Kirkland, a designated Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings.
For Petitioner: June B. Faris, Daughter and
Qualified Representative c/o Isabel C. Brill 11017 Howland Drive
For Respondent: Mark M. Heinish, Esquire
Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of physical disability.
On August 19, 1998, Petitioner, Isabel C. Brill (Brill), filed a Public Accommodations Charge of Discrimination with the
Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) against Respondent, Ocean View Villas (Ocean View), alleging that Ocean View had discriminated against Brill based on a physical disability while Brill was renting motel rooms from Ocean View. On June 29, 2000, the Commission entered a Determination: Cause, finding that there was reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful public accommodations practice had occurred.
On July 31, 2000, Brill filed a Petition from Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice. The Commission forwarded the petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings on August 14, 2000, for assignment to an Administrative Law Judge.
The final hearing was held by telephonic conference call on October 2, 2000, with Petitioner participating from Virginia, Respondent participating from Boca Raton, Florida, and the Administrative Law Judge presiding in Tallahassee, Florida.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 27, 2000. The motion was heard at the final hearing and was DENIED.
At the final hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of June Faris, Alice Corbett, and Alan Watson. Petitioner's Exhibits 1-4 were admitted in evidence. Respondent presented the testimony of Ramona Jakubaez and John Jakubaez. Respondent's Exhibit 1 was admitted in evidence.
The parties agreed to file proposed recommended orders within ten days after the filing of the transcript, which was filed on October 27, 2000. The parties filed proposed
recommended orders, which have been considered in rendering this Recommended Order.
On May 8, 1998, Brill, June Faris, Allen Watson, and Alice Corbett arrived at the Ocean View Villas, a motel in Deerfield Beach, Florida. Ms. Faris is Brill's daughter. Mr. Watson is a friend of Ms. Faris. Ms. Corbett is a paid caretaker for Brill, who had had a stroke and was confined to a wheelchair. Ocean view is owned and operated by Ramona and John Jakubaez.
Brill and her party checked in without incident and paid for their stay in advance on Brill's VISA credit card. Mr. Jakubaez was aware that Brill was in a wheelchair when they checked into the motel.
Brill used a portable toilet chair because her wheelchair would not fit through the bathroom door. She also wore disposable diapers as a precautionary measure. Ms. Corbett placed pads on the mattress and on the sitting chair in Brill's room in case of accidents.
When Mr. Jakubaez and his wife cleaned Brill's room, they noticed the presence of the toilet chair and became worried that Brill might soil the room. Ms. Jakubaez stated:
Well we saw Ms. Brill sitting in her wheelchair. She had diapers on and all kinds of pads around her and she seemed to be very disoriented. We couldn't communicate with her, but she was there and she had someone to take care of her.
Around 11 o'clock on the morning of May 9, 1998, Brill and her party were having breakfast on the patio at the motel, when the water sprinklers came on. The sprinklers were scheduled to come on automatically for two hours beginning at 9 a.m. Because the sprinklers were wetting them, they left the patio area. Ms. Faris wheeled her mother out to the front of their rooms so that Brill could get some sun. Mr. Jakeubaez came by and asked whether it was a good idea for Brill to be sitting outside.
Ms. Corbett went to do some laundry at the motel's laundry facilities which were available for the motel guests to use. While Ms. Corbett was doing the laundry, which included the pads that Brill used, Ms. Jakubaez came to the laundry area and told Ms. Corbett that she could not use the laundry facilities because the clothes stank. Other motel guests were using the laundry facilities at the same time as Ms. Corbett, and Ms. Jakubaez did not tell them they could not use the laundry equipment.
Ms. Faris and Mr. Watson left Brill with Ms. Corbett and went to the beach. While Ms. Faris and Mr. Watson were away, Mr. Jakubaez came to Brill's room and told Ms. Corbett that he did not want Brill to soil his mattress and chair. Brill was sitting in the chair at the time. Ms. Corbett told Mr. Jakubaez that she had the chair padded and showed him the mattress with no urine stains. Ms. Corbett helped Brill out of the chair into her
wheelchair and showed Mr. Jakubaez the chair, which was undamaged. Brill began to cry at this point. Mr. Jakubaez told Ms. Corbett to tell Ms. Faris that she had to pay an additional
$100 if they continued to stay at the motel. After Mr. Jakubaez left the room, Brill continued to cry until she fell asleep.
When Ms. Faris returned from the beach, Ms. Corbett relayed what Mr. Jakubaez had said about an additional $100 payment. Ms. Faris and Mr. Watson went to the motel office to speak to Mr. Jakubaez.
When Ms. Faris confronted Mr. Jakubaez, he indicated that he wanted her to pay an additional $300 as a damage deposit should Brill damage the room with her incontinence. Ms. Faris explained that her mother was not incontinent. Mr. Jakubaez further told Ms. Faris that Brill belonged in a nursing home and should not be on a vacation. Mr. Jakubaez told her that he did not know why they had a person like Brill staying in a hotel. When Mr. Jakuabez told Ms. Faris that they would have to leave if she did not pay the $300, Ms. Faris asked who would determine if she got the $300 back. Mr. Jakubaez replied that he would get a third party to inspect the room after they vacated it.
Ms. Faris would not agree to pay the additional $300 and called the police. The police declined to become involved because it appeared to be a civil matter.
Brill and her party left Ocean View in late afternoon of May 9, 1998, and went to the Suez Motel in Miami Beach,
Florida, where they checked in and stayed through May 12, 1998. The cost of the rooms at the Suez Motel totaled $426.63.
When Brill left Ocean View, there was no damage to the carpet, mattress, or chair because of incontinence.
Ms. Faris bought groceries for their use during their stay at Ocean View. Because of the groceries, she was unable to get the wheelchair in the car when they left Ocean View. The wheelchair was placed on the top of the car, and the movement of the wheelchair during the trip to the Suez Motel damaged the top of the car. No evidence was presented as to the amount of the damage.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to and the subject matter of this proceeding. Sections 120.57(1) and 760.11(4), Florida Statutes.
Section 509.092, Florida Statutes, provides:
Public Lodging establishments and public food service establishments are private enterprises, and the operator has the right to refuse accommodations or service to any person who is objectionable or undesirable to the operator, but such refusal may not be based upon race, creed, color, sex, physical disability, or national origin. A person aggrieved by a violation of this section or a violation of a rule adopted under this section has a right of action pursuant to
s. 760.11.
The court in LaRoche v. Denny's Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1382, 1383 (S.D. Fla. 1999), a case dealing with racial
discrimination, set forth the analysis which should be used in a public accommodations case.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, as further elucidated in Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed. 2d
207(1981), and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125
L.Ed. 2d 407 (1993), the Plaintiffs must prove by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination.
Specifically, the Plaintiffs must prove that:
they are members of a protective class;
they attempted to contract for services and to afford themselves the full benefits and enjoyment of a public accommodation; (3) they were denied the right to contract for those services and, thus, were denied the full benefits or enjoyment of a public accommodation; and (4) such services were available to similarly situated persons outside the protected class who received full benefits or enjoyment or were treated better. United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 894 F. 2d 83, 88 (3rd Cir. 1990).
Once the Plaintiffs meet this burden, they establish a presumption of intentional discrimination. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 113 S.Ct. 2742. The effect of this presumption shifts the burden to the Defendant to produce evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged action. Id. at
506-507, 113 S.Ct. 2742; McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817; Burdine, 450
U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089. The Defendant's burden of production is a light one. Batey v. Stone, 24 F. 3d 1330, 1334 (11th Cir. 1994).
When a defendant meets its burden of production, the presumption of discrimination which the McDonnell Douglas framework creates, 'drops from the case' and 'the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity.' Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255,
n. 10, 101 S.Ct. 1089. The burden then shifts back to the Plaintiffs to demonstrate that the Defendant's actions were not for the proffered reason, but were in fact, motivated
by race. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507-08, 113
S.Ct. 2742; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101
S.Ct. 1089. Plaintiffs may prove this fact either by means of affirmative evidence that race played an impermissible role in Mr.
Ibarra's actions or by showing that the proffered nondiscriminatory reason does not merit credence. Id. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089. The ultimate burden is on the Plaintiffs to prove that they were the victims of intentional discrimination.
Brill was a member of a protected class. She was confined to a wheelchair as a result of a stroke. She did contract with Ocean View for lodging, which included the use of the laundry facilities at the motel. Brill was denied the use of the laundry facilities, was humiliated by Mr. Jakubaez' inspection of her room, and was required to pay an additional
$300 or leave the motel. Other guests were allowed to use the laundry facilities. Brill has established a prima facie case of discrimination based on physical disability.
Ocean View claims that the deposit was required because of the possibility that Brill might do damage to the bedding and chair in her room due to incontinence. Precautions were taken to preclude damage that might result from incontinence. Brill wore diapers. A portable toilet chair was available. Pads were used on the mattress and chair, and the pads were washed to eliminate any smell. No damage had been done to the mattress or chair when Mr. Jakubaez visited the room and none had been done when Brill left the motel.
The evidence presented established by a preponderance of the evidence that Ocean View discriminated against Brill. The remarks by Mr. Jakubaez that Brill did not need to be on a vacation and should be in a nursing home demonstrate that the discrimination was intentional and based on Brill's physical disabilty.
Brill did not testify as to the effect that Ocean View's actions had on her physically, mentally, or emotionally. There was evidence to show that Mr. Jakubaez' comments and actions when he went to her room, were sufficient to cause her to cry. Based on her reaction, Brill is entitled to $1,000 for compensation for her mental anguish. As a result of Mr. Jakubaez' ultimatum of pay $300 or leave, Brill incurred additional motel expenses at the Suez Motel in the amount of
