STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, ) CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND ) TRAINING COMMISSION, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 03-3660PL

)

TIMOTHY J. MILLER, )

)

Respondent. )

)

RECOMMENDED ORDER

Pursuant to notice, a hearing was conducted in this case on December 3, 2003, by video teleconference at sites in West Palm Beach and Tallahassee, Florida, before Stuart M. Lerner, a duly- designated Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH).

APPEARANCES

For Petitioner: Linton B. Eason, Esquire

Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489

Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489

For Respondent: John P. Marinelli, Esquire

1615 Forum Place

Suite 500-B, Barristers Building West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-2382

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE

Whether Respondent committed the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against him and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On September 29, 2000, Petitioner issued an Administrative Complaint against Respondent alleging that, "[o]n or about December 31, 1997, [he] did unlawfully and knowingly make a false statement in writing with the intent to mislead [now]- Sergeant [and then-Deputy] James Diefenbacher of the Broward County Sheriff's Office, a public servant, in the performance of his official duty," in "violat[ion] [of] the provisions of Section 837.05 or any lesser included offenses, Section 943.1395(6) and/or (7), Florida Statutes, and/or Rule 11B- 27.0011(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code," and that, in light of this unlawful conduct, the taking of disciplinary action against him was warranted. Respondent disputed all of the allegations in the Administrative Complaint with the exception of those in paragraph 1, which he admitted,1 and requested "a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, before an administrative law judge appointed by the Division of Administrative Hearings." The matter was referred to DOAH on June 17, 2003, for the assignment of an administrative law judge to conduct the "formal hearing" Respondent had requested. It

was docketed as DOAH Case No. 03-2242PL. The "formal hearing" was originally scheduled for July 23, 2003, but was cancelled and rescheduled for September 8, 2003. On September 8, 2003, at the request of the parties, an order was entered cancelling the "formal hearing" and closing the file in DOAH Case No. 03-2242PL "with leave for either party to request [DOAH] to reopen the case, should the parties not reach a settlement."

On September 23, 2003, Petitioner filed a motion requesting that the file in DOAH Case No. 03-2242PL be reopened. On October 9, 2003, an order was issued granting the motion and reopening DOAH Case No. 03-2242PL as DOAH Case No. 03-3660PL. Subsequently, the "formal hearing" in DOAH Case No. 03-3660PL was scheduled for December 3, 2003.

On December 2, 2003, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation, which provided as follows:

1. The parties hereby stipulate that at all times material hereto Respondent was a certified law enforcement and correctional officer in the State of Florida.

   
   

2. The parties stipulate to the introduction of the following documents:

   
   

   1. Stipulation [sic] dated December 31, 1997 consisting of one page.

      
      

      Respondent stipulates to the authenticity of Respondent's signature only. Exhibit "1."

      
      

   2. Deferred Prosecution Agreement consisting of one page. Exhibit "2."

   3. Nolle Prosse document consisting of one page. Exhibit "3."

      
      

3. The issue to be decided in this matter is whether or not Respondent had specific intent to deceive by affidavit dated December 31, 1997.

As noted above, the "formal hearing" requested by Respondent on the allegations in the Administrative Complaint issued against him was held on December 3, 2003.

Petitioner's evidentiary presentation consisted exclusively of the offering into evidence of the three exhibits (Petitioner's Exhibits 1 through 3) described in the parties' Joint Stipulation. All three of these exhibits were received into evidence. Respondent testified on his own behalf and offered two exhibits (Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2) into evidence, both of which were admitted.

At the close of the taking of evidence, the undersigned established a January 20, 2004, deadline for the filing of proposed recommended orders. Respondent filed his Proposed Recommended Order on January 20, 2004.

On January 30, 2004, Petitioner filed a Request for Extension of Time to File Post-Hearing Documents. During a telephone conversation with the undersigned's secretary on February 3, 2004, counsel for the Respondent indicated he did not oppose the request. On February 3, 2004, the undersigned issued an order granting Petitioner's motion and giving

Petitioner until 5:00 p.m. on February 10, 2004, to file its proposed recommended order. Petitioner filed its Proposed Recommended Order on February 3, 2004.

The parties' post-hearing submittals have been carefully considered by the undersigned.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Based on the evidence adduced at "formal hearing," and the record as a whole, including the parties' Joint Stipulation, the following findings of fact are made:

1. Respondent is now, and has been since February 19, 1998, certified as a correctional officer in the State of Florida. He holds Correctional Certificate Number 178896.

2. On February 19, 1982, Respondent was certified as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida and issued Law Enforcement Certificate Number 34142, which has since expired.

3. Respondent is now, and has been since shortly after receiving his bachelor of science degree in education from Slippery Rock University, certified as a teacher in the State of Florida.

4. From the early 1980's until 1993, Respondent worked as a police officer for various law enforcement agencies in Florida.

5. In 1985, Respondent was physically arrested and charged with battery in Pinellas County. He was acquitted of the charge

   following a jury trial. After the acquittal, at Respondent's request, records relating to the matter were ordered sealed.

6. In the mid 1990's, Respondent worked for Wackenhut Corporation as a teacher at correctional facilities in Moore Haven and South Bay, Florida.

7. While working for Wackenhut in South Bay, Respondent was asked to assist in the "start up" of a "work release center" in Broward County, Florida, that Wackenhut was going to operate for the Broward County Sheriff's Office. Pursuant to Wackenhut policy, Respondent had to "go through a correctional academy" before assuming his new duties.

8. After graduating from the "correctional academy," Respondent relocated to Broward County and began his new assignment for Wackenhut.

9. Respondent's primary tasks were to "draw[] up all the rules and regulations for the [soon to be opened] facility" and "interview[] people for jobs."

10. Respondent was housed in a "temporary [Wackenhut] office" in Lauderdale-by-the-Sea, Florida, along with others involved in the effort to open the facility, including Richard Fortenberry, who was going to be the facility administrator.

11. On September 26, 1997, Respondent was accused of stealing a "couple of packs of playing cards" from a retail establishment in Palm Beach County, Florida. The Palm Beach

    County Sheriff's Office deputy on the scene issued Respondent a notice to appear2 in lieu of physically arresting Respondent.

12. As directed, Respondent subsequently appeared in the Criminal Division of Palm Beach County Court to respond (in Palm Beach County Court Case No. 97-024167 MM A04) to the retail theft accusation made against him.

13. On November 17, 1997, Respondent signed a Deferred Prosecution Agreement in Palm Beach County Court Case No. 97- 024167 MM A04,3 which provided that, if Respondent complied with the[] "conditions [set forth in the agreement] during the [three-month] period of Deferred Prosecution, no criminal prosecution concerning this charge [of retail theft] [would] be instituted "

14. On December 22, 1997, the Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office issued a Nolle Prosse in Palm Beach County Court Case No. 97-024167 MM A04.

15. The Broward County "work release center" was scheduled to open in February of 1998.

16. Respondent was to occupy a "lead supervisor" position at the facility when it opened.

17. Before he was able to assume this position, however, Respondent needed to fill out an "extensive" application (even though he was already employed by Wackenhut) and pass a pre-

    employment review conducted by the Broward County Sheriff's Office.

18. Respondent filled out the application, "to the best of [his] ability," in October of 1997.

19. On the application, he mentioned the 1985 Pinellas County battery charge of which he was acquitted, but not the notice to appear that he had received the previous month.4

20. Deputy James Diefenbacher was the Broward County Sheriff's Office "contract manager" for the Broward County "work release center" project.

21. In November of 1997, after Respondent had entered into his Deferred Prosecution Agreement in Palm Beach County Court Case No. 97-024167 MM A04, Mr. Fortenberry told Respondent that Deputy Diefenbacher needed from Respondent certain documents concerning the 1985 Pinellas County battery charge in order for Deputy Diefenbacher to complete his pre-employment review of Respondent's background. Respondent promptly furnished Deputy Diefenbacher the requested documents.

22. On December 31, 1997, Deputy Diefenbacher "showed up" at Respondent's office in Lauderdale-by-the-Sea and told Respondent that he "needed to talk to [Respondent] real quick."

23. It was New Year's Eve. The "handful of people," including Respondent, who were there, were finishing up there work for the day so the office could close early.

24. After he and Respondent "looked over [Respondent's] application" together, Deputy Diefenbacher turned on a tape recorder, "swore [Respondent] in," presented Respondent with a document, and told Respondent, "I need you to sign this document here. It means that you don't have any other arrest history."5

25. The document, which was typed on Broward County Sheriff's Office letterhead, read as follows:

    I swear under oath that all information regarding my criminal history has been presented to the Broward Sheriff's Office. My criminal history consists of a charge of simple battery, of which I was found not guilty of all charges by the court. Not [sic] other criminal history exists.

    
    

    SWORN AND ATTESTED TO BY TIMOTHY J. MILLER ON THIS 31ST DAY OF DECEMBER NINETEEN HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN.

    
    

    Signed

    
    

    By: DEPUTY JAMES DIEFENBACHER OF THE BROWARD SHERIFF'S OFFICE

    
    

    Signed CCN#

    
    

26. Respondent signed the document without reading it.

    
    

    Respondent took Deputy Diefenbacher at his word that, by signing the document, Respondent was attesting that he had no other arrests other than his 1985 arrest in Pinellas County for battery.

27. Respondent did not intend to deceive anyone in signing

    the document. He believed that the information contained in the document (as explained to him by Deputy Diefenbacher) was true.6 He did not consider his having been given a notice to appear (on September 26, 1997, in Palm Beach County) to have constituted an arrest.7

28. Nonetheless, "a couple [of] years later," Petitioner was charged with and tried for perjury in connection with his signing the document; however, he was acquitted of the charge.8

    CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    
    

29. DOAH has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding and of the parties hereto pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes.

30. At all times material to the instant case, Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, has provided that any person employed or appointed as a law enforcement or correctional officer in the State of Florida shall "[h]ave a good moral character as determined by a background investigation under procedures established by the [Criminal Justice Standards and Training] [C]ommission."

31. At all times material to the instant case, Section 943.1395, Florida Statutes, has authorized Petitioner to revoke the certification of a law enforcement or correctional officer who has failed to maintain "good moral character . . . as required by Section 943.13(7)," Florida Statutes, or,

    alternatively, to impose specified, lesser penalties on the certificate holder.

32. Such action may be taken only if the certificate holder's lack of "good moral character" is established by clear and convincing evidence. See Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities and Investor Protection v. Osborne Stern

    and Company, 670 So. 2d 932, 935 (Fla. 1996); Newberry v. Florida Department of Law Enforcement, 585 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); and Section 120.57(1)(j), Florida Statutes ("Findings of fact shall be based on a preponderance of the evidence, except in penal or licensure disciplinary proceedings or except as otherwise provided by statute. ").

33. Clear and convincing evidence "requires more proof than a 'preponderance of the evidence' but less than 'beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.'" In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d 744, 753 (Fla. 1997). It is an "intermediate standard." Id. For proof to be considered "'clear and convincing' . . .

    the evidence must be found to be credible; the facts to which the witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; the testimony must be precise and explicit and the witnesses must be lacking in confusion as to the facts in issue. The evidence must be of such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." In re

    Davey, 645 So. 2d 398, 404 (Fla. 1994), quoting, with approval, from Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). "Although this standard of proof may be met where the evidence is in conflict, . . . it seems to preclude evidence that is ambiguous." Westinghouse Electric Corporation, Inc. v. Shuler Bros., Inc., 590 So. 2d 986, 989 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).

34. In determining whether Petitioner has met its burden of proof, it is necessary to evaluate its evidentiary presentation in light of the specific allegations of lack of "good moral character" made in the charging instrument. Due process prohibits an agency from taking penal action against a certificate holder based on matters not specifically alleged in the charging instrument, unless those matters have been tried by consent. See Shore Village Property Owners' Association, Inc.

    v. Department of Environmental Protection, 824 So. 2d 208, 210 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); Hamilton v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 764 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Lusskin v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 731 So. 2d 67,

    69 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Cottrill v. Department of Insurance, 685 So. 2d 1371, 1372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); and Delk v. Department of Professional Regulation, 595 So. 2d 966, 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).

35. "'Moral character' is not only the ability to distinguish between right and wrong, but the character to

    observe the difference; the observance of the rules of right conduct, and conduct which indicates and establishes the qualities generally acceptable to the populace for positions of trust and confidence." Zemour, Inc. v. State Division of Beverage, 347 So. 2d 1102, 1105 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). A law enforcement or correctional officer demonstrates a lack of "good moral character" when he or she engages in "acts and conduct which would cause a reasonable man to have substantial doubts about an individual's honesty, fairness, and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of the state and nation." Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: G. W. L., 364 So. 2d 454, 458 (Fla. 1978).

36. Petitioner, which has the ultimate authority to administratively interpret the provisions of Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and Section 943.1395, Florida Statutes, has codified in Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4) what the Florida courts have said on the subject of what constitutes a lack of "good moral character." At all material times in the instant case, Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.0011(4), has provided, in pertinent part, as follows:

    For the purposes of the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission's implementation of any of the penalties specified in Section 943.1395(6) or (7), F.S., a certified officer's failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), F.S., is defined as:

    
    

    * * *

    
    

    (b) The perpetration by the officer of an act which would constitute any of the following misdemeanor or criminal offenses, whether criminally prosecuted or not: Section[] . . . 837.05, 837.06 . . . .

    
    

    * * *

    
    

37. At all times material to the instant case, Sections

    
    

    837.05 and 837.06, Florida Statutes, have provided as follows:

    
    

    1. False reports to law enforcement authorities.--

       
       

       1. Except as provided in subsection (2), whoever knowingly gives false information to any law enforcement officer concerning the alleged commission of any crime, commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

          
          

       2. Whoever knowingly gives false information to a law enforcement officer concerning the alleged commission of a capital felony, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

       
       

    2. False official statements.--Whoever knowingly makes a false statement in writing with the intent to mislead a public servant in the performance of his or her official duty shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

    
    

38. In the instant case, Petitioner is seeking to take disciplinary action against Respondent on the ground that Respondent has failed to maintain "good moral character" in that, "[o]n or about December 31, 1997, [he] did unlawfully and

    knowingly make a false statement in writing with the intent to mislead [now]-Sergeant [and then-Deputy] James Diefenbacher of the Broward County Sheriff's Office, a public servant, in the performance of his official duty."

39. As the parties agreed in their prehearing Joint Stipulation, the key factual "issue to be decided in this matter is whether or not Respondent [in giving this written statement] had specific intent to deceive" Deputy Diefenbacher. This issue is outcome-determinative because the mere making of an untrue statement, without any intent to deceive, does not demonstrate a lack of "good moral character,"9 whereas the "[lack of good moral character] appears to some degree whenever there is a subjective intent to deceive, no matter how immaterial the deception." Kungys v. U.S., 108 S. Ct. 1537, 1551, 485 U.S. 759, 780 (1988).

40. It was Petitioner's burden at the "formal hearing" held in this case to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent possessed such "subjective intent to deceive."

41. Deceptive and other wrongful "intent may be established through direct or indirect circumstantial evidence." Johnson v. Hamrick, 155 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1377 (N.D. Ga. 2001).

42. "Direct evidence [of wrongful intent] is evidence that, if believed, would prove the existence of [wrongful] intent without resort to inference or presumption." King v. La

    Playa-De Varadero Restaurant, No. 02-2502, 2003 WL 435084 *3 n.9 (Fla. DOAH 2003).

43. "Direct evidence of [wrongful] intent is often unavailable." Shealy v. City of Albany, Ga., 89 F.3d 804, 806 (11th Cir. 1996); see also State v. West, 262 So. 2d 457, 458 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972)("[I]ntent is not usually the subject of direct proof."); and U.S. v. Britton, 289 F.3d 976, 981 (7th Cir. 2002)("As direct evidence of a defendant's fraudulent intent is typically unavailable, specific intent to defraud may be established by circumstantial evidence and by inferences drawn from examining the scheme itself that demonstrate that the scheme was reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension.")(internal quotation marks omitted).

44. In the instant case, Petitioner did not present any direct evidence of deceptive intent. Rather, it attempted to establish such intent by showing that Respondent represented, in his December 31, 1997, written statement, that his "criminal history consist[ed] [only] of a charge of simple battery," when he knew that, in October of that year, he had been given a "notice to appear" to respond (in Palm Beach County Court Case No. 97-024167 MM A04) to an accusation of retail theft (which was ultimately never prosecuted in accordance with the terms of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement he had entered into). It is Petitioner's position, as explained in its Proposed Recommended

    Order, that someone with Respondent's background "would understand that the notice [to] appear charges [the] individual [to whom it is given] with a crime and thus, is certainly considered a part of a criminal history" and that therefore the undersigned should infer that Respondent had actual knowledge of the falsity of the representation he made in his written statement regarding his "criminal history" and thus such representation was made with the intent to deceive.

45. Whether Petitioner made out, through its circumstantial proof, a prima facie case of deceptive intent is an academic issue, given the persuasiveness of Respondent's evidentiary presentation.

46. Any presumption of deceptive intent that may have arisen from Petitioner's proof in its case-in-chief was rebutted and overcome by the uncontradicted, credible testimony that Respondent gave in his own defense concerning the circumstances surrounding the giving of his written statement and his state of mind at the time.

47. Having determined that Respondent was telling the truth when he gave this exculpatory testimony,10 the undersigned concludes that there is not clear and convincing evidence supporting a finding that Respondent engaged in the

    intentionally deceptive and misleading conduct alleged in the Administrative Complaint.

48. Absent such evidence, the Administrative Complaint must be dismissed.

RECOMMENDATION

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby

RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent in the instant case.

DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.

S

STUART M. LERNER

Administrative Law Judge

Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building

1230 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060

(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675

Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2004.

ENDNOTES

1/ Paragraph 1 of the Administrative Complaint alleges as follows:

Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on February 19, 1982, and was issued Law Enforcement Certificate Number 34142, and on February 19, 1998, was issued Correctional

Certificate Number 178896.

Respondent is bound by his admission of these alleged facts. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Horkheimer, 814 So. 2d 1069, 1072 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)("While State Farm now claims the policy limits are lower, it is bound by its admission on default."); City of Deland v. Miller, 608 So. 2d 121, 122 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)("The parties are bound by their pleadings.

Admissions in the pleadings are accepted as facts without the necessity of further proof. Moreover, these uncontested facts do not have to be introduced into evidence at trial.")(citation omitted); Fernandez v. Valle, 364 So. 2d 835, 838 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)("Appellant, Carmen Fernandez, admitted in her answer the allegation contained in the appellee-plaintiff's complaint that she jointly operated the station in question as a partnership or joint venture with her husband. She is bound by that admission and the appellees were not required to offer proof at trial."); and Vann v. Hobbs, 197 So. 2d 43, 45 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)("Admissions made in the complaint and answer, upon which issue is finally joined, are accepted as facts without the necessity of supporting evidence. The litigants are bound by these admissions.").

2/ Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.125(a), a "notice to appear" is "a written order issued by a law enforcement officer in lieu of physical arrest requiring a person accused of violating the law to appear in a designated court or governmental office at a specified date and time."

3/ At all times material to the instant case, Respondent knew that Palm Beach County Court Case No. 97-024167 MM A04 was a criminal case.

4/ The application was not offered into evidence, and it is unclear from the evidentiary record exactly what information the application asked for. (This lack of clarity, however, is not fatal to Petitioner's case since the "false statement" that

Respondent is alleged, in the Administrative Complaint, to have made is not any statement made in the application. Rather, the allegedly "false statement" identified in the Administrative Complaint is a written statement Respondent gave Deputy Diefenbacher on or about December 31, 1997, after Respondent had completed and submitted the application.)

5/ This finding is based on Respondent's unrebutted evidence, which the undersigned (although not required to) finds credible. See Department of Highway Safety v. Dean, 662 So. 2d 371, 372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)("[T]he finder of fact is not required to believe the testimony of any witness, even if unrebutted.") (The other participant in the conversation, Deputy Diefenbacher, did not testify at the "formal hearing.")

6/ The actual truth or falsity of the information depends on the meaning ascribed to "criminal history," a term susceptible to differing interpretations.

7/ Respondent so testified, and the undersigned has credited this testimony, which is quite plausible given, as noted above, that, in Florida, a "notice to appear" is "issued . . . in lieu of physical arrest" and that Respondent had been forthcoming about his 1985 battery arrest and prosecution in Pinellas County.

8/ In his Response to Administrative Complaint and Request for Formal Hearing, Respondent raised this acquittal as an affirmative defense. It is well-established, however, that the acquittal of a criminal charge does not bar a civil or administrative action arising out of the same facts. See The Florida Bar v. Musleh, 453 So. 2d 794, 796 (Fla. 1984); State v.

Dubose, 11 So. 2d 477, 480-81 (Fla. 1943); and Knight v. State,

336 So. 2d 385, 387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).

9/ See St. Amanze v. I.N.S., 2003 WL 22061870 *2 (D. R.I.

2003).

10/ "Being a state of mind, intent is usually a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact. The trier of fact has the opportunity to observe the witnesses. From that observation, the trier of fact may determine the believability of that witness and the weight to be given his testimony. The demeanor of the witness, his frankness, or lack of frankness, his intelligence, his interest in the outcome of the case, and the reasonableness of the testimony presented, in the light of

all the evidence in the case, are but a few of those factors which may play a part in making that determination." State v. West, 262 So. 2d at 458.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice

Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Linton B. Eason, Esquire

Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489

Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489

John P. Marinelli, Esquire 1615 Forum Place

Suite 500-B, Barristers Building West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-2382

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS

All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within

15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.

Docket for Case No: 03-003660PL

Orders for Case No: 03-003660PL