STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL ) REGULATION, BOARD OF MEDICINE, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 86-4888
)
EDWARD A. WEISS, M.D., )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice a formal hearing was conducted in this case on September 16, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida, before Michael M. Parrish, a duly designated Hearing officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The parties were represented at the hearing as follows:
For Petitioner: Stephanie A. Daniel, Esquire
Department of Professional Regulation
130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
For Respondent: Stephen Marc Slepin, Esquire
Slepin & Slepin
114 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301
and
John Crider, Esquire Crider and Abbott, P.A. Post Office Box 2410
Crystal River, Florida 32629 ISSUES AND INTRODUCTION
This is a case in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent, a licensed physician, on the basis of conduct of the Respondent which is alleged to have taken place while he was a commissioned medical officer on active duty in the armed forces of the United States, prior to his being licensed by the State of Florida. The charges against the Respondent are set forth in a Second Amended Administrative Complaint, referred to hereinafter as "the Administrative Complaint." The main issues raised in this case are as follows:
Whether Section 458.303(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1983), precludes the prosecution of the Respondent under Section 458.331, Florida Statutes (1983), for acts allegedly committed by the Respondent in his capacity as a commissioned medical officer on active duty in the United States Air Force.
Whether the Respondent can be prosecuted under Section 458.331, Florida Statutes (1983), on the basis of acts allegedly committed prior to the time Respondent was licensed as a physician by the State of Florida.
Whether the United States Air Force is "the licensing authority of another state, territory, or country", which acted against the Respondent's license to practice medicine and, if so, whether the Respondent is therefore in violation of Section 458.331(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1983).
Whether the Respondent has violated Section 458.331(1)(1), Florida Statutes (1983), by "making deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in the practice of medicine. "
Whether the Respondent has violated Section 458.331(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1983), by "making or filing a report which the licensee knows to be false".
At the formal hearing the Petitioner presented certified copies of United States Air Force documents, a stipulation of the parties, a certified composite of the history of the Respondent's licensure by the Department of Professional Regulation since 1985, and the transcripts of depositions (with exhibits attached) of Colonel Lubin, Captain O'Shea, and Doctor Bonner. The Respondent presented the testimony of Colonel Lubin.
Following the hearing, both parties submitted proposed recommended orders containing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The parties' proposed recommended orders have been carefully considered during the formulation of this recommended order. All of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties are specifically addressed in the appendix which is attached to and incorporated into this recommended order.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witness at hearing, I make the following findings of fact.
The Respondent, Edward A. Weiss, M.D., is presently licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. He has been so licensed since September of 1985. The Respondent was not licensed in the State of Florida prior to September of 1985.
During 1984, and for a number of years prior to 1984, the Respondent was a commissioned medical officer in the United States Air Force on active duty. During the period relevant to this case, the Respondent was stationed at the Eglin Air Force Base Hospital under Colonel Arnold Lubin, M.D. At all relevant times the Respondent held the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. At all relevant times, the Respondent practiced the specialty of neurology and he was at all relevant times "Board eligible", but he was not "Board Certified". By February of 1984, the Respondent had been a clinical neurologist for approximately twelve years, and had been Staff Neurologist at Eglin for eight years.
Sometime during 1980, Congress made changes in the pay and allowance structure for all Air Force Medical Officers. At that time medical officers, including the Respondent, submitted rough drafts for pay computations as per directions. The Respondent was not, at that time, called upon to submit any new
credentials. Thereafter, the Respondent began to receive payment from the Air Force at the rate of pay authorized for medical officers who were "Board Certified". Somewhat later, the Respondent was asked on several occasions, in writing, to document his "Board Certified" status. For a long time, the Respondent ignored these requests for documentation.
The Respondent finally received an ultimatum which required that he produce documentation of his "Board Certified" status by a date certain in November of 1983. In response to that ultimatum, the Respondent created a counterfeit certificate that purported to be issued by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology and purported to certify that the Respondent was certified by that Board as qualified to practice the specialty of neurology. The Respondent forwarded copies of the fraudulent certificate to the Air Force
Military Personnel Center and to the Eglin Air Force Base Hospital. Sometime in 1984 an investigation was initiated by the Air Force to determine whether the Respondent had fraudulently received "Board Certified" specialty pay without being eligible for such pay.
Following the investigation, on June 8, 1984, William T. Twinting, Major General, USAF, the Commander at Eglin Air Force Base, issued a Notification of Intent to Impose Non-Judicial Punishment. The Notification stated that preliminary investigation had disclosed that:
[The Respondent], for the purpose of obtaining the approval of Board Certified pay from the United States in the amount of $8,730.30 did at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, on or about November 1983 make and use a certain document to wit: A certificate of qualification to practice the specialty of Neurology which said document, as [the Respondent] then knew, contained a statement that [the Respondent was] certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology as qualified to practice the specialty of Neurology which
statement was false in that [the Respondent was] not so certified and was then known
by [the Respondent] to be false.
On June 11, 1984, the Respondent was served with a copy of the Notification Of Intent To Impose Non-Judicial Punishment. On that same date, the Respondent tendered his resignation from the United States Air Force. On June 21, 1984, the Respondent received notification of the Non-Judicial Punishment imposed against him. In pertinent part, the notification read as follows:
You are hereby reprimanded and ordered to forfeit $1,300.00 per month for two months, but the execution of that portion
of this punishment which provides for forfeiture of $1,300.00 per month for
two months is suspended until 10 December 1984, at which time, unless this suspension is sooner vacated, it will be remitted without further action.
You are hereby reprimanded. A member
of the United States Air Force is expected to maintain the highest standards of personal conduct, integrity and responsi- bility. Your action in this case is indicative of a lack of these qualities.
On August 22, 1984, the Secretary of the Air Force accepted the Respondent's resignation of June 11, 1984, and directed that the Respondent be issued an Honorable Discharge Certificate.
The process known in the Air Force as "decredentialling" consists of the removal of a medical officer's privileges to treat patients at Air Force hospitals. The Respondent was never decredentialed by the Air Force. No Air Force action was taken against the Respondent's "rank," his "pay grade," his "specialty code," or his "medical privileges". The Respondent's Air Force privileges to practice medicine were not revoked, suspended, nor limited in any way, and his competence to practice medicine was never felt to be at issue.
The United States Air Force authorizes qualified medical officers to practice medicine in the Air Force at Air Force facilities. The Air Force does not issue any paper documents described as licenses to practice medicine in the Air Force. The Air Force accepts into the Medical Corps only those medical doctors it believes have the qualifications to safely and properly practice medicine.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and on the applicable statutes, rules, and court decisions, I make the following conclusions of law.
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and the parties to this proceeding. Sec. 120.57, Fla. Stat.
In a license discipline proceeding of this nature, the Petitioner has the burden of proving its allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Ferris
v. Turlington, 510 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1987). The nature of that burden is described as follows in Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So.2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983):
Clear and convincing evidence requires that the evidence must be found to be credible; the facts to which the witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; the testimony must be precise and explicit and the witnesses must be lacking in confusion as to the facts in issue. The evidence must be
of such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.
In the more recent case of Smith v. Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Services,
522 So.2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), the court quoted with approval the foregoing language from Slomowitz, and also noted:
"Clear and convincing evidence" is an intermediate standard of proof, more than the "preponderance of the evidence" standard used in most civil cases, and less than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard used in criminal cases. See State v. Graham, 240 So.2d 486 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970).
For the reasons which are set forth at length below, it is concluded that the charges in this case should be dismissed. The basic reasons which require dismissal are (a) that the Board of Medicine lacks statutory authority to prosecute the Respondent for the specific actions alleged in the Administrative Complaint and (b) the actions proved at the hearing are not violations of the statutory provisions with which the Respondent has been charged.
Section 458.303(1), Florida Statutes (1983), reads as follows, in pertinent part:
The provisions of ss. 458.331
. . . shall have no application to:
. . .
(c) Commissioned medical officers of the Armed Forces of the United States and of the Public Health Service of the United States while on active duty.
The Respondent argues that the above-quoted language is a permanent bar to any disciplinary action which is based on occurrences during the active duty service of commissioned medical officers. The Petitioner argues that the quoted language constitutes only a limited bar which prevents disciplinary action during periods of active duty service, but allows disciplinary action to be initiated as soon as any period of active duty service ends. The above-quoted statutory language is reasonably amenable of either interpretation, and is, therefore, ambiguous. In Lester v. Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation, State Board of Medical Examiners, 348 So.2d 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), the court held, at page 925, with regard to another ambiguous statutory provision:
In construing the language and import of this statue we must bear in mind that it is, in effect, a penal statute since it imposes sanctions and penalties in the nature of denial of license, suspension from practice, revocation of license to practice, private or public reprimand, or probation, upon those found guilty of violating its proscriptions. This being true the statute must be strictly construed and no conduct is to be regarded as included within it that is not reasonably proscribed by it. Furthermore, if there are
any ambiguities included such must be construed in favor of the applicant or licensee. (emphasis added)
Application of the foregoing language from Lester requires that the ambiguity of Section 458.303(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1983), be resolved in favor of the licensee. Accordingly, Section 458.303(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1983), must be construed as a permanent bar to any disciplinary action which is based on occurrences during the active duty service of commissioned medical officers. Thus, the Board of Medicine lacks statutory authority to take disciplinary action based on the facts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
The Board of Medicine also appears to be precluded from prosecuting the Respondent because the Respondent's actions which form the basis for the Administrative Complaint all took place before the Respondent was licensed in the State of Florida. The only Florida appellate court decision which appears to address this issue is Farzad v. Department of Professional Regulation, 443 So.2d 373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). There the court found a way to avoid deciding the issue, but nevertheless discussed it at length and expressed a clear reluctance to adopt a rule of law which would authorize the Board of Medicine to prosecute a physician for misconduct which occurred prior to the physician's Florida licensure. The discussion in the Farzad case was as follows:
Next, we address appellant's contention that Florida is without jurisdiction to invoke disciplinary measures since the 1972 incident occurred three years before her licensure. In response, appellee relies on Gould v. State, 99 Fla. 662, 127 So. 309 (1930), in which the Supreme Court stated that an attorney could be disbarred for misconduct which occurred prior to his licensure. See also State ex rel. Turner v. Earle, 295 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1975). Similarly, appellee reasons that it may consider acts of misconduct which occurred prior to licensure when taking disciplinary action against a licensee.
However, we are constrained to point out that there is a distinction between attorney disbarment proceedings and disciplinary proceedings against a physician under Chapter
458. Disciplinary proceedings against an attorney are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court. Art. V, s. 15, Fla. Const. As recognized in Gould v. State, 127 So. at 311, the court has inherent power vested in it to control the conduct of its own affairs and to maintain its own dignity.
On the other hand, disciplinary proceedings against physicians are governed by statute, and the rule is clear that where statutes authorizing revocation of a license to engage in the practice of a profession are invoked, the provisions of the statutes must be strictly construed and strictly followed,
because the statute is penal in nature. State ex rel. Jordan v. Pattishall, 99 Fla. 296, 126 So. 147 (1930).
With this distinction in mind, we are reluctant to extend the rule of Gould v. State to cover the situation presented here. In Gould, the misconduct occurred immediately preceding Gould's admission to the bar; whereas, in this case, the misconduct occurred three years prior to licensure. We note also that while the Gould court permitted disciplinary action against an attorney based on misconduct which occurred prior to admission to the Bar, other jurisdictions are split on this issue.
Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 807 (1979). (emphasis added)
On the basis of the foregoing language from Farzad, it is concluded that the Board of Medicine lacks statutory authority to take disciplinary action based on events which took place prior to the Respondent's licensure in the State of Florida. This would appear to be especially the case where the events alleged in the Administrative Complaint occurred almost two years before the Respondent received his Florida license.
Attention is now addressed to the specific statutory violations with which the Respondent has been charged. The Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent has violated Paragraphs (b), (i), and (1) of Subsection (1) of Section 458.331, Florida Statutes (1983). Those statutory provisions read as follows, in pertinent part:
(1) The following acts shall constitute grounds for which the disciplinary actions specified in subsection (2) may be taken:
. . .
(b) Having a license to practice medicine revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against, including the denial of licensure, by the licensing authority of another state, territory, or country.
. . .
(i) Making or filing a report which the licensee knows to be false, intentionally or negligently failing to file a report or record required by state or federal law, willfully impeding or obstructing such filing or inducing another person to do so. Such reports or records shall include only those which are signed in the capacity as a licensed physician.
. . .
(1) Making deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in the practice of medicine. . . .
Count One of the Administrative Complaint charges the Respondent with a violation of Section 458.331(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1983), by making or
filing a report which the licensee knows to be false. It is axiomatic that, absent a statutory definition or some other legislative indication of a special meaning, the words in a statute are generally given their plain and ordinary meaning. From The Random House Dictionary (1980 Edition), we learn that the meaning of the noun "report" includes "a detailed account or statement describing an event, action, etc., usually presented formally". The fraudulent certificate prepared and used by the Respondent is not a "report" within the ordinary meaning of that word. Nor is there any clear and convincing evidence of any other false report made or filed by the Respondent. The rough draft for pay computations submitted by the Respondent in 1980 is not in evidence, so it cannot be determined whether that document is a report, and, if so, whether it is false. The Respondent's application for privileges at one Eglin Air Force Base Hospital (Document 5 in Petitioner's Exhibit 1) may be a report and may contain a false statement, but it is irrelevant to the disposition of this case, because the Respondent has not been charged with any violation based on that document and it is well-settled that licensees may not be found guilty of violations with which they have not been charged. See Wray v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners, 435 So.2d 312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Sternberg v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners, 465 So.2d 1324 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
Section 458.331(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1983), must also be read in light of the construction it has received in Department of Professional Regulation v. Valaria A. Alsina, M.D., 6 F.A.L.R. 3863 (Final Order issued 3/14/84), and in Britt v. Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medical Examiners, 492 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). In Alsina the Board of Medicine adopted a conclusion that Section 458.331(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1983), did not encompass false medical bills sent to an insurance company to obtain compensation to which the physician was not entitled. Setting aside the issue of whether a false certificate is a report, the circumstances in Alsina are analogous to the facts in this case in which the Respondent submitted false information which resulted in compensation to which he was not entitled. Although Britt reflects that the Board of Medicine has, to some extent, modified its decision in Alsina, the construction in Britt is not so broad as to encompass the facts in this case.
It must also be noted that Section 458.331(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1983), is limited by its specific terms to reports "signed in the capacity as a licensed physician." At the time of making or filing any "report" charged in the Administrative Complaint, the Respondent was not licensed in Florida, nor (as discussed hereinafter) was he "licensed" by the Air Force. Accordingly, at the time of the events alleged in the Administrative Complaint, the Respondent was not acting in his capacity as a licensed physician. For the foregoing reasons it is concluded that the evidence is insufficient to prove a violation of Section 458.331(1)(i), Florida Statute (1983), and the allegations in Count One of the Administrative Complaint should be dismissed.
Turning next to the charge that the Respondent has violated Section 458.331(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1983), it must first be noted that the applicable portion of the subject statute condemns the making of "deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in the practice of medicine. "
(emphasis added) The evidence establishes that the Respondent made a deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representation. However, for the reasons which follow, that representation does not appear to have been made "in the practice of medicine".
As noted earlier in these conclusions of law, because of their penal nature, the statutes that authorize the imposition of disciplinary penalties must be strictly construed. Lester v. Dept. of Professional and Occupational Regulation State Board of Medical Examiners, 348 So.2d 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Solloway v. Department of Professional Regulation, 421 So.2d 573 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). When so construed, it is clear that the subject portion of Section 458.331(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1983), is limited in its application to certain types of representations made ". . . in the practice of medicine." Therefore, representations made other than in the practice of medicine are not within the scope of the above-quoted statutory provision and cannot be the basis for the imposition of disciplinary action against a physician.
In determining the meaning of statutory language, it is axiomatic that great weight must be given to interpretations of the statute made by the agency charged with enforcement of the statute, unless clearly erroneous. See Gay v. Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Florida, 59 So.2d 788 (Fla. 1952); Daniel v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, 213 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1968). The subject statutory language has recently been interpreted by the Board of Medicine in Department of Professional Regulation vs. Ahmed M. Elmariah, M.D., DOAH Case No. 86-4527, DPR Case Nos. 0053824 and 0057164 (Final Order issued 10/14/88, Recommended Order issued 5/16/88). In Elmariah the Board said, with regard to the meaning of Section 458.331(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1983):
The Board finds that the phrase, "making deceptive, untrue, or fraudulent representations in the practice of medicine" is reasonably and permissibly interpreted as including all representations directly related to the practice of medicine and attempts to practice medicine. Applying for hospital privileges directly relates to the practice of medicine and the attempt to practice medicine.
While the interpretation quoted immediately above appears to be broader than the literal language of the statute, it cannot be said that the Board's interpretation is "clearly erroneous". Accordingly, what must be determined in this case is whether the Respondent's representation in this case was "directly related" to the practice of medicine or to an attempt to practice medicine. The Respondent in this case has not been charged with making representations in an application for hospital privileges. Rather, at the time of the representation, the Respondent already had Air Force authorization to practice medicine and already had hospital privileges at Eglin Air Force Base. The representations were made relative to the amount of salary that would be paid to the Respondent. It is concluded that, given the timing, the purpose, and the effect of the representations in question, such representations were, at most, only indirectly related to the practice of medicine. Accordingly, the representations proved at the hearing in this case do not constitute a violation of Section 458.331(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1983), as interpreted by the Board in Elmariah, and the charges in Count Two of the Administrative Complaint should be dismissed.
Turning, finally, to the allegations of Count Three of the Administrative Complaint, the first question which must be addressed is whether the United States Air Force is "the licensing authority of another state, territory, or country". For purposes of administrative proceedings, the terms "license" and "licensing" are defined as follows at Section 120.52(9) and (10), Florida Statutes (1987):
"License" means a franchise, permit, certification, registration, charter, or similar form of authorization required by law, but it does not include a license required primarily for revenue purposes when issuance of the license is merely a ministerial act.
"Licensing" means the agency process respecting the issuance, denial, renewal, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, or amendment of a license or imposition of terms for the exercise of a license.
The evidence in this case establishes that the United States Air Force does not issue a "license" to practice medicine to its commissioned medical officers within the meaning of that term as quoted above, nor does the United States Air Force go through a "licensing" process with regard to its commissioned medical officers. Therefore, on the facts in this case, the United States Air Force is not a "licensing authority".
Assuming, arguendo, that the United States Air Force is a "licensing authority", the evidence in this case fails to show that the United States Air Force "acted against" any license to practice medicine it may have issued to the Respondent. The action taken by the Air Force did not in any way impact upon or limit the respondent's authority to practice medicine in the Air Force. Furthermore, the action taken against the Respondent was not in his capacity as a medical doctor, but in his capacity as a military officer--the Air Force accused him of being a bad officer, not of being a bad doctor. For the foregoing reasons, the evidence fails to establish a violation of Section 458.331(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1983) , and the charges in Count Three of the Administrative Complaint should be dismissed.
Based on all of the foregoing, I recommend the entry of a Final Order dismissing all charges against the Respondent.
DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of November, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida.
MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building
2009 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of November, 1988.
APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-4888
The following are my specific rulings on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by all parties.
Findings proposed by Petitioner Paragraph 1: Accepted in substance.
Paragraphs 2 and 3: Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary details.
Paragraph 4: Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary details. Further, the portion of the second sentence following the comma is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact.
Paragraph 5: Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary details.
Paragraph 6: First sentence accepted. Remainder rejected as unnecessary or redundant.
Paragraph 7: Rejected as irrelevant because Respondent has not been charged with the conduct described in this paragraph.
Paragraphs 8 and 9: Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary details.
Paragraph 10: First two sentences accepted in substance. Last sentence rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence.
Paragraphs 11, 12, 13, and 14: Accepted in substance.
Paragraphs 15, 16, and 17: Rejected as irrelevant, subordinate, unnecessary details.
Paragraph 18: Rejected as irrelevant, subordinate, unnecessary details. Further, first half of last sentence is contrary to the greater weight of the evidence.
Paragraphs 19 and 20: Rejected as irrelevant, subordinate, unnecessary details.
Paragraph 21: First three lines are accepted in substance. The last two lines are rejected as not supported by clear and convincing evidence.
Paragraphs 22 and 23: Accepted in substance.
Paragraph 24: First two sentences accepted in substance. Last sentence rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary.
Paragraph 25: Accepted.
Paragraph 26: Rejected as irrelevant.
Paragraph 27: Rejected as irrelevant and subordinate details. Paragraph 28: Accepted.
Paragraph 29: Rejected as irrelevant, subordinate, and unnecessary details.
Paragraph 30: Accepted in substance. Findings proposed by Respondent
All of the findings of fact proposed by the Respondent have been accepted in whole or in substance, with the exception of Paragraph B. Paragraph B is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law rather than a proposed finding of fact.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Stephen Marc Slepin, Esquire Slepin & Slepin
114 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301
John Crider, Esquire Crider and Abbott, P.A. Post Office Box 2410
Crystal River, Florida 32629
Stephanie A. Daniel, Esquire Department of Professional
Regulation
130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medicine
Department of Professional Regulation
130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
Bruce D. Lamb, General Counsel Department of Professional
Regulation
130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Nov. 04, 1988 | Recommended Order sent out. CASE CLOSED. Hearing held 9-16-88. |
| Nov. 01, 1988 | Memorandum to T. Oldham from M. M. Parrish (Request for Extension of Time in which to issue Recommended Final Order is Approved, Extension Granted until November 7, 1988) sent out. |
| Sep. 27, 1988 | * |
| Sep. 27, 1988 | Order On Motions sent out. |
| Sep. 27, 1988 | Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order filed. |
| Sep. 23, 1988 | Motion to Extend Filing Deadline for Proposed filed. |
| Sep. 22, 1988 | Transcript filed. |
| Sep. 16, 1988 | Respondent's Trial Memorandum filed. |
| Aug. 31, 1988 | Order on Motions sent out. (Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Count IIIof the Amended Complaint Denied; Petitioner's Motion to Amend AmendedAdministrative Complaing Granted; Petitioner's Motion to Shorten Period for Discovery is Gr anted) |
| Aug. 31, 1988 | Memorandum in Opposition to DPR's Motion to Shorten Period for Discovery filed. |
| Aug. 23, 1988 | Motion to Shorten Period for Discovery filed. |
| Aug. 11, 1988 | Respondent's Objection to Petitioner's First Set of Request [SIC] forAdmissions; Petitioner's First Set of Request for Admissions filed. |
| Aug. 04, 1988 | Petitioner's First Set of Request for Admissions filed. |
| Aug. 02, 1988 | Motion to Amend Amended Administrative Complaint; Second Amended Administrative Complaint filed. |
| Jul. 25, 1988 | Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss filed. |
| Jul. 13, 1988 | Respondent's Motion to Dismiss Count III of the Amended Administrative Complaint filed. |
| Jun. 30, 1988 | Notice of Taking Deposition filed. |
| May 24, 1988 | Response to Order filed. |
| May 12, 1988 | CC of Notice of Taking Deposition filed. |
| May 04, 1988 | CC of Notice of Taking Deposition filed. |
| May 04, 1988 | Order sent out. |
| Apr. 28, 1988 | Notice of Filing filed. |
| Mar. 24, 1988 | Order Granting Continuance and Placing Case in Abeyance sent out. |
| Mar. 22, 1988 | (Petitioner's) Notice of Taking Deposition filed. |
| Mar. 22, 1988 | Respondent's Motion for Continuance filed. |
| Mar. 03, 1988 | Notice of Taking Deposition (3) filed. |
| Feb. 03, 1988 | Notice of Hearing (set for 4-21-88; 9:00am; Talla) sent out. |
| Feb. 02, 1988 | Report to Hearing Officer filed. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Feb. 17, 1989 | Agency Final Order | |
| Nov. 04, 1988 | Recommended Order | Board has no statutory authority to discipline licensee for actions during active duty prior to licensure. Dismissal recommended. |
