vs.
RUDOLPH G. DYER, and GOLDEN KEY REALTY, INC.,
Respondents.
) Case No. 03-0125PL
This case came before Administrative Law Judge John G. Van Laningham for final hearing by video teleconference on March 24, 2003, at sites in Tallahassee and Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
For Petitioner: Christopher J. DeCosta, Esquire
400 West Robinson Street, Suite N308 Hurston Building, North Tower Orlando, Florida 32801-1772
For Respondents: Rudolph G. Dyer, pro se
Golden Key Realty, Inc. 6221 Margate Blvd.
In this disciplinary proceeding, the issues are whether Respondents, who are licensed real estate brokers, failed to reconcile their brokerage escrow account properly; failed to maintain trust funds in an escrow account as required; filed a false report or record; obstructed or hindered Petitioner’s investigator in an official investigation; failed to account for and deliver trust funds; committed various acts of fraud, misrepresentation, dishonest dealing, or culpable negligence in any business transaction; or committed any of these enumerated offenses, as alleged by Petitioner in its Administrative Complaint.
On December 19, 2002, Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, issued a twelve-count Administrative Complaint against Respondents, wherein it was alleged that Respondents had violated various provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 61J2, Florida Administrative Code. Respondents timely requested a formal hearing to contest these allegations, and the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings on
January 15, 2003.
The presiding administrative law judge set the final hearing for March 24, 2003. Both parties appeared at the appointed place and time.
At hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of one witness: Catherine Rivera. Petitioner also offered ten exhibits, numbered 2 through 11, inclusive, and all except Petitioner’s Exhibit 3 (which was withdrawn) were admitted into evidence. At Petitioner’s request, the administrative law judge took official recognition of the applicable statutes and rules. Respondent Dyer testified on his own behalf and presented the testimony of one other witness: Elysee Joseph. Respondents offered no exhibits.
The administrative law judge issued a post-hearing order on May 13, 2003, requiring the parties to submit proposed recommended orders on or before May 22, 2003. Petitioner timely submitted a proposed recommended order; Respondents did not.
Respondent Rudolph Dyer (“Dyer”) is a licensed real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Real Estate Commission (“Commission”).
Respondent Golden Key Realty, Inc. (“Golden Key”) is and was at all times material hereto a corporation registered as
a Florida real estate broker subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Commission.
Dyer is the president and a director of Golden Key, and at all times relevant to this case he had substantial, if not exclusive, control of the corporation. Indeed, the evidence does not establish that Golden Key engaged in any conduct distinct from Dyer’s in connection with the transactions at issue. Therefore, Respondents will generally be referred to collectively as “Dyer” except when a need to distinguish between them arises.
Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings for the Commission. At the Commission’s direction, Petitioner is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints against licensees within the Commission’s jurisdiction.
Escrow Account Irregularities and Related Misconduct
On or about November 14, 2001, Petitioner conducted a routine audit of Dyer’s records. Pursuant to the audit, Catherine Rivera (“Rivera”), Petitioner’s investigator, determined that as of October 31, 2001, the balance in Dyer’s escrow account was $127.
Rivera determined further that Dyer’s trust liability,
i.e. the total amount of money that Dyer should have been
holding in escrow on his clients’ behalf, was $2,870. Thus, there existed a shortfall of $2,743 in Dyer’s escrow account.
In light of this discovery, Rivera requested that Dyer provide additional records, including previous bank statements and the reconciliation statements that licensed brokers must prepare each month showing either that their trust liabilities and bank balances are in agreement or explaining why they are not. Dyer was unable to produce these records, whereupon Rivera advised him that Petitioner would initiate disciplinary proceedings.
On or about April 26, 2002, after being formally notified of pending administrative charges arising from the aforementioned deficiencies concerning his escrow account and associated records, Dyer sent Rivera a letter in which he a) admitted having failed to reconcile his bank balances and trust liabilities and b) informed Rivera that “immediately after the audit [on November 14, 2001,] steps were taken to close out all escrow deposit accounts being held by the company.” In fact, Dyer continued to use his escrow account to hold funds in trust through June 2002; as it happened, the escrow account would not be completely closed until July 29, 2002. The undersigned is not convinced, however, that Dyer lied to Petitioner about closing the escrow account, as Petitioner here contends. Rather, given the ambiguity of the language used (“steps were
taken”), the undersigned accepts Dyer’s explanation that what he intended to communicate was that activity in the escrow account was being allowed to wind down in an orderly fashion——which was substantially true.
Continuing to investigate the matter, Rivera arranged to meet with Dyer at his office on June 19, 2002, to review the previously requested bank records and files. When Rivera arrived on that date, however, Dyer again failed to provide the desired documents. As a result, Rivera scheduled yet another appointment to inspect records at Dyer’s office. The next such meeting would take place on July 29, 2002.
In the meantime, Petitioner served a subpoena duces tecum on Dyer’s bank and obtained a complete set of bank records, including canceled checks, pertaining to Dyer’s escrow account.
On July 29, 2002, Dyer finally provided reconciliation statements for his escrow account pursuant to Rivera’s longstanding request. These statements were self-contradictory and woefully inadequate, but, if nothing else, they clearly demonstrated (and the undersigned finds) that the escrow account balance fell significantly short of Dyer’s total trust liability during the months of May through August 2001, inclusive.
Indeed, there is no dispute (for Dyer admitted at final hearing), and it is hereby found, that at all times relevant to
this case, Dyer was commingling trust funds with other funds, to the point that the escrow account effectively became an operating account of Golden Key.
Dyer also produced documents purporting to be copies of checks drawn on his escrow account. At least seven of these copies were not genuine reproductions of the respective originals but were, instead, fakes.1 Specifically, in five instances, the payee of an escrow-account check was, according to the copies that Dyer produced, an individual whom, the inference is clear, Dyer owed escrowed funds. In reality, each such check actually had been made payable to and been uttered by Golden Key, which latter facts are irrefutably established by the bank-produced records.2
Dyer admitted that the above-described copies of checks he had produced to Petitioner were fakes, but he denied having personally altered the underlying documents to create the false copies, blaming an unnamed accountant for that misdeed, and he disclaimed advance knowledge of the tampering. The undersigned, however, does not fully believe Dyer’s explanation. Dyer had exclusive authority over the escrow account and substantial control over Golden Key’s operations. The undersigned finds it inconceivable that a stranger to the subject transactions could have knowingly falsified these particular checks, in the manner shown, without Dyer’s active
assistance. Therefore, while acknowledging the possibility that Dyer himself might not have altered the documents in question, the undersigned finds that he was, at the very least, aware of and knowingly complicit in the attempted deception.
The Fanfan Transactions
On or about June 13, 2001, Dyer facilitated a contract between Herinslake, as seller, and Francique Fanfan (“Fanfan”), as buyer, for the purchase and sale of real property commonly known as 5435 Northwest Tenth Street, Plantation, Florida. The contract called for an initial deposit of $500 and an additional deposit of $500 to be placed with Dyer within ten days after the buyer’s acceptance.
Dyer received $500 from Fanfan on June 19, 2001. In evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 9 is a $500 money order dated June 18, 2001, which names the sender (maker) as “Fan Fan” and lists as his address “601 W Oakland Pk Blvd, Ft Lauderdale 33311.” The undersigned infers that Petitioner’s Exhibit 9 is, in fact, a copy of the money order that Fanfan tendered to Dyer on June 19, 2001, as a deposit on the contract to purchase property from Herinslake.
Petitioner alleges (and Dyer disputes) that some time after June 19, 2001, Dyer collected the agreed-upon second $500 deposit from Fanfan, making a total of $1,000 being held in escrow on Fanfan’s behalf. Petitioner asserts that Petitioner’s
Exhibit 7, which is a $500 money order dated July 9, 2001, payable to Golden Key, is proof of the second deposit.
Petitioner further alleges that after the contract between Herinslake and Fanfan failed to close (which is undisputed), Dyer returned $500 to Fanfan and kept $500 (which is disputed).
Taken together, the testimony of Dyer and that of his former salesman, Elysee Joseph, is imprecise, confusing, and somewhat in conflict as it relates to Fanfan. They agree, however, that when the Herinslake-Fanfan transaction fell apart, Dyer returned Fanfan’s entire deposit——of $500.
Dyer also points out that months later he assisted Fanfan in the purchase of a condominium unit located at 2800 Northwest Fifty-Sixth Avenue, Lauderhill, Florida. His testimony is corroborated by the settlement statement from that transaction, which is in evidence as part of Petitioner’s Exhibit 11. The settlement statement identifies the seller as Evelyn Goodison; names Francique Fanfan, “a single man,” as buyer; and indicates that the transaction closed on April 10, 2002. According to the settlement statement, Fanfan had placed a $1,000 deposit against the purchase price, and the testimony at final hearing established that Dyer had held this sum in escrow pending the closing.
The undersigned finds that Petitioner has failed to prove, clearly and convincingly, that Dyer retained $500
belonging to Fanfan in connection with the aborted contract between Herinslake and Fanfan, for several reasons.
First, the money order dated July 9, 2001, a copy of which is in evidence as Petitioner’s Exhibit 7, appears not to have been tendered by Francique Fanfan, the alleged victim here. This particular money order identifies the sender as “Michelle Fanfan” and gives as her address “2076 Kimberly Blvd, N Lauderdale, Fl 33068.” There is no evidence whatsoever in the record regarding Michelle Fanfan, and hence no finding can be made that she was in any way related to Francique Fanfan, who (the evidence shows) was a single man. Moreover, Michelle Fanfan’s address does not match Francique Fanfan’s address as reported in Petitioner’s Exhibit 9.
Second, the undersigned believes that it is highly unlikely Fanfan would have continued to do business with Dyer if, as Petitioner alleges, Dyer had cheated him out of $500 on an earlier deal. Thus, the very fact that Fanfan purchased the Goodison property through Dyer tends to refute Petitioner’s charge.
Finally, Fanfan, the alleged victim, did not testify at the final hearing, and consequently there is no direct evidence that Dyer took $500 from Fanfan.
The Charges
In counts I and VII of its Administrative Complaint, Petitioner accuses Respondents of having failed to properly prepare monthly escrow-reconciliation statements. Petitioner’s position is that in maintaining records showing significant shortages in the escrow account for a period of approximately six months, and by failing to take corrective action regarding the shortages, Respondents failed to comply with Rule 61J2- 14.012, Florida Administrative Code, and hence violated Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes.
In counts II and VIII, Petitioner alleges that Respondents committed fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Petitioner’s position is that Respondents committed fraud or misrepresentation when they tendered false or forged documents to Rivera during the course of her official investigation. In addition, Petitioner asserts that Respondents committed culpable negligence towards the individuals who placed their funds in trust with Respondents.
In counts III and IX, Petitioner asserts that Respondents obstructed or hindered the enforcement of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, in violation of Section 475.42(1)(i),
Florida Statutes, and therefore in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. Petitioner’s position is that Respondents willfully interfered with Rivera’s investigation by submitting fraudulent documents to the investigator.
In counts IV and X, Petitioner accuses Respondents of having made or filed a report or record which the licensee knew to be false, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(l), Florida Statutes. Petitioner’s position is that Respondents knowingly tendered false copies of canceled checks to Rivera.
In counts V and XI, Petitioner charges Respondents with failing to account for and deliver trust funds, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes. Petitioner’s position is that Respondents failed to account for and deliver the second deposit allegedly received from Fanfan in connection with the Herinslake-Fanfan transaction.
In counts VI and XII, Petitioner accuses Respondents of having failed to maintain trust funds in the real estate brokerage escrow account until disbursement was properly authorized, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. Petitioner’s position is that during the six months of concern, Respondents’ escrow account funds were regularly several thousand dollars less than the trust liability.
Ultimate Factual Determinations
Dyer failed to prepare written monthly reconciliation statements as required by Rule 61J2-14.012, Florida Administrative Code, and thus he violated Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. Petitioner therefore has established the charges set forth in counts I and VII of its Administrative Complaint, by clear and convincing evidence.
The evidence does not establish that Dyer committed fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction. There is no persuasive evidence that Dyer intended to harm (or actually harmed) any of his clients. While Dyer did participate in a dishonest scheme to deceive Rivera by producing false copies of his canceled checks, this particular wrongdoing occurred, not in a business transaction, but rather in connection with a regulatory investigation. Thus, Dyer did not violate Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Counts II and VIII were not proved.
Dyer attempted to obstruct or hinder Rivera’s investigation by producing copies of canceled checks that he knew were false and misleading. Petitioner has clearly established that Dyer violated Section 475.42(1)(i), Florida Statutes, which in turn constitutes a violation of Section
475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, as charged in counts III and IX of the Administrative Complaint.
The evidence does not support the charge that Dyer violated Section 475.25(1)(l), Florida Statutes, which prohibits the filing false reports and records, because the altered documents that Dyer produced to Rivera were not signed by Dyer—— at least not in the sense contemplated by the statute, which specifies that “such reports or records shall include only those which are signed in the capacity of a licensed broker or salesperson.” Counts IV and X thus were not proved.
The evidence does not clearly establish that Dyer failed to return a deposit of $500 to Fanfan after his deal with Herinslake fell through. Thus, counts V and XI, which allege violations of Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes, were not proved.
Dyer failed to maintain trust funds in a segregated escrow account, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. Petitioner therefore has established the charges set forth in counts VI and XII of its Administrative Complaint, by clear and convincing evidence.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has personal and subject matter jurisdiction in this proceeding pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes.
Section 475.25, Florida Statutes, under which Respondents have been charged, sets forth the acts for which the Commission may impose discipline. This statute provides, in pertinent part:
The commission may deny an application for licensure, registration, or permit, or renewal thereof; may place a licensee, registrant, or permittee on probation; may suspend a license, registration, or permit for a period not exceeding 10 years; may revoke a license, registration, or permit; may impose an administrative fine not to exceed $1,000 for each count or separate offense; and may issue a reprimand, and any or all of the foregoing, if it finds that the licensee, registrant, permittee, or applicant:
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(b) Has been guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme, or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction in this state or any other state, nation, or territory; has violated a duty imposed upon her or him by law or by the terms of a listing contract, written, oral, express, or implied, in a real estate transaction; has aided, assisted, or conspired with any other person engaged in any such misconduct and in furtherance thereof; or has formed an intent, design, or scheme to engage in any such misconduct and committed an overt act in furtherance of such intent, design, or scheme. It is immaterial to the guilt of the licensee that the victim or intended victim of the misconduct has sustained no damage or loss; that the damage or loss has been settled and paid after discovery of the misconduct; or that such victim or intended victim was a customer or a person in
confidential relation with the licensee or was an identified member of the general public.
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1. Has failed to account or deliver to any person, including a licensee under this chapter, at the time which has been agreed upon or is required by law or, in the absence of a fixed time, upon demand of the person entitled to such accounting and delivery, any personal property such as money, fund, deposit, check, draft, abstract of title, mortgage, conveyance, lease, or other document or thing of value, including a share of a real estate commission if a civil judgment relating to the practice of the licensee's profession has been obtained against the licensee and said judgment has not been satisfied in accordance with the terms of the judgment within a reasonable time, or any secret or illegal profit, or any divisible share or portion thereof, which has come into the licensee's hands and which is not the licensee's property or which the licensee is not in law or equity entitled to retain under the circumstances.
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Has violated any of the provisions of this chapter[, including, as alleged here, Section 475.42(1)(i), Florida Statutes,] or any lawful order or rule made or issued under the provisions of this chapter or chapter 455[, including, as alleged here, Rule 61J2-14.012, Florida Administrative Code].
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Has failed, if a broker, to immediately place, upon receipt, any money, fund, deposit, check, or draft entrusted to her or him by any person dealing with her or him as
a broker in escrow with a title company, banking institution, credit union, or savings and loan association located and doing business in this state, or to deposit such funds in a trust or escrow account maintained by her or him with some bank, credit union, or savings and loan association located and doing business in this state, wherein the funds shall be kept until disbursement thereof is properly authorized; or has failed, if a salesperson, to immediately place with her or his registered employer any money, fund, deposit, check, or draft entrusted to her or him by any person dealing with her or him as agent of the registered employer. The commission shall establish rules to provide for records to be maintained by the broker and the manner in which such deposits shall be made.
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Has made or filed a report or record which the licensee knows to be false, has willfully failed to file a report or record required by state or federal law, has willfully impeded or obstructed such filing, or has induced another person to impede or obstruct such filing; but such reports or records shall include only those which are signed in the capacity of a licensed broker or salesperson.
Section 475.42(1), Florida Statutes, which Respondents are alleged to have violated, committing a disciplinable offense according to Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part:
(i) No person shall obstruct or hinder in any manner the enforcement of this chapter or the performance of any lawful duty by any person acting under the authority of this chapter or interfere with, intimidate, or
offer any bribe to any member of the commission or any of its employees or any person who is, or is expected to be, a witness in any investigation or proceeding relating to a violation of this chapter.
Section 475.42(1)(i), Florida Statutes.
Rule 61J2-14.012, Florida Administrative Code, which Respondents are alleged to have violated, committing a disciplinable offense according to Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, contains the following requirements:
A broker who receives a deposit as previously defined shall preserve and make available to the BPR, or its authorized representative, all deposit slips and statements of account rendered by the depository in which said deposit is placed, together with all agreements between the parties to the transaction. In addition, the broker shall keep an accurate account of each deposit transaction and each separate bank account wherein such funds have been deposited. All such books and accounts shall be subject to inspection by the BPR or its authorized representatives at all reasonable times during regular business hours.
Once monthly, a broker shall cause to be made a written statement comparing the broker's total liability with the reconciled bank balance(s) of all trust accounts. The broker's trust liability is defined as the sum total of all deposits received, pending and being held by the broker at any point in time. The minimum information to be included in the monthly statement- reconciliation shall be the date the reconciliation was undertaken, the date used to reconcile the balances, the name of the bank(s), the name(s) of the account(s), the account number(s), the account balance(s) and date(s), deposits in transit,
outstanding checks identified by date and check number, an itemized list of the broker's trust liability, and any other items necessary to reconcile the bank account balance(s) with the balance per the broker's checkbook(s) and other trust account books and records disclosing the date of receipt and the source of the funds. The broker shall review, sign and date the monthly statement-reconciliation.
Whenever the trust liability and the bank balances do not agree, the reconciliation shall contain a description or explanation for the difference(s) and any corrective action taken in reference to shortages or overages of funds in the account(s). Whenever a trust bank account record reflects a service charge or fee for a non-sufficient check being returned or whenever an account has a negative balance, the reconciliation shall disclose the cause(s) of the returned check or negative balance and the corrective action taken.
Being penal in nature, Section 475.25, Florida Statutes, “must be construed strictly, in favor of the one against whom the penalty would be imposed.” Munch v. Department of Professional Regulation, Div. of Real Estate, 592 So. 2d 1136, 1143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
A proceeding, such as this one, to suspend, revoke, or impose other discipline upon a professional license is penal in nature. State ex rel. Vining v. Florida Real Estate Commission,
281 So. 2d 487, 491 (Fla. 1973). Accordingly, to impose discipline, Petitioner must prove the charges against Respondents by clear and convincing evidence. Department of
Banking and Finance, Div. of Securities and Investor Protection v. Osborne Stern & Co., 670 So. 2d 932, 933-34 (Fla.
1996)(citing Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So. 2d 292, 294-95 (Fla. 1987)); Nair v. Department of Business & Professional Regulation, 654 So. 2d 205, 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
Regarding the standard of proof, in Slomowitz v.
Walker, 429 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), the Court of Appeal, Fourth District, canvassed the cases to develop a “workable definition of clear and convincing evidence” and found that of necessity such a definition would need to contain “both qualitative and quantitative standards.” The court held that:
clear and convincing evidence requires that the evidence must be found to be credible; the facts to which the witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; the testimony must be precise and explicit and the witnesses must be lacking confusion as to the facts in issue. The evidence must be of such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.
Id. The Florida Supreme Court later adopted the fourth district’s description of the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof. Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 93-62, 645 So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994). The First District Court of Appeal also has followed the Slomowitz test, adding the interpretive comment that “[a]lthough this standard of proof may be met where
the evidence is in conflict, . . . it seems to preclude evidence that is ambiguous.” Westinghouse Elec. Corp., Inc. v. Shuler
Bros., Inc., 590 So. 2d 986, 988 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), rev.
denied, 599 So. 2d 1279 (1992)(citation omitted).
As set forth in the Findings of Fact, the trier has determined as matter of ultimate fact that Petitioner has proved Dyer violated both Rule 61J2-14.012, Florida Administrative Code, and Section 475.42(1)(i), Florida Statutes, which violations constitute separate disciplinable offenses pursuant to Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes; and that he violated Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. The undersigned further concludes that the plain language of these particular statutory and rule provisions, being clear and unambiguous, can be applied to the historical events at hand without a simultaneous examination of extrinsic evidence or resort to principles of interpretation. It is therefore unnecessary to make additional legal conclusions with regard to these charges.
On the other hand, the fact-finder has determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Petitioner has failed to establish, by the requisite level of proof, that Dyer committed the other offenses of which he stands accused, namely, violations of Sections 475.25(1)(b), 475.25(1)(d)1., and 475.25(1)(l), Florida Statutes. The findings concerning Dyer’s alleged violation of Section 475.25(1)(d)1., Florida Statutes,
which stem from straightforward resolutions of disputed facts, require no supporting legal conclusions to be meaningful. The factual findings regarding the remaining counts, however, were informed by the administrative law judge’s understanding of the law. Therefore, a brief discussion of the pertinent legal principles will illuminate the dispositive findings of ultimate fact regarding the charges that failed on grounds both factual and legal.
Fraud and Dishonesty
Petitioner must show that Respondents committed an intentional act in order to establish a violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. See Munch, 592 So. 2d at 1143-
investigation——is an extremely serious offense that warrants the severe penalty of revocation. In addition, he commingled trust funds with other funds, moving escrowed monies into Golden Key’s operating accounts instead of keeping such funds properly segregated in an escrow account, which constitutes a violation of Section 475.25(1)(k), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, a penalty of revocation should be imposed, together with a fine of
$3,000.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order that: (a) finds Respondents guilty as charged in counts I, III, VI, VII, IX, and XII of the Administrative Complaint; (b) revokes Respondents’ respective real estate licenses; and (c) imposes an administrative fine of $3,000 against Respondents, jointly and severally.
DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of June, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 2003.
1/ The evidence clearly and convincingly proves that Dyer submitted fake copies of checks numbered 1146, 1148, 1155, 1163,
1202, 1206, and 1208.
2/ The five instances to which the text refers involved checks numbered 1146, 1148, 1202, 1206, and 1208.
Christopher J. DeCosta, Esquire Department of Business and Professional
400 West Robinson Street, Suite N308 Hurston Building, North Tower Orlando, Florida 32801-1772
Rudolph G. Dyer
Golden Key Realty, Inc. 6221 Margate Blvd.
Hardy L. Roberts, III, Esquire Department of Business and
Nancy P. Campiglia, Acting Director Division of Real Estate
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
