STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND )
TREASURER, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 86-3951
)
FLORENCE MOUNTS WILLIAMS, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, the above matter was heard before the Division of Administrative Hearings by its duly designated Hearing Officer, Donald R. Alexander, on March 3 and 4, 1987, in Okeechobee, Florida, and on March 12, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Richard E. Turner, Esquire
William W. Tharpe, Jr., Esquire 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
For Respondent: Thomas F. Woods, Esquire
The Mahan Station 1709-D Mahan Drive
Tallahassee, Florida 32308 BACKGROUND
In a lengthy twelve-count amended administrative complaint filed on February 10, 1987, petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer, has charged that respondent, Florence Mounts Williams, licensed by petitioner as an insurance agent, violated various provisions within Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (1985). 1/ Generally, it is alleged that from 1984 to 1986, while petitioner was an officer and director of a general lines insurance agency named Mr. Auto Insurance of Okeechobee, Inc., in Okeechobee, Florida, and also doing business as Florida Insurance Agency in the same city, she accepted premiums from twelve customers for various types of insurance coverage, that she either failed to submit the premiums and applications to the carrier, or failed to submit a complete and timely application, or failed to notify the applicants that their applications had been rejected. It is also alleged she failed to timely return the premiums previously received from the customers after no coverage was obtained or the policies were cancelled.
Respondent denied the above allegations and requested a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings by petitioner on October 2,
1986, with a request that a Hearing Officer be assigned to conduct a final hearing. By notice of hearing dated December 8, 1986, the final hearing was scheduled for March 3 and 4, 1987, in Okeechobee, Florida. A continued hearing was held in Tallahassee on March 12, 1987.
At final hearing petitioner presented the testimony of Margaret Copeland, William C. Norton, William J. Little, Terryl J. Wisener, William H. Douglas, Mary J. Moore, Kenneth R. Wood, William A. McClellan, Sr., Michael T. Ryan, Luther B. Starnes, Carolyn F. Douglas, William Douglas, Francis L. Carr, Martha
W. Carr, Frank I. Henry, Margaret J. Henry, Keith N. Bliss, Richard Abrams, II, Karen Tischler, Mark H. Roerhig, Eugene F. O'Neill, Peggy Donohue and Karen Allen. It also offered petitioner's exhibits 1-11 and 13-63. All were received in evidence except exhibit 25. Respondent testified on her own behalf and presented the testimony of Andrew M. Beverly, accepted as an expert in insurance. She also offered petitioner's exhibits 1-23. All were received in evidence.
The transcripts of hearing (three volumes) were filed on April 10, 1987. Proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed by the parties on May 8, 1987. A ruling on each proposed finding of fact is made in the Appendix attached to this order.
At the outset of the hearing petitioner voluntarily dismissed Counts II, IV and V. Remaining at issue is whether respondent's insurance agent license should be disciplined for the alleged violations set forth in Counts I, III, and IV through XII of the amended administrative complaint.
Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Introduction
At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Florence Mounts Williams (Williams or respondent), was licensed as an insurance agent by petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer (Department or petitioner). When the events herein occurred, Williams was an officer and director of Mr. Auto Insurance of Okeechobee, Inc. (Mr. Auto), an incorporated general lines insurance agency located in Okeechobee, Florida. She was also an officer and director of Florida Insurance Agency, Inc. (FIA), an insurance agency doing business in the same city. Respondent sold insurance to the public through both businesses.
Williams is charged with violating the Florida Insurance Code while dealing with nine customers during the period between 1984 and 1986. These business transactions were made either through Mr. Auto or FIA, and, with certain exceptions, generally relate to Williams accepting a premium for a policy and then failing to procure a policy for the customer, or falling to refund the premium after the customer cancelled the policy. Some of these customers eventually filed complaints with the Department, and after an investigation was conducted, the administrative complaint, as amended, was issued. That prompted this proceeding.
The State of the Industry and Williams in 1984-86
Before discussing the specific charges, it is appropriate to describe the industry conditions and practices as they existed in 1984-86. These were established without contradiction by expert witness Beverly. It is within this broad framework that Williams operated when the transactions in question occurred. The expert's bottom line conclusion, after reviewing the nine customers' files, was that no impropriety had occurred.
The agent-customer interface normally begins when a customer visits an insurance agent to purchase a policy. The agent will generally get a rate quotation by telephone from a managing general agent (MGA) who brokers policies on behalf of various insurance companies. An MGA may more accurately be described as a branch office of the insurance company under contract. If the rate quoted by the MGA to the agent is acceptable to a customer, the agent has the applicant complete an application and pay the quoted premium, or at least make a down payment on the same. The application and premium are then forwarded by the agent to the MGA for risk review to determine if the applicant meets underwriting requirements. At the same time, the agent will issue a binder to the customer which evidences temporary coverage until the application is accepted or rejected by the insurance company. In the event coverage is later declined, industry practice dictates that the agent obtain coverage with another company as soon as possible since the agent has the responsibility to maintain coverage on a customer. However, what constitutes a reasonable period of time to do so was not disclosed. In obtaining new coverage, the agent need not have the customer execute a new application since the validity of the original application is not affected. The customer should, however, be notified at the earliest convenient time that coverage is with a different company.
In some cases, a customer may choose to finance his premium through a premium finance company. If he does, the finance company pays the entire premium to the MGA or insurer when application is made, and the customer pays the amount owed (plus a finance charge) to the finance company through installment payments over an agreed period of time. If for some reason an application is not accepted by the insurer, it is the responsibility of the MGA or insurer to so notify the premium finance company and return the money. The finance company must then refund any money paid by the insured.
When the events herein occurred, it was established through expert testimony that the Florida insurance marketplace was in a "chaotic" condition and could be described as a "zoo." During this time, a small agent such as Williams might find herself doing business with as many as fifteen different MGAs, each with a different set of rules. Thus, it was common for an agent to be confused as to her binding authority with a particular MGA and whether the proper amount of coverage was obtained. Moreover, because of the chaotic marketplace, it became increasingly difficult to find companies who would write coverage on certain types of policies.
It was further established that in 1984-1986 the MGAs were "overflowed with work" thereby causing delays of up to "months" for an agent to learn from an MGA if the risk had been accepted and a policy issued. Applications and checks were also lost or misplaced by the MGA and carrier during this time period. Consequently, the agent would think that coverage had been obtained, and so advise the customer, but would later learn that the application had been rejected, or the company had no record of one ever being filed. There were also lengthy delays in MGAs and insurance companies returning unearned premiums to the agent for repayment to the customers. According to industry practice, once
a refund is received by an agent, checks to customers would typically be issued only once a month. In Williams' case, she made refunds on the twenty-fifth day of each month. A further prohibition on an agent is that a refund can be paid to a customer only after the agent receives the refund check from the insurance company or MGA. In other words, refunds from an agent's own funds are prohibited.
As a result of this confusion, the number of occasions when an agent was cited for an error or omission (E&O) went up "astronomically." Indeed, industry statistics tell us that one in six insurance agents has a claim filed against his E&O policy for failure to provide coverage as promised. For this reason, no reasonable agent, including Williams, would do business without an E&O policy.
When the policies in question were sold, Williams had approximately 4,000 active and inactive files in her office. Her office help was mainly persons with no prior training in insurance, and who only stayed on the job for a matter of weeks or months. Consequently, there was some confusion and disarray in her two offices. Even so, Williams was responsible for the conduct of her employees. At the same time, however, it was not unreasonable for Williams to assume that, due to the overload of work on the MOAs, an agent could expect no action on an application to be taken by an MGA or carrier for many months, and that applications and checks might be misplaced or lost.
Count I
This count involves an allegation that Williams violated nine sections of the Insurance Code in conjunction with the sale of a boat insurance policy to David and Margaret Copeland on September 19, 1984. The evidence reflects that Margaret Copeland applied for insurance on her boat with Mr. Auto on or about September 19, 1984. Copeland had previously been turned down for insurance by several other local agents. After Williams received a telephonic quote of $168 per year from an MGA, and relayed this advice to Copeland, Copeland gave a $30 check as a down payment on her policy. The remaining premium was paid by two partial payments made on October 6 and November 7, 1984, respectively. Copeland was issued a binder to evidence her insurance coverage, and a receipt for the
$30 down payment. The binder indicated that Barnett Bank was the loss payee and that coverage was with "Professional." In actuality, "Professional" was Professional Underwriters Insurance Agency, Inc. (Professional), an MOA in Altamonte Springs for various insurance companies doing business in the state.
According to Williams, the application and check were forwarded to Professional shortly after the application was executed.
Because the boat was being financed with Barnett Bank, and the lender required evidence of insurance, Copeland instructed Mr. Auto to furnish a copy of the policy to the bank. A copy of the binder was furnished by Williams to the bank on November 19, 1984, and again on December 7, 1984. However, after Margaret Copeland did not receive a copy of a policy, she contacted Mr. Auto on several occasions to obtain a copy but was given "excuses" why one had not been issued. At this point Williams simply believed Professional was "dragging its feet" since past experience had taught her Professional typically took three to four months to forward a copy of the policy. Nonetheless, in response to Copeland's requests, Williams wrote Professional on December 3, 1984, asking that it "please check on the (Copelands') boat policy which was written 9-19-84" because the lienholder needed a copy. Professional did not respond to Williams' request. After no policy was received, Margaret Copeland contacted Professional's office in Altamonte Springs by telephone and learned no policy
had been issued by that firm. The Copelands then requested Mr. Auto to cancel their policy on March 12, 1985, and demanded a full refund of their premium.
After having the Copelands execute a notice of cancellation, the same was forwarded by Williams to Professional with a note reading "Karen, check this out and see what is happening," together with a copy of her previous request that Professional check on the whereabouts of the policy. Again, Professional did not respond to this inquiry. Williams then telephoned Professional and spoke to its office manager seeking advice on the amount of refund due the Copelands.
She was told to make a proration. On May 19, 1985, Williams offered David Copeland a partial refund ($89) of his premium but he declined. This amount of refund was based on Williams' belief that coverage existed from September 18, 1984, when she received a quotation, until March 12, 1985, or for approximately six months, and $59 represented the remaining unearned premium. Given the climate of the industry at that time, it was reasonable for Williams to make such an assumption. After Copeland declined her offer, Williams wrote Professional seeking further assistance and stating that "Insured was in here today, wanted his refund. I tried to prorate it and give it to him." Again, Williams received no formal reply from the MGA. To date, a policy has not been produced. Williams eventually refunded the entire premium to the Copelands in February 1987.
Through testimony from a Professional representative, it was established that Williams had no binding authority with Professional except on homeowners and dwelling fire policies. On all others, including the type the Copelands desired, it was necessary for the agent to first telephone Professional and receive a "telephone bind" from a Professional representative. In a letter to petitioner dated August 7, 1985, Professional acknowledged that there was "a possibility this risk may have been quoted," but it could find no record of an application having been filed or verification of coverage bound through a binder number or cashed check. It did acknowledge receiving the Copelands' request to cancel their policy in March 1985. If a binder had been authorized, it would have been recorded in a binder book with a number assigned to that binder unless the company lost the policy or otherwise inadvertently failed to record this information. The representative also confirmed that Professional routinely brokered this type of policy in 1984, and that it binds several thousand policies per year. Given this volume of work, the representative acknowledged it was possible that Williams or an employee of her firm may have been given a telephone quote for the Copeland policy, or that the application could have been misplaced.
C. Count III
On June 19, 1985, William C. Norton, a retired railroad conductor, went to Mr. Auto to purchase an insurance policy for two automobiles. After being quoted an annual premium of $315 by an MGA (Jergen & Roberts), Williams gave this advice to Norton who then gave her a check in that amount. Norton was given a receipt and a binder to evidence his coverage. The binder reflected Norton's application had been placed with "Foremost," which is Foremost Insurance Company (Foremost) in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Williams forwarded the application to the MGA but it was later returned unbound because of several traffic violations by Norton. She then "shopped" the application around and was able to procure a policy from Orion Insurance Company (Orion) through Standard Underwriters, an MGA, at an estimated cost of $528.70 instead of the previously quoted rate of $315 per year. It should be noted that during this period of time, Norton was covered through binders executed by Williams. After Williams paid the amount ($528.70) due the MGA, a policy number (PA-102390) was issued. However, through "neglect" Williams never billed Norton for the difference
between the originally quoted premium and the $528. After Orion reviewed Norton's driving record, it increased the annual premium to $622. When Williams received a bill for $622 per year, she sent Norton a notice on October 24, 1985, requesting an additional $144. 2/ When he refused, the policy was cancelled by the company for nonpayment in February 1986. By this time, Norton had gone to another company to obtain coverage. He had also requested from Williams a copy of his policy on four or five occasions but one was never produced. Norton also demanded a full refund of his money even though he had been covered by binders and a policy from June 1985 until February 1986, and was not entitled to a refund. When Williams refused, Norton filed an action in small claims court in February 1986, and won an uncontested judgment for $315. Williams stated she did not contest the matter because of several stressful events then occurring (e.g., a divorce and an employee theft) and the expense of hiring legal counsel.
Mobile Home Division of Florida (MHD) is an MGA in Fort Lauderdale that reviews applications for automobile insurance with Foremost (and others), and determines if the applicant meets Foremost's underwriting requirements. It is one of five MGAs in the State representing Foremost. A representative of MHD reviewed his firm's records, and found no evidence of having received the Norton application. However, this was not surprising since Williams had not used MHD to obtain Norton's policy.
Count VI
Terryl J. Wisener is a college student with numerous traffic violations on his record. Because of this, he was forced to obtain automobile insurance through the Florida Joint Underwriters Association (FJUA), a small group of companies who write policies for high risk drivers such as Wisener. Insurance agents are "assigned" to one of the companies writing policies, even though they are not a regular agent of that company. Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) happened to be a servicing carrier for FJUA in 1986, and Williams accordingly filed FJUA applications with that carrier when seeking insurance for high-risk customers. Under then existing rules, Williams could temporarily "bind" Allstate by writing a binder on a policy, but approval of the application and issuance of permanent coverage rested with Allstate. Until the application was rejected by Allstate, the driver was insured through the binder. During this same time period, it was "commonplace" for an FJUA carrier to return an application because of an "insignificant error" to avoid having to write a policy on a high-risk customer.
On December 30, 1985, Wisener purchased a six-month automobile insurance policy through Williams. When the policy was due to expire on June 30, 1986, he returned seeking a renewal. Williams attempted to place the liability coverage with Allstate and the physical damage coverage through "Coastal," an MGA for Adriatic Insurance Company. She was quoted premiums of
$996.70 and $814.70, respectively, for the two policies. After accepting a down payment of $552 from Wisener, she issued a binder and mailed the application to Allstate and Coastal with drafts for the entire premiums due. Because Wisener's Chevrolet Camaro was an eight-cylinder automobile, Coastal rejected the application in October 1986. Williams then attempted to replace the physical damage coverage with Allstate in November 1986. By virtue of Williams' binding authority, Wisener had coverage with Allstate until it rejected his application. The application, along with about fifty or sixty others, was eventually rejected by Allstate on February 27, 1987, because of a lack of "information." Until this occurred, Williams properly assumed that Wisener was covered and that Allstate was reviewing his application. In the meantime, and apparently without advising Williams, Wisener decided in October 1986 to purchase a policy through
his parents' Allstate insurance agent in Port St. Lucie. He did so because he "believed" he had no insurance. However, he never made inquiry with Williams to confirm or deny this, or asked for a refund of his money.
A representative of Allstate searched his firm's records and could find no evidence that a policy was ever written for Wisener through Williams. The company does acknowledge that it received Wisener's application and that it eventually returned the same "unbound" almost four months later. It gave no explanation for the delay. Although Wisener had not received a refund as of the time of hearing, this responsibility rests with Allstate (and not Williams) since it has never refunded to Williams the money paid by her for Wisener's policy.
Count VII
This count concerns a mobile home insurance policy purchased by Samuel and Mary Jo Moore in June 1985 from FIA. On June 25, 1985, Mary Jo Moore made application to renew her insurance policy on the mobile home. The policy had been in force for some ten years. Moore paid Williams $118 by check which was deposited and cashed by Williams. A check for $23 was also paid at a later date due to a premium increase. Williams issued Moore a binder evidencing coverage with Mobile Home Insurance Association (MHIA), an MGA in Gainesville, Florida. Shortly afterward, Williams learned from the MGA that the Moores' previous carrier, American Pioneer, had gone bankrupt and that there was a limited market for the Moores' application.
Williams thereafter forwarded the application to another MGA, Jerger & Sons, Inc. (Jerger), in early August 1985. Temporary coverage was eventually issued by Jerger on August 23, 1985. However, the application was deemed to be incomplete because information regarding the number of spaces in the Moores' trailer park was lacking. This was not surprising since the Moores lived on private property and not in a trailer park. The application was returned to Williams with a reminder that unless the missing information was submitted to Jerger by September 6, 1985, coverage would be terminated. When no information was filed by that date, Jerger cancelled its coverage and returned the unbound policy on September 12, 1985. The Moores were not notified of this lapse in coverage. By allowing the coverage to lapse, and not notifying the Moores, Williams was negligent in her duties as an agent.
After Jerger returned the application to Williams in late August 1985, Williams attempted to get the Moores to furnish photographs of the trailer site, and to sign the new application. Because both worked at jobs during business hours, Williams claimed she was unable to reach them prior to September 6, 1985. Williams continued her efforts to place the insurance and eventually filed the application with Foremost in March 1986. Although Williams concedes a lapse in coverage did occur, there is no evidence that this was an intentional or debilitate act on her part. After having the application returned twice, coverage was finally obtained for $201 in July 1986, or almost a year after the Moores first approached her concerning a renewal of their policy. This policy is effective through July 1987. Williams paid out of her own funds the difference between the original premium ($141) and the $201. In view of the original premium being applied to the 1986-87 premium, the Moores are not due a refund.
On October 31, 1985, a tornado struck in the Okeechobee area causing damage to the Moores' trailer. The Moores contacted respondent who, at her own expense, had an adjuster from Vero Beach survey the damage in November. The
adjuster learned no coverage was in force. The Moores then contacted respondent who, for some reason, had Jerger search for a policy. As might be expected, none was found, and Jerger would not agree to cover the loss. Williams instructed the Copelands to proceed against her E&O carrier for payment of their claim. At the time of final hearing, the claim had not yet been resolved.
Count VIII
On or about February 19, 1986, William A. McClellan, a retiree, purchased an automobile insurance policy from FIA. He paid $201 by check to Williams and received from her a receipt and binder evidencing coverage with "AIB" (Associated Insurance Brokers), the MGA for Balboa Insurance Company in Newport Beach, California.
After the application was forwarded to AIB, it was initially returned because the agency check was drawn on insufficient funds. Thereafter, the check was made good (with no lapse in coverage) and Williams subsequently received a bill from Balboa for $247, or $46 more than she had previously quoted McClellan. When McClellan was presented the bill for an additional premium on May 1, 1986, McClellan told Williams to cancel his policy and to refund the unearned premium. She relayed this request to AIB and coverage was cancelled effective June 13, 1986. Thereafter, McClellan visited Williams' office at least seven or eight times seeking his refund, but was always told it was still being processed.
This was a correct representation by Williams since AIB was less than diligent in processing a refund check. McClellan also filed a complaint with petitioner. Upon inquiry by petitioner, Williams advised the Department that McClellan would be paid as soon as AIB issued her a check.
On or about July 29, 1986, AIB finally cut a check in the amount of
$91.22 payable to Williams, and eventually issued a second check in the amount of $25.38 on October 1, 1986. The delay in issuing the checks was attributable to AIB and not Williams. After Williams received the first check, she offered McClellan a partial refund of $91.22 but he declined the offer. On October 10, 1986, or the day after Williams received the second check by mail, a representative of AIB flew by private plane to Okeechobee and obtained $133 in cash from Williams, who by then had received the second check from AIB. 3/ The representative paid McClellan the same day.
Count IX
On or about March 16, 1985, Luther B. Starnes purchased an insurance policy for his two automobiles from Mr. Auto for which he paid $473 by four installments over the next few months. After Williams received a telephone bind, Starnes was issued a binder evidencing insurance with a company called "Integrity." He also received a "Florida Vehicle Identification Card" evidencing PIP and liability coverage on his vehicles. In this case, Williams placed the coverage by telephone with AIB, the MGA for Integrity, which authorized her to temporarily bind the coverage. The application and check were thereafter sent by Williams to the MGA. After not receiving a policy by the fall of 1985, Starnes telephoned a district office of Integrity and learned his name was not on its computer. However, he did not contact Williams after that, or ask for a refund of his premium.
Despite the accusation that Williams had no basis to believe that a policy had ever been issued by Integrity, an AIB representative confirmed at hearing that Starnes' application and premium had been received by AIB, and that AIB had issued a policy number covering Starnes. Indeed, respondent's exhibit
10 reflects that Integrity cashed the check, and simultaneously placed a sticker on the check which read "Integrity Insurance Co. Private Passenger Auto 100-FAB- 0206809." This indicated that AIB had assigned a policy number on behalf of Integrity and that Starnes' coverage was in effect. Indeed, Williams properly relied upon her cancelled check in believing that Starnes was insured.
Moreover, it was appropriate for Starnes to pay for this coverage until Integrity formally rejected his application. Although Starnes never received a copy of a policy, the responsibility to issue one rested upon MGA or Integrity, but not Williams.
Count X
On or about July 11, 1986, David and Carolyn Douglas purchased an insurance policy for two trucks owned by David. The policy cost $1300 per year and Carolyn paid Williams this amount by check. A binder was given to Carolyn reflecting coverage through Dana Roerig and Associates (Roerig), an MGA in St. Petersburg for Canal Insurance Company (Canal). Under the MGA's then existing policy, it was necessary for Williams to forward the application to Roerig and request a rate quotation. After receipt of the application Roerig would normally telephone the agent, quote a rate, and then bind if the rate was acceptable. In this case, the quoted rate was unsatisfactory, and Roerig returned the application unbound on August 10, 1986. Williams then attempted to place the coverage through an MGA in Lakeland (E&S Agency). However, Williams was quoted a rate on September 25 which she knew was too expensive.
After obtaining the second excessive quote, Williams immediately bound coverage with Allstate and forwarded the Douglas application to that carrier with an agency check on September 25, 1986. Because Allstate accepted only money orders or cashiers checks, and the application was undated, the application and check were returned by Allstate to Williams on October 7. Williams then sent Allstate a dated application and a money order in the amount of $1500, or $200 more than the original Douglas policy required.
Although Allstate did not formally issue a policy, it assigned the Douglas application a policy number on December 15, 1986, and simultaneously issued a refund check for $121 to Douglas, since the policy cost $1,179 and not
$1,300 as had been originally quoted to Carolyn Douglas. Therefore, at that point the coverage remained in effect. On December 23 Allstate issued another refund check to Douglas in the amount of $776 and advised it was cancelling coverage effective February 6, 1987. Allstate later returned the remainder of the $1,300 owed David and Carolyn Douglas. Therefore, even though they had coverage for some six months through various binders and the policy itself, the Douglases paid no premium. Although Carolyn Douglas made several attempts to obtain a copy of the policy, Williams could not produce one since the two MGAs and Allstate had held the application almost continuously for six months. It is noted that Allstate has never repaid Williams the $1500 sent by her with the Douglas application in October, 1986.
Count XI
Francis Carr is a locktender on Lake Okeechobee whose duties require him to open and close the locks. The job is subject to bids, and all bidders must have evidence of general liability insurance. Desiring to submit a bid, Carr purchased a one-year general liability policy from Mr. Auto on September 20, 1985, and paid Williams $540.75 for the coverage. Carr received a copy of a policy from Scottsdale Insurance Company (Scottsdale) on a later date.
On April 15, 1986, Carr asked that his policy be cancelled. This was done the next day. Carr was due a $181 refund as unearned premium. Through no fault of Williams, the refund check was not issued by Scottsdale until October 21, 1986, or some six months later. Williams later endorsed the check without recourse to a local dress shop.
In July 1986, Carr again bid on the locktender job, and, through his wife, made application on July 7 for a new policy so that he could submit a bid. Although the annual premium had now increased to approximately $1,500 per year, Mrs. Carr paid only a $215 down payment. Under this type of policy, Carr was responsible for thirty-five percent of the entire year's premium even if he cancelled the policy after one day. Therefore, the policy had a minimum cost of
$525 regardless of its term. Because he had not paid this minimum amount, Williams applied Carr's $181 refund check from the prior year to the minimum amount owed. This was consistent with the industry practice of agents applying credit refunds to new policies of this nature. She also paid $85 from her own funds in early October 1986 to meet the thirty-five percent threshold amount.
By then, however, Carr had instructed another employee to cancel his policy since his bid had not been accepted. When he didn't get a refund from the prior year, Carr filed a complaint with petitioner. However, Carr is not entitled to a refund from either year since he still owes Williams $85 for the 1986-87 policy, even after the 1985-86 refund is applied to the second policy.
I. Count XII
Frank I. Henry and Margaret J. Henry (no relation) lived together in a rented mobile home in 1984. Margaret purchased a policy on the mobile home contents from Mr. Auto in July 1984. She paid Williams a $40 premium, and then made three payments of $47.28 each to Envoy Finance Corporation (Envoy), a Deerfield Beach finance company which financed the balance of the amount owed. Margaret received a binder from Williams reflecting coverage with Mobile Homes Division (MHD), an MGA in Fort Lauderdale Envoy submitted a check for $118.50 to MHD on July 16, 1984, reflecting full payment for the policy.
After forwarding the application to MHD, Williams assumed Henry had coverage through American Fidelity Company (AFC), a company which later went out of business that fall. According to MHD, however, the application should have been returned to Williams a few days after it was received because it had no insurance company writing those types of policies. Williams denied receiving the application, and MHD had no record of the application being returned. Williams' version is corroborated by the fact that MHD never advised Envoy that the policy had been returned, something MHD should have done if coverage was rejected. Moreover, MHD has never refunded the $118.50 paid by Envoy in July 1984. According to uncontradicted expert testimony, it is the responsibility of the MGA or carrier to advise the finance company of a coverage denial, and to make a refund to the finance company, which then makes a refund to the customer. Therefore, MHD or AFC, but not Williams, is at fault for not refunding Henry's money.
Around April 20, 1985, Frank's mobile home was damaged by a fire. His claim was rejected by MHD since it had no record of coverage. Prior to this time, no request for a copy of the policy had been made by Henry, and Williams properly assumed that Henry's coverage was in effect. Williams has since notified her E&O carrier of a possible liability. As of the time of hearing, Henry's claim was still unpaid and he has not received a refund of his premium from MHD, AFC or Envoy.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties thereto pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986).
According to the amended administrative complaint, as further amended at final hearing, respondent is charged in nine counts with violating numerous provisions within Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (1985). The charges relate to respondent's conduct in conjunction with the Copeland, Norton, Wisener, Moore, McClellan, Starnes, Douglas, Carr and Henry transactions. The amended complaint alleges the following statutory provisions are relevant to the charges:
626.561 Reporting and accounting for funds.
All premiums, return premiums, or other funds belonging to insurers or others received by an agent, solicitor, or adjuster in transactions under his license shall be trust funds so received by the licensee in a fiduciary capacity; and the licensee in the applicable regular course of business shall account for and pay the same to the insurer, insured, or other person entitled thereto.
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626.611 Grounds for compulsory refusal, suspension, or revocation of agent's, solicitor's, or adjuster's license or service representative's, supervising or managing general agent's, or claims investigator's permit.--The department shall deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew or continue the license of any agent, solicitor, or adjuster or the permit of any service representative, supervising or managing general agent, or claims investigator, and it shall suspend or revoke the eligibility to hold a license or permit of any such person, if it finds that as to the applicant, licensee, or permittee any one or more of the following applicable grounds exist:
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Demonstrated lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance.
Demonstrated lack of reasonably adequate knowledge and technical competence to engage in the transactions authorized by the license or permit.
Fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license or permit.
Misappropriation, conversion, or unlawful withholding of moneys belonging to insurers or insureds or beneficiaries or to others and received in conduct of business under the license.
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626.621 Grounds for discretionary refusal, suspension, or revocation of agent's, solicitor's, or adjuster's license or service representative's, supervising or managing general agent's, or claims investigator's permit.--The department may, in its discretion, deny, suspend, revoke, or refuse to renew or continue the license of any agent, solicitor, or adjuster or the permit of any service representative, supervising or managing general agent, or claims investigator, and it may suspend or revoke the eligibility to hold a license or permit of any such person, if it finds that as to the applicant, licensee, or permittee any one or more of the following applicable grounds exist under circumstances for which such denial, suspension, revocation, or refusal is not mandatory under s. 626.611:
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(4) Failure or refusal, upon demand, to pay over to any insurer he represents or has represented any money coming into his hands belonging to the insurer.
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(6) In the conduct of business under the license or permit, engaging in unfair methods of competition or in unfair or deceptive acts or practices, as prohibited under part X of this chapter, or having otherwise shown himself to be a source of injury or loss to the public or detrimental to the public interest.
* * *
626.9521 Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices prohibited.--No person shall engage in this state in any trade practice which is defined in this part as, or determined pursuant to s. 626.9561 to be an unfair method of Competition or an unfair or deceptive act or practice involving the business of insurance. Any person who violates any provision of this part shall be subject to the penalties provided in s. 627.381.
626.9541 Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices defined.--
(1) UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION AND UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS.--The following are defined as unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
* * *
(o) Illegal dealings in premiums; excess or reduced charges for insurance.--
1. Knowingly collecting any sum as a
premium or charge for insurance, which is not then provided, or is not in due course to be provided, subject to acceptance of the risk by the insurer, by an insurance policy issued by an insurer as permitted by this code.
In its proposed order, petitioner has also referred to Section 626.734, Florida Statutes (1985). However, that statute was not cited in either the original or amended complaints and accordingly has been disregarded. The proposed order further asserts that the evidence supports a conclusion that Williams has violated each of the foregoing statutes on nine occasions: Subsections 626.611(7), (8), (9) and (10), 626.626(6), 626.9541(1)(0)1. and 626.561(1),
Florida Statutes (1985). Therefore, the undersigned assumes that petitioner has abandoned its claim that violations of Sections 626.621(4) and 626.9521 have occurred.
While there is some confusion as to the standard of proof in an administrative license revocation proceeding, the most recent decisional law indicates that the agency bears the burden of substantiating its allegations by a preponderance of evidence. Turlington v. Ferris, 496 So.2d 177, 178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). At the same time, Bowling v. Department of Insurance, 394 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), teaches us that the illicit conduct proven must be as grave as the consequences which the agency seeks to impose. Id. at 171. In other words, where the agency seeks revocation of a license, as it does here, the licensee's actions must be shown to be so serious as to warrant the most severe of penalties--loss of one's livelihood. Finally, it is axiomatic that the cited penal statutes in Chapter 626 must be strictly construed in favor of the licensee. Back v. Florida State Board of Dentistry, 378 So.2d 34, 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). With this in mind, the evidence will be reviewed to determine which, if any, of the charges have been substantiated.
Before addressing the specific counts, one general allegation may be rejected. It is alleged Williams violated Subsection 626.611(8) by demonstrating a lack of reasonably adequate knowledge and technical competence to engage in the transactions authorized by her license. But, given the state of the industry in 1984-86, Williams cannot be faulted for having difficulty in obtaining coverage or occasionally misunderstanding the various rules of the numerous MGAs with which she dealt. Further, the few isolated failures to obtain a complete application, when judged against hundreds of applications being processed, does not equate to incompetence or lack of knowledge. Finally, although an agent's failure to rectify an omission may be negligence, such failure is not a lack of knowledge or technical competence. Therefore, this portion of the charges should be dismissed.
Count I - Having disposed of the above allegation, this leaves Williams charged in Count I with (a) not accounting for and paying funds belonging to the insured [s. 626.561(1)], (b) demonstrating a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance [s. 626.611(7)], (c) committing a - fraudulent or dishonest practice under her license [s. 626.611(9)], (d) misappropriating, converting or unlawfully withholding monies belonging to the insured [s. 626.611(10)], (e) engaging in an unfair or deceptive act in the business of insurance (s. 626.9521), (f) engaging in an unfair or deceptive act or having shown herself to be a source of injury or loss to the public [s. 626.621(6)], and (g) knowingly collecting a premium for insurance which she knew was not subject to acceptance by the insurer [s. 6269541(1)(o)]. All such violations allegedly occurred in conjunction with the Copeland transaction.
As to the first charge, Williams offered to refund to the Copelands the unearned premium ($89) once they cancelled their coverage. Therefore, she did not fail to "pay funds belonging to the insured." This is particularly true since she had a reasonable basis for believing that the Copelands had enjoyed six months of coverage and were entitled to only a part of their original premium. Next, her actions do not equate to a lack of fitness or trustworthiness since she accepted the premium in good faith, made at least one telephonic and two written inquiries regarding the whereabouts of the policy prior to the cancellation notice being executed, and offered to promptly make a partial refund when requested to do so. As to the next charge, the evidence reveals that Williams was given a quote regarding coverage and therefore could reasonably assume that a policy was forthcoming. Since the MGA typically took months to process applications, and lost or misplaced applications were not unusual, there is insufficient evidence to find that a fraudulent or dishonest practice occurred. In view of respondent's belief that coverage existed for some six months, and her lack of certainty as to whether the application was lost or misplaced, it cannot be said that Williams misappropriated, converted or unlawfully withheld the Copelands' monies. Similarly, no unfair or deceptive act occurred since Williams assumed that the application was being reviewed by Professional, a task which normally took months to accomplish. Finally, the more persuasive evidence reflects that Williams received a quotation from the MGA, and therefore did not knowingly accept a premium for insurance she knew would not be accepted. Count I must accordingly fail.
Count III - This count charges Williams with the same violations discussed in Count I for her dealings with William C. Norton. However, the evidence reflects that Norton was covered for almost eight months through a binder issued by Williams, and eventually by an Orion policy; that although Norton paid $315 for his coverage, this was less than one-half of the annual premium due; and that he was not entitled to a refund. As such, there has been no violation of the cited statutory provisions, and these charges must also fail.
Count VI - This count also involves the same statutory provisions and relates to the Terryl Wisener transaction. Summarizing the evidence of record, it reflects Williams bound coverage with a carrier in accordance with the customer's request; the application was eventually rejected several months later through no fault of her own; and any unearned premium due the customer is the responsibility of the carrier which, at hearing, still had the customer's money. Therefore, it is concluded that the charges contained in Count VI have not been sustained.
Count VII - Here again, Williams is charged with violating the same statutory provisions for her actions in the Moore transaction. The evidence reveals that Williams was negligent in not obtaining the Moores' signatures and mobile home photographs needed to prevent the initial coverage from lapsing on September 6, 1985, and in failing to so notify the Moores. Although she continued to "shop" the application, her efforts were belated and came after the Moores had suffered a loss. The fact that she had an E&O policy does not excuse this conduct. Even so, such negligence does not contravene all of the relevant statutes. More specifically, those provisions regarding the handling and retention of the premium do not apply. This is because Williams continued, although belatedly, to try to place the customer's coverage, and eventually did so at a later date. Therefore, the monies received were for the purpose of securing a policy and were properly retained. Similarly, negligence does not equate to fraud or an unfair or deceptive act as defined by law, or rise to that
level necessary for Williams to be deemed unfit and untrustworthy. However, her negligent actions were a "source of injury or loss to the public" [s.
626.621(6)] since they resulted in a pecuniary loss to the insured. Therefore, this portion of the charges has been sustained. All others should be dismissed.
Count VIII - For her actions in conjunction with the sale of a policy to William A. McClellan, Williams is charged with violating the same statutes discussed in Count I. However, these charges are not substantiated by the evidence and must necessarily fail. This is because Williams obtained coverage for the customer as requested, timely conveyed the customer's request to cancel his coverage, and promptly offered to refund the unearned premium once it was received from the MGA. Indeed, if fault is to be found in this transaction, it should be placed on the MGA, which took months to issue a refund check through no fault of Williams.
Count IX - Here, the agency has again charged Williams with violating the same statutory provisions as were cited in Count I. These charges stem from alleged improprieties by Williams during the Starnes transaction. Briefly, the evidence reveals that Williams forwarded the Starnes application to the MGA, that the MGA assigned a policy number to the application, and that Starnes was accordingly insured. In view of such coverage, Starnes was liable for payment of a premium. Under these circumstances, it was reasonable for Williams to rely on the AIB policy number as evidence of coverage, and to retain his premium. There being insufficient evidence to sustain the charges, Count IX must fail.
Count X - By this count, the Department contends the same statutory provisions were violated by Williams during the course of the Douglas transaction. The evidence reveals that Williams obtained coverage for the Douglases through several binders and an Allstate policy number until Allstate eventually cancelled the coverage in February 1987. Despite having six months coverage, the Douglases received a full refund of their premium. Since no statutory violations were shown, the charges must accordingly be dismissed.
Count XI - The penultimate charge is that Williams violated the Insurance Code while selling the Carrs a general liability policy. As is explained in petitioner's proposed order, the allegation stems from Williams allegedly failing to refund Carr's unearned premium from his 1985-86 policy. However, the evidence demonstrates that Williams applied Carr's 1985-86 refund of $181 to his 1986-87 premium obligation, a procedure in accord with industry practice as enunciated by witness Beverly. This being so, the charges have not been substantiated, and Count XI must fail.
Count XII - The final count concerns alleged misconduct on the part of respondent while dealing with Frank Henry. Briefly, the facts of record show that Williams forwarded the application to an MGA to write the coverage. She heard nothing further from the MGA, and had no inquiry from the customer regarding the policy. Testimony by the MGA that the policy was returned to Williams is not deemed to be credible or supported by the facts. Therefore, Williams could properly assume that coverage was in effect. Similarly, Williams had no responsibility to return the premium since that duty rests upon the MGA and finance company. Since no violations have been proven, the final count must fail.
There being insufficient credible evidence to support any of the allegations in Counts I, III, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI and XII, these counts should be dismissed. The only proven allegation in Count VII is that Williams was a source of injury to the public (the Moores) because of her negligence in
allowing their policy to lapse and to so notify them. This in turn violates Subsection 626.621(6), Florida Statutes (1985). A violation of this statute does not require mandatory disciplinary action, but instead is a violation which "may" be grounds for a sanction. Since the violation is the only one proven, a reprimand is appropriate.
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of a single violation of
Subsection 626.621(6), Florida Statutes (1985), and that all other charges be dismissed. Respondent should be given a reprimand for this violation.
DONE AND ORDERED this 29th day of May 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
DONALD R. ALEXANDER
Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building
2009 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
(904)488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May 1987.
ENDNOTES
1/ The original administrative complaint contained four counts and was issued on September 10, 1986.
2/ The derivation of this amount ($144) was not disclosed. However, this is not essential to a resolution of the issues.
3/ Since $91.22 and $25.38 do not add up to the $133 refund apparently due McClellan, it is unclear as to how this number was arrived at. However, resolution of this matter is unnecessary.
APPENDIX
Petitioner:
1-3. Covered in finding of fact 1. 4-9. Covered in finding of fact 9.
10-12. Covered in finding of fact 1. 13-14. Covered in finding of fact 12.
Covered in finding of fact 11.
Rejected since respondent's exhibit 13 reflects a full refund was made to the customer, albeit in February 1987.
17-22. Covered in finding of fact 13.
23. Partially covered in finding of fact 13. While no policy was formally issued, Norton was nonetheless covered by binders and Orion prior to cancellation by Orion for nonpayment.
24-27. Covered in finding of fact 13. 28-36. Covered in finding of fact 16.
37. Rejected as irrelevant. Allstate has the responsibility of making a refund to Wisener since it still has his premium.
38-41. Covered in finding of fact 15. 42-45. Covered in finding of fact 19. 46-48. Covered in finding of fact 21.
49. Essentially covered in finding of fact 20. 50-52. Covered in finding of fact 22.
53-57. Covered in finding of fact 23. 58-65. Covered in finding of fact 24.
66-74. Covered in finding of fact 25. As to proposed finding 74, it is noted that Starnes never requested a copy of the policy from Williams, and responsibility for issuing one rested upon AIB.
75-80. Covered in finding of fact 27.
81. Covered in finding of fact 29.
82-84. Covered in finding of fact 28. 85-86. Covered in finding of fact 29. 87-90. Covered in finding of fact 30.
Covered in finding of fact 31.
Covered in finding of fact 32.
93-94. Covered in finding of fact 31.
95. Covered in finding of fact 32 with the caveat that no refund was due. 96-100. Covered in finding of fact 33.
Covered in finding of fact 34.
Rejected as being contrary to the more credible and persuasive evidence.
Rejected since Williams did not know that coverage had been rejected. 104-106. Covered in finding of fact 35.
107. Rejected since responsibility for repayment of the premium initially rests upon the carrier or MGA, and then upon the finance company.
Respondent:
Covered in findings of fact 9-12.
Covered in finding of fact 13.
Covered in finding of fact 14.
Covered in findings of fact 15 and 16.
Covered in finding of fact 17.
Covered in findings of fact 18-21.
Covered in finding of fact 19.
Covered in findings of fact 18-21.
Covered in findings of fact 25 and 26.
Covered in findings of fact 27-29.
Covered in findings of fact 30-32.
Covered in findings of fact 33-35.
Covered in findings of fact 6-8.
Covered in finding of fact 26.
Covered in findings of fact 3, 8 and 15.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Richard E. Turner, Esquire William W. Tharpe, Jr., Esquire 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Thomas F. Woods, Esquire The Mahan Station
1709-D Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
Honorable Bill Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Don Dowdell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer
The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
=================================================================
AGENCY FINAL ORDER
=================================================================
STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER
IN THE MATTER OF
FLORENCE MOUNTS WILLIAMS CASE NO. 86-L-459RET DOAH CASE NO. 86-3951
Revocation of License and Eligibility for Licensure
Ordinary Life, including Health Insurance Agent
General Lines Insurance Agent
/
FINAL ORDER
THIS CAUSE came before the Insurance Commissioner of the State of Florida for consideration and final agency action. On September 4, 1986, the Department of Insurance filed an Administrative Complaint against FLORENCE MOUNTS WILLIAMS alleging various violations of the Insurance Code as set out in the Administrative Complaint. This Complaint as subsequently amended on February 10, 1987 to add additional counts.
FLORENCE MOUNTS WILLIAMS requested formal (Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes) proceeding on this Administrative Complaint. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was duly held on March 3 and 4, 1987, in Okeechobee, Florida, and on March 12, 1987 in Tallahassee, Florida, before the Honorable Donald R. Alexander, Hearing Officer for the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings.
After consideration of the evidence and argument presented at the hearing and further consideration of proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the parties, the Hearing Officer on May 29, 1987, issued a Recommended Order (Attached as Exhibit A) to the Insurance Commissioner in which it was recommended that the Respondent be found guilty of a single violation of Subsection 626.621(6), Florida Statutes, and that all other charges be dismissed, neither party filed timely exceptions to the Recommended Order.
Upon consideration of the entire record and the foregoing Recommended Order, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is ORDERED:
The Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact are adopted in toto as this agency's Findings of Fact.
The Hearing Officer's Conclusions of Law are adopted SAVE AND EXCEPT the conclusions reached in Conclusion of Law paragraph 14. In this conclusion the Hearing Officer ignores the Findings of Fact paragraph 35 that the Henrys suffered a loss for which there was no insurance in force in April of 1985, and that this loss has been submitted to the Respondent's Errors and Omissions Carrier, The failure of this agent to ascertain coverage from July of 1984 until after a loss in April of 1985, resulting in the Henrys not having received any settlement for the loss by March of 1987, constitutes a "source of injury or loss to the public," and therefore, another violation of Section 626.621(6), Florida Statutes, under the same, correct, reasoning that the Hearing Officer sets forth in Conclusions of Law paragraph 9. For this reason I hereby find that Respondent, FLORENCE MOUNTS WILLIAMS, has shown herself to be a source of injury or loss to the public, as envisioned by Section 626.621(6), Florida Statutes, relative to both Counts VII and XII. All other charges are hereby dismissed.
The Hearing Officer's Recommendation that FLORENCE MOUNTS WILLIAMS receive a reprimand for a single violation of Section 626.621(6), Florida Statutes is rejected, since explicit statutory authority for actions in lieu of suspension, revoca- tion, or refusal of license or permit are only set out for administrative fine (626.681, Florida Statutes) , or probation (Section 626,691, Florida Statutes). An administrative fine would not be appropriate to remedy the injury caused.
Accordingly, the Respondent, FLORENCE MOUNTS WILLIAMS, is placed on probation for a period of two (2) years from the date of this Order in accordance with Section 626.691, Florida Statutes. Conditions of this probation are:
Probationer, FLORENCE MOUNTS WILLIAMS, will work diligently with her Errors and Omissions Carrier to achieve settlement of the claims of the Moores and the Henrys. If Probationer's insurer is not willing or able to achieve settlement of these claims during the first year of this probation, Probationer will make restitution of these losses before the end of the second year.
Probationer, FLORENCE MOUNTS WILLIAMS, will cooperate in any examination of her records and performance as an insurance agent during each year of this probation.
Probationer, FLORENCE MOUNTS WILLIAMS, will scrupulously observe and comply with all requirements of Statute and Administrative Rule governing her duties and fiduciary responsibility as an insurance agent.
Any party to these proceedings adversely affected by this Order is entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and Rule 9.110, Fla.R.App.P. Review proceedings must be initiated by filing a petition or notice of appeal with the General Counsel, acting as the agency clerk, at 413-B Larson Building, Tallahassee, Florida, 32399-0300 and a copy of the same with the appropriate district court of appeal within thirty (30) days of rendition of this Order.
DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of August, 1987.
BILL GUNTER
Insurance Commissioner and State Treasurer
ANN WAINWRIGHT
Assistant Insurance Commissioner and State Treasurer
Copies furnished:
RICHARD E. TURNER, Esquire
Office of Legal Service Department of Insurance 413-B Larson Building
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
THOMAS F, WOODS, Esquire
The Mahan Station 1709-D Mahan Drive
Tallahassee, Florida 32308
DON DOWDELL, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level
Tallahassee, Florida 22399-0300
HONORABLE DONALD R. ALEXANDER
Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building
2009 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| May 29, 1987 | Recommended Order (hearing held , 2013). CASE CLOSED. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Aug. 11, 1987 | Agency Final Order | |
| May 29, 1987 | Recommended Order | All charges against licensee, except one, dismissed. |
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs BRIAN WHITNEY MCDANIEL, 86-003951 (1986)
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs JENNIFER L. FALOON, 86-003951 (1986)
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs ANNA MICHELLE MACK, 86-003951 (1986)
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs WAYNE CHARLES REDWOOD, 86-003951 (1986)
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES vs JAY LAWRENCE POMERANTZ, 86-003951 (1986)
