vs.
Respondent.
) Case No. 03-2848
A formal hearing in the above-styled case was held before Daniel M. Kilbride, Administrative Law Judge, Division of Administrative Hearings, on October 21, 2003, in Orlando, Florida.
For Respondent: John C. Stivarius, Jr., Esquire
Qualified Representative Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C. Resurgens Plaza, Suite 2700 945 East Paces Ferry Road Atlanta, Georgia 30326-1380
Whether Respondent violated Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes, by terminating Petitioner's employment with Respondent because of her race (African-American) and/or color (Black).
These proceedings were commenced by Charmaine Lewinson- Evans, Petitioner, by filing of a Charge of Discrimination, against Gambro Healthcare, Inc., Respondent, dated July 8, 2002, with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR). After approximately one year, the FCHR had not completed its investigation and, pursuant to Section 760.11(8), Florida Statutes, Petitioner requested that this matter be referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) for a formal hearing. This matter was referred to the DOAH for a formal administrative hearing on July 30, 2003. Following pre-hearing discovery, a formal administrative hearing was held on
October 21, 2003, before the undersigned Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). At the hearing, Petitioner testified in her own behalf, and offered three exhibits into evidence. Respondent presented the testimony of three witnesses and offered 33 exhibits into evidence.
A Transcript of the hearing was prepared and filed on November 5, 2003. Following its request for an extension of time, Respondent filed its Proposed Recommended Order on November 25, 2003. Petitioner has not filed her proposals as of the date of this Recommended Order.
Petitioner, Charmaine Lewinson-Evans, was employed by Respondent, Gambro Healthcare, Inc., from November 2001 until June 2002, in the position of center director at the Ocoee, Florida, facility (Ocoee facility). The center director was the highest administrative job at the Ocoee facility. Petitioner was hired as an exempt employee, earning approximately $51,000 per year in salary. Petitioner is an African-American female and a member of a protected class.
Respondent is an employer, as defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA).
Petitioner had been hired by Scott Yerger (Yerger), regional director for Respondent. He was Petitioner's immediate supervisor to whom she reported daily.
At the time Yerger hired Petitioner, she had represented through the interview, her resume, and application for employment that she had an extensive nursing background, had functioned as a charge nurse, and had supervised professional and non-professional staff, as well as functioned as a team leader. However, at the time of her hire, Petitioner did not have the requisite management skills to run the Ocoee facility.
Michelle Lee (Lee) was also employed by Respondent as a center director. Lee is currently the center director of the
Orlando Southwest Clinic. She is also an African-American female and has reported to Yerger for the past several years.
Center directors had monthly meetings wherein various matters were discussed, including monthly reports that were due to the regional director. These meetings were conducted by Yerger.
Petitioner testified that she does not recall ever discussing monthly reports in the center director meetings. Lee testified that there were routine reports due each month by the center directors and that Yerger always went over the reports at each monthly meeting. Yerger testified that there were monthly meetings and that he went over the monthly reports that the center directors were to have prepared, both prior to April and after April 2002.
Petitioner's failure to recall ever discussing the monthly reports at the center director meetings is not credible. Lee's testimony is credible.
At the time of Petitioner's hire and for a period of time up to April 2002, all center directors had monthly reports due to Yerger by the 15th of each month. Yerger made it clear to the center directors how important it was to have the monthly reports in by the 15th of each month.
The monthly reports prepared by the center directors for the regional director were vital to the operation of the clinic and the company.
In April 2002, the monthly reports for the center directors changed in format, and Yerger sent out a template to all center directors for use in preparing the monthly reports. In the April 2002 center director monthly meeting, the template for the new monthly reports, which had been the subject of the e-mail previously sent to all center directors, was discussed.
Petitioner testified that these monthly reports were derived from financial information she did not have and that it would take up to two days to prepare the reports. In fact, the monthly reports required of the center directors did not require financial information or a review of payroll records in order to prepare them. Any financial information necessary was already on the reports and had been placed there by Yerger. The only information required was clinical in nature and staffing reports.
In fact, Petitioner did have access to financial information, if necessary, as well as instruction by Respondent as to financial information. Petitioner's role was to make certain the reports were due on time.
Petitioner was also instructed on the items in the center director's checklist by use of a preceptor method.
Petitioner's primary preceptor was Lee. Petitioner was instructed on patient statistics, patient liability reports, staff schedules, and erythropoietin (EPO) survey reports at healthcare plan meetings, and she was taught to close payroll and report statistics at the quarterly Quality Assurance (QA) meeting. Lee mentored Petitioner on how to do the monthly and other reports.
Petitioner was trained in the same manner as all of the other center directors on the new monthly report format and how to complete the reports.
During the time Petitioner was a center director, there was a total of seven center directors working under the supervision of Yerger. Petitioner was the only center director who turned in her monthly reports late without seeking prior approval to be late and without prior notification. The only center director that had difficulty with preparing the monthly reports was Petitioner.
In April 2002, Petitioner received a raise from Respondent at the same time that all annual raises were given to employees. Petitioner had been with Respondent for only four months. She had not been employed long enough to warrant a formal review; as such, she was provided a standard raise of
3.5 percent.
On April 10, 2002, Yerger received a letter from Rex Buchanon, M.D., medical director, indicating serious concerns about the direction of the Ocoee facility managed by Petitioner. After receipt of the letter, Yerger spoke with Petitioner about the contents. Improvement was immediately required of the Ocoee facility and Petitioner. Yerger offered to oversee the responsibilities for corrective actions and staff interviews.
He directed Petitioner to focus on clinical issues.
During this conversation on April 10, 2002, Yerger provided Petitioner with a series of items to complete and perform. These included cleaning and organizing her office in preparation for the visit by the Divisional President Scott Bartos; establishing a patient services committee to deal with patient complaints; completing the paperwork for Suzanne Giordano with Human Resources; locating Susan Bittner's transfer paperwork; and having the staff rounding reports pulled and ready for a Friday meeting with Elpidio Abreu, M.D. Dr. Abreu was coming to the Ocoee facility to specifically address the issues raised in the letter from Dr. Buchanon.
Yerger asked Petitioner, the night before the scheduled meeting with Dr. Abreu, to pull the rounding reports and some of the QA information for him and Lee. Lee was subbing for Petitioner, who was not going to be present at the meeting. When Yerger, Lee, and Dr. Abreu arrived for the meeting the
following day, no reports had been pulled, and Dr. Abreu had to wait while Lee and Yerger pulled the reports.
Following the meeting on April 10, 2002, Petitioner did not clean up her office or remove the post-it notes, boxes, or clutter as requested. Petitioner did not set up the patient services committee as directed by Yerger. Five of the seven items mandated by Yerger were not completed by Petitioner by early May 2002.
On May 8, 2002, Yerger held a meeting with Petitioner and went over matters that needed correcting and improving. Yerger considered this a Performance Improvement Plan. Yerger told Petitioner that although she had started out meeting expectations, she was falling behind. Yerger discussed with Petitioner her lack of follow through with tasks and initiatives that Respondent put out; her failure to complete them; her failure to meet the deadlines provided; and her failure to ask for any assistance from Yerger or to notify him of any difficulties with the reports. He also advised her that she continued to have difficulties in interactions with the staff and that she needed to maintain a professional manner with the staff at all times. He also reminded her that her body language was such that she would cross her arms and shake her head while staff were talking or giving their side of the story and, thus, she was not creating an environment for them to discuss issues.
He also stated that the corrective actions process was supposed to be productive and that she was creating an opposite effect by her actions. Petitioner was given 30 days to make improvements in the areas outlined in the May 8, 2002, conversation.
Contrary to Petitioner's assertions, Yerger did not ask Petitioner during the May 8, 2002, Performance Improvement Plan discussion to change places with Suzanne Giordano (Giordano). Such would have been highly ineffective and counter-productive to flip-flop positions at Ocoee facility like what was described by Petitioner in her testimony. Yerger did inquire in the May 8, 2002, meeting whether Petitioner was happy in her job as center director and whether she wanted to consider a different role in the company, but not in management.
Following the Performance Improvement Plan meeting of May 8, 2002, Petitioner did not show improvement in the areas discussed. After the meeting, Petitioner continued to submit late reports, incomplete reports, and wrong reports and did not provide notification in advance of the reports being late.
Petitioner acknowledged that her performance in the preparation of reports was not proficient and that she was still submitting the reports late, even after the meeting. After the Performance Improvement Plan discussion of May 8, 2002, Petitioner's attitude deteriorated. She became angry and upset and focused only on Yerger's not thinking she could perform her
job. Other workers thought she was rude and abrasive. Yerger personally observed her being rude to other people and co- workers.
Even when the reports were coming in late or were incomplete or wrong, Yerger would call Petitioner about this fact. However, no improvement of Petitioner's performance took place.
Yerger did not have any difficulties with other center directors over performance, late reports, incomplete reports, or wrong reports. Several of the remaining seven center directors were African-American.
Yerger received a written and verbal complaint from Giordano, charge nurse at the Ocoee facility, regarding Petitioner's request for Giordano to back date short-term care plans in violation of Respondent's internal policies. Anyone that is required to correct an entry in the short-term care plans is required to mark through the entry with a single line and note the "error" and put one's initials on the correction with a date. It would be improper and considered a falsification of the records to back date a document or care plan. The care plans required a nurse's signature on them contemporaneous with the date the action was taken, in order for the care plans to be complete.
Several of the care plans containing the signature or initials of Petitioner were incomplete and had corrections not properly noted, in violation of Respondent's policy.
Petitioner alleged that there had been a discriminatory motive in the assignment of Lee as her roommate for the center director conferences to be held in Nashville, Tennessee, and that Yerger was responsible. However, the evidence established that Yerger had nothing to do with the assignment of roommates at the Nashville conference held in June 2002. The roommate assignments were not racially motivated but were designed to accommodate the buddy system that had existed between Lee and Petitioner.
After Petitioner did not show improvement following the 30-day period after May 8, 2002, Yerger, in conjunction with Loretta Castillo (Castillo), divisional human resources manager for the Southeastern Division, via telephone, discussed with Petitioner on June 21, 2002, her lack of improvement. In this conference, Petitioner admitted to Yerger that she had not been performing her job as center director up to Respondent's standards. It was determined that Petitioner would be terminated from her position as center director. During this meeting, Petitioner never complained or raised that any action by Respondent or Yerger was racially motivated.
The decision to terminate Petitioner was based on Petitioner's failure to show improvement. The areas of poor performance were noted in the memorandum prepared by Yerger dated June 21, 2002, and executed by Petitioner on June 25, 2002. Petitioner had been informed she needed to have demonstrated improvements in her leadership and management skills.
The memorandum outlined that Petitioner failed to demonstrate improvement and that she continued to struggle in providing leadership to employees and patients. Petitioner had recently reacted to an employee-related situation improperly by suspending an employee without further investigation or counseling with Human Resources or Yerger prior to the suspension. Petitioner's decision was based on her belief that the employee had been insubordinate to her, which was not the case.
Petitioner had demonstrated poor judgment and failure to make sound decisions. Further, Petitioner had not demonstrated improvement in the areas covered by her Performance Improvement Plan of May 8, 2002. She had been unsuccessful in bridging the professional relationship with the medical doctors and staff. Yerger continued to hear about Petitioner's lack of professionalism.
Based on Petitioner's inability to manage the Ocoee facility and to correct outstanding issues identified on May 8, 2002, she was terminated on June 25, 2002. The decision to terminate Petitioner was not based on her race or color, or any other impermissible factor.
Petitioner was aware that Respondent had a policy for employees who felt that actions of an employee were racially motivated and for reporting any such complaint. During her employment with Respondent, Petitioner never availed herself of Respondent's policy for complaints regarding discrimination against any employee.
Prior to her termination and the filing of the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) and FCHR charge, Petitioner never complained to anyone that any action against her had been the result of any racial animus by Yerger, nor had she expressed any such beliefs to Lee.
Petitioner had been offered the opportunity of continuing to work for Respondent, but in a non-management position and not at the Ocoee facility. Petitioner declined such an option.
Petitioner presented no evidence of any comparators or other center directors in regards to their treatment, performance, or handling by Respondent or Yerger.
Petitioner did not present any evidence of racial motivation by Respondent during her case in chief; nor did Petitioner present any evidence of any comparators who were white who were treated any differently as a result of similar conduct on the part of Petitioner. Giordano was not a valid comparator of Petitioner since she was a charge nurse, a non- management hourly employee.
Petitioner had no knowledge nor did she present any evidence of how Yerger treated the other center directors, how well they performed their jobs, how well they prepared the monthly reports, their leadership and management skills, who they may have roomed with during the Nashville conference, or that she was treated differently in regards to being able to hire employees. In fact, Petitioner testified that she had been authorized to hire employees, contrary to her EEOC charge statement.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter at this proceeding pursuant to Sections 120.57(1) and 120.569 and Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2003).
The State of Florida, under the legislative scheme contained in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, incorporates and adopts the legal principles and precedents established in the
federal anti-discrimination laws specifically set forth under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The Florida law prohibiting unlawful employment practices is found in Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. This section prohibits discrimination against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race or color. § 760.10(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003). The FCHR and the Florida courts interpreting the provisions of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA) have determined that federal discrimination law should be used as guidance when construing provisions of the Act. See Brand v. Florida Power Corp., 633 So. 2d 504, 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Florida Department of Community Affairs v. Bryant, 586 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Cooper v. Lakeland Regional Medical Center, 16 FALR 567, 574 (FCHR 1993).
Petitioner has the ultimate burden to prove discrimination either by direct or indirect evidence. Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, would prove the existence of discrimination without inference or presumption. Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581-82 (11th Cir. 1989). Only blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate, constitute direct evidence of discrimination. Id. at 582; See Earley v. Champion International Corporation,
907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990). There is no record of any direct evidence of discrimination on the part of Respondent's supervisor. There is no evidence he made any race or color- related comments or slurs. Petitioner has not presented any documentary evidence which would constitute direct evidence of discrimination.
Absent any direct evidence of discrimination, the Supreme Court established, and later clarified, the burden of proof in disparate treatment cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) and again in the case of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (1993). The FCHR has adopted this evidentiary model.
Kilpatrick v. Howard Johnson Co., 7 FALR 5468, 5475 (FCHR 1985). McDonnell Douglas places upon Petitioner the initial burden of proving a prima facie case of race or color discrimination. See also Davis v. Humana of Florida, Inc., 15 FALR 231 (FCHR 1992); Laroche v. Department of Labor and Employment Security, 13 FALR 4121 (FCHR 1991).
Judicial authorities have established the burden of proof for establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment. Petitioner must show that:
The Petitioner is a member of a protected group;
The Petitioner is qualified for the position; and
The Petitioner was subject to an adverse employment decision (Petitioner was terminated);
The position was filled by a person of another race or color or that she was treated less favorably than similarly- situated persons outside the protected class:
There must be shown by the evidence that there is a causal connection between a. and c.
Crapp v. City of Miami Beach, 242 F.3d 1017, 1020 (11th Cir. 2001); Canino v. EEOC, 707 F.2d 468 (11th Cir. 1983); Lee v.
Russell County Board of Education, 684 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1982), appeal after remand, 744 F.2d 768 (11th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Georgia, 684 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1982); Samedi v. Miami-Dade County, 134 F.Supp. 2d 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
Proving a prima facie case serves to eliminate the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for Petitioner's disparate treatment. See Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 358, n. 44 (1977). It is not, however, the equivalent of a factual finding of discrimination. It is simply proof of actions taken by the employer from which discriminatory animus is inferred because experience has proved that, in the absence of any other explanation, it is more likely than not that those actions were bottomed on impermissible considerations. The presumption is that more often than not people do not act in a totally
arbitrary manner, without any underlying reason, in a business setting. Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
Once Petitioner has succeeded in proving all the elements necessary to establish a prima facie case, the employer must then articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment decision. The employer is required only to "produce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus."
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, at 257. The employer "need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons . . . [i]t is sufficient if the [employer's] evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the Plaintiff." Id. at 254. This burden is characterized as "exceedingly light." Perryman v. Johnson Products Co., Inc., 698 F.2d 1138, 1142 (11th Cir. 1983).
Once the employer articulates a legitimate reason for the action taken, the evidentiary burden shifts back to Petitioner who must prove that the reason offered by the employer for its decision is not the true reason, but is merely a pretext. The employer need not prove that it was actually motivated by the articulated nondiscriminatory reasons or that
the replacement was more qualified than Petitioner. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, at 257-8.
In Burdine, the Supreme Court emphasized that the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that Respondent intentionally discriminated against Petitioner remains at all times with Petitioner. Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, at 253. The Court confirmed this principle again in St. Mary's Honor Center vs. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S. Ct. 2742
(1993).
In the case sub judice, Petitioner has failed to produce any direct evidence of race or color discrimination. Only the most blatant remarks whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate constitute direct evidence of discrimination. Scott v. Suncoast Beverages, 295 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002); Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1359 (11th Cir. 1999); Pashoian v. GTE Directories, 208 F.Supp. 2d 1293 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
"In determining whether employees are similarly situated for purposes of establishing a prima facie case, it is necessary to consider whether the employees are involved in or accused of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways." Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., 137 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 1998), opinion modified by 151 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 1998). "The most important factors in the
disciplinary context are the nature of the offenses committed and the nature of the punishments imposed." Id. at 1311 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further, "Title VII does not take away an employer's right to interpret its rules as it chooses, and to make determinations as it sees fit under those rules." Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1999), reh'g denied. (quoting Jones, supra, at 1311); Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Comms., 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984).
The Eleventh Circuit requires that, in order to be similarly situated, "the quantity and quality of the comparator's misconduct be nearly identical to prevent courts from second-guessing employers' reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges." Maniccia v. Brown, supra at 1368. See also Henry v. City of Tallahassee, 216 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (N.D. Fl. 2002).
Petitioner cannot demonstrate and support a prima facie case of race discrimination under Title VII by simply showing that she belongs to a protected class and did not violate a work rule. Here, Petitioner must demonstrate that someone outside the protected class committed similar actions or demonstrated similar performance issues under the same superior, worked in the same category as Petitioner, and was not terminated. In the absence of this showing, Petitioner does not
make out one of the essential prongs of a prima facie case under Title VII and the FCRA. Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Medical
Center, supra. See Smith v. International Paper Co., 160 F.Supp.2d 1335, 1339-40 (M.D. Ala 2001).
In the Eleventh Circuit, if two employees are not similarly situated, the different application of work rules does not constitute illegal discrimination. Id. at 1340; Lathem v. Department of Children and Youth Services, 172 F.3d 786, 793 (11th Cir. 1999). In determining whether employees are similarly situated for the purposes of a prima facie case, a court must consider "whether the employees are involved in or accused of same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways. Silvera v. Orange County School Board, 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2002). The comparator's conduct must be nearly identical to the plaintiff's so that the courts will not second-guess employers' reasonable decisions." Smith, at 1340.
The purpose of a prima facie case is to show an adverse employment decision that resulted from a discriminatory motive. Perryman v. Johnson Products Co., 698 F.2d 1138, 1143 (11th Cir. 1983); Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 931 F.Supp 773 (M.D. Ala 1996). To establish a prima facie case under the FCRA, where a termination is the adverse employment action, Petitioner must establish and present evidence that Respondent awarded the position vacated by Petitioner to someone outside
the protected class. Petitioner cannot make out a prima facie case if she does not establish that the position was in fact "awarded to a person of a non-protected class." Green v. School Board of Hillborough County, 25 F.3d 974, 978 (11th Cir. 1994); See also Dudley, supra, at 788.
Petitioner did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination in her case in chief. No showing of any non- protected class replacement employee was presented, no valid comparator was presented and, in fact, Petitioner had no knowledge or evidence of how any other center director was treated, performed, or disciplined. The burden was entirely upon Petitioner to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. "Whatever the employer's decision making process, a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the outcome." Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1706 (1993). This standard required Petitioner to establish that "but for" her protected class and the employer's intent to discriminate she would not have been fired. Petitioner has not done so. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to come forward with sufficient evidence to meet her initial burden of proof on the issue of race or color discrimination.
Assuming, arguendo, however, that Petitioner had met her initial burden, Respondent must then articulate some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action that it took. Respondent need not persuade the trier of fact that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons, but must merely set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reason for those actions. Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, at 254-255; Pashoian, at 1309.
In the instant case, Respondent offered credible testimony that Petitioner was terminated from her position as center director because she failed to meet the employer's reasonable job performance standards. Therefore, Respondent has satisfied its requirement of articulating legitimate, non- discriminatory reasons for terminating Petitioner. See
Samedi v. Miami-Dade County, supra.
Thereafter, Petitioner retains the burden of persuasion and must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by Respondent were not its true reasons, but rather were a pretext for intentional discrimination. Texas Department of Community Affairs, at 253; Samedi, supra at 1346. Thus, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that Respondent intentionally discriminated against Petitioner remains at all times with Petitioner. 450
U.S. at 253. Indeed, even when the non-discriminatory reason
articulated by a respondent has been demonstrated by the petitioner to be false, the petitioner must still prove that the adverse action truly was based upon unlawful discrimination.
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, supra.
Petitioner has not satisfied her burden of persuasion.
By making mere conclusory allegations of discrimination or stating her subjective belief that an unlawful discrimination has taken place is insufficient to met her burden. Samedi, supra at 1346. Furthermore, in the absence of evidence of intent to discriminate, courts and administrative agencies are "not in the business of adjudging whether employment decisions are prudent or fair," but rather "whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged employment decision." Pashoian, supra at 1309.
Petitioner has failed to show that the decision to fire her was based on anything other than legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.
RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order which DENIES Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination and dismisses her complaint.
DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
DANIEL M. KILBRIDE
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 2003.
John C. Stivarius, Jr., Esquire Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C. Resurgens Plaza, Suite 2700
Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100
Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
