vs.
Respondent.
) Case No. 01-1686
Pursuant to notice this cause came on for formal proceeding before P. Michael Ruff, duly-designated Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings in Tallahassee, Florida. The hearing was conducted on August 23, 2001, and the appearances were as follows:
For Petitioner: Mary A. Kane, Esquire
For Respondent: Robert M. Burdick, Esquire
The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Respondent has been the victim of discrimination because of his race as to payment of salary and salary increase
decisions made by the Respondent and, further, whether the Respondent engaged in retaliation against the Petitioner because of his filing of Complaints concerning such alleged discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission).
The Petitioner, Allison Ivey, at times pertinent hereto, has been an employee of the Department of Transportation (Department) and is a Registered Professional Engineer in the State of Florida. On September 12, 1997, the Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission, contending that the Respondent had discriminated against him because of his race in terms of the salary decisions it had made concerning him, involving allegedly paying him less than other Registered Professional Engineers in the Department's employ and by allegedly failing to appropriately accord him pay raises. The Petitioner filed an Amended Charge of Discrimination with the Commission on February 4, 1999, alleging that the Respondent had continually discriminated against him in pay matters and had further retaliated against him because of the filing of the first charge of discrimination.
The Commission entered a finding of "no reasonable cause" on March 23, 2001, thus opining that no unlawful employment practice had occurred in relation to the Petitioner's
allegations. The Petitioner elected to institute the subject formal proceeding thereafter by filing a Petition for Relief, pursuant to Section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes. The matter was ultimately filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned to the undersigned Administrative Law Judge for conduct of a formal proceeding.
The proceeding culminated in a formal hearing on August 23, 2001, at which the Petitioner presented the testimony of three witnesses and had 30 exhibits admitted into evidence. The Respondent Department called five witnesses and had 18 exhibits admitted into evidence. The parties elected to transcribe the proceedings and to submit Proposed Recommended Orders. Their Proposed Recommended Orders have been duly considered in the rendition of this Recommended Order.
The Petitioner, at times pertinent hereto, was an employee of the Department of Transportation, the Respondent. He was so employed since July 1986, and since 1990, has been employed in the Preliminary Estimates Office of the Department. Mr. Ivey holds a Bachelors and a Master's degree in Civil Engineering and became a Registered Professional Engineer in Florida in 1990.
The Department has eight Preliminary Estimates Engineer positions in its Preliminary Estimates Office and Mr. Ivey holds
one of those positions. Preliminary Estimates Engineers perform cost estimates for Department road and bridge construction projects. They prepare official estimates for construction projects and review bids for the projects.
The eight Preliminary Estimates Engineers perform essentially the same type of work. There is one lead worker, Mr. Hal Garland, who has the additional responsibility of back- checking work of other estimates engineers and making work assignments within the office.
Mr. Ivey has no supervisory responsibilities.
Mr. Ivey's immediate supervisor is Mr. Bob Griner. Mr. Griner has supervised Mr. Ivey since he joined the Preliminary Estimates Office in 1990, and Mr. Ivey has never heard him say anything negative about people of Mr. Ivey's race. Mr. Griner's immediate supervisor is Mr. Lex Chance, the State Estimates Engineer. Mr. Chance has been the State Estimates Engineer since 1990, and also manages the Engineering Support Services Section. He previously managed the Final Estimates and Specifications Sections. The Engineering Support Services Section performs computer support work and does not perform the type of work performed by the preliminary estimates Engineers.
The Final Estimates Section performs audits after a project is complete to determine proper payment for the project. The Final Estimates Section does not perform the same work as performed by
the Preliminary Estimates Section. The Specifications Section does not perform the type work performed by the Preliminary Estimates Section either. The Specifications Section develops the specifications that are incorporated into Department highway construction projects.
The Department employs a broad system of job classifications, classifying jobs more by category than with precise specificity. All professional engineers are included in the Engineering, Architecture and Surveying Level IV classifications (EAS-IV). These positions are intended to be positions that perform professional engineering work. Employees in the EAS-IV class may perform various kinds of work. Non- professional engineer related positions that are intended to provide non-professional engineering support services make up the Engineering, Architecture and Surveying Level III class (EAS-III). The Engineering, Architecture and Surveying Level V class (EAS-V) is the supervisory class for engineers.
Professional engineering work involves a practical application of scientific principles for engineering purposes. Registration as a professional engineer qualifies an individual to perform engineering design work and, with the Department, to design and build road and bridge projects. Preliminary Estimates Engineers, including the Petitioner, do not perform professional engineering work. Although Preliminary Estimates
Engineers read and interpret plans, they do not perform engineering design work. Knowledge required to perform Preliminary Estimates Engineer work can be obtained without a professional engineering registration or even a degree in engineering. The work of a Preliminary Estimates Engineer is not comparable to design work which is performed by professional engineers in other areas or sections of the Department.
Both the positions of Mr. Kanu Patel and Mr. Ivey, in the Preliminary Estimates Section do not involve the performance of professional engineering work. The Petitioner and Mr. Patel are the only Preliminary Estimates Engineers who have Master's degrees and are Registered Professional Engineers. The Department has concluded that their positions should properly be classified as EAS-III positions because they do not perform professional engineering work. All other Preliminary Estimates Engineers are classified as EAS-III. The Petitioner is thus over qualified for the position in which he is employed with the Department.
The broad band classification system uses broad pay ranges that give management the discretion to pay employees within a wide range, based on a specific job and the skills required to perform the job. The Department does not pay the
same amount to all employees within the same class. It attempts to pay the same people doing the same type of job, with the same qualifications, relatively identical salaries.
The term "pay inequity" describes a situation where some people, in a particular work group, are not being compensated the same as others in that work group with similar backgrounds, performing the same job. The Department attempts to correct such pay inequities through the methods available to it of increasing pay of individuals.
Although the Department has a broad classification and pay system, it is also subject to the Department of Management Services (DMS) pay rules, including Rule 60K-2.006, Florida Administrative Code, which governs increases to employees base rates of pay. The Department has adopted a pay procedure which implements the DMS pay rule, called Procedure 250-040-035; Pay Actions. The Department adheres to the provisions of the DMS rule in its own pay procedure in granting pay raises.
Department employees' salaries are general referred to as their "base pay." Increases to an employee's base pay are limited by Rule 60K-2.006, Florida Administrative Code. The rule and Department procedure, allow for several types of increases to base pay, including "Superior Proficiency" increases, "Added Duties" increases, and re-assignment and transfer increases. Rule 60K-2.0061, Florida Administrative
Code, and the Department's pay procedure also provide for various types of salary additives; temporary pay increases that can be removed or adjusted upon changed conditions. A "lead- worker" salary additive is available for employees with limited supervisory responsibilities that do not include reviewing employee performance or administrating discipline, but may not be used to create an intermediate level of supervision.
Department management supervisors may use any appropriate type of pay increase to address pay inequities.
The Department's pay procedure provides the method for obtaining Superior Proficiency increases. Superior Proficiency increases may be granted to employees who have met all key performance responsibilities and received a Special Recognition/Accomplishment form during the period under review. Employees who meet those eligibility criteria are ranked through a computerized formula that considers criteria, including the ranking assigned by the appropriate manager, the length of service with the Department and with the state government, how the particular employee's pay relates to the minimum pay for the employee's job class, and the employee's unrewarded eligibility during the previous year. When the ranking is complete, cost center managers are required to give Superior Proficiency increases in the order of the rankings.
Added duties increases may be awarded to employees for additional permanently-assigned job duties. The addition of duties or responsibilities to a position does not automatically entitle an employee to a pay increase. Added duties increases are discretionary with management and must take into consideration not only the effect the additional duties have on the position, but also the pay relationships within the work unit. Budgetary restrictions also limit managers ability to provide pay raises to employees. "Rate" is a salary constraint placed upon the Department by the Legislature and controls the Department's ability to give increases. Rate is allocated within the Department to the various cost centers. Rate limits the ability to grant increases of any type, including superior proficiency and added duties salary increases. Limits on rate prevent the Department from giving pay increases to all employees who are eligible and ranked for Superior Proficiency increases on some occasions. The Petitioner was among the two highest-paid Preliminary Estimates Engineers during 1997. His base rate of pay was $1,658.17 per pay period. Prior to
June 24, 1997, the Petitioner was the highest paid estimates engineer. On June 24, 1997, Mr. Willard Herring was given a Superior Proficiency increase that brought his salary to
$1,669.00 per pay period. Mr. Herring also received an added duties pay increase on July 24, 1997, that brought his salary to
$1,752.45 per pay period. Mr. Griner assigned these additional duties to Mr. Herring and sought the increase for him because he took over preparation of the price trend index from an employee who left the section. During this time Mr. Ivey was the second highest paid Preliminary Estimates Engineer. When Mr. Herring left the section on October 3, 1997, Mr. Ivey was again the highest paid estimates engineer. On November 10, 1997,
Mr. Tyrone Ware was re-assigned to the Preliminary Estimates Section with a re-assignment increase that brought his base pay to $1,771.06 per pay period. Mr. Ware is the same race as
Mr. Ivey, the Petitioner. Mr. Ivey was again the highest paid Preliminary Estimates Engineer on October 6, 2000. His base rate of pay, at that time, was $1,984.03 per pay period.
Mr. Ivey was still the highest paid Preliminary Estimates Engineer at the time of the hearing.
During the time that he has worked in the Preliminary Estimates Section, the Petitioner has received two pay increases above the regular Legislative increase received by all employees. In 1992, upon promotion in class to the then Professional Engineer II class, the Petitioner received a 12.63 percent pay increase. After receiving this increase, the Petitioner was the highest paid Preliminary Estimates Engineer. Effective May 13, 1999, he received a 7.5 percent added duties pay increase for the addition of the quality assessment function
to his position. After receiving this increase, his base pay was $1,883.02. Mr. Griner gave Mr. Ivey these additional duties and sought the increase for him because he felt that Mr. Ivey was the best man for the job.
Although Mr. Griner has consistently given the Petitioner high marks on his annual reviews of performance, the Petitioner has never received a Special Recognition/ Accomplishment form from Mr. Griner, so he has never been eligible to receive a Superior Proficiency increase. Other Preliminary Estimates Engineers have received Superior Proficiency increases after Mr. Griner issued Special Recognition/Accomplishment letters for them. Mr. Willard Herring, Mr. Max H. "Hal" Garland and Mr. Kenneth Richardson each received a Superior Proficiency increase after receiving a special recognition/accomplishment form from Mr. Griner.
Mr. Richardson is of the same race as Mr. Ivey, the Petitioner. Mr. Griner has also issued Special Recognition/Accomplishment forms for Ms. Holly Aldridge and Mr. Kanu Patel, although they did not receive Superior Proficiency increases. Although
Mr. Griner believes that the Petitioner does a good job, he had not issued Special Recognition/Accomplishment forms for the Petitioner because he has already been at the top of the engineers in salary in his section.
Mr. Griner has also used the added duties increase as a tool to equalize pay among the Preliminary Estimates Engineers. Mr. Griner assigned added duties to Mr. Patel for which he received an increase effective May 1999. This increase came at the same time as Mr. Ivey's added duties increase and brought Mr. Patel's pay to within $1.00 per pay period of
Mr. Iveys. Effective July 25, 1997, both Mr. Richardson and Mr. Marvin Waters received added duties increases. Mr. Griner gave them those increases after the departure of another employee because they were on the lower end of the pay scale. Despite those increases, both employees remained lower paid than the Petitioner. In 1998, Mr. Griner also gave Mr. Garland an added duties increase to bring his salary closer in line with the other Preliminary Estimates Engineers. This increase brought his pay close to the amount that the Petitioner was earning at that time. Mr. Griner sought this increase because Mr. Garland had assumed the lead worker responsibilities, was back-checking the work of other estimates engineers and had been underpaid for his work.
The Petitioner believes that he has done a much better job then the other Preliminary Estimates Engineers. He helps his co-workers perform some tasks and believes that they struggle to do their jobs. He believes that his qualifications and abilities are superior to the lead worker, Mr. Garland, and
to his supervisor, Mr. Griner. He believes that the other Preliminary Estimates Engineers lack the knowledge required to do the technical aspects of their jobs. His belief is not shared by his co-workers or supervisors.
The Petitioner has complained to Mr. Griner about his salary at least once a month since 1991. He disagrees with the way the Preliminary Estimates Office has been administered by Mr. Griner. In August of 1997, the Petitioner took his complaints to a higher management level. He and Mr. Akbar Ghavamikia, of the Engineering Support Services Section under the supervision of Mr. Chance, met with Mr. Bill Deyo and
Mr. Jimmy Larscey concerning their pay. Mr. Larscey was
Mr. Chance's superior in the Department. Mr. Chance was present at a meeting with Mr. Larscey. During that meeting, the Petitioner told Mr. Larscey, "Is that all you have got to say?
Then this meeting is over." Mr. Chance recalled that the Petitioner then "stormed" out the door and left the meeting. Mr. Chance was asked by Mr. Larscey to request pay increases for the Petitioner, Mr. Ghavamikia and Mr. Patel. Mr. Chance submitted requests for the increases on September 16, 1997, although he did not have sufficient salary rate granted by the Legislature to actually give any of the requested increases.
The Petitioner believes that Mr. Griner has retaliated against him for filing his Complaint with the Commission by not
giving him Special Recognition/Accomplishment forms. Mr. Griner did not give the Petitioner such a form either before or after he filed his Complaint with the Commission. He did not give the form to Mr. Ivey because he uses the forms and the attendant possibility of receiving a Superior Proficiency increase, as a method of equalizing salaries among the estimates engineers and the Petitioner has always been at or near the top in salary anyway.
The Petitioner also complained that Mr. Griner issued a written reprimand to him in connection with a disagreement over Mr. Garland's pay increase. The reprimand was given because the Petitioner confronted Mr. Griner, accused him of racist behavior by giving Mr. Garland a raise, and called
Mr. Griner a liar. The Petitioner has been disruptive in staff meetings and refused to sign his annual review for the period ending January 31, 1999, because Mr. Griner stated in that review that the Petitioner "needs to improve his attitude toward the department" and that the Petitioner "is often found talking with other employees and not doing his work." These are not a new type of comment from Mr. Griner concerning the Petitioner's history of annual reviews, however. The Petitioner signed his review for the period ending July 7, 1994 for instance, in which Mr. Griner stated "Allison is encouraged to curb his visitation with other employees and devote more time to estimating and
research." The Petitioner also signed his annual reviews for the periods ending January 31, 2000 and January 31, 2001, in which Mr. Griner stated "Allison needs to improve his attitude toward his supervisor and co-workers," "improvements in his judgment is [sic] encourages," "needs to spend less time talking to co-workers," "had improved his attitude towards supervisor and co-workers," and "needs to use better judgment on time spent talking to co-workers."
The Petitioner identified a number of other professional engineers working for the Department who were paid more than he. However, none of those individuals worked in the Preliminary Estimates Section and none were supervised by
Mr. Griner. The Petitioner did not demonstrate that any of these individuals performed substantially the same work as he performs.
The Petitioner believes that he should be earning about $66,820.00 annually for his work as a Preliminary Estimates Engineer. The Petitioner's supervisor, however, after
35 years' service with the Department, was earning less than
$2,000.00 more than the Petitioner believes that he himself should be paid. The Department's management is not willing to pay the Petitioner his expected salary for his work as a Preliminary Estimates Engineer. A salary at that level would require him to be doing design work or supervisory or program
responsibility duties. Paying the Petitioner such a salary would create an inappropriate pay inequity within the Preliminary Estimates Section.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the subject matter of and the parties to this proceeding. Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1997).
The Petitioner maintains that the pay actions by the Respondent have violated the provisions of Sections 760.01 through 760.11, Florida Statutes. Florida courts have determined that federal case law interpreting counterpart Federal Civil Rights Act at Title VII applies to disputes arising under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. See Florida State
University v. Sondel, 685 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
The Petitioner contends that he suffered adverse employment action because of his race. He has the burden of establishing that the Department's pay actions were motivated by a discriminatory purpose as raised in his Petition. Intentional discrimination can be proved by two methods, either by direct evidence of discriminatory intent or through circumstantial evidence. See McDonald-Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
The Petitioner presented no direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Direct evidence of discrimination would be evidence which, if believed, would prove the existence of a fact without inference or presumption. See Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir. 1989). Direct evidence is evidence of overt acts by employers that reveal their intent to discriminate against the aggrieved person. Direct evidence is most often evidence of remarks made by an aggrieved person's supervisors, superiors or employers. "[O]nly the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of 'race,' constitute direct evidence discrimination. Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 582. There was no evidence of any remarks by Mr. Griner or other decision makers at the Department or any other overt acts, verbal or otherwise, which could constitute direct evidence of discriminatory intent.
The Petitioner has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. McDonald-Douglas
Corporation v. Green, supra. A prima facie case may be established by showing that the Petitioner belongs to a protected class and suffered some adverse employment action under circumstances that create an inference that the employer was motivated by discrimination. See generally Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); McDonald-Douglas Corporation v. Green, supra.
If a Petitioner successfully establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer must then come forward with evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
If the employer offers a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the employment action, the Petitioner must then prove by preponderance of evidence that the legitimate reason offered by the employer was not its true reason but rather was a pretext for discrimination. This requires proof that both the reasons given were false, and that discrimination was the true reason for the employer's actions. See St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515-517 (1993).
The Petitioner failed to meet the first threshold of the McDonald-Douglas test. Although he established that he is a member of a protected class, he failed to produce evidence that he suffered adverse employment action under circumstances that create an inference that the Department was motivated by discriminatory reasons. The alleged adverse employment actions that the Petitioner complains of are a combination of the alleged failure to give him a superior proficiency raise, added duties raises, and alleged failure to pay him in accordance with
salaries received by Registered Professional Engineers in other areas or sections of the Department.
The Petitioner's evidence concerning the raises is that some other employees, of different races, received raises at times when he did not receive a raise. This alone is not sufficient to infer that the Department failed to give him a raise because of his race. The circumstances do not suggest that his supervisors did not give him raises because of his race. His evidence concerning his pay, relative to other professional engineers, consists only of his bare assertions that there are other Registered Professional Engineers working for the Department that are more highly compensated. This alone does not justify any inference of racial discrimination. The Petitioner made no competent, preponderant demonstration with his evidence that the work these individuals perform is in any way similar to his job duties and requirements, that their other qualifications are similar, or even that they are of a different race than he. He presented no competent, preponderant evidence that any employee similarly situated to him and who is outside the protected class of which he is a member, received better treatment from the Department. The prima facie case was thus not established.
Even had the Petitioner established a prima facie case, the Department articulated a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for not providing him with additional pay increases and for the level of his pay generally. The Petitioner is over-qualified for his position. He is qualified to function in a professional engineering position, but only performs non-professional engineering work in his current job. He is at the top of the pay structure for the job he performs. He performed essentially the same work as the other Preliminary Estimates Engineers and the Department attempts to maintain a reasonable uniformity in compensation for employees performing the same work, regardless of their race. His supervisor has sought raises for other employees including employees of the same race as the Petitioner, to try to achieve uniformity of compensation among the Preliminary Estimates Engineers. The Petitioner has received raises from these same supervisors and has always been one of the highest compensated Preliminary Estimates Engineers. He does not receive the compensation he feels is appropriate because the job he performs for the Department does not merit that level of pay. He has no design, program or supervisory responsibilities in his position, which would be required to justify the compensation level he believes he is entitled to. The Department has uniformly applied its pay policies and procedures to Mr. Ivey and the other engineers in his section.
Once an employer has articulated a legitimate non- discriminatory reason for the purported adverse employment action, the Petitioner has the burden of establishing, by preponderance of evidence, that the proffered reason is a mere pretext for what actually amounts to discrimination. This requires proof that the reasons given are false and that the real reason amounted to discrimination underlying the employer's actions. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, supra.
The Petitioner has not met that burden. There is no competent, preponderant evidence to show that the reasons advanced by the Department for its decisions in this matter were pretextual. The Petitioner presented no competent evidence that his supervisor was not attempting to equalize salaries among the Preliminary Estimates Engineers. The gravamen of the Petitioner's Complaint amounts to his belief that his pay level is inappropriate because he has greater qualifications and skills than the other estimates engineers. The Petitioner did not present competent, preponderant evidence which would suggest that the Department does not legitimately believe that the type of work he does is non-professional engineering work, deserving of less compensation than other Registered Professional Engineers earn for professional engineering work.
While the Petitioner may believe that this is an unfair policy and result, his belief, even if proven by
preponderant evidence, would not amount legally to discrimination. An employer's proffered reasons may not be proven to be pretextual merely by questioning the wisdom of the reason or decision, at least where the reason is one that might motivate a reasonable employer. See Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1543 (11th Cir. 1997). The reason offered by the Department is reasonable. The preponderant evidence establishes that the Petitioner has been
treated at least as well as similarly-situated employees of other races.
The Petitioner also contends that the Department retaliated against him for filing a Complaint with the Commission. A prima facie case of retaliation requires a showing that the employee engaged in a statutorily protected activity, that an adverse employment action occurred and that the adverse action was causally related to the protected activity. See Little v. United Technologies, 103 F.3d 956, 959, (11th Cir. 1997). The acts of retaliation that the Petitioner complains of are the continuing failure to give him Special Recognition/Accomplishment forms and proficiency pay increases.
The Petitioner did not establish any causal link between the Department's failure to give him Special Recognition/Accomplishment forms and pay increases and the filing of his Complaint with the Commission. The Petitioner's
supervisor did not give him Special Recognition/ Accomplishment forms and Superior Proficiency pay increases both before and after the filing of his Complaint with the Commission. The delivery of the reprimand to the Petitioner on September 11, 1998, has no apparent relationship to the absence of Superior Proficiency increases. The Petitioner did not demonstrate how the reprimand could relate to the alleged failure to provide him Special Recognition/Accomplishment forms and Superior Proficiency pay increases. The Complaint was filed in this case on September 12, 1997. The reprimand was delivered one year later and almost three years have elapsed since the reprimand.
The Petitioner's complains that he has not been properly recognized in any of the years since 1997. The length of time following the filing of the Complaint before the reprimand was delivered does not demonstrate any causal link between them.
Any argument that the reprimand demonstrated some animus against the Petitioner arising from the filing of the Complaint is belied by the fact that the Petitioner's supervisor also gave him an added duties pay increase on May 13, 1999.
Even had the Petitioner made a prima facie showing of retaliation, the Department articulated a legitimate, non- retaliatory reason for not giving the him Special Recognition/ Accomplishment forms and Superior Proficiency pay increases. The Petitioner's supervisor did not provide the forms for the
Petitioner because he uses the forms, and the attendant possibility of receiving a Superior Proficiency increase, as a method of equalizing salaries among the estimates engineers and the Petitioner has always been at or near the top in pay for estimates engineers in any event. The goal of equalizing pay for employees performing the same work is a legitimate consideration of the Petitioner's supervisors and is recognized as such both by Department management and by the written Department pay procedure.
Once an employer articulates a legitimate, non- discriminatory reason for its actions, the Petitioner must prove that the proffered reason was a pretext for discriminatory retaliation. EEOC v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 988 F.2d 1564, 1572 (11th Cir. 1993). The Department's articulated reasons for the alleged retaliatory conduct are the same as those advanced for the underlying claim. The Petitioner presented no competent, preponderant evidence that the reasons advanced by the Department for its decisions were pretextual. The Petitioner presented no competent, preponderant evidence that his supervisor was not attempting to equalize salaries among the Preliminary Estimates Engineers. He simply believes that he should be paid more because of his background, his abilities and
his professional engineer status. The record indicates that the Department has based its pay decisions on its goal of equalizing pay among similarly-situated employees.
The Department did not violate the provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, for failing to increase the Petitioner's pay in the manner he believed appropriate. The Department did not retaliate against the Petitioner for filing his Complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations.
Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is
That a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations denying the Petition for Relief in its entirety.
DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 2001.
Mary A. Kane, Esquire
Robert M. Burdick, Esquire Department of Transportation
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
