STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

JAMES A. ABBANAT, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 86-1091

)

WILLIAM O. REYNOLDS, and )

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL )

REGULATION, )

)

Respondents. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to Notice, this cause was heard by Linda M. Rigot, the assigned Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings, on November 17, 1986, in Key West, Florida.

Petitioner James A. Abbanat appeared on his own behalf as did Respondent William O. Reynolds. Respondent Department of Environmental Regulation was represented by Douglas H. MacLaughlin, Esquire, and Ann Foster, Certified Legal Intern, Tallahassee, Florida.

The prior application for a permit for a weedgate and fence filed by Respondent William O. Reynolds was denied due to a technical deficiency. Respondents William O. Reynolds and Department of Environmental Regulation subsequently entered into a consent order approving the proposed project, and Petitioner James A. Abbanat objected to the issuance of that consent order.

Accordingly, the issue for determination herein is whether the proposed project should be approved.

Respondent Department of Environmental Regulation presented the testimony of David Bischoff, and the Department's Exhibits numbered 1-5 were admitted in evidence. Respondent William O. Reynolds presented the testimony of Robert L. Squibb, Joel Rosenblatt, and Petitioner James A. Abbanat. Additionally, Respondent Reynolds' Exhibits numbered 1-3 were admitted in evidence.

Petitioner James A. Abbanat presented the testimony of Respondent William O. Reynolds and David Bischoff, and Petitioner's Exhibits numbered 1-3 were admitted in evidence.

All parties submitted posthearing proposed findings of fact in the form of proposed recommended orders. A ruling on each proposed finding of fact appears in the Appendix to this Recommended Order.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Respondent William O. Reynolds filed with Respondent Department of Environmental Regulation an application to construct a weedgate and fence at the mouth of a dead-end canal in Atlantis Estates Subdivision located on Big Pine Key in Monroe County, Florida. When the Department noticed its intent to issue

   a dredge and fill permit to Reynolds, Petitioner James A. Abbanat filed his objection. That cause was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for conduct of a formal hearing and was assigned DOAH Case No. 84-1508. On March 8, 1985, a Recommended Order was entered in that cause find in, inter alia, that the proposed project would be constructed in Class III waters of the State (Outstanding Florida Waters), that the weedgate and fence should cause no state water quality violations and should not unreasonably interfere with navigation, that they should actually improve water quality and navigation within the canal and should not significantly decrease water quality outside of the canal, that the project would not be contrary to the public interest, and that the applicant had provided reasonable assurances that the project would not violate Department standards, rules, or applicable statutes. Although the permit application was not certified by a professional engineer registered in the state of Florida, the Recommended Order concluded that that technical deficiency should not form the basis for denying the permit but rather that the permit should be granted with conditions. On April 22, 1985, a Final Order was issued adopting the Recommended Order but denying the permit application solely due to the lack of certification of the permit application by a professional engineer registered in the state of Florida.

   
   

2. Despite the denial of his application for a permit, Respondent William

   O. Reynolds caused to be constructed a weedgate and fence. At some undisclosed time Reynolds did, however, submit to the Department of Environmental Regulation a set of drawings for the fence and weedgate. Although the drawing for the weedgate as built was certified by a professional engineer registered in the State of Florida, no fence drawing was so certified and the fence as built was located differently than the fence as shown in the drawings. The drawings showed a fence extending from the weedgate through the cove at the entrance to the canal for a distance of 200 feet, while the fence as installed is 100 feet in length and is located within the canal itself.

   
   

3. On August 19, 1986, Respondents entered into a consent order acknowledging the prior denial of Reynolds" application due to lack of certification of the permit application, reciting that certification had been obtained, and authorizing the project.

   
   

4. Interested persons were not notified of the entry of the consent order. Accordingly, when Petitioner Abbanat learned of its existence and filed his objection to the entry of that consent order, the Department of Environmental Regulation afforded the required point of entry into administrative proceedings and referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the conduct of a formal hearing. That objection initiated this cause.

   
   

5. The weedgate as built is in substantial accord with the plans submitted to the Department by Reynolds and certified by Joel Rosenblatt, a professional engineer registered in the state of Florida.

   
   

6. The design, location, and size of the weedgate as built is substantially similar to that proposed in DOAH Case No. 84-1508. The weedgate as built has the same system of cables and weights and is supported by support posts on each side. As built, the weedgate opens in the middle to permit unimpeded ingress and egress of boats. The weedgate causes neither interruption of water flow nor erosion.

   
   

7. The effect of the weedgate as built on state water quality standards is the same as the effect determined in DOAH Case No. 84-1508, i.e., the presence of the weedgate causes no water quality violation either in the canal or in the

   water just outside the gate and fence. The presence of windblown wrack in the canal was the major cause of state water quality violations. The sole purpose of the gate and fence is to prevent wrack from entering the canal and decaying there causing lowered dissolved oxygen levels and anoxic and/or anaerobic conditions. There has been little or no wrack in the canal since the weedgate and fence were installed, and the weedgate and fence are beneficial to and appear to have improved the water quality in the canal.

   
   

8. The 200-foot fence across the cove at the mouth at the canal shown in the drawings submitted to the Department of Environmental Regulation does not exist since it has been prohibited by the Department of Natural Resources. Instead, Reynolds constructed a 100-foot fence perpendicular to the north side of the weedgate and joined to the rip-rap on the north side of the canal which forms the south edge of the cove. The fence as built prevents wrack from being blown around the gate into the canal, does not affect the water quality in the canal or in the cove, and does not interfere with navigation.

   
   

9. The cove itself collects wrack to some degree under natural conditions and without the fence to the south of it because all discontinuities on the Florida Keys eastern coastline tend to trap windblown wrack until it is moved elsewhere by wind or current. The cove does collect more wrack since the fence was installed than it did before the fence was installed; however, estimating the amount would be speculative. Although Petitioner's lot adjoins the canal, it does not adjoin the cove. The owner of the property which does adjoin the cove favors the existing weedgate and fence.

   
   

10. The placement of the weedgate and fence does not interfere with navigation in or out of the canal.

    
    

11. It is a policy of the Department of Environmental Regulation to issue a consent order for a project if the project has already been built and is of such design and quality that the Department would be able to issue a permit for it had a proper permit application been filed. The weedgate and the fence are of such design and quality that the Department would be able to issue a permit had Reynolds resubmitted his application showing the revised location of the fence and if the drawings were certified by a professional engineer.

    
    

12. It was determined in DOAH Case No. 84-1508 that the project was not contrary to the public interest. Since that time the standard has changed from "not contrary to the public interest" to "in the public interest." Although the Department presented only conclusory evidence that it had received reasonable assurances that the public interest standard is met by the project as built, Petitioner allowed that evidence to stand uncontroverted.

    
    

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

13. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties hereto and the subject matter hereof. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.

    
    

14. The Department of Environmental Regulation has jurisdiction over the construction and maintenance of the weedgate and fence at this location pursuant to Chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 17-3, 17-4, and 17-103, Florida Administrative Code. Section 17-103.110(3), Florida Administrative Code, provides in part as follows:

    
    

    A consent order is a final agency order wherein

    all parties and the Department, by negotiation, have arrived at a mutually acceptable resolu- tion of alleged violations of law for the purpose of achieving full and expeditious compliance with Chapters 253, 403, 373 and

    376, Florida Statutes, and Department rules promulgated thereunder. . . .

    
    

15. As set forth in the Findings of Fact section of this Recommended Order, the parties in this cause and in DOAH Case No. 84-1508 are identical. Further, the project involved in both cases is identical, i.e., the placement of the weedgate and fence at the mouth of the canal in Atlantis Estates Subdivision. Additionally, the weedgate as built and as applied for in DOAH Case No. 84-1508 is essentially the same structure with the same design and the same location. The water quality, navigation, and public interest issues argued in this case are the identical issues actually tried in DOAH Case No. 84-1508. Accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata applies herein and bars these parties from relitigating those issues actually tried and adjudicated by the entry of the Final Order in DOAH Case No. 84-1508 on April 22, 1985. The only difference between this case and that case are the different public interest test standards, the different location of the fence itself, and the lack of certification by a professional engineer on the fence drawing. As to the difference in the public interest test standards, the Department's witness testified that the current public interest test is met by the existing fence and weedgate, and that evidence was not controverted. The two issues regarding the fence are intertwined. Since the drawing for the fence reflects a location different than the location actually used, the fact that that drawing remains uncertified is immaterial since, in fact, there is no drawing of the existing fence and, therefore, no need to certify that drawing. Although the parties agree that the location of the fence as built is different, no evidence was presented to show any water quality violation caused by the fence or any impediment to navigation caused by it. The only effect the location of the fence as built has on the cove or canal is that the amount of wrack trapped in the cove may be increased by the fence, but that amount is undeterminable and is temporary since the amount of wreck in the cove at any time is dependent on tides and wind. The different location of the fence has no affect on the water quality in the canal, and Petitioner's property does not adjoin the cove.

    
    

16. Since a consent order is a method by which the Department can resolve alleged violations of the Department's standards, rules, and statutes, it is an appropriate vehicle for resolving the only existing defect in this project, the absence of a certified drawing showing the fence as built without a permit since the evidence is clear that the fence as built would be permittable. As a practical matter, to recommend herein against approving the permittable fence and requiring Reynolds to submit a drawing of the fence as actually constructed with a professional engineer's certification would only result in the Department issuing an intent to approve the fence and Petitioner Abbanat being afforded a third opportunity to relitigate this matter. Such a recommendation would accordingly be inappropriate under the doctrine of res judicata. Lastly, the Department presented proof of its policy of issuing a consent order for an existing project which is of such design and quality that the Department would be able to issue a permit for it and further that the weedgate and fence are of such design and quality.

    
    

17. Accordingly, Reynolds has met his burden of proving his entitlement to a permit for the existing weedgate and fence but for the technical violation of not having provided a certified drawing of the fence to the Department. That

technical violation is appropriately cured by the entry of a final order adopting and ratifying the consent order executed by the Department and Reynolds on August 19, 1985, subject to the same conditions contained in that consent order and in the Recommended Order entered in DOAH Case No. 84-1508.

RECOMMENDATION

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is,

RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered approving the consent order signed by the Department of Environmental Regulation and William O. Reynolds on August 19, 1985, and ratifying the conditions contained therein.

DONE and RECOMMENDED this 21st day of January 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida.

LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building

2009 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32301

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of January 1987.

APPENDIX

DOAH CASE NO. 86-1091

1. The Department of Environmental Regulation's proposed findings of fact numbered 1, the first two sentences of 2, 3-5, 10-12, 14-17, 19, and 20 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order.

   
   

2. The remainder of the Department of Environmental Regulation's proposed findings of fact have been rejected as follows: the third sentence of 2 as not being a finding of fact; the first two sentences of 9 as being unnecessary; the last two sentences of 9 as not being supported by the record; and 13 and 15 as being irrelevant to the issues herein.

   
   

3. Respondent Reynolds' proposed findings of fact numbered 1, 5, and 6 have been adopted in this Recommended Order either verbatim or in substance.

   
   

4. The remainder of Reynolds' proposed findings of fact have been rejected as follows: 2-4 and 5 as being unnecessary for determination herein, and 7 as being not supported by the record in this cause.

   
   

5. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 5 and the first sentence of number 4 have been adopted in this Recommended Order either verbatim or in substance.

   
   

6. The remainder of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact have been rejected as follows: 1 and 2 as being unnecessary; 3 and 6 as not being supported by the record in this cause; 5 and 10 as being contrary to the weight of the credible

evidence; and 7 and the second and third sentences of 4 as not constituting findings of fact.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Dale Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental

Regulation

2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301

James A. Abbanat 5561 S.W. 3rd Court

Plantation, Florida 33317

William O. Reynolds Route 1, Box 661-E

Big Pine Key, Florida 33043

Douglas H. MacLaughlin, Esquire Department of Environmental

Regulation

2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301

=================================================================

AGENCY FINAL ORDER

=================================================================

STATE OF FLORIDA

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

JAMES A. ABBANAT,

Petitioner,

vs. DOAH FILE NO. 86-1091

OGC FILE NO. 85-0782

WILLIAM O. REYNOLDS, and STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION,

Respondents.

/

FINAL ORDER

On January 21, 1987, the Division of Administrative Hearings' Hearing Officer who conducted a Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, proceeding submitted her Recommended Order to me and all parties. A copy of the Recommended Order is attached as Exhibit A. Petitioner, J. A. Abbanat, timely

submitted Exceptions to Recommended Order, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B. Respondent, State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation (Department), timely filed a Response to Petitioner's exceptions, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit C. The Recommended Order thereafter came before me as Secretary of the agency for final agency action.

BACKGROUND

This proceeding concerns a weedgate and fence built by William O. Reynolds (Reynolds) in a canal on Big Pine Key, Monroe County. The Department had previously denied Reynolds a permit for the weedgate and fence in a prior proceeding to which J. A. Abbanat (Abbanat) was a party (DOAH Case No. 84-1508). In that proceeding, the Department determined that the proposed weedgate and fence would not cause violations of water quality standards, would not unreasonably interfere with navigation, and was not contrary to the public interest. The Department denied the requested permit, however, because the permit application was not certified by a Florida registered professional engineer.

After denial of his permit application, Reynolds built a weedgate and fence substantially similar to the one he applied for without first receiving a permit from the Department. The Department determined that the work would have been permittable, and so it issued a consent order authorizing the weedgate and fence. Abbanat objected to the consent order and filed a petition for hearing. It is this petition that gives rise to the recommended order before me.

RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS

Exceptions to Findings of Fact

Abbanat has taken exception to numerous findings of fact made by the hearing officer in her recommended order, but those exceptions were not accompanied by a transcript of the proceedings as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 7-103.200(1). Because Abbanat did not furnish a transcript in support of his exceptions to findings of fact, those exceptions are rejected. Booker Creek Preservation Inc., v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 415 So.2d 750 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).

Exceptions to Conclusions of Law

Abbanat has challenged most of the hearing officer's conclusions of law. His exceptions will be addressed by paragraph number in the order presented.

In his first exception, Abbanat generally takes exception to all conclusions of law other than statements of jurisdiction, and reiterates his proposed conclusions of law in their entirety. Because this exception broadly objects in a conclusory manner to all conclusions of law and does not state how the hearing officer erred in making specific conclusions, it is not a proper exception and it is rejected. Fla. Admin. Code Rule 17-103.200.

Abbanat's second exception is to the hearing officer's conclusion on page 7, paragraph 2 that it would not be reasonable to deny approval for the weedgate and fence merely because the fence was not certified by an engineer when the project was otherwise permittable. Such a holding, the hearing officer concludes, would be inappropriate under the doctrine of res judicata. Abbanat argues that this is not actually a conclusion of law and is irrelevant and unwarranted.

I agree with Abbanat that the hearing officer's conclusion on this point is unnecessary and erroneous. For reasons more fully expressed in my ruling on Abbanat's fourth exception, I conclude that the reasonableness of the consent order does not turn solely on Reynolds' strict compliance with permitting criteria. Therefore, the absence of certified drawings of the project as built does not by itself make the Department's resolution of this controversy unreasonable.

In his third exception, Abbanat contends that the hearing officer has misapplied the doctrine of res judicata by holding that

... the doctrine of res judicata applies herein and bars [Abbanat, Reynolds, and the Department] from relitigating those issues actually tried and adjudicated by the entry of the Final Order in DOAH Case No. 84-1508 on April 22, 1985.

Abbanat argues that res judicata should apply to deny Reynolds authorization for weedgate and fence, not to support issuance of such authorization.

In administrative actions, res judicata is the doctrine that an agency order, issued on the merits after opportunity for hearing, is conclusive to the rights, questions, and facts at issue between the parties and serves as a bar to a second action on the same claim. For example, res judicata would apply to bar a reapplication for a project which the Department has previously denied, unless there was a real and substantial change in the project or attendant circumstances. On the other hand, collateral estoppel only bars relitigation of issues that had been previously litigated in another action between the same parties on a different claim. For instance, collateral estoppel would bar a person from contesting the Department's finding in a permitting proceeding that water quality standards would be violated by a proposed project if the person later built the project without a permit and the Department instituted an enforcement proceeding to have it removed.

I hold that the hearing officer has misapplied the doctrine of res judicata. Application of res judicata is not appropriate here because the two actions involving these parties are not identical: the first action involved the propriety of issuing a permit to Reynolds for a proposed project; this action involves the reasonableness of the Department's consent order settling an enforcement case and authorizing a project to remain that has been already constructed in violation of Chapter 403, Florida Statutes. Because of this difference, res judicata does not serve as a bar to this action.

Although res judicata does not apply, collateral estoppel does prevent relitigation of the issues actually litigated and determined in the prior proceeding. In both this enforcement proceeding and the previous permitting proceeding, important issues were whether Reynolds had provided reasonable assurances that the weedgate and fence would not cause water quality violations, would not interfere with navigation, and would not be contrary to the public interest. Since the hearing officer found that these issues were litigated and determined in the previous proceeding and that the weedgate and fence built were substantially similar to those previously applied for, but the two actions did not involve the same claim, she should have held that collateral estoppel, not res judicata, served to bar relitigation of those issues already litigated and decided. Cf. Thomson v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 493 So.2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)(subsequent application for same project barred when first

application denied). Accordingly, I accept Abbanat's exception that the hearing officer has misapplied the doctrine or res judicata, but I hold that collateral estoppel may properly be applied to reach the same result.

Abbanat's fourth exception argues that the hearing officer erred in upholding a consent order which authorizes a project for which no permit has been issued. I find that the hearing officer properly upheld the consent order and I reject the fourth exception. When a person has constructed a project without a permit (such as Reynolds has done), the Department may enter into a consent order to resolve that violation of Chapter 403 without resort to litigation. Considering all the relevant factors, including whether the project is otherwise permittable, resolution of the violation by consent order allowing the project to remain may be appropriate.

The consent order in this case, which settles an enforcement matter and allows an existing structure to remain, is not subject to the strict permitting criteria of Chapter 403, Florida Statutes. The issue for determination in a case such as this is the reasonableness of the Department's determination of the need for and scope of remedial action. One factor in making this determination is whether the project constructed would have been permittable, but other factors are also important, such as the nature and degree of violation, the resources available to the Department and the violator, and the relative harm to the environment caused by remedial action as compared to allowing the project to remain. This consent order differs from that in Williams v. Moeller and Department of Environmental Regulation, 8 FALR 5537 (1986), because the Moeller consent order was not intended to resolve a violation of law, but instead served as substitute authorization for a project which had yet to be built.

The fifth exception challenges the hearing officer's conclusion that the lack of engineer's certification of a fence drawing is irrelevant since there is no drawing to be certified of the fence as it actually exists. I reject the hearing officer's conclusion but not for the reasons urged by Abbanat. While Florida Administrative Code Rule 17-4.05(3) requires that permit applications for proposed projects be certified by a Florida professional engineer, that requirement does not strictly apply to after-the-fact authorizations made by consent order to settle violations. The rationale for requiring certification of applications is to assure that proposed projects are technically feasible and can actually be constructed as designed. When a project has already been built, in many cases it is possible to evaluate its structural integrity and its compliance with accepted engineering standards merely by examining it. Although certification may be required for certain projects because of their nature or magnitude, I conclude that the Department's approval in this case of an existing, simple fence without engineer's certification was reasonable and proper.

Abbanat's sixth exception takes issue with the first paragraph of page seven of the recommended order, which Abbanat contends improperly places the burden of proof on him as to the effect of wrack trapped by the fence on water quality. Reviewing the recommended order, I conclude that the hearing officer properly placed the burden of proving the reasonableness of the consent order on Reynolds and the Department. Her statement on page seven that "no evidence was presented to show any water quality violation caused by the fence" does not represent a shifting of the burden of proof but only a characterization of the proof presented. Accordingly, I reject this portion of exception 6 for the reasons stated. I reject the balance of the exception because it contains factual exceptions which I have previously ruled are improper without a transcript.

The seventh exception touches on many issues. The first three sentences of the exception relate to issues on which I have already ruled in response to exceptions 2 and 3, so I reiterate my rulings on those exceptions. The balance of the exception does not argue that the hearing officer erred in making any conclusion. Instead, it argues that the Department somehow erred in not notifying Abbanat and other property owners before the consent order was issued. I find Abbanat's argument on this point to be not well founded, and I reject the balance of the exception. The Department does not have the duty or the resources to notify every party who might be affected of every action which it takes. Here, Abbanat was eventually notified and his very institution of this proceeding demonstrates that his rights have been recognized and exercised.

Although he has not prevailed in this case, he has twice initiated proceedings and been heard on these issues.

Abbanat's eighth exception is conclusory in nature and does not specify how the hearing officer erred in concluding that Reynolds has met his burden of proof. Because it does not comply with Florida Administrative Code Rule 17- 103.200, the eighth exception is rejected.

Exception 9 is to the hearing officer's recommendation that the consent order be ratified. Abbanat's objection to this recommendation is based on the Department's alleged failure to comply with the unnamed Florida Statutes and Florida Administrative Code rules and misapplication of the doctrine of res judicata. Having already ruled on these issues, I reject Abbanat's exception and accept the hearing officers recommendation.

Accordingly, having considered the recommended order, Abbanat's exceptions, and the Department's response, it is

ORDERED:

1. The hearing officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law are adopted in their entirety in this final order except as modified by my rulings on exceptions; and

   
   

2. The consent order in Case No. 85-0782, State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation v. William O. Reynolds, is ratified and approved and is now final agency action in accordance with Section 120.52, Florida Statutes.

Any party to this Order has the right to seek judicial review of the Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, by filing a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, with the Clerk of the Department in the Office of General Counsel, 2600 Blair Stone Road, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400; and by filing a copy of the Notice of Appeal accompanied by the applicable filing fees with the appropriate District Court of Appeal. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days from the date this Order is filed with the Clerk of the Department.

DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of March, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida.

STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

DALE TWACHTMANN

Secretary

Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400

Telephone: (904) 488-4805

FILING AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT

FILED, on this date, pursuant to S. 120.52 Florida States, with the designated Department clerk, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged.

3-4-87

Clerk Date

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINAL ORDER has been furnished by United States Mail to the following at their respective addresses this 5th day of March, 1987.

James A. Abbanat

5561 Southwest 3rd Court Plantation, Florida 33317

William O. Reynolds Route 1, Box 661-E

Big Pine Key, Florida 33043

Douglas H. MacLaughlin, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400

STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION

DANIEL H. THOMPSON

General Counsel

Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400

Telephone: (904) 488-9730

Docket for Case No: 86-001091

Orders for Case No: 86-001091