STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
PATRICIA D. KOCH, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) CASE NO. 89-3201
) DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, ) DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, this cause came on for formal hearing before P. Michael Ruff, duly-designated Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings, on November 13, 1989.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Ronald W. Brooks, Esq.
Brooks and LeBoeuf, P.A. 863 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, FL 32301
For Respondent: Burton Michaels, Esq.
Department of Administration Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center Building C
2639 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issue in this cause concerns whether the death of the Petitioner's husband arose out of and in the actual performance of duty required by his employment with the Florida Department of Transportation during regularly- scheduled working hours or irregular working hours, as required by his employer, thereby entitling him to "in-line-of-duty" death benefits, as allowed for in subsection 121.091(7)(c)(1), Florida statutes.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This cause arose when the Petitioner, Patricia D. Koch, requested a formal proceeding to contest the Respondent's denial of "in-line-of-duty" death benefits attributable to the death of her husband, a former state employee.
The Respondent agency had determined that the Petitioner was not entitled to in-line-of-duty death benefits because her spouse, Robert Graham Koch, who was employed by the Department of Transportation at the time of death, did not
die in the line of duty, as the Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, Director of Survivor Benefits, Director, interpreted the relevant statutory provisions. See subsection 120.021(14), Florida Statutes. It is undisputed that the spouse must have been fatally injured during regular- scheduled working hours or irregular-scheduled working hours, as required by the employer, and must have been performing a duty required by his employment at the time of death or fatal injury. The Respondent views "regular-scheduled working hours" as being limited to those hours actually listed on the job description.
Mr. Koch was fatally injured at 7:25 a.m., five minutes prior to the time listed on the hours portion of his job description sheet. He was injured as he walked from his parked car to the mechanic shop where he was to receive his work assignments for the day. The Respondent maintains that the fatal accident occurred at 7:25 a.m., rather than 7:30 a.m., and, therefore, that the surviving spouse is ineligible for in-line-of-duty death benefits. Additionally, the Respondent maintains that Mr. Koch's act of walking from his car to the mechanic shop was not in the actual performance of a duty required by, his employment.
The Respondent, therefore, contends that his death was not in the line of duty and that no benefits are in order.
The Petitioner maintains that "regular-scheduled working hours" includes not only those times listed on the job description but also such other times as the decedent was regularly required, by the terms of his employment, to be present on his employer's premises. The Petitioner also contends that the term "actual performance of duty" includes not only those duties listed on the job description itself, but also those other tasks performed by him on his employer's premises, which were preparatory or incidental to his duties as a welder and reasonably necessary for such purpose.
The matter was heard as noticed. The Petitioner testified on her own behalf and presented the testimony of Mr. Wilson Yawn, a maintenance engineer employed by the Florida Department of Transportation ("DOT"); and the Respondent presented the testimony of Mrs. Stanley Colvin, the Director of the Respondent's Office of Survivors Benefit Program. The Petitioner presented three exhibits, which were admitted into evidence; and the Respondent presented four exhibits.
At the conclusion of the proceeding, the parties elected to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Those proposed findings of fact have been treated in this Recommended Order and are ruled upon specifically in the Appendix attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Petitioner, Patricia D. Koch, was the wife of Robert Graham Koch at the time of his death and, thus, is his surviving spouse. When Mr. Koch was killed and at all material times prior thereto, he was employed by the Florida Department of Transportation ("DOT") as a welder.
On the morning of March 10, 1988, at 7:25 a.m., Mr. Koch was fatally injured as he walked from an employee parking area to the mechanic shop when he was struck by a truck. The Petitioner, pursuant to subsection 121.091(7)(c)(1), Florida Statutes, applied to the Division of Retirement for death benefits based upon her husband's fatal injury allegedly "in line of duty". On September 2, 1988, the Petitioner was informed by the Division of Retirement that her application for in-line-of- duty death benefits was denied. The Petitioner, thereafter, on September 23, 1989, petitioned for formal hearing, pursuant to
subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The petition was filed on September 23, 1989; however, the matter was not transferred to the Division of Administrative Hearings until June 14, 1989.
Mr. Koch's job description as a welder required that he work from 7:30
a.m. to 6:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday of each week. On March 10, 1988 (a Thursday), the date of his death, he was required to commence work at 7:30 a.m.
On March 10, 1988, Mr. Koch drove his vehicle through the entrance gate of the fence which surrounds the DOT's premises, drove the vehicle onto DOT's premises, and parked in a parking area designated for him on those premises.
The place where he parked his car was commonly used by DOT employees as a parking area. After driving through the gate, he was, at all subsequent times pertinent to this case, on DOT's property.
As a matter of regular, uniform procedure, required by DOT of all of its welders, the welders, such as Mr. Koch, were required to report to the mechanic shop upon arrival at the DOT premises each morning in order to get their daily duty assignments. Mr. Koch was fatally injured as he walked from his parked car to the mechanic shop. The distance from the location where he parked his car to the mechanic shop is approximately 200 feet and requires approximately three minutes to traverse.
Mr. Koch was required by the terms of his employment to be present at the mechanic shop no-later than 7:30 a.m. If he had not been present at the mechanic shop by 7:30 a.m., he would have been in violation of his employment contract and potentially subject to disciplinary action. It would be impossible for him to comply with the terms of his employment contract unless he started across the DOT premises, walking from his car to the shop door at sometime prior to 7:30 a.m. The terms of his employment contract had to reasonably require that he be-present on the DOT premises at sometime prior to 7:30 a.m. so that he would have time to traverse the distance between the parking area and the mechanic shop at which point he was required to report at 7:30 a.m.
On the morning in question, his presence on the DOT premises was for the purpose of complying with the terms of his employment contract and to render benefit to his employer. His presence there was totally work-related and was not associated with any separate personal interest or pursuit. His duties included not only welding, but also those duties which were preparatory or incidental to his welding duties and which were reasonably necessary to enable him to perform his welding duties. His act of walking from the parking area to the mechanic shop was shown to be an act preparatory to, incidental to, and reasonably necessary for the performance of his duties as a welder. He had to learn of his job requirements for each day in some manner, and his employer required him to learn of it by reporting to the mechanic shop first to receive his duty assignment. Thus, his walking from his car to the mechanic shop was a reasonable response to his duty assignment and was shown to be reasonably necessary to the performance of his welding duties for DOT.
Mr. Wilson Yawn has been a DOT employee for over 37 years. He was the maintenance engineer in charge of the DOT Spring Hill Road maintenance yard, where the fatal injury occurred. He was, thus, Mr. Koch's supervisor. His understanding has always been that once employees came onto DOT's premises and were performing acts preparatory to or incidental to their assigned duties, then such acts were "in line of duty". According to Mr. Yawn, if DOT employees learn that actions, such as Mr. Koch's, in walking from his car to the mechanic shop door on DOT premises, were determined not to be covered by in-line-of- duty
benefits, this might affect their willingness to punctually report to work. Both employees and supervisors know that in order to punctually report to work at 7:30 a.m., an employee has to be on the premises some minutes prior to that in order to drive to the parking area, park the car, secure it, and walk to the door of his first duty station.
The Respondent's administrator expressed the opinion that Mr. Koch was not acting in the line of duty at the time of his death and that denial of benefits under such circumstances would not affect the willingness of employees to report to work in a punctual manner. The testimony of Mr. Yawn is accepted as more credible in this regard since he has been employed by DOT for some 37 years and showed himself to be thoroughly versed in DOT's policies regarding the time for reporting for work, the necessity of punctuality, and the policy regarding the status of employees once they were on the DOT premises. It is found that Mr. Koch was acting "in the line of duty" at the time of his death. In fact, if Mr. Koch had been a little less punctual and merely drove in the front gate at 7:30 a.m. and reported to his duty station at the mechanic shop at approximately 7:35 a.m., which would have been necessary in order to allow him time to walk from his car to the shop, he would not have been punctual. He would have arrived at work late. Indeed, if he had been seven minutes late, he would have been required, under DOT policy, to sign himself out as 15 minutes tardy. If he had not been so punctual, he also would likely have avoided fatal injury.
The supervisors of the DOT mechanic shop determine duty assignments based upon who is present at 7:30 a.m. If employees are tardy, this affects the efficiency and speed in which work gets completed. Additionally, if employees are tardy, the State of Florida loses valuable and costly work hours. It is, thus, in the State's best interest to promote the reporting of employees to work in a punctual manner. Likewise, the DOT's policy that employees are covered by all relevant benefits if present on the employer's premises tends to encourage employees to be punctual in reporting to their duty stations.
The Respondent has taken the position that "actual performance of duty", as required by the statutory entitlement provision for in-line-of-duty death benefits, as applied to a welder, would include not only welding but also those tasks performed by the welder on the employer's premises which are preparatory or incidental to his welding and which are reasonably necessary for such purposes.
One of the purposes of such death benefits is to provide a surviving spouse of a state employee with some degree of financial security. Thus, the in-line-of-duty death benefits are intended to be for the benefit of state - employees in this regard.
Mrs. Koch is currently receiving worker's compensation benefits attributable to her husband's death. She is receiving worker's compensation because the state has determined that her husband was killed in an accident which "arose out of and in the course and scope of his employment". In determining whether she should receive in-line-of-duty death benefits, the Respondent did not consider the state's earlier worker's compensation determination that his death was the result of an accident arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this proceeding. Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1987). Subsection 121.021(14), Florida Statutes, and Rule 22B- 6.001(2), Florida Administrative Code, provide that death in the line of duty means "death arising out of and in the actual performance of duty required by a member's employment during his regularly- scheduled working hours or irregular working hours as required by the employer". The First District Court of Appeals in Bolinger v. Department of Administration Division of Retirement, 335 So.2d 568, 570, 571 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), held that the 1970 legislature, in enacting Chapter 121, deliberately selected a definition closely resembling the test for worker's compensation coverage which related to injuries ) arising out of and in the course and scope of employment". The Bolinger court further observed:
The legislature may, thus, be presumed to have intended that, as in the workman's compensation context, `the words arising out refer to the origin of the cause' of the injury, and that `in the actual performance of duty,' like `in the course of employment' in workman's compensation acts, `refer[s] to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident occurs.' Bituminous Gas. Corp. v.
Richardson, 148 Fla. 323, 325, 4 So.2d
378, 379 (1941)
The linkage between workman's compensation concepts and the Retirement System Act definition of `in line of duty' disability is underscored by the provision in ss.121.021(13) that the administrator of the division of retirement, when initially passing on applications for such disability benefits, may require appropriate proof of the `cause of any such injury or illness' and, in that connection, that
`workmens' compensation records under the provisions of Chapter 440 may also be used.' Legislative purposefulness in the choice of a workmens' compensation test is indicated also by the existence of another statute, when the Retirement System Act was enacted, preventing duplication of workmens' compensation and retirement disability benefits payable to public employees. Sec. 440.09(4), F.S.
1971; 1973 op. att'y gen. 104, no. 073-
62. The law prohibiting duplicate benefits was repealed three years later by Ch. 73-127, ss.2, Florida laws. But compare ss.440.15(10), F.S. 1975, which reduces workmens' compensation benefits duplicating social security disability benefits payable under 42 USC ss.423.
This last sentence is inapplicable to the situation at bar since such a benefits coverage question is obviously not at issue.)
While it is true that the cases of Walker v. State, 360 So.2d 1291 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Division of Retirement v. Allen, 395 So.2d 1192 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); and Division of Retirement v. Putnam, 386 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), indicate that not every application of the workman's compensation law and the definition of compensable injury has been adopted by analogy or otherwise by the courts, in determining line-of-duty benefits, the implications of Bolinger, that under ordinary circumstances there is an analogous linkage between the worker's compensation coverage concepts and the Retirement System Act definition of "in line of duty", have not been overruled.
The cases cited by the Respondent above; and others in that line of decisions have, indeed, indicated that the workers' compensation definition for coverage determination, that is, "arising out of" does not apply to the situations extant in those cases. That is, those cases dealt with the concept of whether the injury or illness involved was causally related to the employment. For instance, as in the Allen decision, supra., the issue was whether the illness involved related to stress occasioned by the peculiar nature or effort involved in the particular employee's employment situation and functions. The court discussed the workers' compensation "arising out of" concept, which would have required that the employee demonstrate that some unusual stress resulting from an unusual effort peculiar to his particular job duties resulted in his illness or disability. The court in Allen held that that workers' compensation concept, regarding causal relationship, did not apply because the Retirement System Act, Chapter 121, had a broader, applicable definition, since it was not confined to an injury arising out of employment but included illness, as well.
The courts in those cases merely ruled that, the Retirement System Act being broad enough to encompass illness and not just injury, (as did the workers' compensation act) that there was no burden on the claimant involved to show some unusual stress different from most occupations, which was peculiar to his employment situation, as a causal connection between his disability and his employment duties. The cases also stand for the lack of necessity of a claimant under the Retirement System Act to show a suddenly-occurring injury, since the Retirement System Act also encompasses illness as a compensable incident.
In the instant situation, however, the concept of causal relationship or whether Mr. Koch's fatal injury "arose out of" his employment is not at issued in the sense of determining how the injury occurred, (the pivotal issue in the cases cited by the Petitioner, referenced above) - There is no dispute that his fatal injury resulted from collision with the DOT vehicle. This case rather, turns on the concept referenced in the workers' compensation coverage definition of "in the course of employment," which Bolinger analogizes to the retirement system concept of "in the actual performance of duty." The Petitioner's cited cases in no way alter or overrule the Bolinger court's conclusion and concept that "in the actual performance of duty" (the retirement language), like "in the course of employment" in the worker's compensation act, refers to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident occurs. This last portion of the worker's compensation definition which the Bolinger court analogized to the "in the actual performance of duty" concept in the retirement statute is still an intact holding from the Bolinger decision and has not been overruled.
Under the still applicable workers' compensation concept, the general rule applicable in the typical case is that "an injury shall be deemed to have occurred in the course of `employment' [analogous to `in the actual performance of duty') if it is sustained by a workman, on the premises of his employer, while preparing to begin the day's work or while doing other acts preparatory or incidental to the performance of his duties, which are reasonably necessary for such: purpose". See Winn Dixie Stores v. Akin, 533 So.2d 829, 830 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); see also City of St. Petersburg v. Cashman, 71 So.2d 733, 734 (Fla. 1954). Following this principle, in which the Bolinger decision still remains controlling authority, "actual performance of duty," required for in-line-of- duty death benefits entitlement, and applied to a welder, would include not only welding itself, but those tasks performed by a welder on the employer's premises which are preparatory or incidental to his welding and which are reasonably necessary for such purposes. Here, the fatal accident occurred on Mr. Koch's employer's premises. Mr. Koch's act of walking from his car to the mechanic shop, where he received his instructions as to his duties for the day, as a regular routine required by his employer, was an act which was preparatory or incidental to the performance of his duties. It was reasonably necessary for such purposes. It must have been so or his employer would not have required it of him.'.
Further, the employer's job description for Mr. Koch's position required that he report to his duty station at 7:30 a.m. His first duty station was shown, by the evidence to be the mechanic shop, where he received his instructions for the day from his supervisor. It is obviously impossible that he could enter the door of the mechanic shop at 7:30 a.m., as required by his employer, without performing certain acts reasonably necessary to his employer's purposes prior to 7:30 a.m. That is, entering the gate upon the premises of his employer, parking his car, and walking to the mechanic shop. Accordingly, Mr. Koch's death clearly occurred while he was in the actual performance of his duties.
The fact that his fatal injury occurred at 7:25 a.m. rather than 7:30
a.m. does not change this analysis. See Winn Dixie Stores v. Akin, 533 So.2d 829, 830 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Mr. Koch's arrival at work five minutes early, for punctuality's sake, is certainly not unreasonable. In fact, since his job description and employer's instructions required him to be on duty at his station (first, the mechanic shop) at 7:30 a.m., his employment duties implicitly required him to be on the premises and approaching his initial duty station prior to 7:30 a.m. The evidence shows that it takes several minutes to enter the DOT premises gate, park one's car, and walk to the mechanic shop. If he entered the gate at 7:30 a.m., he would be running the risk of some sanction for tardiness because it would be physically impossible to be at his duty station at 7:30 a.m. His arrival at work five minutes early for punctuality's sake was, thus, not unreasonable and was implicitly required by the terms of his employment contract. Accordingly, there is no question that his injury occurred in the "actual performance of his duties" and, therefore, was incurred in the line of duty. Therefore, death benefits should be awarded.
Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore
RECOMMENDED:
That a Final Order be entered by the Respondent agency awarding the Petitioner, Patricia D. Koch, the in-line-of-duty death benefits provided for by subsection 121.091(7)(c)(1), Florida Statutes.
DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
(904) 488-9675
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 1990.
APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-3201
Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-14. Accepted.
Rejected, as constituting a conclusion of law.
Accepted.
Accepted.
Rejected, as to the first sentence, since it is a conclusion of law; the second sentence being accepted.
Accepted.
Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact
Accepted.
Accepted.
Accepted.
Accepted, but not materially dispositive.
Rejected, as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact.
Rejected, as being a conclusion of law and not a proposed finding of fact, and as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence, and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Aletta L. Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration
435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esq. General Counsel
Department of Administration
435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
Ronald W. Brooks, Esq. Brooks and LeBoeuf, P.A. 863 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, FL 32301
Burton Michaels, Esq. Department of Administration Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center Building C
2639 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560
=================================================================
AGENCY FINAL ORDER
=================================================================
STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION
DIVISION OF RETIREMENT
PATRICIA D. KOCH,
Petitioner,
vs. DOAH Case No. 89-3201
DOR Case No. DR88-15
DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, DIVISION RETIREMENT,
Respondent.
/
FINAL ORDER
On March 9, 1990, the duly appointed Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings in the above-styled and numbered cause completed and submitted to the Division of Retirement of the Department of Administration and to all parties in this cause, a Recommended Order. A copy of that Recommended Order is attached hereto, incorporated by reference herein, and made a part hereof as Exhibit "A".
Pursuant to Rule 28-5.404, Florida Administrative Code, and Section 120.57(1)(b)8, Florida Statutes, the parties were allowed twenty(20) days within which to submit written exceptions to that Recommended Order. Neither party submitted any exceptions within that 20-day period.
ADOPTION OF RECOMMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
After having considered the recommended Findings of Fact Nos. 1 through 13 on pages 4 through 9 of the Recommended Order attached hereto as EXHIBIT "A", together with all matters of record reduced to writing, or in tangible form, as of March 9, 1990, the Division of Retirement hereby accepts, adopts, and incorporates by reference herein the recommended Findings of Fact Nos. 1 through
13 on pages 4 through 9 of the Recommended Order as a part of this Final Order, and, therefore, it is,
ORDERED AND DIRECTED that the recommended Findings of Fact Nos. 1 through
13 on pages 4 through 9 of the said Hearing Officer's Recommended Order be and the same are hereby adopted in toto as part of this Final Order of the agency in this cause.
RULINGS ON RECOMMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
After having considered the recommended Conclusions of Law on pages 9 through 14 of the Recommended Order attached hereto, the Division of Retirement hereby rejects those Conclusions of Law on the whole in that they attempt to equate Workers' Compensation rules with "in-line-of-duty" disability and death provisions under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. The law is otherwise as set out in the following Conclusions of Law that are hereby adopted in lieu of the Hearings Officer's recommendations. The following constitute the Conclusions of Law of this Final Order.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of this proceeding. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
The Petitioner, Patricia D. Koch, had the burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the death of her late husband, Robert G. Koch, on March 10, 1988, arose out of and in the actual performance of duty required by his employer, the Florida Department of Transportation, during his regularly scheduled working hours or irregular working hours as required by that employer, in order that she qualify for benefits under the Florida Retirement System as the, surviving spouse of a member killed in line of duty, pursuant to Section 121.021(14) and 121.091(7)(c)1., Florida Statutes. Wilson v. Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, 538 So.2d 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), and Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Career Service Commission, 289 So.2d 412, 414 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
The Petitioner has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the death of her late husband, Robert G. Koch, arose out of and in the actual performance of duty required by the Florida Department of Transportation during his regularly scheduled working hours or irregular working hours as required by that employer on March 10, 1988.
Though in Bolinger v. Division of Retirement 335 So.2d 568, 570, 571 (F1a. 1st DCA 1976), the First District Court of Appeal intimated in 1976 that there may have been a "linkage" between "concepts" in disability cases under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, and Workers' Compensation cases under Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, subsequent decisions of the First District Court of Appeal clearly rejected that notion. Division of Retirement v. Allen, 395 So.2d 1192, 1193, 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), Division of Retirement v. Putnam, 386 So.2d 24, 825 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), Dixon v. Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, 481 So.2d 52, 54 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), Walker v. State, Division of Retirement, 360 So.2d 1291, 1292 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)
It is hereby held that at 7:25 a.m. on the morning of March 10, 1988, the late Robert G. Koch was struck by a vehicle as set forth in the above findings of fact at a time when he was going to work at which time he was engaged in an activity which would have constituted the actual performance of duty of his said position with the Florida Department of Transportation.
The Petitioner, Patricia D. Koch, the surviving spouse of the late Robert G. Koch, a member of the Florida Retirement System, is entitled to death in-line-of-duty benefits under Sections 121.021(14) and 121.091(7)(c)1., Florida Statutes, inasmuch as the late Robert G. Koch was not killed on the way to work, but, he had in fact, arrived at work and was killed in the line of duty as defined in those sections.
ORDER
Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is,
ORDERED AND DIRECTED that the Petitioner, Patricia D. Koch, be granted death in-line-of-duty benefits under Sections 121.021(14) and 121.091(7)(c)1., Florida Statutes.
DONE AND ORDERED this 2nd day of May, 1990, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
J. MCMULLIAN III Director of the Division of Retirement
Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Nonroe Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
(904) 487-1230
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS ARE GOVERNED BY THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. SUCH PROCEEDINGS ARE COMMENCED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF THE DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, AND A SECOND COPY, ACCOMPANIED BY FILING FEES PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WISH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT, OR WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE PARTY RESIDES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED.
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that this Final Order Was filed with the Clerk of the Division of Retirement on this day of day, 1990, and that on this same date, copies were furnished to the following as noted respectively: Ronald W. Brooks, Esquire, Brooks and LeBoeuf, P.A., 863 East Park Avenue, Tallahassee, Florida, 32301 (by certified mail with return receipt requested); Burton M. Michaels, Esquire, Division of Retirement, 2639 North Monroe Street, Building C, Tallahassee, Florida, 32399-1560 (by hand delivery); P. Michael Ruff, Hearing Officer, and the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings, The DeSoto Building, 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida, 32399-1550 (by hand delivery of each).
Clerk
Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center Building C
2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
(904) 487-1230
| Issue Date | Proceedings |
|---|---|
| Mar. 09, 1990 | Recommended Order (hearing held , 2013). CASE CLOSED. |
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| May 02, 1990 | Agency Final Order | |
| Mar. 09, 1990 | Recommended Order | Injury occurs "in the performance of duty" if occurs on premises while preparing to begin the days work or acts preparatory thereto (walking to shop) |
