STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

SING OIL COMPANY - WOODVILLE ) HIGHWAY SITE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) CASE NO. 91-2264VR

)

COUNTY OF LEON, )

)

Respondent. )

)

FINAL ORDER

This case came before the undersigned pursuant to Section 120.65(9), Florida Statutes, and Leon County Ordinance No. 90-31, adopted July 16, 1990.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Charles A. Francis

FRANCIS & SWEET

Post Office Box 10551 Tallahassee, FL 32302

For Respondent: Herbert W.A. Thiele, Esquire

County Attorney

Leon County Courthouse Tallahassee, FL 32301-1860

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether Sing Oil Company has demonstrated by a preponderance of evidence that development rights in certain real property it owns have vested against the provisions of the Tallahassee-Leon County 2010 Comprehensive Plan.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

An Application for Vested Rights Determination (the Application) dated November 8, 1990, was filed with the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department (the TLCPD) by Petitioner Sing Oil Company (Sing Oil) on November 19, 1990. The Application was initially reviewed by TLCPD staff and denied, as indicated in letter of denial dated January 31, 1991. Sing Oil filed its appeal to Staff Committee for Respondent on February 11, 1991. The Application was ultimately reviewed by the Staff Committee on March 11, 1991, and was denied. Notice of denial was provided to Sing Oil by letter dated March 19, 1991. By letter dated March 19, 1991, the denial was appealed by Sing Oil. On April 12, 1991, Leon County referred the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of a Hearing Officer.

Pursuant to an agreement of the parties, a hearing was held on June 7, 1991, to give the parties an opportunity to summarize the evidence and present

oral argument of their respective positions. At the commencement of the hearing, the transcript of the hearing before the Staff Committee and the Application with exhibits were accepted into evidence. Neither Sing Oil nor Leon County presented any testimony or additional exhibits.

The parties agreed to file a proposed final order by July 15, 1991. Both parties did file timely proposed final orders. Since the deadline for filing proposed final orders exceeded ten days after the date of hearing, the parties waived the requirement that an order be rendered thirty days after the hearing. Rule 22I-6.031, Florida Administrative Code.

References to the record of the hearing conducted by the Division of Administrative Hearings on June 7, 1991, will be shown as, e.g. DOAH-p. 10. References to the Application and its attached exhibits will be shown as, e.g. App.-Ex. A.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Procedure.

   
   

   1. On November 9, 1990, Sing Oil filed an Application for Vested Rights Determination with the TLCPD.

      
      

   2. The following information concerning the development of the property was contained on the Application.

      1. "Sing Oil Company" is listed as the "owner/agent."

      2. Question 3 lists the name of the project as "Sing Oil Company-Woodville."

         
         

   3. Leon County Environmental Management Permit, DER General Permit, DOT Drainage Connection Permit, DOT Connection Permit, Leon County Septic Tank Permit, and expired Leon County Building Permit are included in Sing Oil's Application as forms of government approvals and as the actions of government relied on by Sing Oil.

      
      

   4. On March 11, 1990, a hearing was held to consider the Application before the Staff Committee comprised of the County Attorney, the Director of Planning for the Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department, and the Director of Growth Management for the County.

      
      

   5. By letter dated March 19, 1991, Mark Gumula, Director of Planning of the TLCPD, informed Sing Oil that the Application had been denied.

      
      

   6. By letter dated March 19, 1991, to Mr. Gumula, Sing Oil appealed the decision to deny the Application.

      
      

   7. On April 12, 1991, the Division of Administrative Hearings received the request for a hearing to review this matter.

      
      

2. The Property.

   
   

   1. Sing Oil currently owns approximately 1.97 acres of property (the Property) located at the Northwest corner of Woodville Highway (SR 363) and Lawhon Road. At the time Petitioner purchased it, the Property was zoned to permit construction of a convenience store.

   2. Sing Oil contracted to purchase the property on August 24, 1988, and obtained title to the property by Warranty Deed executed December 22, 1988, recorded in O.R. Book 1354, Page 2081 of the Public Records of Leon County, Florida for the purchase price of $160,000.

      
      

   3. At the time Sing Oil purchased the Property, there was an occupied residence located on the Property.

      
      

3. Development Activity.

   
   

   1. The project Sing Oil proposed to develop is a 3,250 square foot Sing convenience store, with 38 parking spaces, on a 48,000 square foot site, and with total impervious surface being 25,650 square feet.

      
      

   2. After acquisition of the site, Sing Oil had the residential structure removed in preparation for site improvements.

      
      

   3. Prior to acquisition of the Property, the Property was surveyed by Bobby A. Presnell & Associates, and Broward Davis & Associates had performed a substantial amount of on-site work to determine feasibility for development and absence of any environmental or other site problems which would impair development. The Property was purchased for the specific purpose of building a convenience store.

      
      

4. Governmental Approvals.

   
   

   1. On December 23, 1988, one day after acquisition of the site, Sing Oil filed its Application for an Environmental Management Permit with Leon County, and obtained Permit #89-0076 on January 5, 1989.

      
      

   2. On February 7, 1989, Sing Oil obtained Florida Department of Environmental Regulation Permit #RC37-160284.

      
      

   3. On March 13, 1989, Sing Oil filed its application with the Florida Department of Transportation for a Drainage Connection Permit and Application #15880 was approved on March 15, 1989.

      
      

   4. On April 5, 1989, Florida Department of Transportation Connection Permit #55-898-19 was issued to Sing Oil.

      
      

   5. On May 8, 1989, Sing Oil applied for and obtained a State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services On Site Sewage Disposal System Permit.

      
      

   6. On June 22, 1989, Sing Oil was issued Leon County Building Permit #89- 01392.

      
      

   7. The Leon County Environmental Management Permit has as an attached exhibit the Sing Oil Company Site and Grading Plan prepared by Broward Davis & Associates, Inc. and approved by Leon County.

   8. Page 2 of the Site Plan which is an Exhibit to the Environmental Permit contains the following notes:

      
      

      Lot Area: 1.97 Ac.

      Site Area: 48,000 sq. feet

      Proposed Building Area: 3,250 sq. feet

      Proposed Use: Convenience Store

      Parking Reqd.: 17 spaces

      Parking Provided: 38 spaces

      Vehicle Use Area: 21,000 sq. feet

      Landscape Islands Reqd.: 4

      Landscape Islands Provided: 4

      Area of Walks & Dumpster Pad: 1,064 sq. feet Total Impervious Area: 25,650 sq. feet

      Total Green Area: 22,350 sq. feet (47%) Total Interior Green Area: 17,560 sq. feet (37%)

      
      

5. Development Expenses.

   
   

   1. The cost of purchase of the Property was $160,000.00. At the time of purchase, a residential structure was located on the Property. The structure was removed from the Property and sold for $7,000.00. Therefore, the net cost to Sing Oil for the original purchase of the Property was $153,000.00. These costs were incurred by Petitioner in reliance on the zoning classification of the property at the time of purchase.

      
      

   2. Prior to closing on the Property, Petitioner expended approximately

      $1,000.00 on survey and preliminary engineering work. After closing, Sing Oil expended $1,568 in engineering fees in connection with the Application for the Environmental Management Permit, and an additional $1,140.00 for the permit.

      These costs were incurred by Petitioner in reliance on existing zoning and permissible uses at the time of purchase of the Property.

      
      

   3. Subsequent to the issuance of the Environmental Management Permit, Petitioner expended $143,179.39 in engineering work permit fees, application fees and impact fees. These costs were incurred by Petitioner in reliance on existing zoning and permissible uses, the Environmental Management Permit, approved exhibits to the permit and other permits and approvals obtained from State and local government.

      
      

6. Current Status of the Development.

   
   

   1. The Property is a fairly level site, with no severe grading or environmentally sensitive features and is ready for construction.

      
      

   2. Other than the removal of an existing residential structure, no site development or vertical construction has occurred on the site.

      
      

7. The Building Permit.

   
   

   1. On June 16, 1989, Petitioner made payment to Leon County for a county- wide impact fee and for a building permit. Leon County issued a building permit for the site on June 22, 1989.

      
      

   2. In July 1989, Petitioner and Amoco Oil Company executed a confidentiality agreement. In February 1990, Petitioner and Amoco executed a

      purchase agreement, and the merger of the Petitioner with Amoco was completed in October 1990.

      
      

   3. At the time of the execution of the confidentiality agreement leading to its merger with Amoco, Petitioner placed development activity on hold pending the merger. By the time the merger was accomplished in October 1990, Petitioner's building permit had expired and Leon County had adopted the 2010 Comprehensive Plan.

      
      

   4. At no time during the course of the merger nor at any time after the issuance of the building permit in June 1989, did the Petitioner request an extension of the building permit. Had a request for extension of the permit been received, the County would have routinely granted an extension for at least

      90 days, with no limit on further extensions.

      
      

8. Application of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan.

1. At the time Petitioner purchased the Property, existing zoning would have permitted development of the Property for Petitioner's intended use, a convenience store and gasoline station.

   
   

2. The current land use designation for the Property pursuant to the 2010 Comprehensive Plan prohibits development for retail commercial purposes.

   
   

3. The Comprehensive Plan does permit multi-family residential and office uses of certain sizes on the Property.

   
   

4. Petitioner has presented no evidence that application has been made to Leon County for any Comprehensive Plan concurrency or consistency determinations for any other proposed use for the site.

   
   

   1. Detrimental Reliance.

      
      

5. Petitioner has established that it relied on existing zoning and permits that it obtained from State and local government in incurring costs associated with its intended development of the Property. The "detriment" Petitioner suffers as a result of such reliance is occasioned by Petitioner's admittedly inadvertent failure to extend or renew the previously issued building permit. Therefore, Petitioner's inability to proceed with its development as planned, due to the interim adoption of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, is a result of its own omission and not the result of any act or omission on the part of the Leon County government.

   
   

   CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

   
   

   1. Jurisdiction

      
      

6. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the parties to and the subject matter of this proceeding. Section 120.65(9), Florida Statutes (1989), and Leon County Ordinance No. 90-31 (the Ordinance).

   
   

   1. The Ordinance

      
      

7. Pursuant to Section 163.3167, Florida Statutes, the County was required to prepare a comprehensive plan governing the use and development of land located within the County. In compliance with Section 163.3167, Florida Statutes, the County adopted a comprehensive plan (2010 Comprehensive Plan),

   which was submitted to the Florida Department of Community Affairs for review on February 1, 1990.

   
   

8. The County adopted the Ordinance to insure that existing rights to develop property of Leon County property owners (created by the Constitutions of the State of Florida and the United States), are not infringed upon by application of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. The purpose of the Ordinance is to establish the:

   
   

   ... sole administrative procedures and standards by which a property owner may demonstrate that private property rights have vested against the 2010 Comprehensive Plan.

   
   

   (Section I of the Ordinance.)

   
   

9. Pursuant to the Ordinance, any Leon County property owner who believes that his or her property rights to develop property are vested, and therefore believes that the property may be developed without complying with the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, must file an application provided by the County within 120 days after July 16, 1990. If an application is filed pursuant to the Ordinance and it is determined that development rights have vested, the consistency and concurrency requirements of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan do not apply to the property.

   
   

10. Applications to determine if development rights have vested are initially reviewed for technical correctness by the TLCPD's staff. (Section

    III.C. of the Ordinance.) Once the Application is accepted, the staff of the TLCPD makes the initial determination as to whether development rights in the property are vested. Id. If staff cannot determine whether an applicant's development rights in the property are clearly and unequivocally vested, a hearing before a Staff Committee consisting of the County Attorney, the Director of Planning, and the Director of Growth Management is to be conducted within fifteen days after the TLCPD staff's decision. (Section III.3.c. of the Ordinance.) A hearing before the Staff Committee may also be requested by an applicant if staff determines that the applicant's property is not vested. Id.

    
    

11. An applicant is required to present all evidence in support of his or her application at the hearing before the Staff Committee. (Section III.C.4. of the Ordinance.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the Staff Committee must "adopt a decision of approval, denial, approval with conditions, or to continue the proceedings to a date certain." Id. Written notice of the Staff Committee's decision is to be provided within ten calendar days after the hearing. Id.

    
    

12. If a hearing before the Staff Committee is waived or if the decision of the Staff Committee is adverse to the applicant, Section III.C.5. of the Ordinance provides for an appeal to a Hearing Officer. The nature of such an appeal is set out in Section III.C.5. of the Ordinance:

    
    

    This "appeal" is not intended to mean an appeal in the traditional sense, that is, only a review of the Staff Committee record of their hearing. The Hearing Officer "appeal" shall be construed in its broadest, non-technical sense, which is

    merely an application to a higher authority for a review of the Staff Committee action taken.

    
    

13. In reviewing the action taken by the Staff Committee, Section

    III.C.5.c. of the Ordinance provides the following:

    
    

    If the Staff Committee record of their hearing is full and complete, the Hearing Officer may determine

    that the record is the only evidence that is necessary. However, the Hearing Officer may determine that additional evidence and oral or written testimony, including cross-examination, is necessary to properly evaluate the Staff Committee's action and render a decision as to its validity. The Hearing Officer shall have the authority to determine the need for additional evidence and/or testimony.

    
    

14. Sections III.C.5.e and f of the Ordinance govern the manner in which an appeal is filed and the manner in which any hearing conducted by a Hearing Officer is to be conducted.

    
    

15. Section III.C.5.g of the Ordinance governs a Hearing Officer's decision.:

    
    

    1. The Hearing Officer shall review the record and testimony presented at the hearing before the

       Staff Committee, if any, and at the Hearing Officer's hearing ....

       
       

    2. The Hearing Officer shall be guided by the previously adopted Comprehensive Plan, the adopted 2010 Comprehensive Plan, the Land Development Regulations, this ordinance, and established case law.

       
       

    3. The burden shall be upon the appellant to show that the decision of the staff or Staff Committee cannot be sustained by a preponderance of the evidence or the staff or Staff Committee decision departs from the essential requirements of law.

       
       

    4. The Hearing Officer's determination shall include appropriate findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decisions in the matter of the appeal. The Hearing Officer may affirm, affirm with conditions, or reverse the decision of the staff or the Staff Committee.

       
       

    5. The Hearing Officer shall file his written determination on each appeal with the Director within thirty (30) calendar days of the date of appeal hearing and a copy shall be provided to the Clerk and the applicant.

    
    

16. Section IV of the Ordinance governs the determination of whether an applicant's development rights in property have vested. Section IV.A of the Ordinance provides two situations where development rights will be considered vested: "common law vesting" and "statutory vesting."

    1. Statutory Vesting

       
       

17. Statutory vesting under the Ordinance contains threshold requirements as follows:

    
    

    1. The right to develop or to continue the development of property shall be found to exist if: A valid and unexpired final development order

       was issued by the County prior to February 1, 1990, substantial development has occurred on a significant portion of the development authorized in a single final development order, and is completed or development is continuing in good faith as of July 16, 1990.

       
       

    2. Each statutory vesting determination also requires that all material requirements, conditions, limitations, and regulations of the development order have been met.

       
       

    3. The right to develop or to continue to the development of a Planned Unit Development shall be found to exist if the Planned Unit development was subject to a valid and unexpired final development order issued prior to July 16, 1990. However, Planned Unit Developments approved prior to February 1, 1990, must have commenced substantial development consistent with the Planned Unit Development in good faith as of July 16, 1990, in order to qualify for vesting under this subparagraph.

       
       

       (Section IV.A.2. of the Ordinance.)

       
       

       1. Continuing Good Faith, Final Development Orders, and Substantial Development Defined

          
          

18. Section II of the Ordinance defines the terms "continuing good faith," "final development orders" and "substantial development," as used in the above- quoted Section IV.A.1. and 2, as follows:

    
    

    B. CONTINUING GOOD FAITH. As used in this ordinance shall mean the final development order for a project has not expired, and no period of ninety (90) consecutive days passes

    without the occurrence on the land, of development activity which significantly moves the proposed development toward completion, unless the developer establishes that such ninety (90) day lapse in development activity was due to factors beyond

    the developer's control or unless development activity authorized by a final development order has been completed on a significant portion of the development subject to said final development order and has significantly moved the entire development toward completion. (emphasis supplied.)

    1. FINAL DEVELOPMENT ORDER. The following unexpired development orders shall be considered to be final development orders for purposes of a determination

       of vested rights in a previously-approved development:

       
       

       1. Exempt subdivision;

          
          

       2. Minor subdivision;

          
          

       3. Preliminary subdivision plat approval;

          
          

       4. Final subdivision plat approval;

          
          

       5. Final site plan approval (pursuant to County Ordinance 88-16);

          
          

       6. Approval of a P.U.D. concept plan;

          
          

       7. Approval of a P.U.D. final development plan;

          
          

       8. Building permit; and

          
          

       9. Any other development order which approved the development of land for a particular use or uses at a specified intensity of use and which allowed development activity on the land for which the development order was issued.

    
    

    H. SUBSTANTIAL DEVELOPMENT. As used in this ordinance shall mean that all required permits necessary to continue the development have been obtained; permitted clearing and grading has commenced on any significant portion of the development subject to a single final development order; and the actual construction of water and sewer lines, or streets, or the stormwater management system, on said portion of the development is complete or is progressing in a manner that significantly moves the entire development toward completion.

    
    

    1. Common Law Vesting

       
       

19. Common Law Vesting is defined in the Ordinance as follows:

    
    

    A right to develop or to continue the development of property not withstanding the 2010 Comprehensive Plan may be found to exist whenever the applicant

    proves by a preponderance of evidence that the owner, acting in good faith upon some act or omission of the County, has made a substantial change in position or has incurred such extensive obligations and expenses that it would be highly inequitable and unjust to destroy the right to develop or to continue the development of the property.

    (Section IV.A.1.a of the Ordinance.)

    
    

    1. The Sing Oil Application for Vested Rights

       
       

20. Petitioner contends that it is entitled to a determination of vested rights under both the statutory and common law vesting provisions of the Ordinance.

    
    

    1. Statutory Vesting

       
       

21. Central to Petitioner's argument in favor of statutory vesting is its contention that an Environmental Management Permit, issued on January 5, 1989, constitutes a "Final Development Order" as that term is defined in Section

    II.E.9. of the Ordinance. Petitioner cites a previous decision of the Division of Administrative Hearings in a vested rights case, Centervillage Limited Partnership v. City of Tallahassee, Case No. 90-6431VR, as authority for the proposition that an Environmental Management Permit may be considered a "Final Development Order" for the purpose of vesting. Petitioner misconstrues the Centervillage case on this point.

    
    

22. Centervillage involved facts wherein the developer engaged in give and take negotiations with State and local government for a lengthy period. These negotiations resulted in a "conceptual agreement" between the developer and local government. The conceptual agreement provided that the developer would incur extensive costs and obligations, which included the initial purchase of added land, construction of drainage facilities on the land, and donation of the land and drainage facility to the City. In return for this and other costs and obligations incurred by the Centervillage Petitioner, local government agreed to allow development of the property in question to its "fullest commercial development." The Environmental Management Permit in Centervillage was held to contain evidence of the mutual understanding of the parties to the agreement as to the meaning of "fullest commercial development."

    
    

23. The Centervillage case involved numerous facts regarding good faith reliance and extensive costs and obligations incurred by the developer based on negotiations with local government. Such facts are not present in this proceeding and Sing Oil's reliance on Centervillage as authority for its arguments in favor of both statutory and common law vesting in this case are misplaced.

    
    

24. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Environmental Permit in this case could be construed to be a "Final Development Order," Petitioner has failed to prove that it meets the elements of substantial development or continuing good faith development which are also required in order to establish a right to statutory vesting under Section II of the Ordinance. Petitioner concedes in its Proposed Final Order that its argument for statutory vesting is not persuasive. The decision in this appeal is based primarily on Sing Oil's claim of common law vesting under Section IV of the Ordinance.

    
    

    1. Common Law Vesting

       
       

25. Common law vesting, as defined in Section IV.A.1.a of the Ordinance, contains essentially the same elements as those required to establish equitable estoppel pursuant to Florida case law. 1/ Florida Courts have described the doctrine of equitable estoppel as follows:

    
    

    The doctrine of equitable estoppel will limit

    a local government in the exercise of its zoning power when a property owner (1) relying in good

    faith (2) upon some act or omission of the government

    (3) has made substantial change in position or incurred such excessive obligations and expenses that it would be inequitable and unjust to destroy the rights he has acquired.

    
    

26. Smith v. Clearwater, 383 So.2d 681, 686 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1980). See also, Key West v. R.L.J.S. Corporation, 537 So.2d 641 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1989); and Harbor Course Club, Inc. v. Department of Community Affairs, 510 So.2d 915 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1987).

    
    

    1. Elements of Equitable Estoppel in this Case

    
    

27. Petitioner relied on existing zoning and land use designation in purchasing the property in question.

    
    

28. Section IV.1.4. of the Ordinance provides that "[a] zoning classification or a rezoning does not guarantee or vest any specific development rights." This provision is consistent with case law. See, Miami Beach v. 8701 Collins Ave., 77 So.2d 239 (Fla. 1955); Pompano Beach v. Yardarm Restaurant, Inc., 509 So.2d 1295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987); Lauderdale Lakes v. Corn, 427 So.2d

    239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); and Gainesville v. Cone, 365 So.2d 737 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Therefore, Petitioner must prove reliance on more than the zoning classification at the time of purchase of the property in order to prevail in this proceeding.

    
    

29. In this case Petitioner essentially argues that it relied in good faith on its Environmental Management Permit, and on to its building permit in incurring cost and obligations in furtherance of its plan to develop a convenience store and gasoline station on the property in question. Petitioner further contends that it failed to proceed with development pursuant to its building permit due to a delay in approval of its merger with Amoco. This delay, argues Petitioner, was occasioned by the Internal Revenue Service holding up the approval of the merger, a circumstance beyond Petitioner's control.

    
    

30. Assuming arguendo the accuracy and merit of the "unavoidable delay" argument, Petitioner's proof fails on other grounds. It is clear from the record in this case that at any time during the lengthy period between the acquisition of the permit, the expiration of the permit and the adoption of the Comprehensive Plan, Petitioner could have requested an extension and/or renewal of its building permit. According to the record in this case, had Petitioner made such request(s), the applications would have received "perfunctory" approval. The expiration of the building permit was due to the admitted inadvertence of Petitioner and not due to any act or omissions on the part of the Respondent.

    
    

31. Petitioner argues that it has acted in good faith throughout the events which led to the filing of its Application for Vested Rights, but in this case, Petitioner's "good faith" is not really the issue. Here it is the omission of the property owner and not an act or omission of government which creates the Petitioner's dilemma. Under such circumstances, equitable estoppel is not available to the property owner, even though its application would prevent an otherwise harsh result. See, Gross v. City of Riviera Beach, 367 So.2d 648, 650-651 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).

32. Petitioner has failed to prove that the decision of the Staff Committee cannot be sustained by a preponderance of evidence or that such decision departs from the essential requirements of law.

ORDER

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is ORDERED that the denial of Petitioner's Application by the Leon County

Vested Rights Staff Committee is AFFIRMED.

DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida.

JAMES W. YORK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 904/488-9675

FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 1991.

ENDNOTES

1/ Based upon the conclusions of law discussed below, Petitioner has failed to establish the threshold elements of equitable estoppel in this case. Therefore, it is not necessary to reach the argument of Respondent that, under the Ordinance, Petitioner must also prove that its rights to develop the property for uses other than those originally intended have also been destroyed.

APPENDIX TO FINAL ORDER CASE NO. 91-2264VR

Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact:

1-21. Adopted in material part in Findings of Fact 1-21 of the Final Order.

22. Accepted.

23-24. Adopted in material part in Findings of Fact 22 and 23 of the Final Order.

1. Adopted in material part in Finding of Fact 24 of the Final Order.

2. Accepted.

3. Adopted in material part in Finding of Fact 25 of the Final Order.

4. Accepted.

5. Adopted in material part in Finding of Fact 30 of the Final Order.

6. Adopted in material part in Finding of Fact 29 of the Final Order.

Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact:

1. Accepted.

2. Adopted in material part in Finding of Fact 14 of the Final Order. The remainder of Respondent's proposed finding of fact 2 is hereby accepted.

3. Adopted in material part in Findings of Fact 15, 16 and

   17 of the Final Order.

4. Adopted in material part in Finding of Fact 19 of the Final Order.

5. Adopted in material part in Finding of Fact 28 of the Final Order.

6-7. Adopted in material part in Findings of Fact 29 and 30 of the Final Order.

1. Adopted in material part in Finding of Fact 26 of the Final Order. The remainder of Respondent's proposed finding of fact 8 is hereby accepted.

2. Adopted in material part in Finding of Fact 22 of the Final Order.

3. Adopted in material part in Finding of Fact 31 of the Final Order.

4. Adopted in material part in Finding of Fact 32 of the Final Order.

5. Adopted in material part in Finding of Fact 33 of the Final Order.

6. Adopted in material part in Finding of Fact 34 of the Final Order.

Copies furnished:

Charles Francis, Esquire Post Office Box 10551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Herbert W.A. Thiele, Esquire County Attorney

Leon County Courthouse Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Sandy O'Neal, Clerk

Board of County Commissioners Leon County Courthouse Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Mark Gumula

Director of Planning

Tallahassee-Leon County Planning Department

300 South Adams Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS

Judicial review of this decision is available to the Appellant and Leon County and shall be by common-law certiorari to the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit.

Docket for Case No: 91-002264VR

Orders for Case No: 91-002264VR