The Issue The ultimate issue for determination is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her age by failing to provide equal raises in October 1994 and equal termination benefits in August 1995, in violation of Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes (1997). (All statutory references are to Florida Statutes (1997) unless otherwise stated).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner did not appear at the administrative hearing and did not submit any evidence. Respondent seeks attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of Petitioner's failure to comply with the Discovery Order. It is uncontroverted that Petitioner is a female born on November 17, 1929, and a member of a protected class. Respondent employed Petitioner up to her dismissal on August 1, 1995. Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Commission on or about August 31, 1995. The Commission's date stamp on the Charge of Discrimination is legible only for the month and year of filing. August 31, 1995, is the deemed date. Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination contains two allegations of age discrimination. First, Petitioner alleges that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on August 1, 1995, by terminating Petitioner's employment without the same severance pay that Respondent paid to one of Petitioner's co- workers. Second, Petitioner alleges that in October 1994 Respondent failed to give Petitioner the same raise as Respondent gave Petitioner's co-workers in the same position, i.e., a laboratory technician. Time Limits The Charge of Discrimination was timely filed in accordance with the requirements of Section 760.11(1). The filing date of August 31, 1995, fell within 365 days of the earliest alleged discrimination on October 1, 1994. Section 760.11(3) authorized the Commission to issue a determination of reasonable cause within 180 days of August 31, 1995, when the Charge of Discrimination was filed. Counting September 1, 1995, as the first day of the 180-day time limit, Section 760.11(3) authorized Commission to determine reasonable cause no later than February 27, 1996. Section 760.11(7) required Petitioner to file a request for hearing within 35 days of February 27, 1996. Counting February 28, 1996, as the first day of the 35-day period and assuming for the benefit of Petitioner that February 1996 had only 28 days, Section 760.11(7) required Petitioner to file a request for hearing no later than April 3, 1996. Petitioner did not timely file her request for administrative hearing. Petitioner first requested an administrative hearing in the Petition for Relief filed on September 10, 1997. Petitioner filed her request for hearing approximately 525 days late and 560 days after the expiration of the 180-day time limit prescribed in Section 760.11(3). Section 760.11(7) statutorily bars Petitioner's claim. Section 760.11(7) expressly provides, in relevant part: If the aggrieved person does not request an administrative hearing within the 35 days, the claim will be barred. Fees and Costs The Commission referred the request for hearing in the Petition for Relief to DOAH on October 16, 1997. On November 3, 1997, Respondent filed its Answer and Affirmative Defenses and its Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted and Alternative Motion for More Definite Statement with Incorporated Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof (respectively, the "Motion to Dismiss" and "Motion for More Definite Statement"). On October 17, 1997, Respondent served Petitioner with copies of the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More Definite Statement by United States Mail. Petitioner did not file a response to the Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More Definite Statement within 12 days of the date of service, or anytime thereafter. On November 18, 1997, an Order to Show Cause required Petitioner to file no later than December 15, 1997, a written response stating why the relief requested by Respondent should not be granted. A Notice of Hearing issued on the same date scheduled the administrative hearing for February 9, 1998. On December 8, 1997, Petitioner filed her written response to the Order to Show Cause but did not serve a copy on Respondent. On December 30, 1997, a Notice of Ex Parte Communication provided Respondent with a copy of Petitioner's written response and reminded each party to serve the opposing party with copies of any documents filed with DOAH. On January 15, 1998, Respondent filed a renewed Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More Definite Statement and requested a continuance of the administrative hearing on the ground that Respondent had not received a copy of Petitioner's response to the Order to Show Cause until the first week in January. Petitioner did not respond to either of the renewed motions or to the motion for continuance. On February 3, 1998, the ALJ continued the hearing to a date to be agreed upon by the parties during a telephone hearing scheduled for February 9, 1998. The telephone hearing was scheduled to hear oral argument on Respondent's pending motions and as a case management conference. At the outset of the telephone conference conducted on February 9, 1998, Petitioner stated that she did not wish to proceed without counsel. Petitioner represented that she had been attempting to obtain counsel, without success, and requested additional time in which to obtain counsel. Attorney Robert Hosch, Petitioner's nephew, participated in the motion hearing on February 9, 1998, for the limited purpose of representing that he would assist Petitioner in obtaining counsel. The ALJ granted Petitioner's request for additional time; reserved ruling on Respondent's pending motions for disposition after hearing oral argument during a telephone conference rescheduled for March 2, 1998; instructed Petitioner to have her attorney file a notice of appearance no later than February 19, 1998, and a response to Respondent's renewed Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More Definite Statement no later than March 2, 1998. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties during the telephone conference, the ALJ scheduled the administrative hearing for April 28, 1998. On February 23, 1998, an Order Continuing and Rescheduling Formal Hearing memorialized the foregoing matters. On March 2, 1998, the parties and Mr. Hosch participated in another telephone conference concerning Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More Definite Statement. Mr. Hosch stated that he did not represent Petitioner but was assisting her in obtaining counsel. Petitioner requested additional time in which to obtain counsel. The ALJ required Petitioner to file a more definite statement and a notice of appearance from her attorney, if any, no later than March 12, 1998. The ALJ instructed the parties and Mr. Hosch that failure to file a more definite statement and any notice of appearance on or before March 12, 1998, would result in dismissal of the proceeding. On March 6, 1998, an Order Granting Motion for More Definite Statement memorialized the rulings and instructions entered during the March 2 telephone conference. On March 13, 1998, Petitioner filed a one-page letter purporting to be a more definite statement. On March 16, 1998, the undersigned entered a Recommended Order of Dismissal. On April 5, 1999, the Commission entered an Order Remanding Case to Administrative Law Judge for Further Proceedings on the Merits (the "Remand"). In relevant part, the Remand concluded that the Recommended Order of Dismissal denied Petitioner her right to represent herself and that it was an abuse of discretion to do so. The Remand stated, in relevant part: An examination of the DOAH file discloses that Petitioner attempted to file a more definite statement by letter dated 3/11/98, and received by DOAH 3/13/98. It is not known why the Judge does not refer to this letter in his Order. Perhaps it was ignored because it was received one day late. If so, this only strengthens the Commission's finding that the Petitioner was deprived of an essential due process requirement of Florida law, and the Judge abused his discretion. . . . it is necessary that there be a finding that the conduct upon which the order is based was equivalent to willfulness or deliberate disregard of the order. Petitioner's argument . . . is probably strong enough by itself to remand the Recommended Order, at least on the issue of willful or deliberate default. Remand at fourth unnumbered page. On April 19, 1999, an Order Reopening File required the parties to file a status report no later than May 17, 1999. The Order expressly stated that failure to timely file a status report would result in the dismissal of the case. Neither party timely filed a status report. On May 20, 1999, Respondent filed Respondent's Status Report requesting rulings on the original and renewed Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More Definite Statement and requesting the administrative hearing to be scheduled after January 1, 2000. Petitioner never filed a status report and did not respond to Respondent's request for rulings on the pending motions. On June 9, 1999, the ALJ entered an Order Denying Dismissal. The Order denied Respondent's original and renewed Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More Definite Statement. On the same date, a Notice of Hearing scheduled the administrative Hearing for September 28 and 29, 1999, and a Prehearing Order required the parties to comply with several requirements incorporated herein by this reference. On June 25, 1999, Respondent filed Respondent's Motion for Continuance of the hearing scheduled for September 28-29, 1999, on the ground that counsel for Respondent was scheduled for a four-week trial in circuit court beginning September 21, 1999. Petitioner never responded to the Motion for Continuance. An order dated July 13, 1999, rescheduled the administrative hearing for January 20 and 21, 2000. On November 16, 1999, Respondent served Petitioner with Respondent's First Set of Interrogatories and Respondent's First Request for Production of Documents. Petitioner neither objected to nor answered either discovery request. On November 30, 1999, Respondent served Petitioner with a Notice of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum on December 16, 1999. On December 1, 1999, Petitioner filed a letter requesting a continuance of the administrative hearing and an extension of time to respond to discovery and to attend the deposition. In relevant part, the letter stated that Petitioner continues: . . . to have difficulty finding counsel who will assist me on a contingency fee basis . . . . At this time, it would be impossible for me to pay an attorney for his or her time in assisting me. For the same reason, I am requesting that each of the parties' discovery efforts be halted for a short period of time, in order that I might find counsel to help me with my responses and to attend my deposition. I do understand that the Respondent has a right to gather information about my claim and I plan to fully cooperate with those efforts. However, I need the assistance of an attorney in preparing my case and representing me at deposition and at the hearing. I am diligently trying to secure counsel and I only seek a reasonable continuance of the hearing and of pending discovery. . . . Please allow at least a few extra months before the hearing date and allow me at least an additional month to respond to the Respondent's discovery requests and to attend my deposition, which is currently scheduled for mid-December, 1999. . . . On December 10, 1999, Respondent filed Respondent's Objection to Petitioner's Request for Continuance and Rescheduling of Formal Hearing and Request for Stay of Discovery. On December 14, 1999, Respondent filed Respondent's Limited Withdrawal of Objection to Continuance and Amended Response to Request for Continuance. Respondent agreed to a continuance of the hearing for one month but objected to any extension of the time for responding to discovery requests or for taking the deposition. An order dated December 17, 1999, rescheduled the administrative hearing for February 28 and 29, 2000, and denied Petitioner's request to stay discovery while she sought counsel. Counsel for Respondent made reasonable efforts to conduct discovery at Petitioner's convenience. Subsequent to November 30, 1999, when Respondent's counsel scheduled Petitioner's deposition for December 16, 1999, Petitioner contacted Respondent's counsel to reschedule the December 16 deposition because Petitioner was recovering from a cold. Respondent's counsel rescheduled the deposition for January 4, 2000, and specifically obtained Petitioner's approval of the January 4th-deposition date. During the week of December 27, 1999, Petitioner contacted Respondent's counsel and represented that Petitioner was scheduled to have surgery to remove cancer from Petitioner's mouth on January 3, 2000. Petitioner stated that she would not be able to talk for several weeks and would not be able to appear at the January 4th deposition. Respondent's counsel agreed to reschedule the deposition if Petitioner would provide written confirmation of the scheduled surgery from Petitioner's physician. Petitioner never provided the written confirmation. Respondent's counsel re-noticed Petitioner's deposition for January 17, 2000. Respondent's counsel obtained Petitioner's specific approval of the new deposition date before scheduling the deposition. Petitioner failed to appear for her deposition on January 17, 2000, and Respondent's counsel rescheduled the deposition for February 2, 2000. Respondent's counsel made several requests by telephone to obtain Petitioner's answers to interrogatories and Petitioner's response to the request to produce. Both discovery requests had been served on November 16, 1999. Petitioner never objected to or answered Respondent's interrogatories and never objected to or produced the requested documents. On January 10, 2000, Respondent's counsel filed a Motion to Compel and Motion for Sanctions; and Respondent's Motion to Compel Appearance at Deposition and Responses to Discovery and Motion for Sanctions. The Discovery Order (dated January 28, 2000) reserved ruling on the request for sanctions until an evidentiary hearing could be conducted during the administrative hearing scheduled for February 28, 1999. However, the Discovery Order granted the request to compel Petitioner's appearance at the deposition scheduled for February 2, 2000; required Petitioner to bring to the deposition her answers to interrogatories and any documents in response to Respondent's request to produce; and required Petitioner to file her Prehearing Statement in accordance with the requirements of the Prehearing Order entered on June 9, 1999. On January 28, 1999, the administrative assistant for the ALJ telephoned Petitioner and read paragraphs 1-7 of the Discovery Order. On the same date, Respondent's counsel caused a copy of the Discovery Order to be hand-delivered to Petitioner's residence. Petitioner was not home, and the courier posted the Discovery Order on the front door of Petitioner's residence. On January 29, 2000, Respondent's counsel personally hand-delivered a copy of the Discovery Order to Petitioner at Petitioner's residence and informed Petitioner of the Order's contents. On February 2, 2000, Petitioner failed to appear for her deposition. Petitioner never filed her answers to interrogatories, never filed the documents sought in Respondent's request to produce, and never filed a Prehearing Statement. Respondent's counsel telephoned Petitioner to confirm that Petitioner would be attending a prehearing conference that had been previously scheduled in accordance with the requirements of the Prehearing Order entered on June 9, 1999. Petitioner stated that she would not attend the prehearing conference. When Respondent's counsel asked why Petitioner would not attend the prehearing conference, Petitioner hung up without explanation. When counsel for Respondent made additional attempts to coordinate a prehearing conference, Petitioner refused to speak to counsel for Respondent. Petitioner's refusal to appear at deposition, answer interrogatories, produce documents, and participate in a prehearing conference individually and collectively prejudiced Respondent's ability to prepare a defense. Petitioner's refusal denied Respondent relevant and material information including the identity of Petitioner's witnesses and exhibits as well as Petitioner's current employment and earnings. Petitioner's refusal deprived Respondent's counsel of the ability to fully perform her duties and responsibilities to her client. Respondent incurred attorney's fees and costs as a result of Petitioner's refusal to appear at deposition, answer interrogatories, and produce documents. Respondent incurred court reporter costs of $169.15 as a result of Petitioner's refusal to appear at any of her depositions. Respondent incurred attorney's fees of $499.75 as a result of Petitioner's refusal to appear at her first deposition. Respondent incurred attorney's fees of $1,870.50 as a result of Petitioner's failure to appear at her second deposition, answer interrogatories, and produce documents; and as a result of various motions filed to obtain Petitioner's attendance at deposition and Petitioner's responses to discovery requests. Petitioner willfully and deliberately disregarded the requirements of the Discovery Order. In relevant part, paragraph 6 in the Discovery Order stated: In the absence of competent and substantial evidence of good cause submitted by Petitioner, the failure of Petitioner to timely comply with the requirements of this Order shall be "equivalent to willfulness or deliberate disregard of the order [quoting from the Remand]." Upon Respondent's timely motion and showing of good cause for imposing sanctions, such failure by Petitioner shall subject Petitioner to the imposition of appropriate sanctions including the assessment of fees and costs, the preclusion of evidence, and the dismissal of this proceeding. Petitioner had adequate notice of the terms of the Discovery Order and the opportunity to show good cause for her failure to comply with the Discovery Order. On January 28, 2000, the administrative assistant for the ALJ read to Petitioner over the telephone the contents of paragraphs 1-7 of the Discovery Order. Petitioner received a copy of the Discovery Order on January 28 and 29, 2000. On January 29, 2000, Respondent's counsel explained the Discovery Order to Petitioner. Petitioner chose not to comply with the Discovery Order. Petitioner neither appeared at the administrative hearing to present evidence to prove the merits of her case nor appeared to present evidence to show why the sanctions requested by Respondent should not be granted. Monetary sanctions are appropriate in this case and commensurate with the offense. Dismissal and the preclusion of evidence are neither appropriate nor adequate sanctions because Petitioner did not appear at the administrative hearing and did not present any evidence. Respondent's counsel was required by law and the rules of ethics to make every reasonable effort to prepare an adequate defense of her client for presentation at the administrative hearing. Dismissal is not appropriate for other reasons. The Commission reversed a previous dismissal in this case and remanded the case in an effort to ensure Petitioner's right to represent herself. After the remand, Petitioner sought additional time to obtain counsel. Relevant orders allowed Petitioner additional time to obtain counsel; afforded Petitioner the right to represent herself during discovery, in accordance with the purpose of the Remand; and attempted to balance the competing interests of the parties.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing this proceeding as untimely filed; finding that Respondent did not discriminate against Petitioner; denying Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief; and imposing monetary sanctions against Petitioner in the aggregate amount of $2,539.40. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Janet M. Courtney, Esquire Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor and Reed, P.A. 215 North Eola Drive Post Office Box 2809 Orlando, Florida 32802 Margaret H. Wilson 5532C Cinderlane Parkway Orlando, Florida 32808
The Issue The issue is whether Section 11B(3) of the Florida Workers' Compensation Reimbursement Manual, 2004 Second Edition, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. PRELIMINARY STATEMNET On February 21, 2008, Petitioner filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing with the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA). The petition requests a hearing on the determination issued by AHCA in a reimbursement dispute involving Petitioner under Section 440.13, Florida Statutes.1/ The petition also includes a "rule challenge" under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, in which Petitioner alleges that Section 11B(3)2/ of the Florida Workers' Compensation Reimbursement Manual, 2004 Second Edition ("the 2004 Manual"), is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The "affected agencies" identified in the petition are AHCA and the Department of Financial Services (Department). The Department is identified because it promulgated Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501, which according to the petition, incorporates by reference the 2004 Manual. On February 27, 2008, AHCA referred the petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH). The DOAH Clerk established two cases based upon the petition--DOAH Case No. 08-1058, which is the reimbursement dispute, and DOAH Case No. 08-1060RX, which is the rule challenge. AHCA is designated as the Respondent in the reimbursement dispute, and the Department is designated as the Respondent in the rule challenge. On February 28, 2008, the Department filed a motion to dismiss the rule challenge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the 2004 Manual is no longer adopted by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501. Petitioner did not file a response to the motion within the time allowed by Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.204(1). No hearing is necessary to rule on the jurisdictional issue raised in the motion.
Findings Of Fact The 2004 Manual is no longer adopted by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501 or any other rule. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.501(1) was amended, effective October 1, 2007, to incorporate the 2006 version of the Florida Workers' Compensation Reimbursement Manual. The amendment deleted the Rule's reference to the 2004 Manual. AHCA applied the 2004 Manual in the reimbursement dispute involving Petitioner, which is pending as DOAH Case No. 08-1058.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent should deny Petitioner's application for licensure as a general lines insurance agent on the grounds that Petitioner was convicted of a crime of moral turpitude that is punishable by more than one year of imprisonment and committed a material misstatement or misrepresentation within the meaning of Subsections 626.611(2) and (14), and 626.621(8), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rules 69B-211.042(21)(s) and 69B-211.042(2).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for the licensure of insurance agents in the State of Florida, pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2004). On June 23, 2004, Petitioner electronically filed (on-line) a completed application for licensure as an agent authorized to sell resident life, variable annuity, and health insurance (the license). In the on-line application, Petitioner answered "no" to the following question: [i]n the past 12 months, have you been arrested, indicted, or had an Information filed against you or been otherwise charged with a crime by any law enforcement authority anywhere in the United States . . . ? On May 19, 2004, Petitioner was arrested in New York for grand larceny, a third degree felony in that state. The allegations were that Petitioner received unemployment benefits from the State of New York after Petitioner found employment. The State of New York eventually convicted Petitioner on one count of grand larceny in the third degree. The sentence placed Petitioner on probation for five years and required Petitioner to pay restitution in the amount of $11,573.57. Petitioner is not scheduled to be released from probation until December 1, 2009. Petitioner's failure to disclose the arrest in New York is a material misstatement within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(2), Florida Statutes (2003). The arrest in New York occurred within approximately 35 days of the date that Petitioner submitted the application. A preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that the failure to disclose the criminal history on the application was inadvertent. Petitioner knew, or should have known, the importance of accurate answers to questions on the license application. The final section of the on-line application, entitled "Applicant Affirmation Statement" contained the following language: Whoever knowingly makes a false statement in writing with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his/her official duty shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree. * * * Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing application for license and that the facts stated in it are true. I understand that misrepresentation of any fact required to be disclosed through this application is a violation of The Florida Insurance and Administrative Codes and may result in the denial of my application and/or the revocation of my insurance license(s). The material misstatement or misrepresentation of the arrest history of Petitioner was an intentional, false statement. Petitioner knew that the answer he supplied in the application was not true. The failure to disclose the arrest was a reckless and careless act. The false statement evinces a "lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance" within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(7), Florida Statutes (2003). Petitioner has now been convicted of a felony that is a crime of moral turpitude. The preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that the crime is punishable by imprisonment for one year or less. Petitioner is on probation through December 1, 2009. After a final order denying the application, Petitioner is subject to the presumption and waiting periods prescribed in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042(6).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying the license application. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Dana M. Wiehle, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Peter J. Soto 14028 Island Bay Drive, Apartment 103 Orlando, Florida 32828 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muñiz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether the petitioner is entitled to an award under section 57.111, Florida Statutes, of attorney’s fees and costs incurred in the appellate matter Witmer v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 631 So. 2d 338 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), and, if so, the amount of such award.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, is the state agency responsible for issuing occupational licenses to veterinarians with access to the backside of a racetrack and for regulating such licensees. Sections 550.10(1)(b) and .105(2)(d)2, Florida Statutes. Dr. Witmer has been licensed to practice veterinary medicine in Florida since January 1, 1993, and, as of October 19, 1993, he was authorized to practice veterinary medicine at Florida racetracks by virtue of a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license (“license”) issued by the Department. He has been domiciled in Florida at all times material to this matter. On October 19, 1993, Dr. Witmer was a partner in a professional practice in veterinary medicine with its principal office at 1450 Southwest Third Street, Pompano Park, Broward County, Florida. His professional practice had three full-time employees and a net worth, including both personal and business investments, of less than $2 million. In the Administrative Complaint and Emergency Order of Suspension dated October 19, 1993, the Department took two actions with respect to Dr. Witmer’s license.1 First, in the administrative complaint, it put Dr. Witmer on notice that the Department had initiated a disciplinary action against him, charging him with violations of a statute and a rule governing his license which, if proven, would justify the imposition of penalties, including revocation or suspension of his license. Secondly, in the emergency order of suspension, it summarily suspended Dr. Witmer’s license. Dr. Witmer requested a formal administrative hearing pursuant to section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, to challenge the truth of the allegations contained in the administrative complaint. The request was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned DOAH Case Number 93-6638. That action was pending at the time Dr. Witmer filed the application for attorney’s fees and costs at issue in this proceeding. Underlying proceeding On the basis of the allegations contained in the administrative complaint and its determination that Dr. Witmer’s interest in his license was “far outweighed by the immediate danger to the public health and safety and to the integrity of harness racing in the State of Florida,” the Department suspended Dr. Witmer’s pari-mutuel wagering occupational license as of October 19, 1993, ordered him to cease and desist from all activities authorized by the license, and barred him from entering any pari-mutuel establishment as a patron for the duration of the emergency suspension. Dr. Witmer chose to seek immediate judicial review of the emergency order pursuant to sections 120.60(8) and 120.54(9)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1993). It is this appellate proceeding which is the proceeding underlying Dr. Witmer’s application for attorney’s fees and costs at issue herein. State agencies are authorized by section 120.60(8), Florida Statutes (1995) to immediately suspend a license under the following circumstances and subject to the following conditions: If the agency finds that immediate serious danger to the public health, safety, or welfare requires emergency suspension, restriction, or limitation of a license, it shall show compliance in its order with the requirements imposed by s. 120.54(9) on agencies making emergency rules. Summary suspension, restriction, or limitation may be ordered, but a formal suspension or revocation proceeding under this section shall also be promptly instituted and acted upon. Section 120.54(9)(a), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: If an agency finds that an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare requires emergency action, the agency may adopt any rule necessitated by the immediate danger by any procedure which is fair under the circumstances and necessary to protect the public interest, provided that: * * * 3. The agency publishes in writing at the time of, or prior to, its action the specific facts and reasons for finding an immediate danger to the public health, safety, or welfare and its reasons for concluding that the procedure used is fair under the circumstances. . . . The agency’s findings of immediate danger, necessity, and procedural fairness shall be judicially reviewable. On February 2, 1994, the District Court of Appeal for the Fourth District of Florida issued its opinion in Witmer v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, Case Number 93-3232, reported at 631 So. 2d 338. The court quashed the Emergency Order of Suspension, concluding that the order was “facially inadequate,” and ruling that “the Department’s findings of immediate danger to the public welfare are not supported by specific facts and reasons as required by 120.54(9)(a)3, Florida Statutes.” Id. at 340, 343. The district court in Witmer observed that its review was limited to a determination of whether the order complied with the requirements of section 120.54(9)(a)3 and based its analysis upon the following rules of law: If the facts alleged in the complaint and [emergency] order are sufficient to demonstrate immediacy, necessity and fairness, no hearing is required prior to the emergency suspension. . . . The factual allegations contained in the emergency order must sufficiently identify particularized facts which demonstrate an immediate danger to the public. (Citation omitted.) Where, as here, no hearing was held prior to the entry of the emergency order, every element necessary to its validity must appear on the face of the order. (Citation omitted.) The order must be “factually explicit and persuasive concerning the existence of a genuine emergency.” (Citation omitted.) Witmer, 631 So. 2d at 341. In reaching its conclusion that the emergency order was facially inadequate, the court in Witmer held that the Department failed to allege facts in the complaint and order to establish the essential elements of the violations upon which the emergency suspension was based. Firstly, the court found that the charge in the emergency order that Dr. Witmer had failed to report gratuities was not supported by any allegations of fact in the complaint and order. Id. at 341. Secondly, the court found that the Department failed to allege that Dr. Witmer’s actions related to horse racing or to race horses, an essential element of a violation of section 550.235(2), Florida Statutes, and of rule 61D-1.002(10), Florida Administrative Code. Id. at 342. Thirdly, the court found that the Department failed to allege that Dr. Witmer reached an agreement with a second person to commit the violation, an essential element of any conspiracy, including one to violate section 550.235(2) and rule 61D-1.002(10). Id. Finally, the court concluded that the public harm alleged by the Department in the order was too attenuated to support the emergency suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license. Id. at 343. The district court issued its mandate to the Department on February 18, 1994, directing it to act in accordance with the opinion quashing the Emergency Order of Suspension. The Department did not seek review of the decision of the district court in the Florida Supreme Court. Consequently, the decision of the district court had the effect of nullifying the emergency suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license. Summary Dr. Witmer was a small business party, as that term is defined for purposes of section 57.111, at the time the Department entered the emergency order.2 The evidence is sufficient to establish that the Department initiated an action against Dr. Witmer when it entered an Emergency Order of Suspension. This order was issued under the authority granted state agencies in section 120.60(8), Florida Statutes. The order had the effect of immediately and summarily suspending Dr. Witmer’s pari-mutuel wagering occupational license. Dr. Witmer had the right to seek immediate judicial review of the emergency order pursuant to section 120.54(9)(a)3. The appellate court quashed the emergency order because it was legally insufficient to support the suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license under the standards of section 120.54(9)(a)3. The Department did not appeal or seek further review of the appellate court’s decision. Dr. Witmer, therefore, prevailed in the administrative proceeding initiated by the Department. The Department presented no evidence to establish that its action in ordering the emergency suspension of Dr. Witmer’s license had a reasonable basis in law and fact or that any special circumstances exist which would make an award of attorney’s fees and costs in this case unjust.3 The monetary value of the attorney’s fees rendered in connection with the appellate proceeding culminating in the decision quashing the Emergency Order of Suspension is $9,715.00, and the costs incurred total $250. These fees and costs are reasonable and were necessary to prosecute the appellate proceeding.4
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent, Sergio A. Balsinde ("Respondent") is entitled to elect to be exempt from the workers' compensation insurance coverage requirements of chapter 440, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the requirement of the workers' compensation law that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation insurance coverage for their employees and corporate officers. § 440.107(3). A corporate officer may elect to become exempt from the workers' compensation insurance coverage requirements of chapter 440 by complying with the election of exemption methodology set forth in section 440.05. If the election of exemption meets the criteria of section 440.05, then the Department is required to issue a certification of the election to be exempt to the officer. § 440.05(3). A corporate officer is ineligible for an exemption if he is affiliated with "a person who is delinquent in paying a stop-work order and penalty assessment order issued pursuant to section 440.107, or owed pursuant to a court order." § 440.05(15). Balco was originally incorporated in 1985. Mr. Balsinde has been a corporate officer of Balco since at least April 28, 2003, the date of the earliest Balco annual report entered into evidence. Mr. Balsinde is also a corporate officer and 10 percent owner of LC Cable Corp. The Department issued and served a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment on Balco on February 8, 2007. At the final hearing in the instant case, Mr. Balsinde testified that the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment had been erroneously entered against his company. He testified that the uninsured workers in question did not even work for Balco. Mr. Balsinde testified that he had attempted to rectify the error with the Department, but was unable to make the Department acknowledge its mistake. Whatever the merits of Mr. Balsinde's factual claim, neither he nor any other representative of Balco formally challenged the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment. Having long ago become final, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment cannot be contested in this proceeding. On September 23, 2008, Balco entered into an Amended Payment Agreement Schedule with the Department that called for Balco to make 60 monthly payments, each due on the first day of the month, and a suspension of the Stop-Work Order. After Balco ceased making payments according to the schedule, the Department issued an Order Reinstating Stop-Work Order on October 26, 2009. The reinstatement order was served on Mr. Balsinde on October 30, 2009. As of October 26, 2009, the unpaid balance of the penalty assessment against Balco was $22,236.38, which was ordered due immediately by the reinstatement order. As of the date of the hearing in this case, the balance remained unpaid. Neither Mr. Balsinde nor any other representative of Balco filed a timely request for a review proceeding to challenge the reinstatement order. Balco did not appeal the reinstatement order. On July 22, 2010, a final decree in Chapter 7 bankruptcy was entered on behalf of Mr. Balsinde by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida, in Case Number 10-18850-LMI. The discharge in bankruptcy was received by Mr. Balsinde as an individual. Though the final decree listed the Department as an unsecured creditor and Balco as a business of the debtor, Balco did not receive a discharge in bankruptcy, nor did the company file a bankruptcy petition subsequent to the issuance of the reinstatement order by the Department. Mr. Balsinde submitted a Notice of Election to be Exempt to the Department on November 29, 2010, as an officer of LC Cable Corp., a corporation operating in the construction industry. The Department reviewed Mr. Balsinde's application to determine his eligibility to elect the exemption. The Department's Coverage and Compliance Automated System indicated that Mr. Balsinde is the officer of a corporation that is delinquent in paying a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, which makes him ineligible for an exemption. The Department issued a Notice of Denial of Mr. Balsinde's election of exemption on December 6, 2010.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, finding that Sergio A. Balsinde is ineligible for an election of exemption under section 440.05. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2011.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Insurance, should pay reasonable attorney fees and costs to Crudele under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1997), the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, after Crudele appealed and reversed the Department's Emergency Order of Suspension.
Findings Of Fact On July 15, 1996, the Department issued an Emergency Order of Suspension of Crudele's eligibility for licensure and license as a Florida life insurance agent and life and health insurance agent. The Emergency Order of Suspension was based on alleged violations of the insurance code in connection with the surrender of insurance annuities for purchase of a startup company's unsecured promissory notes. It stated: Based on the foregoing specific facts and for the reasons of protecting the insurance-buying public and insurers from further harm, preventing further abuses of fiduciary relationships, and preventing further defrauding of insureds and insurance companies by the [Petitioner], the Insurance Commissioner finds that [Crudele] constitutes and is an immediate and serious danger to public health, safety, or welfare necessitating and justifying the Emergency Suspension of all licenses and eligibility for licensure and registrations heretofore issued to [Crudele] under the purview of the Department of Insurance. The danger, more specifically, is to the insurance-buying public which must place its trust in the honesty and competence of insurance agents. The trust involves the responsibility that insurance agents have for fiduciary funds accepted by them and insurance matters entrusted to them. The danger is clear and present that failure to properly handle such funds and matters may cause serious losses and damage to the insurance-buying public. Prior to issuance of the Emergency Order of Suspension, the Department received two verified complaints--one by the alleged victim, and the other by her adult daughter. The complaints alleged essentially: Crudele was introduced to Mary Clem, an 84 year-old widow of a tenant farmer, by Charles Perks, Clem's insurance agent, in 1992. In 1992, Crudele and Perks solicited and sold Clem two annuities for a total of $50,000, representing Clem's life savings from working in sick people's homes as a nurses aide. A year after selling the annuities, Crudele and Perks returned to Clem and convinced her to invest the money she had in her annuities into a new company called Zuma that was to recycle automobile tires into useful products. Crudele and Perks represented that Zuma was a "sure fire business." They said they were offering Clem the opportunity to get "in on the ground floor" and that the stock would then go on the open market and double in value. Clem did not have a great deal of education and had no experience investing in stocks or bonds. Her sole source of income was Social Security plus her modest savings. She conceded that when she was offered a 12% interest rate, she found the offer too irresistible to refuse. Neither Crudele nor Perks gave Clem a prospectus or any other descriptive brochure about Zuma. Clem purchased a total of three Zuma promissory notes at three separate times for a total of $60,000. This represented the bulk of her retirement savings. Clem acted based on her trust and confidence in Crudele and Perks. Clem later went to a lawyer to draft a will. The lawyer became very concerned about Clem's purchases of the Zuma promissory notes and her inability to understand the nature of the transaction. Clem was not getting any of her payments from Zuma as promised. Clem was "going out of her mind" with worry. She summoned her daughter, Roberta Anderson, to come down to Florida from Indiana to investigate the matter. Anderson was unable to contact Crudele, and he did not contact her. Anderson and Clem were not aware of any efforts on Crudele's part to recover the funds or otherwise remedy the situation. After a great deal of effort, Anderson was able to recover approximately $23,000 of her mother's money. Crudele apparently played no part in helping Anderson recover the $23,000. The Zuma notes went into default, and apparently the remainder of the money was lost. Clem suffered a very serious financial loss that, given her circumstances, she could ill afford. It may be inferred from the evidence that the Department based its Emergency Order of Suspension on the Clem and Anderson verified complaints. There was no evidence of any other basis for the Emergency Order of Suspension. There was no evidence as to whether the Department conducted any investigation of any kind prior to entry of the Emergency Order of Suspension. Nor is there any evidence as to the Department's decision-making process. The Emergency Order of Suspension stated: (1) that it was being issued pursuant to "sections 120.59(3) [and] 120.60(8) [now Section 120.60(6), Florida Statutes (1997)], Florida Statutes [1995]; (2) that Crudele had "the right to request a hearing in accordance with the provisions of Section 120.59(4), Florida Statutes [1995]"; and (3) that Crudele "was entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes [1995], and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure." The Emergency Order of Suspension also stated that an Administrative Complaint seeking final disciplinary action would be filed within 20 days. On July 15, 1996, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint on essentially the same allegations as those in the Emergency Order of Suspension. Crudele sought judicial review of the Emergency Order of Suspension in the District Court of Appeal, First District. On August 19, 1997, the court issued an Opinion reversing the Emergency Order of Suspension because it did not "set forth particularized facts which demonstrate sufficient immediacy or likelihood of continuing harm to the public health, safety, and welfare to support a suspension of his license without notice and hearing." The court's Mandate issued on September 4, 1997; it referred to the court's Opinion and commanded that "further proceedings, if required, be had in accordance with said opinion, the rules of Court, and the laws of the State of Florida." The Administrative Complaint filed against Crudele was given Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) Case No. 97-2603. On February 17, 1998, a Final Order sustaining some of the charges and suspending Crudele's license and eligibility for licensure for six months was entered in Case No. 97-2603.
The Issue Did Respondent fail to comply with Sections 440.10 and 440.38, Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida government responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement, pursuant to Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation for the benefit of their employees. Respondent works in the construction industry, specifically as it relates to drywall services. On February 25, 2004, Petitioner's investigator, David Kunz, visited Respondent's worksite at 400 West Bay Street in Jacksonville, Florida (also known as the Bennett Federal Building). Petitioner's investigator observed 12 workers engaged in drywall construction. Mr. Kunz spoke with Respondent's project foreman at the worksite, and with the assistance of a Spanish-speaking colleague, he interviewed all of Respondent's workers at the site. A representative of the general contractor, Skanska, U.S.A., furnished Petitioner's investigator with a certificate of workers' compensation insurance which had been provided to the general contractor by Respondent as a subcontractor on the Bennett Federal Building job. The address listed for Respondent was in North Carolina, and the producer of the policy also had a North Carolina address. The next day, Petitioner's investigator obtained a copy of Respondent's workers' compensation insurance policy. After reviewing the policy, the investigator concluded that Respondent had violated Florida's Workers' Compensation Law, because an endorsement applying Florida premium rates was not a part of the policy. Mr. Kunz then issued a Stop Work Order to Respondent on February 26, 2004. The Stop Work Order required Respondent to cease its business operations immediately, due to its lack of compliance with Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. By the Stop Work Order, Respondent was charged with failure to secure the payment of workers' compensation that met the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and the Florida Insurance Code, because North Carolina premium rates, rather than Florida premium rates, had been applied. The Stop Work Order indicated that the penalty amount assessed against Respondent would be subject to amendment based on further information provided by Respondent, including the provision of business records. St. Paul's Insurance Companies maintain a presence in Orlando, Florida, but the documents subsequently provided by Respondent to the investigator as purported proof of Respondent's compliance with Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, did not meet all necessary Florida requirements. The carrier on Respondent's policy is St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company. The "producer" was "Insur A Car Commercial" in North Carolina. The "producer" is the agent responsible for processing the policy for the insurance carrier. Respondent's workers' compensation insurance policy lists U & M Contractors, Inc., 9036 Arborgate Dr., Apt. A, Charlotte, NC 28273 in the "Insured" column. The policy number is 6S16UB-0130B52-8-03. Respondent's insurance policy was "produced" outside Florida. Respondent had procured workers' compensation insurance from an insurance carrier which was appropriately licensed to do business in Florida, but Respondent did not maintain at all times a Florida endorsement to its policy indicating that the applicable premium rates were Florida premium rates. Respondent's workers' compensation insurance policy includes no Florida endorsement showing the application of Florida premium rates. Only North Carolina is listed in Item 3A of Respondent's workers' compensation policy. The endorsement (WC 00 03 26 (A)) for "Other States Insurance" in Respondent's policy specifically states that it "does not satisfy the requirements of that state's workers' compensation law" for any state not listed in Item 3A. Florida is not listed in Item 3A. The "Extension of Information" page of Respondent's workers' compensation insurance policy indicates the type of work that Respondent intends to perform, pursuant to the policy. The type of work is indicated by a class code, or number, assigned to the type or category of work. The Extension of Information page assigns class code 5445 (drywall installation) as to the work Respondent would be performing under the policy. The source for the class codes is the SCOPES Manual, published by the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI). Petitioner's Agency's adoption of the SCOPES Manual was accomplished by Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.021. Respondent's policy's Extension of Information page further indicates that a premium rate (rate per $100.00 of remuneration provided to Respondent's employees) of $10.20 had been applied by the insurer for class code 5445, and that the premium rate was for North Carolina, not Florida. By contrast, the approved Florida premium rate for class code 5445 is $20.88 per $100.00 of remuneration. The source for Florida premium rates is the NCCI Basic Manual. Mr. Kunz testified that the Basic Manual is used regularly by workers' compensation investigators. Mr. Kunz issued an Agency Request for Business Records on February 26, 2004, the same date as the Stop Work Order. He specifically sought Respondent's payroll records, because Chapter 440 requires Petitioner "to calculate the penalty of an employer who is in noncompliance based on the employer's payroll." Some payroll records were forwarded to Mr. Kunz by Respondent. Some payroll records were provided to one of Petitioner's fellow investigators by a general contractor for whom Respondent had subcontracted drywall installation at the Bennett Federal Building worksite. The latter records were part of a separate investigation, but were shared between the two investigators. However, several weeks of Respondent's payroll records were not initially provided from any source. Respondent's payroll records include, among other entries, the names of its workers and the dates and amounts of remuneration provided to those workers. The records indicate that Respondent provided remuneration to its workers in the years 2003 and 2004. The penalty period assigned by Petitioner against Respondent is from November 17, 2003, through February 25, 2004, because November 17, 2003, was the day that work on the Bennett Federal Building began, and February 25, 2004, was the date listed in the Stop Work Order. Mr. Kunz used the payroll records he had to calculate an initial penalty amount of $74,479.90. Payroll for weeks not accounted for in Respondent's first production of payroll records was imputed by Mr. Kunz in the initial penalty amount, pursuant to Chapter 440, by calculations based on the first records he had. He issued the First Amended Penalty Assessment Order (Amended Order) to Respondent on March 3, 2004, in the amount of $74,479.90. A subsequent production of records by Respondent caused Petitioner to recalculate the penalty for some weeks for which payroll previously had only been imputed. The recalculation caused the assessed penalty amount to decrease to $51,779.50, and on March 9, 2004, a second Amended Order in the amount of $51,779.50 was issued to Respondent. The second Amended Order included the imputation of payroll for Respondent's two owners, Juan Mitchell (Mitchell) and Hector Urbina (Urbina). Mr. Kunz had received no payroll records at any time for the two owners, though he had twice specifically requested those records. He determined that the owners were named on Respondent's insurance policy and had actually been present on the Florida worksite. Mitchell and Urbina are classified under code 5445 (drywall installation). Their respective average weekly wages for the entire penalty period was imputed according to Chapter 440, and the penalty amount for Mitchell and Urbina was calculated by first multiplying the evaded premium amount by the premium rate for class code 5445. The evaded premium amount was determined by taking the amount of wages for a penalty period, dividing it by one hundred (100), and multiplying it by the premium rate for the pertinent class code. The evaded premium amount was then multiplied by 1.5 to arrive at the penalty amount assessed for Mitchell ($4,434.72) and for Urbina ($4,434.72). The 1.5 multiplier is specifically required by Section 440.107(7)(d)1., Florida Statutes. Wages were similarly imputed for the following employees for February 23, 24, and 25, in 2004, because records did not exist for that partial work week: Alex Rosales; Jose Jimenez: Julio Betata; Orlin Betata; Erick Estrada; Melvin Landaverde; Neptale Lopez; and Jose Valentin. In calculating the penalty for the remainder of Respondent's workers for whom payroll records were provided, Petitioner's investigator similarly applied the foregoing methodology.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation, enter a final order that affirms the Stop Work Order and assesses the $51,779.50 penalty cited in the Second Amended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Joe Thompson Assistant General Counsel Department of Financial Services Division of Workers' Compensation 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Juan Carlos Mitchell U & M Contractors 1912 Southwest 67th Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33068 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction to hear this cause, alleging that Respondent Employer has committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Following a July 28, 2003, "Notice of Determination: No Jurisdiction," by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief as more fully described below. On or about September 3, 2003, the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings. It appearing on the face of the referral package that Respondent did not regularly employ 15 persons and that therefore Respondent did not qualify as an "employer" under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, a September 12, 2003, Order was entered scheduling a telephonic hearing for October 1, 2003, and permitting the filing of any documents in support of the parties' respective positions. Respondent's "Submission of Materials in Support of Dismissal of Petition and Supporting Memorandum of Law" was served by United States Mail on September 25, 2003. It contained a prayer for dismissal. Pursuant to Rule 28-106.204, Florida Administrative Code, Petitioner was entitled to respond in writing by October 6, 2003. Petitioner did not respond. Respondent's "Supplemental Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction" was served upon Petitioner by hand-delivery, by United States Mail, and by "e-mail" on September 26, 2003. Per Rule, Petitioner was entitled to file a written response by October 8, 2003. Petitioner did not respond. A Corrected Order entered September 26, 2003, permitted the parties until October 7, 2003, to submit any documents tending to support or refute jurisdiction by the Division of Administrative Hearings over this cause. This Order also rescheduled the telephonic hearing for October 9, 2003. Petitioner filed nothing in response to either the September 12, 2003, Order or the September 26, 2003, Corrected Order. At the October 9, 2003, telephonic conference call, Respondent appeared through counsel. The opening of hearing was delayed five minutes, but Petitioner did not appear. Thereafter, oral argument upon all Motions proceeded without Petitioner. Petitioner still had not called in to the meet-me telephone number after 15 minutes, and the telephonic hearing was concluded. In an abundance of caution, an Order to Show Cause was entered on October 10, 2003, giving Petitioner 10 days in which to show cause, in writing, filed with the Division, why this cause should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner has filed nothing. Therefore, Respondent's documentation, including but not limited to: Respondent's accountants’ affidavits and its payroll journals, unemployment tax returns, and a payroll schedule, may be presumed true and accurate. All the documentation supports a finding that Respondent never employed more than 14 people for any one week in the year 2001 and employed 15 or more employees for only one week (December 21-28, 2002) in the year 2002.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing this cause for lack of jurisdiction. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Truman Jeffery Mayfield 902 Phillips Street Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Robert G. Riegel, Jr., Esquire Ryan R. Fuller, Esquire Coffman, Coleman, Andrews & Grogan, P.A. Post Office Box 40089 Jacksonville, Florida 32203
