STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

MICHAEL CRUDELE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 97-4844F

)

DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND )

TREASURER, )

)

Respondent. )

)

FINAL ORDER

On February 9, 1998, a formal administrative hearing was held in this case in Tallahassee, Florida, before J. Lawrence Johnston, Administrative Law Judge, Division of Administrative Hearings.

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Cynthia S. Tunnicliff, Esquire

Carol Forthman, Esquire Pennington, Culpepper, Moore,

Wilkinson, Dunbar and Dunlap, P.A.

215 South Monroe, Second Floor Tallahassee, Florida 32301

For Respondent: James A. Bossart, Esquire

Department of Insurance and Treasurer 612 Larson Building

200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Insurance, should pay reasonable attorney fees and costs to Crudele under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1997), the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, after Crudele appealed

and reversed the Department's Emergency Order of Suspension.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

This case commenced upon the filing of a Petition for Award of Attorney Fees under Section 57.111, on October 17, 1997. A response was filed on October 31, 1997.

On October 31, 1997, the Department also filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition for Costs and Attorney's Fees on the ground of lack of jurisdiction to award appellate attorney fees. On November 6, 1997, Crudele filed a Motion for Summary Hearing.

Based on the written arguments, an Order Denying Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Hearing was entered on

December 10, 1997. Final hearing was scheduled for February 9, 1998.

On January 5, 1998, the Department filed a petition in the District Court of Appeal, First District, for review of the Order Denying Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Summary Hearing. On January 21, 1998, the Department filed a Motion for Stay or to Hold in Abeyance. Crudele filed a response in opposition, and a telephone hearing was held on the motions on February 2, 1998.

An Order Denying Stay and Granting Expedited Discovery was entered on February 5, 1998.

At final hearing, Crudele and his attorney testified, and he had Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2 admitted in evidence. Crudele also requested official recognition of the First District's Slip Opinion and Mandate reversing the Emergency Order of Suspension; this request was granted without objection.

The Department did not call any witnesses but offered into evidence copies of verified consumer complaints against Crudele

as Respondent's Exhibit 1. However, Crudele objected, and the objection was sustained.

Crudele ordered the preparation of a transcript of the final hearing, and the parties were given ten days from the filing of the transcript to file proposed final orders.

On February 11, 1998, the Department filed a motion to reconsider the ruling on Crudele's objection to Respondent's Exhibit 1; on March 3, 1998, the Department filed an Amended Motion to Reopen Record for receipt of certified copies of the consumer complaints as Respondent's Exhibit 1. Crudele continued to object.

A hearing was held on March 9, 1998, and the Amended Motion to Reopen Record was granted. The certified copies of the consumer complaints (by the alleged victim and her adult daughter) were received as Respondent's Exhibit 1. The Department's unopposed request for five additional days from the filing of the transcript to file proposed final orders also was granted at the March 9 hearing.

The transcript of the final hearing was filed on April 6, 1998. Both parties filed proposed final orders (although the Department's was incorrectly called a proposed recommended order.)

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On July 15, 1996, the Department issued an Emergency Order of Suspension of Crudele's eligibility for licensure and license as a Florida life insurance agent and life and health insurance agent. The Emergency Order of Suspension was based on alleged violations of the insurance code in connection with the surrender of insurance annuities for purchase of a startup company's unsecured promissory notes. It stated:

   Based on the foregoing specific facts and for the reasons of protecting the insurance-buying public and insurers from further harm, preventing further abuses of fiduciary relationships, and preventing further defrauding of insureds and insurance companies by the [Petitioner], the Insurance Commissioner finds that [Crudele] constitutes and is an immediate and serious danger to public health, safety, or welfare necessitating and justifying the Emergency Suspension of all licenses and eligibility for licensure and registrations heretofore issued to [Crudele] under the purview of the Department of Insurance. The danger, more specifically, is to the insurance-buying public which must place its trust in the honesty and competence of insurance agents. The trust involves the responsibility that insurance agents have for fiduciary funds accepted by them and insurance matters entrusted to them. The danger is clear and present that failure to properly handle such funds and matters may cause serious losses and damage to the insurance-buying public.

2. Prior to issuance of the Emergency Order of Suspension, the Department received two verified complaints--one by the alleged victim, and the other by her adult daughter. The complaints alleged essentially:

   Crudele was introduced to Mary Clem, an 84 year-old widow of a tenant farmer, by Charles Perks, Clem's insurance agent, in 1992.

   
   

   In 1992, Crudele and Perks solicited and sold Clem two annuities for a total of $50,000, representing Clem's life savings from working in sick people's homes as a nurses aide.

   A year after selling the annuities, Crudele and Perks returned to Clem and convinced her to invest the money she had in her annuities into a new company called Zuma that was to recycle automobile tires into useful products.

   
   

   Crudele and Perks represented that Zuma was a "sure fire business." They said they were offering Clem the opportunity to get "in on the ground floor" and that

   
   

   the stock would then go on the open market and double in value.

   
   

   Clem did not have a great deal of education and had no experience investing in stocks or bonds. Her sole source of income was Social Security plus her modest savings. She conceded that when she was offered a 12% interest rate, she found the offer too irresistible to refuse.

   
   

   Neither Crudele nor Perks gave Clem a prospectus or any other descriptive brochure about Zuma.

   
   

   Clem purchased a total of three Zuma promissory notes at three separate times for a total of $60,000. This represented the bulk of her retirement savings.

   
   

   Clem acted based on her trust and confidence in Crudele and Perks.

   
   

   Clem later went to a lawyer to draft a will. The lawyer became very concerned about Clem's purchases of the Zuma promissory notes and her inability to understand the nature of the transaction.

   
   

   Clem was not getting any of her payments from Zuma as promised. Clem was "going out of her mind" with worry. She summoned her daughter, Roberta Anderson, to come down to Florida from Indiana to investigate the matter.

   
   

   Anderson was unable to contact Crudele, and he did not contact her. Anderson and Clem were not aware of any efforts on Crudele's part to recover the funds or otherwise remedy the situation. After a great deal of effort, Anderson was able to recover approximately

   $23,000 of her mother's money. Crudele apparently played no part in helping Anderson recover the $23,000. The Zuma notes went into default, and apparently the remainder of the money was lost. Clem suffered a very serious financial loss that, given her circumstances, she could ill afford.

3. It may be inferred from the evidence that the Department based its Emergency Order of Suspension on the Clem and Anderson verified complaints. There was no evidence of any other basis for the Emergency Order of Suspension. There was no evidence as to whether the Department conducted any investigation of any kind prior to entry of the Emergency Order of Suspension. Nor is there any evidence as to the Department's decision-making process.

4. The Emergency Order of Suspension stated: (1) that it was being issued pursuant to "sections 120.59(3) [and] 120.60(8) [now Section 120.60(6), Florida Statutes (1997)], Florida Statutes [1995]; (2) that Crudele had "the right to request a hearing in accordance with the provisions of Section 120.59(4), Florida Statutes [1995]"; and (3) that Crudele "was entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes [1995], and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure."

5. The Emergency Order of Suspension also stated that an Administrative Complaint seeking final disciplinary action would be filed within 20 days. On July 15, 1996, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint on essentially the same allegations as those in the Emergency Order of Suspension.

6. Crudele sought judicial review of the Emergency Order of Suspension in the District Court of Appeal, First District. On August 19, 1997, the court issued an Opinion reversing the Emergency Order of Suspension because it did not "set forth

   particularized facts which demonstrate sufficient immediacy or likelihood of continuing harm to the public health, safety, and welfare to support a suspension of his license without notice and hearing." The court's Mandate issued on September 4, 1997; it referred to the court's Opinion and commanded that "further proceedings, if required, be had in accordance with said opinion, the rules of Court, and the laws of the State of Florida."

7. The Administrative Complaint filed against Crudele was given Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) Case

   No. 97-2603. On February 17, 1998, a Final Order sustaining some of the charges and suspending Crudele's license and eligibility for licensure for six months was entered in Case No. 97-2603.

   CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

   
   

8. In this case, Crudele is seeking fees and costs for successfully appealing an Emergency Order of Suspension issued by the Department under Section 120.60(8), Florida Statutes (1995) [now Section 120.60(6), Florida Statutes (1997).] The Department contends that no award is possible because the district court of appeal denied Crudele's application for attorney fees and costs under Section 120.595(5), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996). In support of its argument, the Department cites the case of Louth v. Williams, 643 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), as holding that "sole jurisdiction to determine entitlement to appellate fees lies with the appellate courts."

9. As Crudele has pointed out, Louth only addressed the circumstances of that case, which did not involve Section 57.111,

   Florida Statutes (1997), the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act. It is concluded from a careful reading of the pertinent statutes that a Section 57.111 award of appellate fees can be made under certain circumstances.

10. Subsection (4)(a) of Section 57.111 provides that an award is available for an "adjudicatory proceeding or administrative proceeding pursuant to chapter 120 initiated by a state agency." Subsection (4)(a) specifically requires the filing of an affidavit revealing "the nature and extent the services rendered by the attorney as well as the costs incurred in preparations, motions, hearings, and appeals in the proceeding." (emphasis added)

11. Subsection (4)(b)1 of Section 57.111 provides that a petition must be "submitted . . . to the court which first conducted the adversarial proceeding in the underlying action, or to the Division of Administrative Hearings which shall assign an administrative law judge, in the case of a proceeding pursuant to chapter 120 . . . ." (emphasis added) This language confirms that the petition for a Section 57.111 award in this case properly was submitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH); the district court of appeal did not have exclusive jurisdiction.

12. In the December 10, 1997, Order Denying Motion to Dismiss filed by the Department on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, it was concluded not only that DOAH had jurisdiction to make a Section 57.111 award of appellate fees in

    this case but also that the district court of appeal's Opinion and Mandate constituted the "final judgment or order" for purposes of Section 57.111(3)(c)1, Florida Statutes (1997). The latter conclusion went beyond what was necessary to determine jurisdiction and, on reconsideration, is withdrawn.

13. Section 57.111(3)(c)1., Florida Statutes (1997), provides that a small business party is the "prevailing small business party" when "[a] final judgment or order has been entered in favor of the small business party and such judgment or order has not been reversed on appeal or the time for seeking judicial review of the judgment or order has expired."

14. If the district court of appeal's Opinion and Mandate constituted a "final judgment or order" for purposes of subsection (3)(c)1, Crudele clearly was the "prevailing small business party" for purposes of Section 57.111(3)(c)1., Florida Statutes (1997), regardless whether he was operating as sole proprietor of an unincorporated business or as a corporation.

    The Department's argument that Crudele's alleged operation of his business as a corporation defeats his claim to status as a "small business party" is both factually and legally incorrect.

15. The Department argued most clearly for the first time in its Proposed Recommended [sic] Order and supporting Memorandum of Law that the entry of the Emergency Order of Suspension and the Opinion and Mandate reversing it on appeal did not result in the entry of "[a] final judgment or order" for purposes of Section 57.111(3)(c)1., but rather in the entry of non-final

    order. In making this argument, the Department analogized the Emergency Order of Suspension to an interlocutory order granting a temporary injunction in a civil case.

16. It is only necessary to test the validity of the analogy the Department's argument seeks to draw if the phrase "final judgment or order" used in Section 57.111(3)(c)1, Florida Statutes (1997), did not means final judgment or final order. Otherwise, obtaining an order would entitle the small business party to an award under Section 57.111 regardless whether it was final. It is concluded that "final judgment or order," as used in Section 57.111(3)(c)1., means final judgment or final order. This conclusion is supported by the use of the phrase "judgment or order" later in the same sentence without the modifier "final." It is concluded that, if the Emergency Order of Suspension and Opinion and Mandate of the district court of appeal reversing it did not constitute a final order, Crudele was not a "prevailing small business party" for purposes of Section 57.111(3)(c)1., Florida Statutes (1997).

17. Returning to the analogy, in the case of a temporary injunction in a civil case, requests for temporary and permanent relief generally are combined in a single complaint, which results in the opening of a single case. See Trawick's Florida Practice and Procedure, §§ 28-2 and 28-5. Generally, an evidentiary hearing is held on the request for a temporary injunction. If a temporary injunction without notice is sought under Rule 1.610(a), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion

    to dissolve the temporary injunction may by filed at any time and must be heard within five days. See Rule 1.610(d), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. If a request for a temporary injunction is not combined with a complaint for permanent relief, and a second case is opened when a separate complaint for a permanent injunction is filed, the cases can be consolidated under Rule 1.270(a), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. See Court Commentary to 1984 Amendment to Rule 1.610(e). In either case, the judge who will enter the final judgment on the complaint for a permanent injunction retains jurisdiction and can dissolve or modify the temporary injunction as the case proceeds. See Trawick's Florida Practice and Procedure, §§ 28-2 and 28-5.

18. While an emergency suspension order under Section 120.60(6) is entered by the agency with final order authority, no administrative complaint for temporary relief is filed, and there is no statutory or rule entitlement to an evidentiary hearing on the allegations in the emergency suspension order. Instead, Section 120.60(6)(c) provides: "Summary suspension, restriction, or limitation may be ordered, but a suspension or revocation proceeding pursuant to ss. 120.569 and 120.57 shall also be promptly instituted and acted upon." There is no procedure to dissolve or modify the emergency suspension order as part of the proceeding instituted under Sections 120.569 and 120.57; the only available procedure is an immediate appeal under Section 120.60(6)(c).

19. While there clearly are differences between the

    procedures for obtaining a temporary injunction in a civil case and the procedures for obtaining an emergency suspension order under Section 120.60(6), Florida Statutes (1997), there also are many similarities. It is concluded that the differences are the result of the nature of proceedings under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and that the two proceedings are indeed analogous. The case law supports this view.

20. In Cunningham v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 677 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), a doctor petitioned the court for a writ of certiorari, contending that an emergency order of suspension of his physician's license was not necessary to protect the public interest. The emergency suspension order was entered under Section 120.60(8), Florida Statutes (1995), which is now Section 120.60(6), Florida Statutes (1997). The court "construe[d] [the doctor's] petition as a direct appeal of an emergency order" and began its opinion with the explanation:

    
    

    As an initial point, we review the emergency order pursuant to section 120.68(1), Florida Statutes (1995), which authorizes immediate review of an intermediate agency order if review of the final order would not provide an adequate remedy. See, e.g., National Freight, Inc., v. Dept. of Transp., 483 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Witmer v. Department of Business & Prof. Reg., 631 So.2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

    Id., at 61. It appears from the opinion that the court considered the emergency suspension order to be a "preliminary, procedural, or intermediate order" under Section 120.68(1). As the Department has pointed out, the 1997 codification of Section

    120.68(1) is the same.

    
    

21. In the National Freight decision cited in Cunningham, the holder of special permits to operate 100 semitrailers in excess of the 48-foot maximum length applied for renewal and was notified that the permits would be considered expired as of their expiration dates, notwithstanding the pending renewal applications. The permit holder sought review of the notification as a non-final order. The district court of appeal characterized the notification as "preliminary agency action, review of which after final agency action would be inadequate. Section 120.68(1), Fla. Stat., Fla. R. App. P. 9.100." National Freight, at 742. Immediate appellate review was warranted because the preliminary agency action would "effectively preclude petitioner from operating nonconforming vehicles in this state, resulting in economic deprivation which would not necessarily be recoverable in the event petitioner is ultimately successful in its administrative challenge." Id.,

    fn 1.

    
    

22. Although the notification issued in National Freight apparently was not designated as an emergency suspension order issued under Section 120.60(8) [now Section 120.60(6), Florida Statutes (1997)], the Cunningham court saw fit to analogize the two and use National Freight's characterization of the notification in that case as a non-final order as support for likewise characterizing the emergency suspension order in Cunningham.

23. In Commercial Consultants Corp. v. Dept. of Business Reg., Div. of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums, 363 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), land developers appealed from a temporary cease and desist order issued without giving them prior notice or an opportunity to be heard. It required the developers to notify customers of the cease and desist order and place funds in escrow. It also "provide[d] for a prompt hearing, upon request, to determine if the order should be made permanent."

    Id. at 1163. In explaining why it had jurisdiction, the court stated: "Although this 'temporary' order is intermediate agency action, it is subject to immediate judicial review. We have authority under Section 120.68(1) to review intermediate agency action 'if review of the final agency decision would not provide an adequate remedy.'" Id., at 1163-1164. The court held that the cease and desist order "present[ed] a proper case for our immediate review." Id., at 1164.

24. Like the notification issued in National Freight, although the cease and desist order entered in Commercial Consultants apparently was not designated as an emergency suspension order, it was analogous in purpose and effect, and the court's characterization of it is instructive.

25. It is recognized that the Cunningham court focused on Section 120.68(1), Florida Statutes (1995), in explaining why it entertained immediate review of the emergency suspension order in that case without mentioning Section 120.60(8) [now Section 120.60(6), Florida Statutes (1997)]. In its 1995 iteration,

    Section 120.60(8) referred to and required compliance with the procedures for promulgation of an emergency rule under Section 120.54(9). Section 120.54(9)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1995), specifically provided: "The agency's findings of immediate danger, necessity, and procedural fairness shall be judicially reviewable." Section 120.60(6)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), now provides: "The agency's findings of immediate danger, necessity, and procedural fairness are judicially reviewable."

26. It also is noted that in the Witmer decision cited by the Cunningham court, a case in which a veterinarian appealed an emergency order suspending his license, the court began its review with the explanation:

    This court has jurisdiction to review emergency administrative orders under section 120.54(9)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1993).

    Little v. Coler, 557 So.2d 157, 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). The scope of review is limited to a determination of whether the emergency order complies with the requirements of section 120.54(9)(a)3. . . . That section [provided in pertinent part] . . . The agency's findings of immediate danger, necessity and procedural fairness shall be judicially reviewable.

    
    

    Id. at 340-341. Like the 1995 codification of these statutes, Section 120.60(8), Florida Statutes (1993), also required emergency suspension orders to comply with the procedures for promulgation of an emergency rule under Section 120.54(9), and Section 120.54(9)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1993), also specifically provided: "The agency's findings of immediate danger, necessity, and procedural fairness shall be judicially reviewable."

27. It could be argued that the statutes cited in the preceding paragraph make emergency suspension orders immediately appealable as of right and, therefore, final orders. But, first, the Cunningham court did not consider emergency suspension orders to be immediately appealable as of right. Second, even if these statutes made emergency suspension orders immediately appealable as of right, that would not necessarily make them final orders for purposes of Section 57.111(3)(c)1., Florida Statutes (1997). Rule 9.130(a)(3)(B), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that non-final orders granting, continuing, modifying, denying, or dissolving an injunction are appealable as of right. Nonetheless, a temporary injunction clearly is and takes the form of an interlocutory, non-final order. See Trawick's Florida Practice and Procedure, § 28-2. Likewise, the other non-final orders made immediately appealable by Rule 9.130(a)(3), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, also do not lose their non-final nature.

28. The characteristics of a final administrative order recently were described as follows:

    Its finality depends on whether it has brought the administrative adjudicative process to a close. "The test to determine whether an order is final or interlocutory in nature is whether the case is disposed of by the order . . . ." Prime Orlando Properties, Inc. v. Department of Bus. Regulation, Div.

    of Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, 502 So.2d 456, 459 (Fla. 1st DCA

    1986).

    
    

    Hill v. Div. of Retirement, 687 So. 2d 1376, 1377 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

29. The court in Prime Orlando added another criterion:

    
    

    whether a question remains open for judicial determination. In other words, a final decree marks the end of judicial labor. (citations omitted)

    
    

    Prime Orlando at 459. Obviously, Prime Orlando refers to court proceedings. But just as clearly, the administrative process does not end with the entry of an emergency suspension order; rather, it ends with the disposition of the proceeding under the Section 120.569 and 120.57 proceeding that follows.

30. It also is noted that Section 120.569(2)(l), Florida Statutes (1997), provides for the entry of an immediate final order if made necessary by an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare. As its name states, an immediate final order is a final order. Unlike an emergency suspension order under Section 120.60(6), an immediate final order does not rely upon the institution and resolution of additional administrative proceedings; instead, it is the beginning and end of administrative proceedings.

31. It must be acknowledged, as reflected in Findings 4 through 6, supra, that while the Opinion and Mandate of the district court of appeal are entirely consistent with review of a non-final order, the Emergency Order of Suspension itself was internally inconsistent.

32. The Emergency Order of Suspension recited that it was being issued pursuant to both Section 120.59(3) (the authority for issuance of an immediate final order) and Section 120.60(8) (the authority for issuance of an emergency suspension order), [Florida Statutes (1995)].

33. In addition, the Emergency Order of Suspension stated that the recipient had "the right to request a hearing in accordance with the provisions of Section 120.59(4), Florida Statutes [1995]." While Section 120.59, Florida Statutes (1995), dealt primarily with final orders, it provided that the recipient of any order shall be given notice that "shall inform the recipient of any administrative hearing or judicial review that is available under s. 120.57 or s. 120.68, shall indicate the procedure which must be followed to obtain the hearing or judicial review, and shall state the time limits which apply." Notwithstanding the implication of the statement in the Emergency Order of Suspension, whether the Emergency Order of Suspension was a final order or an emergency suspension order, Crudele had no right to an administrative hearing on it.

34. Finally, the Emergency Order of Suspension stated that the recipient "was entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure." While, as has been discussed, Section 120.68 applied to judicial review of both final and non- final administrative orders, Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, governed only appeals of final orders;

    meanwhile, Rule 9.130(a)(1), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides: "Review of . . . non-final administrative action shall be by the method prescribed by rule 9.100." The latter rule provides for review of non-final administrative action by petition.

35. Notwithstanding the internal inconsistencies in the Emergency Order of Suspension, it is concluded that the Emergency Order of Suspension was not a final order and that Crudele is not a "prevailing party" under Section 57.111(3)(c)1., Florida Statutes (1997). In so concluding, it is recognized that the Final Order entered in Witmer v. Dept. of Business and Prof. Reg., DOAH Case No. 94-2268F, on February 24, 1997, granted a Section 57.111 petition based on the reversal of an emergency suspension order. But it does not appear that the issue whether an emergency suspension order is a "final judgment or order" for purposes of Section 57.111(3)(c)1., Florida Statutes, was raised prior to entry of the Final Order in DOAH Case No. 94-2268F.

DISPOSITION

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Petition for Award of Attorney Fees under Section 57.111 is denied.

DONE AND ORDERED this 26th day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing (850) 921-6847

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May, 1998.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Cynthia S. Tunnicliff, Esquire Carol Forthman, Esquire Pennington, Culpepper, Moore,

Wilkinson, Dunbar and Dunlap, P. A.

215 South Monroe, Second Floor Tallahassee, Florida 32301

James A. Bossart, Esquire

Department of Insurance and Treasurer 612 Larson Building

200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333

Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Bill Nelson

State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner

Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS ARE GOVERNED BY THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE. SUCH PROCEEDINGS ARE COMMENCED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF THE DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS AND A SECOND COPY, ACCOMPANIED BY FILING FEES PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT, OR WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE PARTY RESIDES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED.

Docket for Case No: 97-004844F

Orders for Case No: 97-004844F