upon an in- house review of Chapter 723 and the receipt of numerous inquiries from the public. The Respondent therefore began a process to determine what rules needed to be adopted.
After reviewing Chapter 723 and the inquiries it had received, the Respondent drafted a conceptual approach to part of the rules. This conceptual approach was presented to the Petitioner and Intervenor for their review and comment. Following their review, the Respondent discussed the conceptual approach with the Petitioner and the Intervenor. The Respondent then proceeded to draft the rules it determined to be needed pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes.
Subsequent to the promulgation of the rules the Respondent determined were necessary to implement, enforce end interpret Chapter 723, the Petitioner filed two Petitions with the Division of Administrative Hearings challenging the validity of several of the Respondent's rules. In particular, the Petitioner has challenged Rules 7D-30.04(4), 7D-30.06, 7D-31.01(2), 7D- 31.01(4), 7D-31.O1(5), 7D-31.O1(12), 7D-32.01(5) and 7D-32.02(1), Florida Administrative Code.
The challenged rules involve four general subjects: advertising, a prospectus to be provided to prospective lessees, notices to be provided tenants and the definitions of "lot rental amounts" and "pass-through charges." The challenged rules have been grouped and discussed according to these general subjects, infra.
1. Standing
In order for the Petitioner to challenge the rules it seeks to challenge in these cases, the Petitioner must demonstrate that it is "substantially affected" by each challenged rule. Section 120.56(1), Florida Statutes (1985). As a trade association challenging rules on behalf of its members, the Petitioner must meet the test for standing first discussed by the Supreme Court of Florida in Florida Home Builders Association v. Department of Labor and Employment Security, 412 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1982). That test was restated in Farmworker Rights Organization, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 417 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), as follows:

In Florida Home Builders, the Supreme Court of Florida held that a trade or professional association has standing to institute a rule challenge under section 120.56(1), Florida Statutes (1979), even though it acted solely as the representative of its members, provided the following requirements are met:
1. the association demonstrates that a substantial number of its members, although not necessarily a majority, are substantially affected by the challenged rule;
2. the subject matter of the challenged rule is within the association's general scope of interest and activity; and
3. the relief requested is of a type appropriate for a trade association to receive on behalf of its members. 417 So.2d at 754.
The record in these cases supports a conclusion that the subject matter of the challenged rules is within the Petitioner's general scope of interest and activity and that the relief requested is of a type appropriate for the Petitioner to receive on behalf of its members. The Petitioner therefore clearly meets the second and third parts of the test for trade association standing quoted, supra.
In order to conclude that the Petitioner also meets the first part of the test for trade association standing quoted, supra, it must be concluded that the Petitioner has demonstrated, as to each rule challenged, that a substantial number of its members, although not necessarily a majority, are substantially affected by the challenged rule. In order to conclude that a substantial number of the Petitioner's members are substantially affected by a rule, it must be concluded that the Petitioner has demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the tests of Agrico Chemical Company v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 406 So.2d 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), have been met:
1. that he will suffer injury in fact
  which is of sufficient immediacy . . . , and
2. that his substantial injury is of a type or nature which the proceeding is designed to protect.
The Petitioner has demonstrated that its members are substantially affected by all of the rules challenged except Rule 7D-30.06(1), Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioner's failure to demonstrate that. its members are substantially affected by Rule 7D-30.06(1), Florida Administrative Code, is discussed, infra.
Based upon the foregoing, it is concluded that the Petitioner has standing to challenge all of the rules at issue in these proceedings except Rule 7D-30.06(1). The Respondent and Intervenor also have standing to participate in these proceedings.
1. Rule Challenges Generally
The First District Court of Appeal of Florida has established the following standard to be applied by Hearing Officers in determining the validity of agency rules:

[The hearing officer must look to the legislative authority for the rule and determine whether or not the proposed rule is encompassed within the grant. The burden is upon one who attacks the proposed rule to show that the agency, if it adopts the rule, would exceed its authority; that the requirements of the rule are not appropriate to the ends specified in the legislative act; that the requirements contained in the rule are not reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation or that the proposed rule or the requirements thereof are arbitrary or capricious.

A capricious action is one which is taken without thought or reason or irrationally.
An arbitrary decision is one not supported by facts or logic, or despotic. Administrative discretion must be reasoned and based upon competent substantial evidence. Competent substantial evidence has been described as such evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Agrico Chemical Company v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 365 So.2d 759, 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), cert denied, 376 So.2d 74
(1979).
The First District Court provided further guidance in Department of Professional Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984):

The well recognized general rule is that agencies arc to be accorded wide discretion in the exercise of their lawful rulemaking
authority, clearly conferred or fairly implied and consistent with the agencies'
general statutory duties. . . . An agency's construction of the statute it administers is entitled to great weight and is not to be overturned unless clearly erroneous. .
Where, as here, the agency's interpretation of a statute has been promulgated in rulemaking proceedings, the validity of such rule must be upheld if it is reasonably related to the purposes of the legislation interpreted and it is not arbitrary and capricious. The burden is upon petitioner in a rule challenge to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the rule or its requirements are arbitrary and
capricious, . . Moreover, the agency's interpretation of a statute need not be the sole possible interpretation or even the most desirable one; it need only be within the range of possible interpretations.

455 So.2d at 517.
Although agencies are to be accorded wide discretion in exercising their lawful rulemaking authority, it is clear that an agency cannot enlarge, modify, or contravene the provisions of a statute. Campus Communications, Inc. v. Department of Revenue,
473 So.2d 1290 (Fla. 1985); Department of Business Regulation v. Salvation Limited, Inc., 452 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
The Petitioner has argued that the Respondent has not offered any testimony or evidence concerning the reasonableness of its interpretations of the statute involved in these cases. The Petitioner therefore argues that the language of Chapter 723, should be interpreted based upon the "popular signification of the terms used." In interpreting Chapter 723, all appropriate rules of statutory construction will be applied.
Petitioner has also argued that "[s]ince the DBR has not submitted any evidence or testimony in the record regarding its policy choices in defining terms, interpreting the statute or establishing policies by rule, the lack of evidence mitigates, if it does not entirely eliminate the rule calling upon the Court to accord great difference to the agency interpretation of the statute." The cases cited by the Petitioner do not support such a
conclusion except in dicta and the Petitioner's argument is therefore rejected.
It is not necessary for the Respondent to offer specific evidence that interpreting Chapter 723 requires special expertise in order for the general rules of Durrani and Agrico Chemical to apply. In the case most directly on point cited by the Petitioner, Department of Insurance v. Insurance Services Office,
434 So.2d 908 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the agency had argued that the terms at issue were not technical terms of art and should be given their common ordinary meaning. Under those circumstances, the Court indicated in a footnote that since the agency had disavowed the utilization of any special agency expertise in its interpretation of the statute, the rule calling upon the Court to accord great deference to the agency's interpretation of the law was mitigated, if not entirely eliminated.
In these cases, the Respondent has not disavowed the use of special agency expertise. Additionally, the Legislature has specifically designated the Respondent with authority to interpret Chapter 723. Section 723.006(6), Florida Statutes (1985). It is inferred from this delegation of authority that the Legislature intended to rely upon the Respondent's expertise in interpreting Chapter 723.
The Intervenor has argued that the fact that the Petitioner had an opportunity to input the Respondent's decision in adopting the challenged rules and was involved from the beginning of the rulemaking process "all but throws him out of court' in and of itself." The Intervenor's argument is based upon Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Framat Realty, Inc., 407 So.2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The Intervenor's reliance on the Court's decision in Framat Realty in support of its argument is misplaced. Although the Court did emphasize the importance of the rulemaking process, the Court did not expand or modify the rules governing the determination of the validity of agency rules as expressed in Durrani and Agrico Chemical.
The Intervenor has also argued that the record contains very little testimony on most of the challenged rules and therefore "[own this basis alone, the hearing officer is urged to make such brief findings and deny all relief." The Intervenor is correct in its argument that there is not much testimony about the various rules challenged in these cases. This does not, however, mean that the Petitioner has failed to meet its burden of proof. The determination of whether the Petitioner's challenge in these cases is correct is primarily a question of law. Most if not all,
of the testimony presented by the Petitioner was Presented merely to prove standing; not to prove that the rules challenged are invalid. The latter determination can be made based upon the language of Chapter 723, and the challenged rules, which are a part of the record. The Intervenor's argument is therefore rejected.
1. Challenge of Advertising Rule
Pursuant to Section 723.016(1), Florida Statutes (1985), all advertising materials "for, used by, or promoting any mobile home park" must be filed with the Respondent by developers, mobile home park owners and mobile home dealers ID days prior to their use. Pursuant to Section 723.016(3), Florida Statutes (loss), it is provided that no advertising or oral statement made by any developer, park owner or mobile home dealer shall:
1. Misrepresent a fact or create a false or misleading impression regarding the mobile home or mobile home park.
2. Contain any asterisk or other reference symbol as a means of contradicting or Substantially changing any statement previously made or as a means of obscuring a material fact.
3. Misrepresent the size, nature, extent, qualities, or characteristics of the offered facilities.
4. Misrepresent the nature or extent of any service incident to the tenancy.
If false or misleading information is published, Section 723.017, Florida Statutes (1985), provides the following remedy:

Any person who pays anything of value toward the purchase of a mobile home or placement of a mobile home in a mobile home park located in this state in reasonable reliance upon any material statement or information that is false or misleading and published by or under authority from the park owner or developer in advertising and promotional materials, including, but not limited to, a prospectus, the items required as exhibits to a prospectus, brochures, and newspaper advertising, shall have a cause of action to rescind the contract or collect damages from the developer, park owner, or mobile home dealer for his loss.
To implement, enforce and interpret these provisions of Chapter 723, as authorized by Section 723.006(6), Florida Statutes (1985), the Respondent has promulgated Rules 7D-30.05, 7D-30.06 and 7D-30.07, Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioner has challenged Rule 7D-30.06, Florida Administrative Code, in paragraph 3 of its Petition to Determine Invalidity of an Existing Rule filed in case number 85-3858RX. In particular, the Petitioner has contended that the rule requires the use of an identification number on certain advertisements and approval of advertisements before use. The Petitioner contends that these alleged requirements enlarge, modify or otherwise contravene Chapter 723 and are arbitrary and capricious.
In pertinent part, Rule 7D-30.06, Florida Administrative Code, provides:
1. All advertising, including scripts for
  radio, telephone and television, used in promoting a mobile home park under the jurisdiction of the Division must be filed at least 10 days prior to use.
2. The Division will assign an identification number to each advertising piece upon filing.
3. Each visual advertising and each script shall display the identification number assigned by the Division for that specific piece of advertising.
. . . .
(6) Corrections to deficient advertising shall be submitted at least 10 days prior to its use and such submission shall reference the identification number. [Emhpasis added] .
The evidence proves that a substantial number of the Petitioner's members advertise their mobile home parks and developments. Mr. Frank Williams, Executive Director of the Petitioner also testified that advertising materials had to be filed with the Respondent 10 days prior to their use and "then receive approval" from the Respondent. To the extent that Mr. Williams testified or implied that approval is required before an advertisement is used, that testimony is rejected as contrary to the plain language of Rule 7D-30.06, Florida Administrative Code.
Mr. Neal Kullman also testified about advertising. Mr. Kullman testified about the treatment of advertisements he had submitted to the Respondent. Based upon the challenge with regard to the Respondent's rule dealing with advertising, most of Mr. Kullman's testimony was irrelevant. What is being challenged by the Petitioner is an alleged requirement that advertising material must be approved prior, to being used. As to this alleged requirement Mr. Kullman in effect admitted, however, that he waited for approval of his advertising materials because of the potential that an advertisement might ultimately be found to be deficient by the Respondent, not because the Respondent's rules require prior approval.
The Petitioner has argued that the requirement of the rule that an identification number assigned to filed advertising materials must be displayed on visual advertising and each script is in effect a requirement that an "approval number" must be displayed. Because Section 723.016, Florida Statutes (1985), only requires filing, the Petitioner argues that Rule 7D-30.06(2) is invalid. This argument has no basis in fact. Based upon the
testimony of Mr. Kullman and the plain language of Rules 7D- 30.06(2) and (3), Florida Administrative Code, the identification number is not an "approval number."
Rules 7D-30.06(2) and (3), Florida Administrative Code, clearly provide that the identification number is to be assigned upon filing of the advertising material. See also Rule 7D- 30.05(2), Florida Administrative Code (defining "identification number" as the "designation given for the piece of advertising at the time of filing with the Division"). In light of the fact that the identification number is assigned at the time the advertisement is filed, and based upon Mr. Kullman's testimony, it is clear that an advertisement may be used prior to approval of the advertisement by the Respondent despite the fact that Rule 7D- 30.06(3), Florida Administrative Code, requires that the identification number must be displayed on each visual advertisement and each script.
Once an advertisement has been filed as required by Section 723.016, Florida Statutes (1985), and the identification number is assigned, there is nothing in Rules 7D-30.06(2) or (3), Florida Administrative Code, which prevents use of the advertisement. Because the identification number is available upon filing of the advertisement, the requirement of the rule that the identification number be displayed can easily be met without waiting for approval of the advertisement by the Respondent.
The Petitioner has also argued that Rule 7D-30.06(6), Florida Administrative Code, requires that advertising be approved prior to use. Because Section 723.016, Florida Statutes (1985), only requires filing, the Petitioner argues that Rule 7D-30.06(6) is invalid.
Although it may be prudent to wait until the Respondent has reviewed an advertisement before using it, it is concluded that Rule 7D-30.06(6), Florida Administrative Code, does not require that an advertisement be approved by the Respondent before it is used. All that is required is that, if an advertisement is found to be deficient and is corrected, the corrected advertisement must be filed at least 10 days before its use just as any previously unfiled advertisement must be filed. In effect, the rule treats the corrected advertisement as a new unfiled advertisement. Once a corrected advertisement has been filed there is nothing in the challenged rule which prevents its use.
Based upon the foregoing, it is concluded that the Petitioner has failed to prove that Rule 7D-30.06, Florida
Administrative Code, requires approval of advertisements prior to their use as alleged. The Petitioner has argued that Rule 7D- 30.06, Florida Administrative Code, is invalid based upon its interpretation of the rule that advertising material must be approved prior to use. The Petitioner has demonstrated that its members are substantially affected by the rule as it has been interpreted by the Petitioner. That interpretation is, however, an incorrect interpretation of the rule.
The Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that Rule 7D- 30.06, Florida Administrative Code, as orooer1v interoreted substantially affects its members. It is therefore concluded that the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate standing to challenge Rule 7D-30.06, Florida Administrative Code.
If it is ultimately concluded that the Petitioner has standing to challenge Rule 7D-30.06, Florida Administrative Code, it is concluded that the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the rule is invalid. The Petitioner has contended that the rule requires prior approval of advertising materials and that this requirement is beyond the scope of the Respondent's delegated authority and is arbitrary and capricious. Because the rule does not require prior approval, the rule cannot be invalid for the reasons alleged by the Petitioner.
1. Challenge of Prospectus Rules
Section 723.011, Florida Statutes (1985), provides, in pertinent part:

(1)(a) Every mobile home park owner of a park which contains 26 or more lots shall file a prospectus or offering circular with the division prior to entering into an enforceable rental agreement.

(b) The division shall determine whether the proposed prospectus or offering circular is adequate to meet the requirements of this chapter and shall notify the park owner by mail, within 45 days of receipt of the document, that the division has either approved the prospectus or offering circular or found specified deficiencies.
. . . .
(2) The park owner shell furnish a copy of the prospectus or offering circular together
prospective lessee. Delivery shall be made upon execution of the rental agreement or at the time of occupancy, whichever occurs first. However, the park owner is not required to furnish a copy of the prospectus or offering circular if the tenancy is a renewal of a tenancy and the mobile home owner has previously received the prospectus or offering circular.
Section 723.011, Florida Statutes (1985), was effective as of January 1, 1985, for mobile home parks with 100 or more spaces and as of July 1, 1085, for mobile home parks with between
26 and 99 spaces. Section 10, Chapter 84-80, 1984 Laws of Florida.
A prospectus filing fee of $10.00 per lot is required for parks for which lots have not been offered for lease prior to the effective date of Chapter 723. Section 723.011(1)(d)1, Florida Statutes (1985). For parks in which lots have been offered prior to the effective date of Chapter 723, a filing fee ranging from $100.00 to $300.00, depending upon the number of lots in the parks, is required. Section 723.011(1)(d)2, Florida Statutes (1985).
Pursuant to Section 723.012, Florida Statutes (1985), a prospectus must contain certain information. This Section and the information which must be included in a prospectus is discussed, infra.

1. Prior Approval of Prospectuses
In Rule 7D-31.O1(12), Florida Administrative Code, the Respondent has provided for approval of a prospectus prior to its use as follows:

After March 15, 1985, only a prospectus which has been determined by the Division to meet the requirements of the Statutes and these rules may be delivered to a mobile home owner.
In Rule 7D-30.04(4), Florida Administrative Code, the Respondent has similarly required that amended prospectuses must be approved prior to use:

Amendments shall not be delivered to
existing tenants prior to approval by the Division. Approved amendments shall be provided to existing tenants prior to renewals of their rental agreements.
The Petitioner has challenged Rules 7D-30.04(4) and 7D- 31.01(12), Florida Administrative Code, in paragraphs 3 c and 4 f of its Petition in case number 85-3858RX. In particular, the Petitioner has contended that the requirement of these rules that a prospectus or amended prospectus must be approved prior to use is an invalid exercise of delegated authority and is arbitrary and capricious.
Section 723.011(2), Florida Statutes (1985), requires that any prospective lessee of a lot in a mobile home park with 26 or more spaces must be provided with a prospectus and all exhibits thereto upon execution of a rental agreement or at the time of occupancy, whichever occurs first. Section 723.012, Florida Statutes (1985), specifies what information must be included in the prospectus and the exhibits to be attached thereto. Pursuant to Section 723.014, Florida Statutes (1985), it is provided that if a prospectus is not provided as required by Section 723.011(2), any rental agreement entered into is voidable by the lessee.
Prior to entering into a rental agreement, the prospectus to be provided to the lessee must be filed with the Respondent. Section 723.011(1), Florida Statutes (1985). Upon filing, the Respondent is required to determine whether the prospectus is adequate and must notify the mobile home park owner within 45 days after receipt whether the prospectus is approved or whether there are any specific deficiencies.
Based upon the requirements of Section 723.011, Florida Statutes (1985), it is clear that the Legislature intended that prospective mobile home park lessees are to be provided with comprehensive information concerning their rights and obligations as tenants of a mobile home park. Unless prospective lessees are provided with accurate information, the intent of the Legislature will be defeated. Without prior approval of a prospectus by the Respondent it is possible that lessees will be provided with inaccurate or insufficient information contrary to the Legislature's intent. If the Petitioner's interpretation of Section 723.011, Florida Statutes (1985), was correct, it would be possible for a mobile home park owner to simply file a prospectus with the Respondent which fails to comply with the requirements of Section 723.012, Florida Statutes (1985), and then deliver the inadequate prospectus to a prospective lessee. It is not
suggested that a mobile home park owner would intentionally provide inadequate information, but based upon the testimony of the Petitioner's own witnesses, insuring that a prospectus meets the requirements of Section 723.012 is not a simple task. It is therefore very likely that, without obtaining prior approval of a prospectus, an inadequate prospectus could be provided to prospective lessees. Such a result is contrary to the intent of the Legislature and should be avoided.
If an inadequate prospectus is provided to a prospective lessee, Section 723.014, Florida Statutes (1985), does provide a remedy. That remedy allows the lessee to void the lease. Thus, once a lessee is provided with accurate information, the lessee can decide that his or her actual rights are insufficient or his or her actual obligations are too great to remain as a tenant in the park. This remedy will, however, require that the lessee move out of the park at some expense and inconvenience. This expense and inconvenience can be avoided if the lessee is provided with accurate information, as contemplated by Chapter 723, before entering into a lease agreement. One way to insure that accurate information is provided is to require that the prospectus be approved by the Respondent before it is provided to the lessee.
In support of the Petitioner's position, the Petitioner has argued that Section 723.011(2), Florida Statutes (1985), does not specifically require that an approved prospectus be delivered "although that word [approved] was used in subsection 1 of the section." Therefore, the Petitioner argues that the Legislature's use of different terms ("approved prospectus" and "prospectus") in different sections of the same statute is strong evidence that different meanings were intended. Although the Petitioner is correct that the use of different terms in different sections of the same statute is strong evidence that different meanings were intended, the Petitioner's characterization of the language of Section 723.011 is incorrect. In Section 723.O11(1), the Legislature did not use the terms "approved prospectus." The Legislature did, however, use the terms "proposed prospectus" in Section 723.011(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985). This Section provides that "[the division shall determine whether the proposed prospectus . . . is adequate . . . ." This reference is to the prospectus which is to be filed with the Respondent. Thus, the Legislature clearly referred to the prospectus required to be filed as a proposal prior to its review and approval by the Respondent. The use of the terms "proposed prospectus" supports a conclusion that the Respondent's requirement that prospectuses and amended prospectuses be approved by the Respondent prior to use,
as provided in Rules 7D-30.04(4) and 7D-31.01(12), Florida Administrative Code, is a proper one.
Based upon the foregoing it is concluded that the Respondent's requirement that a prospectus or amended prospectus must be approved prior to its use as provided in Rules 7D-30.04(4) and 7D-31.01(12), Florida Administrative Code, is based upon an interpretation of Chapter 723 which is within the range of possible interpretations of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes (1985). Therefore, Rules 7D-30.04(4) and 7D-31.01(12), Florida Administrative Code, are not invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority or arbitrary and capricious.

2. Limitation of Prospectus Amendments
Rule 7D-31.O1(5), Florida Administrative Code, provides:

(5) Subject to those restrictions stated in subsection (4) of this rule, the prospectus offered for any given home owner or prospective home owner shall be binding for the length of the tenancy offered, which shall include any assumptions of that tenancy, and may not be changed except in the following circumstances:
1. Amendments consented to by both the home owner and the park owner.
2. Amendments to reflect new rules or rules that have been changed in accordance with procedures described in Chapter 723,
  F.S. (1984 Supp.) and the prospectus.
3. Amendments to reflect changes in the name of the owner of the park.
4. Amendments to reflect changes in zoning.
5. Amendments to reflect a change in the person authorized to receive notices and demands on the park owner's behalf.
6. Amendments to reflect changes in the entity furnishing utility or other services.
7. Amendments required by the Division.
8. Amendments required as a result of revisions of Chapter 723, F.S. (1984 Supp.)
The Petitioner has challenged this rule in paragraph 4 d of its Petition in case number 85-3858RX. In particular, the
Petitioner has contended that the rule is invalid in that it purports to limit amendments of a prospectus. In support of its position, the Petitioner has argued that there is no authority in Chapter 723 which allows the Respondent to limit the type or substance of amendments to a prospectus.
As pointed out by the Intervenor, there is no specific authority in Chapter 723 providing for any amendment of a prospectus once it has been filed and approved by the Respondent. None of the parties, however, have argued that all amendments to a prospectus are prohibited. Instead, the Petitioner evidently believes that practically all of the information included in a prospectus should be amendable and the Respondent believes that the only types of amendments which may be made to a prospectus have been provided for in its rules.
The Legislature, in requiring that a prospectus be provided to a prospective lessee prior to entering into a rental agreement, has clearly provided that the prospective lessee is to receive notice of certain rights and obligations. In particular, Section 723.012, Florida Statutes (1985), provides that the following information must be included in a prospectus:
1. The name of the mobile home park;
2. Certain statements;
3. A summary of statements included in the prospectus;
4. An index;
5. The name and address or location of the park;
6. The name and address of the person authorized to receive notices and demands on the park owner's behalf;
7. A description of the park property;
8. A description of the recreational and other common facilities that will be used by the mobile home owners;
9. Arrangements for management of the park and maintenance and operation of the park property and other property;
10. A description of all improvements required to be installed by the mobile home owner;
11. The manner in which utility and other services will be provided and the person or entity furnishing them.
12. An explanation of the manner in which park rules or regulations will be set, changed or promulgated;
13. A description of existing zoning;
14. A statement of the nature and type of zoning and the zoning authority; and
15. Certain exhibits.
As already stated, it is clear that the Legislature intended that prospective lessees are to be informed of certain rights and obligations prior to becoming tenants of a mobile home park. Once a lessee has been informed of these rights and obligations, it would be ridiculous to allow a mobile home park owner to unilaterally change those rights and obligations by amending the prospectus. There are certain instances when information contained in a prospectus may or should be changed, however. The Respondent has recognized this and has provided that certain amendments may be made to a previously approved prospectus.
Based upon the foregoing, the Petitioner's argument that Rule 7D-31.01(5), Florida Administrative Code, is invalid because there is no statutory authority which allows the Respondent to limit amendments to a prospectus once it has been given to a tenant is unfounded.
Whether the Respondent has gone far enough in the types of amendments which should be allowed to a prospectus which has been given to tenants is questionable. The Petitioner, however, has only presented evidence to establish its standing as to one specific type of amendment which is not allowed by the challenged rules. Mr. Neil Kullman testified that a tornado destroyed 50 mobile homes at an existing mobile home park. A prospectus indicating the number of lots at the park, including those lots where the 50 destroyed homes were located, had been distributed to tenants. Evidently, the Petitioner believes that an amendment of the prospectus should be allowed under these circumstances. The Petitioner, however, presented no evidence to substantiate such a conclusion. No evidence was presented from which it can be concluded that the 50 lots cannot be continued to be used as mobile home spaces. Therefore, the Petitioner has failed to prove that an amendment is necessary. If the Petitioner believes that
an amendment should be allowed if the mobile home park owner wishes to use the spaces for some other purpose, the Petitioner is incorrect. Such an amendment could materially affect the rights of existing tenants. To allow an amendment of a prospectus which would materially affect existing tenants rights would be contrary to the Legislature's intent.
The Petitioner also presented evidence concerning changes which park owners would like to make to a prospectus which has already been approved by the Respondent or has already been filed with the Respondent but which has not been delivered to tenants or to tenants who would be affected by the change. It is not clear if the Petitioner presented this evidence in support of its challenge to the rule limiting amendments to prospectuses. If so, the Petitioner misunderstands what Rule 7D-31.01(5), Florida Administrative Code, provides. The challenged rule only provides that once a prospectus has been distributed to a tenant, the - prospectus cannot be amended except as provided in the rule. The rule simply does not apply to changes in a prospectus which has been filed with the Respondent which a park owner wishes to make changes to before it has been provided to prospective tenants. Evidence concerning those type changes is therefore irrelevant.
Based upon the foregoing, it is concluded that the Petitioner has failed to prove that Rule 7D-31.01(5), Florida Administrative Code, is invalid.

3. Perpetually Binding Prospectuses
The Petitioner has also challenged the validity of Rule 7D-31.01(5), Florida Administrative Code, in paragraph 4 e of its Petition filed in case number 85-3858RX. In particular, the Petitioner has argued in its Petition that the rule is invalid in that it purports to make the prospectus offered to any one tenant binding, not only with respect to that tenant, and with respect to a future tenant who may purchase the mobile home from him during the term of his tenancy, but also binding with respect to all future purchasers of that home.
As pointed out by the Respondent and the Intervenor, the Petitioner has misstated the effect of the rule and what the rule provides in its Petition. Evidently, the Petitioner now agrees because the Petitioner has not argued in its proposed final order that the rule is invalid on the same non-constitutional grounds stated in its Petition. Because it is not totally clear whether the Petitioner has abandoned its non-constitutional challenge to Rule 7D-31.01(5) as stated in paragraph 4 e of its
Petition, it is concluded that Rule 7D-31.O1(5), Florida Administrative Code, is not invalid on the non-constitutional ground set out in paragraph 4 e of the Petition filed in case number 85-3858RX. This conclusion is based upon the fact that the Petitioner has misinterpreted the rule in its challenge.
The Petitioner also challenged Rule 7D-31.01(5), Florida Administrative Code, on constitutional grounds in paragraph 4 e of its Petition. In the Petitioner's proposed final order, the Petitioner has raised another constitutional argument. This constitutional challenge and the constitutional challenge contained in the Petitioner's Petition are beyond the jurisdiction of the Division of Administrative Hearings. Therefore, no conclusions are reached as to the constitutionality of Rule 7D- 31.01(5), Florida Administrative Code.

4. Uniformity of Prospectus Terms and Conditions
Rule 7D-31.01(4), Florida Administrative Code, provides:
(4) For all tenancies in existence on June 4, 1984, the terms and conditions of the prospectus that affect those tenancies shall be uniform throughout the park except for rent variations based upon lot location and size. Both the manner of increase of any lot rental amount as well as any changes in services shall be uniform for those affected tenancies. No tenancies in existence on June 4, 1984 nor any assumptions of those tenancies in existence shall be required to install any permanent improvements.
The Petitioner has challenged this rule in paragraph.
4 c of its Petition filed in case number 85-3858RX. In particular, the Petitioner has argued that the rule is invalid in that the rule "purports to regulate the lot rental agreement and contracts between the mobile home park owner and his tenants."
Rule 7D-31.01(4), Florida Administrative Code, was promulgated by the Respondent as an interpretation of, or to implement, Section 723.011(3), Florida Statutes (1985), which provides:

(3) With regard to a tenancy in existence on the effective date of this chapter, the prospectus or offering circular offered by the mobile home park owner shall contain the same terms and conditions as rental agreements offered to all other mobile home owners residing in the park on the effective date of this act, excepting only rent variations based upon lot location and size, and shall not require any mobile home owner to install any permanent improvements.
The challenged rule requires that all terms and conditions of the prospectus given to tenants of a mobile home park as of June 4, 1984 must be uniform. Section 723.011(3), Florida Statutes (1985), only provides that the prospectus given to those tenants must contain the same terms and conditions as rental agreements offered to all other mobile home owners residing in the park on June 4, 1984.
It is not totally clear what rental agreements Section 723.011(2) is referring to: those actually in effect as of June 4, 1984 or those which existing tenants may be entering into after
the effective date of Chapter 723. Because Section 723.011(3) refers to rental agreements "offered" it is possible that the statute is referring to future rental agreements which tenants as of June 4, 1984, may be entering into after the effective date of Chapter 723. If this is the intent of the Legislature, the contents of the rental agreement will be governed by Section 723.031, Florida Statutes (1985). What must be included in a rental agreement pursuant to Section 723.031 Is not the same as what must be,. contained in a prospectus under Section 723.012, Florida Statutes (1985). For example, the method of increasing rental charges, which must be included in a prospectus, is not required to be included in a rental agreement. Despite these facts, the rule requires that all of the terms and conditions of the prospectus must be uniform even if a term or condition which must be included in a prospectus pursuant to Section 723.012 is not required to be included in a rental agreement pursuant to Section 723.031 and is not included in the rental agreement.
If Section 723.011(3), Florida Statutes (1985), is referring to rental agreements actually in effect as of June 4, 1984, it is possible that the terms and conditions contained in those agreements will not be the same as the terms and conditions required to be included in a prospectus. Despite this fact, the rule requires that all of the terms and conditions of the prospectus must be uniform even if a term or condition which must be included in a prospectus is not included in existing rental agreements.
In light of the fact that Section 723.011(3), Florida Statutes (1985), only requires that the prospectus contain the same terms and conditions as rental agreements and the fact that rental agreements may not include all of the terms and conditions which must be included in the prospectus, Rule 7D-31.01(4), Florida Administrative Code, is invalid. The rule is invalid to the extent that it requires uniformity of terms and conditions in a prospectus given to tenants of a mobile home park as of June 4, 1984, which are not included in rental agreements offered to those tenants.
1. Challenge to Rule Involving Notices
Section 723.037(1), Florida Statutes (1985), provides as follows:

A park owner shall give written notice to each mobile home owner at least 90 days prior to any lot rental increase, reduction in
services or utilities, or change in rules and regulations. Rules adopted as a result of restrictions imposed by governmental entities and required to protect the public health, safety, and welfare may be enforced prior to the expiration of the 90-day period but are not otherwise exempt from the requirements of this chapter.
In Rule 7D-32.02, Florida Administrative Code, the Respondent has provided the following pertinent requirements with regard to the-notice requirement of Section 723.037:
1. Prior to the effectiveness of any lot rental increase, reduction in services or utilities, or change in rules and regulations, the park owner or subdivision developer shall give written notice to the owner of each mobile home in the park or subdivision at least 90 days in advance. The notice is not effective until given to the last of all homeowners in the park and no increase, reduction or change shall be effective prior to 90 days after the date all homeowner have been given notice. The notice shall contain, at minimum, the following information:
  . . . .
  (d) A concise explanation of the reason for the proposed change. Only factors specifically identified in the prospectus as affecting lot rental amount may be relied upon by the park owner as justification for the reasonableness of a rental increase.
The Petitioner has challenged this rule in paragraphs 2 a and 2 b of its Petition filed in case number 85-3859RX and in paragraph 5 b of its Petition filed in case number 85-3858RX. In paragraph 5 b of its Petition filed in case number 85-3858RX, the Petitioner has challenged the requirement that notice be given to all mobile home owners and not to just those owners which are affected by the proposed change. In paragraph 2 a of its Petition filed in case number 3859RX the Petitioner has challenged the requirement of the rule that a concise explanation of the reason for the proposed change must be included in the notice. Finally, in paragraph 2 b of its Petition filed in case number 85-3859RX the Petitioner has contended that the Respondent has interpreted the language of Rule 7D-32.02(1)(d) in such a way as to establish a policy of general applicability which should have been adopted as a rule.
In order to determine whether the requirement of Rule 7D-32.02(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code, is proper it is necessary to consider all of Section 723.037, Florida Statutes (1985). Under this Section, notice must be provided at least 90 days prior to a proposed change. Within 30 days of the notice, the mobile home park owner may be required to meet with a committee of up to five mobile home owners designated by a majority of the mobile home owners or, if a homeowners' association has been formed, by the board of directors of the
association. Section 723.037(3), Florida Statutes (1985). Within
15 days after the meeting, the home owners may request that any remaining dispute be submitted to mediation pursuant to Section 723.038, Florida Statutes (1985), unless the parties agree that the dispute should be arbitrated rather than mediated. Sections 723.037(3) and (4), Florida Statutes (1985).
The Petitioner has argued that Section 723.037 requires that notice of a lot rental increase, change in services or utilities or a change in rules and regulations is all that must be given to tenants. If the term "notice" is given its plain and ordinary meaning, the Petitioner argues, all that the statute requires is that tenants be informed that there will be a lot rental increase, a change in services or utilities or a change in rules and regulations. Section 723.037, however, does not require that notice of a change must be given. What Section 723.037 provides is that "written notice" must be given 90 days before a proposed change is to occur. Exactly what tenants are to be given notice of is not specifically provided for in Section 723.037. Reading Section 723.037 as a whole, however, it appears clear that the Legislature intended to require more than just providing notice that a change may occur. The notice is intended to provide a trigger to a process whereby the tenants of the park can contest the proposed change. In order for tenants to decide, which they must, whether the change should be contested it is reasonable to conclude that the tenants should receive more information than just the fact that a change is proposed. Without the information which the Respondent has required that tenants be provided with in Rule 7D-32.02, Florida Administrative Code, the tenants cannot make an intelligent decision to accept the change or contest it.
The Petitioner has made several specific arguments concerning the requirement of the rule that a "concise explanation" of the reason for the proposed change be provided in the notice. First, the Petitioner has argued that the terms "concise explanation" are not defined and are so broad that the Respondent may arbitrarily determine whether a park owner has complied with this requirement. In support of this argument, the Petitioner has cited Grove Isle Ltd., v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 454 2d 571 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). That case is clearly distinguishable from these cases. In Grove Isle the challenged rule included the terms "public interest" and required that it be demonstrated that the "proposed activity or discharge is clearly in the public interest." Because the terms "public interest" were not defined, the Court concluded that the agency could arbitrarily decide whether an applicant's activity
complied with the rule and therefore concluded that the rule was invalid.
The terms at issue in these cases are not as difficult to define as the terms "public interest." This is especially true when the terms are considered in the context in which they are used. Grove Isle, therefore, is distinguishable from these cases.
The Petitioner has also argued that the Respondent has established a policy of general applicability which affects the substantial rights of park owners in explaining what is required as a concise explanation. The evidence establishes that in several instances, a park owner had merely indicated that the reason for a lot rental increase was "prevailing market conditions and economic conditions." In informing the park owner that this explanation was insufficient, which it clearly is, the Respondent indicated the following:

The explanation must include the specific changes in the factors described in the prospectus under prevailing market conditions and economic conditions which were the reasons for the change.
This explanation only applies to the particular park owners which the Respondent provided the explanation to. It is not clearly intended to be a policy of general applicability even though the explanation was given to more than one park owner because those park owners had given the same clearly insufficient explanations in their notices. More importantly, the explanation given by the Respondent does not expand, modify or in anyway change what the rule already requires. It is therefore concluded that the Petitioner has failed to prove that the Respondent has adopted a policy which should have been promulgated as a rule.
Based upon the foregoing, it is concluded that the Respondent's requirement that certain information be included in notices required by Section 723.037, Florida Statutes (1955), as contained in Rule 7D-32.02, Florida Administrative Code, is a proper requirement under Section 723.037, Florida Statutes (1985).
The Petitioner has also argued that Rule 7D-32.02, Florida Administrative Code, is invalid because it requires that notices must be given to all tenants of the park and not just those affected by the change. Section 723.037(1), Florida Statutes (1985), requires that each mobile home owner is to be given notice of any of the specified proposed changes. It is not
unreasonable to interpret this requirement of the statute to require that for any proposed change every home owner must be notified. This is especially true when the statute is read as a whole. The process to contest a proposed change established in Section 723.037 requires involvement of all of the mobile home owners in the park in deciding whether to contest a proposed change, not just those owners affected by the proposed change.
The committee which may discuss a proposed change with the park owner is to be designated by a majority of the mobile home owners or the board of directors of the homeowners' association, if one is formed. Section 723.037(2), Florida Statutes (1985). If the proposed change is to be contested after the meeting of the committee and the park owner, the decision is also to be made by a majority of the mobile home owners. Because of this involvement of all of the mobile home owners or their association, it is reasonable to require that notices be provided to all mobile home owners.
1. Challenge to Definitions
Rule 7D-31.01(2), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following definition which has been challenged by the Petitioner:
1. "Lot rental" or "lot rental amount" or rental amount" means all consideration paid by the home owner to the park owner. It includes rent, special use fees, pass-through charges, fees, assessments, and any other financial obligations of the home owner to the park owner, which are related to the tenancy. As used herein, the following definitions shall apply:
This definition has been challenged by the Petitioner in paragraph
4 a of its Petition filed in case number 85-3858RX.
The Petitioner has argued that, if the term "rental" is given its plain and ordinary meaning, the Respondent's definition is arbitrary and capricious in that it includes "any other financial obligations of the home owner to the park owner." While the Petitioner is probably correct that the term "rental" or "rent" standing alone does not include other financial obligations of a lessee to a lessor, the Petitioner has ignored the context in which the Respondent's rule is to apply.
The challenged definition is included in Chapter 7D-31, Florida Administrative Code, which provides rules pertaining to the prospectus required by Section 723.011, Florida Statutes (1985), and rental agreements governed by Section 723.031, Florida Statutes (1985). Therefore, the definition of "lot rental" is provided for purposes of prospectus and rental agreements only. Whether the definition of "lot rental" is valid must therefore be determined in the context of what must be included in the prospectus and rental agreements.
Pursuant to Section 723.012(9), Florida Statutes (1985), the following information must be included in all prospectuses:
1. An explanation of the manner in which rents and other charges will be raised, including, but not limited to:
  1. Notification of the mobile home owner at least 90 days in advance of the increase.
  2. Disclosure of any rate increases or pass-through of such increases which may affect lot rental fees, including but not limited to:
1. Water rates.
2. Sewer rates.
3. Waste disposal rates.
4. Maintenance costs.
5. Management costs.
6. Property taxes.
7. Major repairs or improvements.
8. Any other fees, costs, entrance fees, or charges to which the mobile home owner may be subjected. [Emphasis added]
This provision of Section 723.012, Florida Statutes (1985), clearly requires that a prospectus must include information involving other charges which clearly may not be contemplated in the normal meaning of the term "rent." What the Respondent has done in Chapter 7D-31 is to use a term or terms ("lot rental", lot rental amount" or "rental amount") which it has defined to include the information which Section 723.012(9), Florida Statutes (1985), requires to be included in prospectuses: the manner in which rents and other charges are to be raised. The Respondent could have used any term or abbreviation it chose to describe the information which must be included in the prospectus pursuant to Chapter 723.
The Respondent is not attempting to define the term "rent" or give it a broader meaning than its ordinary meaning. The Respondent has only used a term to define what Section 723.012(9), Florida Statutes (1985), requires to be included in a prospectus.
Section 723.031(5), Florida Statutes (1985), provides what must be included in a lot rental agreement:

The rental agreement shall contain the amount of the rent, any security deposit, installation charges, fees, assessments, services included, and any other financial obligations of the mobile home owner.

Section 723.031(5), Florida Statutes, like Section 723.012(9), Florida Statutes (1985), requires the inclusion in a lot rental agreement of information which does not generally constitute rent: other financial obligations. Again, the Respondent has provided for the use of terms for purposes of Chapter 7D-31, Florida
Administrative Code, which it has defined to include information which Section 723.031(5), Florida Statutes (1985), requires to be included in lot rental agreements.
Based upon the foregoing, it is concluded that the Respondent's definition of "lot rental amount" included in Rule 7D-31.O1(2), Florida Administrative Code, is not invalid.
The Petitioner has also challenged Rule 7D-32.01, Florida Administrative Code, which provides:

"Lot rental" means all amounts as defined in Rule 7D-31.O1, Florida Administrative Code, to be paid by the home owner to the park owner or the subdivision developer.

This rule has been challenged in paragraph 5 a of the Petition filed in case number 85-3858RX.
This definition of "lot rental" is included in Chapter 7D-32, Florida Administrative Code, which includes the mobile home mediation and arbitration rules. Mediation and arbitration is provided as a possible response to the notice required to be given pursuant to Section 723.037, Florida Statutes (1985), prior to a lot rental increase. When Section 723.037 is read in - conjunction with Section 723.012(9), it is clear that the Legislature intended that notice is to be given of any proposed increase in rent or other increases specified in Section 723.012(9). Mediation or arbitration is also clearly intended to be available to contest a proposed increase in rent or other increase as specified in Section 723.012(9), Florida Statutes (1985).
By referring to the definition of "lot rental" included in Rule 7D-31.01(2), Florida Administrative Code, the Respondent has again used a term or terms which it has defined to include the type of increase which pursuant to Section 723.037, Florida Statutes (1985), may be contested by mediation or arbitration. It is therefore concluded that the definition of "lot rental" contained in Rule 7D-32.01, Florida Administrative Code, is not invalid.
Finally, the Petitioner has challenged the following definition of "pass-through charges" provided for in Rule 7D- 31.0l(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code:
"Pass-through charges" means those amounts, other than special use fees, which are itemized and charged separately from the rent and which represent the mobile home owner's share of costs charged to the park owner by any state or local government or utility company.

This rule has been challenged in paragraph 4 b of the Petition filed in case number 3858RX.
This definition is provided as a part of the Respondent's implementation of Section 723.031(5), Florida Statutes (1985), which provides:

The rental agreement shall contain the amount of the rent, any security deposit, installation charges, fees, assessments, services included, and any other financial obligations of the mobile home owner.
However, for a tenancy in existence on the effective date of this act and until the term of the existing rental agreement expires, this provision shall not be construed to prevent the mobile home park owner from passing on to the mobile home owner any costs, including any increased cost for utilities, which are incurred due to the actions of any state or local government. [Emphasis added]
The Petitioner has argued that the statute provides that cost "incurred" may be passed on and that such costs include many other items than those specifically "charged" to the mobile home park owner as provided in the definition of "pass-through charges" provided in Rule 7D-31.01(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code. This argument is rejected. It is concluded that the use of the term "charged" in the challenged rule is not inconsistent with the term "incurred" used in Section 723.031(5), Florida Statutes (1985). Nor has the Petitioner presented any evidence which indicates that the use of the term "charged" was intended or has been interpreted by the Respondent to mean anything inconsistent with the term "incurred" or the provisions of Chapter 723.
It is therefore concluded that the definition of "pass- through charges" included in Rule 7D-31.01(2)(b), Florida

Administrative Code, is not beyond the Respondent's authority or arbitrary and capricious.

ORDER

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is

ORDERED:

The Petitioner has failed to prove that it has standing to challenge Rule 7D-30.06, Florida Administrative Code. Paragraph 3 d of its Petition filed in case number 85-3858RX is therefore dismissed;
The requirements of Rule 7D-31.01(4), Florida Administrative Code, are beyond the scope of the Respondent's delegated legislative authority and are arbitrary and capricious to the extent that the rule requires uniformity of terms and conditions in a prospectus given to tenants of a mobile home park as of June 4, 1984, which are not included in rental agreements offered to those tenants; and
The Petitioner has failed to prove that the other rules challenged by the Petitioner in these cases are invalid. Therefore, except as provided in paragraphs 1 and 2, the Petitioner's request to declare Rules 7D-30.04, 7D-31.O1(2), 7D- 31.01(5), 7D-31.01(12), 7D-32.01 and 7D-32.02, Florida Administrative Code, invalid is denied.

DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of March, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida.

LARRY J. SARTIN

Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building

2009 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1986.

APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 85-3858RX, 85-3859RX

The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Final Order where they were accepted. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reasons for their rejection have also been noted. Paragraph numbers in the Final Order are referred to as "FO ."

The parties have proposed "findings of fact" which are actually statements of the law. What the pertinent statutes and rules provide is essential to a determination of whether the rules of the Respondent challenged in these cases are invalid. Despite this fact, it has been concluded that it is not necessary or proper to make findings of fact which do no more than state what the law provides. Therefore, proposed findings of fact which state what a statute or rule provides have been rejected as findings of fact. The relevant statutes and rules have, however, been discussed in the Conclusions of Law portion of this Final Order.

Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Paragraph 1: Accepted in FO 2, 3 and 4.

Paragraph 2: The first sentence of this proposed finding of

fact has been accepted in FO 5. The remainder of this proposed finding of fact is rejected as a statement of the law.

Paragraph 3: Accepted in FO 18, 19 and 20.

Paragraph 4: Accepted in FO 23, 24 and 25.

Paragraph 5: Accepted in FO 29.

Paragraph 6: Accepted in FO 30, 31, 32, 36, 37 and 38.

Paragraph 7: This proposed finding of fact is rejected as contrary to the evidence.

Paragraph 8: Rejected as a statement of the law.

Paragraph 9: The first sentence of this proposed finding of fact is rejected. The evidence does not support this proposed finding of fact. The last sentence is accepted in FO 39.

Paragraph 10: Accepted in FO 11. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact:

Paragraph 1: Accepted in FO 1.

Paragraph 2: Accepted in FO 1.

Paragraph 3: Accepted in FO 1.

Paragraph 4: Accepted in FO 1.

Paragraph 5: Accepted in FO 6.

Paragraph 6: Accepted in FO 7.

Paragraph 7: Accepted in FO 8, 9, 10 and 11.

Paragraph 8: Accepted in FO 12.

Paragraph 9: Accepted in FO 13.

Paragraph 10: Accepted in FO 14.

Paragraph 11: Accepted in FO 16.

Paragraph 12: Accepted in FO 15.

Paragraph 13: Accepted in FO 26.

Paragraph 14: This proposed findings of fact is rejected.

It proposes a finding as to what the evidence did not prove.

Paragraph 15: This proposed finding of fact is rejected. It proposes a finding as to what the evidence did not prove.

Paragraph 16: Accepted in FO 18 and 19.

Paragraph 17: Accepted in FO 23.

Paragraph 18: This proposed finding of fact is technically incorrect and is rejected. See, however, FO 27.

Paragraph	19:	Accepted	in	FO	41.
Paragraph	20:	Accepted	in	FO	42.
Paragraph	21:	Accepted	in	FO	43.
Paragraph	22:	Accepted	in	FO	44.
Paragraph	23:	Accepted	in	FO	45.
Paragraph	24:	Accepted	in	FO	46.
Paragraph	25:	Accepted	in	FO	47.
Paragraph	26:	Accepted	in	FO	48.
Paragraph	27:	Accepted	in	FO	19,	22	and 23.
Paragraph	28:	Accepted	in	FO	33.
Paragraph	29:	Accepted	in	FO	31.
Paragraph	30:	Accepted	in	FO	32.
Paragraph	31:	Accepted	in	FO	36.
Paragraph	32:	Accepted	in	FO	38.
Paragraph	33:	Accepted	in	FO	36.
Paragraph	34:	Accepted	in	FO	40.
Paragraph	35:	Accepted	in	FO	40.
Paragraph	36:	Accepted	in	FO	40.

Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact: Paragraph 1: Accepted in FO 1.

Paragraph 2: The first sentence is rejected as a statement of law. The last sentence is accepted in FO 18 and 19.

Paragraph 3: Accepted in FO 18.

Paragraph 4: Accepted in FO 19 and 22.

Paragraph 5: Accepted in FO 25.

Paragraph 6: Accepted in FO 11 and 18.

Paragraph 7: The first sentence is accepted in FO 9 and 10.

The second sentence is rejected as irrelevant.

Paragraph 8: Accepted in FO 13.

Paragraph 9: This proposed finding of fact is rejected. The evidence does not support the proposed finding of fact and it is irrelevant.

Paragraph	10:	Accepted	in	FO	1.
Paragraph	11:	Accepted	in	FO	2.
Paragraph	12:	Accepted	in	FO	1.
Paragraph	13:	Accepted	in	FO	7.
Paragraph	14:	Accepted	in	FO	7.
Paragraph	15:	Accepted	in	FO	8 and 9.
Paragraph	16:	Accepted	in	FO	9.
Paragraph	17:	Accepted	in	FO	11.
Paragraph	18:	Accepted	in	FO	14.
Paragraph	19:	Accepted	in	FO	16.
Paragraph	20:	Accepted	in	FO	17.

Paragraphs 21 through 25: These proposed findings of fact are rejected, The evidence does not support these proposed findings of fact.

Paragraphs 26 and 27: These proposed findings of fact are rejected as statements of law.

Paragraph 28: This proposed finding of fact is rejected. It proposes a finding as to what the evidence did not prove.

Paragraphs 29 through 33: These proposed findings of fact are rejected as statements of the law.

Paragraph 34: Accepted in FO 28.

Paragraph 35: Accepted in FO 28.

Paragraph 36: Accepted in FO 28.

Paragraph 37: This proposed finding of fact is rejected. This proposed finding of fact is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The evidence only proved that one member of the Petitioner was not aware of any action being brought against a member of the Petitioner for use of an unapproved ad.

Paragraph 38: This proposed finding of fact is rejected. It proposes a finding as to what the evidence did not prove.

Paragraph 39: This proposed finding of fact is rejected as a statement of the law.

Paragraph 40: Rejected as irrelevant.

Paragraph 41 through 43: These proposed findings of fact are rejected as statements of the law.

Paragraphs 44 through 47: These proposed findings of fact are rejected. They propose findings as to what the evidence did not prove.

Paragraphs 48 through 50: These proposed findings of fact are rejected as statements of the law.

Paragraph 51: This proposed finding of fact is rejected. It proposes a finding as to what the evidence did not prove.

Paragraphs 52 through 55: These proposed finding of fact are rejected as statements of the law.

Paragraph 56: This proposed finding of fact is rejected. It proposes a finding as to what the evidence did not prove.

Paragraphs 57 and 58: These proposed findings of fact are rejected as statements of the law.

Paragraph 59: This proposed finding of fact is rejected. It proposes a finding as to what the evidence did not prove.

Paragraph 60: This proposed finding of fact is rejected as a statement of the law.

Paragraph 61: This proposed finding of fact is rejected because it is irrelevant.

Paragraph 62: This proposed finding of fact if rejected. It proposes a finding as to what the evidence did not prove.

Paragraph 63: This proposed finding of fact is rejected as a statement of the law.

Paragraph 64: The last sentence of this proposed finding of fact is rejected because it proposes a finding as to what the evidence did not prove. The rest of the proposed finding of fact is accepted in FO 40.

Paragraph 65: This proposed finding of fact is rejected as a statement of the law.

Paragraph 66: This proposed finding of fact is rejected. It proposes a finding as to what the evidence did not prove.

Paragraph 67: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 68: Accepted in FO 19 and 22.

Paragraph 69: Accepted in FO 35.

Paragraph 70: Accepted in FO 38.

Paragraph 71: This proposed finding of fact is not technically correct and is therefore rejected. The Respondent did not advise the Petitioner. It advised some of the Petitioner's members. See FO 36.

Paragraph 72: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 73: Rejected as irrelevant.

Paragraphs 74 and 75: These proposed findings of fact are rejected as statements of the law.

Paragraph 76: This proposed finding of fact is rejected. It proposes a finding as to what the evidence did not prove.

COPIES FURNISHED:

John C. Courtney, Esquire, Robin H. Conner, Esquire

Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

John T. Allen, Jr., Esquire John T. Allen, P.A.

4508 Central Avenue

St. Petersburg, Florida 33711

Richard B. Burroughs, Jr. Secretary

Department of Business Regulation 725 South Brounough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Jack M. Skelding, Jr., Esquire David D. Eastman, Esquire

Bob L. Harris, Esquire

Haben, Parker, Skelding, Costigan, McVoy & Labasky

318 North Monroe Street Post Office Box 669 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Carroll Webb, Executive Director

Administrative Procedures Committee

120 Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Liz Cloud, Chief

Bureau of Administrative Code 1802 The Capitol

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Docket for Case No: 85-003858RX

Issue Date	Proceedings
Mar. 26, 1986	Final Order (hearing held , 2013). CASE CLOSED.

Orders for Case No: 85-003858RX

Issue Date	Document	Summary
Mar. 26, 1986	DOAH Final Order	Petitioner failed to prove rules governing prospectus requirements for manufactured housing rentals were invalid.

Source: Florida - Division of Administrative Hearings

FLORIDA MANUFACTURED HOUSING ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES, 85-003858RX (1985)

Docket for Case No: 85-003858RX

Orders for Case No: 85-003858RX

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FLORIDA MANUFACTURED HOUSING ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES, 85-003858RX (1985)

Docket for Case No: 85-003858RX

Orders for Case No: 85-003858RX

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