STATE OF FLORIDA
DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL )
SERVICES, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 04-2656PL
)
MICHAEL DEAN MASTIN, )
)
Respondent. )
)
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Pursuant to notice, a formal hearing was held in this case before Larry J. Sartin, an Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, on December 9 and 10, 2004, and March 29, 2005, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
APPEARANCES
For Petitioner: Gregg S. Marr, Esquire
Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building
200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333
For Respondent: Paul H. Bass, Esquire
Paul H. Bass, P.A.
Datran Tower II, Suite 1509 9130 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156
Deborah Marks, Esquire Deborah Marks, P.A.
999 Brickell Bay Drive, Suite 1809
Miami, Florida 33131
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Michael Dean Mastin, committed the offenses alleged in an Administrative Complaint issued by Petitioner, the Department of Financial Services, on July 6, 2004, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On January 26, 2004, Petitioner issued an Administrative Complaint, Petitioner's Case No. 71867-04-AG, alleging that Respondent had violated certain statutory provisions governing the conduct of Florida insurance agents. On July 26, 2004, Respondent executed a document titled Election of Proceedings, disputing the factual allegations of the Administrative Complaint and requesting a hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2004). A copy of the Administrative Complaint and the Election of Proceedings was filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on July 27, 2004. The matter was designated DOAH Case No. 04-2656PL and was assigned to the undersigned.
A final hearing was scheduled for September 30, 2004, by Notice of Hearing issued August 19, 2004. After granting two requests for continuances, the final hearing was scheduled for December 9 and 10, 2004, by an Amended Notice of Hearing.
The final hearing commenced as scheduled on December 9, 2004. On December 10, 2004, during a recess of the final hearing, comments were made by an employee of Petitioner's Division of Insurance Fraud which suggested to Respondent that criminal charges might be brought against him. Consequently, following the recess, Respondent requested that the case be continued to give Respondent an opportunity to seek additional legal advice from an attorney specializing in criminal law as to whether he should proceed with this matter. The requested continuance was granted.
On December 14, 2004, a telephone conference was held to discuss whether the case should be placed in abeyance.
Respondent requested an abeyance of the matter so that he would not have to choose between testifying in this proceeding or asserting his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. During the conference, Petitioner represented that "there was no active criminal investigation" of Respondent, or words to that effect, but was unable to state whether criminal proceedings would be pursued in the future. Therefore, Respondent's request for an abeyance was granted. Petitioner was ordered to report the status of the case on or before March 1, 2005.
On December 30, 2004, counsel for Petitioner filed a letter indicating that there was an active criminal investigation
underway and that the matter would be presented to the State Attorney's Office, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in mid-January.
On February 8, 2005, Petitioner filed a Motion to Resume Final Hearing. Petitioner reported in the Motion that it had concluded its criminal investigation, referred the matter to the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit State Attorney's office, and that prosecution had been declined.
On February 15, 2005, the final hearing was scheduled to reconvene on March 29, 2005. The hearing reconvened as scheduled and was completed on March 29, 2005.
At the final hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of David Greenberg, Rhoda Augustine, Debbie Brown, Robert Keegan, Dennis Adams, Howard Seiden, Linda Grant, Anne Marie Thomas-Oto, Deborah Kelly, and Andrew Curtis. Mrs. Augustine, Mr. Keegan, and Ms. Grant were called as rebuttal witnesses. Petitioner's Exhibits number 1 through 18, 20 through 25, 28, 33 through 34,
38 through 39, 42, 45 through 49, 52, 55, 57, and 59 through 67 were admitted.
The Respondent testified on his own behalf. Respondent's Exhibits number 1 through 19 were admitted.
By Notice of Filing of Transcript issued May 31, 2005, the parties were informed that the Transcript of the final hearing had been filed on May 25, 2005.
Some of the exhibits admitted at the final hearing were not filed with the Transcript. Therefore, Petitioner was contacted by the undersigned's administrative assistant and asked to coordinate the filing of duplicates of the exhibits with Respondent. On July 14, 2005, Petitioner filed copies of Petitioner's Exhibits 7 through 10, 25, and 49, and Respondent's
Exhibits 2 through 7, 9 through 11, and 18. After the copies of these exhibits were filed, the original Respondent's Exhibits 2 through 7, and 10 through 11 were located.
The parties, pursuant to agreement, had until June 24, 2005, to file proposed recommended orders. Both parties filed proposed orders on June 24, 2005. The post-hearing submittals have been fully considered.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Parties.
Petitioner, the Department of Financial Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility for, among other things, the investigation and prosecution of complaints against individuals licensed to conduct insurance business in Florida. Ch. 626, Fla. Stat. (2004).1
Respondent, Michael Dean Mastin, is currently, and was at all times pertinent to this matter, licensed in Florida as a Life (2-16) and Life & Health (2-18) Agent. The Department,
therefore, had, at all times relevant this matter, jurisdiction over his licenses and appointments.
Mr. Mastin's license identification number is A167869.
During the times relevant, Mr. Mastin conducted insurance business as a sole proprietor, using the fictitious name "AIT." He also conducted accounting services, including the preparation of Federal income tax returns for individuals (hereinafter referred to as "Tax Returns").
Tax Return Preparations.
During the early part of 1998, in response to an advertisement concerning Tax Return preparation and investment advice carried in a local newspaper, Ervin "Augie" Augustine or Rhoda Augustine telephoned Mr. Mastin.
At the time of this first contact, Mr. Augustine was approximately 85 or 86 years of age2 and Mrs. Augustine was 71 or
72 years of age.3
Mr. Augustine, who died on August 18, 2000, had been diagnosed with Alzheimer's in 1997. Mr. Augustine continued to handle most of the business affairs of the Augustines until early 2000.
Mr. Mastin visited the Augustines at their home after they telephoned him. It was agreed during the meeting that Mr. Mastin would prepare the Augustine's 1997 Tax Return.
Mr. Mastin subsequently prepared the Augustine's 1997 Tax Return. See Petitioner's Exhibit 7. That return was filed by the Augustines with the Internal Revenue Service during the spring of 1998.
The Augustines, who maintained their important documents in files which they maintained at their home, filed a copy of the 1997 Tax Return prepared by Mr. Mastin. The copy of the 1997 Tax Return maintained by the Augustines did not include a "Schedule A." Schedule A is used by individual Federal income taxpayers to "itemize" deductions which may be taken against taxable income in computing the amount of income tax they must pay. In lieu of itemizing deductions, individual Federal income taxpayers may take the "standard" deduction, a statutorily established deductible amount. For the 1997 tax year, the standard deduction for married taxpayers 65 years of age or older filing a joint return was $8,500.00.4 The 1997 Tax Return prepared by Mr. Mastin and filed by the Augustines claimed a standard deduction of $8,500.00.
At the time that Mr. Mastin prepared the Augustines' 1997 Tax Return, Mr. Mastin told them that he would waive his normal fee for the preparation of their 1997 Tax Return if they would purchase insurance-investment products from him. They agreed, and consequently, Mr. Mastin did not charge the Augustines any fee for preparing their 1997 Tax Return in
anticipation of their purchase of insurance-investment products from him.
Mr. Mastin subsequently gave the Augustines a presentation on insurance-investment products he wished to sell them, but they made no purchase at that time.
During the spring of 1999, Mr. Mastin prepared the Augustine's 1998 Tax Return. See Petitioner's Exhibit 8. Again, Mr. Mastin did not charge the Augustines for his services.
The Augustines kept a copy of the 1998 Tax Return prepared by Mr. Mastin. Like the 1997 Tax Return, the copy of the 1998 Tax Return maintained by the Augustines did not include a "Schedule A." Again like the 1997 Tax Return, the 1998 Tax Return prepared by Mr. Mastin and filed by the Augustines claimed a standard deduction, this time in the amount of
$8,900.00, which was the amount of the standard deduction for married taxpayers 65 years of age or older filing a joint return for the 1998 tax year.5
On or about May 4, 1999, Mr. Mastin sold an annuity contract to the Augustines. The Augustines paid $30,000.00 for the annuity, for which Mr. Mastin earned a commission of
$2,160.00. This purchase fulfilled the agreement between
Mr. Mastin and the Augustines as to the waiver of his fees for Tax Return preparation.
By letter dated June 1, 1999, Mr. Mastin memorialized his agreement with the Augustines concerning the waiver of his fees for Tax Return preparation in exchange for the Augustines purchasing the annuity contract through him. The letter (hereinafter referred to as the "Fee Waiver Letter"), which was signed by Mr. Mastin as "Accountant", and acknowledged by the Augustines, provides the following:
This is to represent [sic] that an exchange for the tax return preparation for 1997 and 1998 and the extensive financial planning be in place of the commissions received under the American national [sic] annuity. If the annuity would not be taken [six] then the charge for the tax returns and financial planning will [sic] be the same as the commission and will [sic] be billed.
Petitioner's Exhibit 11. This letter, which contains several errors in spelling and punctuation, and is also not worded very professionally, contains the initials "MM/mm" at the bottom of the letter under Mr. Mastin's signature. It is inferred that this refers to Michael Mastin as the author and, either himself or his wife, Mary Mastin, as the typist.
The Augustines purchased additional annuity contracts from Mr. Mastin on September 8, 1999, October 8, 1999, and January 19, 2000. Mr. Mastin received commissions of $917.37,
$2,160.00 and $10,500.00 respectively for these sales. On February 9, 2001, Mrs. Augustine made an additional payment on
one of the previously purchased annuity contracts, for which Mr. Mastin received a commission of $1,350.00.
Mr. Mastin prepared the 1999 and 2000 Tax Returns for the Augustines.6 See Petitioner's Exhibits 8 and 9. Again, Mr. Mastin did not charge for his Tax Return preparation services.
The Augustines kept a copy of the 1999 Tax Return and Mrs. Augustine kept a copy of the 2000 Tax Return. Like the 1997 and 1998 Tax Returns, the copy of the 1999 and 2000 Tax Returns maintained by the Mrs. Augustine did not include a "Schedule A." Again like the 1997 and 1998 Tax Returns, the 1999 and 2000 Tax Returns prepared by Mr. Mastin claimed the standard deduction. For 1999, the amount of the claimed deduction was $8,900.00, which was the amount of the standard deduction for married taxpayers 65 years of age or older filing a joint return for the 1999 tax year.7 For 2000, the amount of the claimed deduction was $9,050.00, which was the amount of the standard deduction for married taxpayers 65 years of age or older filing a joint return for the 2000 tax year.8
Other than the commissions which Mr. Mastin earned for the annuity contracts he sold to the Augustines, Mr. Mastin, consistent with his initial verbal agreement and subsequently the Fee Waiver Letter, did not bill or charge the Augustines for the preparation of their 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000 Tax Returns.
Nor did they directly pay him for his Tax Return preparation services.
Mr. Mastin's Unconvincing Position.
Mr. Mastin asserted through his testimony that he charged the Augustines for Tax Return preparation services he provided them and that they did indeed pay him. His testimony is rejected for its lack of credibility.
In support of his argument that he was paid for his Tax Return preparation services, Mr. Mastin asserted unconvincingly the following:
That he received a check in 1999 in the amount of
$100.00 for his preparation of the 1997 and 1998 Tax Returns,
$45.00 cash in the spring of 2000 from Mr. Augustine for the 1999 Tax Return, and $50.00 cash in the spring of 2001 from Mrs. Augustine for the 2000 Tax Return;
That the Tax Returns he prepared for the Augustines contained a Schedule A and that a deduction for the amount of the tax preparation fees which they paid him was claimed thereon. A copy of the alleged Schedule A's was admitted as Respondent's Exhibits 13 through, and including, 16;
That invoices, admitted as Respondent's Exhibit 12, were sent to the Augustines for his Tax Return preparation services; and
That he revoked the Fee Waiver Letter the day after he wrote it.
Mr. Mastin's testimony and the evidence he offered in support of his assertion that he received three payments for his Tax Return preparation services to the Augustines was unconvincing for a number of reasons:
The ultimate facts of this case taken as a whole, do not support Mr. Mastin's testimony;
Mrs. Augustine, whose was more credible despite the occasional confusion in her testimony, denied that any payments were ever made to Mr. Mastin for his services;
The $100.00 check, Respondent's Exhibit 11, was payable to Mr. Mastin, was signed by Mr. Augustine and was dated October 6, 1999. Although the evidence failed to prove what the check to Mr. Mastin was for, more importantly, the evidence failed to prove it was made in payment for any Tax Return preparations. The check was written during the time when the Augustines had purchased two annuity contracts and immediately prior to their purchase of a third. More importantly, this alleged payment of Tax Return preparation fees is inconsistent with the Fee Waiver Letter prepared by or on behalf of
Mr. Mastin and signed by him. Finally, the date of the check is inconsistent with Mr. Mastin's deposition testimony that the Augustines paid him for the 1997 and 1998 Tax Returns when he
took the 1998 Tax Return to them to be signed, which was some time during the spring of 1999, not October 1999;
Mr. Mastin's assertion that he received cash for the 1999 Tax Return preparation and that the Augustines gave him only $45.00 because that was all the cash they had at the time is inconsistent with the fact that the Augustine's usual custom was to pay for expenses by check so that they would have a record of the transaction. There simply was no reason for them not to have followed this custom in paying for the preparation of their 1999 Tax Return. Additionally, if they had for some unexplained reason paid Mr. Mastin with cash, it is unlikely that the Augustines would not have had sufficient cash to pay the entire fee. There is also no reason, even if it were assumed that the Augustines did not have $50.00 in cash, that they wouldn't have used a check to pay the full amount of the asserted charge; and
Mr. Mastin's testimony concerning the 2000 Tax Return fee he asserted Mrs. Augustine paid him is rejected for essentially the same reasons Mr. Mastin's testimony concerning the payment for the 1999 Tax Return has been rejected.
Mr. Mastin's testimony and the evidence he offered in support of his assertion that he included a deduction on the Augustine's Tax Returns for the amount of the fee he received from them was unconvincing for a number of reasons:
The ultimate facts of this case taken as a whole, do not support Mr. Mastin's testimony;
The Schedule A's admitted as part of Respondent's Exhibits 14 through 16, while reflecting a deduction for the
$100.00 he testified he received in 1999 and the $45.00 cash he received in 2000, were not included with the copy of the 1997 through 2000 Tax Returns maintained by the Augustines; and
The amount of the total itemized deductions listed on the Schedule A's offered in evidence by Mr. Mastin unrealistically and unconvincingly equal the exact amount of the standard deduction reflected by the Augustine's copy of the Tax Returns filed by them for those years. The likelihood that the Augustine's itemized deductions would be exactly the same as the standard deduction four years in a row is ridiculously low.9
Mr. Mastin testified unconvincingly that invoices were provided to the Augustines for his services. The Augustines did not have a copy of those invoices in their files and their existence is inconsistent with the ultimate facts of this case and Mrs. Augustine's testimony that she never received them and had no copy of them in her files.
Finally, Mr. Mastin's testified unconvincingly that he spoke to Mrs. Augustine immediately after the Fee Waiver Letter had been executed and mailed a letter the next day, June 2, 1999, to Mrs. Augustine revoking the Fee Waiver Letter. A copy
of the June 2, 1999 letter (hereinafter referred to as the "Fee Waiver Revocation Letter), was admitted as Petitioner's
Exhibit 26. According to Mr. Mastin, he spoke to Mrs. Augustine and sent the Fee Waiver Revocation Letter because he was concerned that the Fee Waiver Agreement violated the laws governing his conduct as a licensed insurance agent in Florida.
The authenticity of the Fee Waiver Revocation Letter and Mr. Mastin's testimony concerning it are rejected for several reasons:
The ultimate facts of this case taken as a whole, do not support Mr. Mastin's testimony or the authenticity of the Fee Waiver Revocation Letter;
Mrs. Augustine denied ever receiving a telephone call from Mr. Mastin revocating the Fee Waiver Letter and denied receiving the Fee Waiver Revocation Letter. Mrs. Augustine did not have a copy of the Fee Waiver Revocation Letter in her files;
The Fee Waiver Revocation Letter was addressed only to Mrs. Augustine. It was not addressed to Mr. Augustine, although he was still alive at the time the letter was alleged to have been written and mailed. Because of the failure to address the letter to both Mr. and Mrs. Augustine, as the Fee Waiver Letter was, it is concluded that the Fee Waiver Revocation Letter was
prepared after this dispute arose, which was after Mr. Augustine had died;
Although Mr. Mastin had had Mr. and Mrs. Augustine sign the Fee Waiver Letter, he did not take this precaution with the Fee Waiver Revocation Letter which was purportedly written in order for Mr. Mastin to avoid a possible violation of the laws governing his insurance practice;
The initials at the bottom of the Fee Waiver Revocation Letter, indicating who had written the letter and who had typed it, are "MM/DEK." "DEK" are the initials of Mr. Mastin's secretary, Deborah Elfast Kelly. Ms. Kelly, however, testified that she did not remember typing the letter,10 that it is her custom to type her initials, not capitalized as the her initials appear on the Fee Waiver Revocation Letter, but in lower case;
The spelling and punctuation in the Fee Waiver Revocation Letter, and the unprofessional language thereof, are consistent with other documents which were authored by
Mr. Mastin and typed either by him or his wife and not someone employed as a secretary, like Ms. Kelly, who also provides secretarial services to a lawyer; and
Finally, the Fee Waiver Revocation Letter was not provided by Mr. Mastin to any of the employees of the Department who initially investigated this matter and requested information concerning Mr. Mastin's business relationship with the
Augustines until discovery had commenced. Such a letter could have resolved at least one of the charges Mr. Mastin faces in this case in his favor had he produced it earlier. The fact that it was not produced until this case began in earnest suggests that it is a recent creation.
The Agent of Record Letter.
Some time prior to 2002, Mrs. Augustine became interested in purchasing an additional annuity contract. After making several unsuccessful attempts to contact Mr. Mastin, she contacted another insurance agent and purchased annuity products from that agent.
In early February or late January 2002, Mr. Mastin contacted Mrs. Augustine for the first time since preparing the Augustine's 2000 Tax Return. He telephoned her to determine whether she wished for him to prepare her 2001 Tax Return. During this conversation, in response to an inquiry from
Mr. Mastin, Mrs. Augustine informed Mr. Mastin that she had purchased annuity products from another insurance agent.
Mr. Mastin became very upset and angry with Mrs. Augustine.
Shortly after their telephone conversation,
Mrs. Augustine received a letter dated February 14, 2002, from Mr. Mastin. Petitioner's Exhibit 18. Mr. Mastin unreasonably criticized Mrs. Augustine for what he perceived as her lack of loyalty to him after all he thought he had done for her. He
also told her that he had had "a chance to review [her] file", and informed her he was enclosing a "copy of an agreement that I found in the file that you signed on February 17, 2000, which should be self explanatory." He went on to state:
I remember the exact time and sayings that you and Augie made [sic] that morning. This is a standardized legal document that has been and still is used widely over the country in this area [sic] and has been very successful [sic] in being enforceable. It is not my intend [sic] to get an attorney to handle this matter as I hope we can work this out like honorable adults.
If I don’t' hear from you in 30 days, I will assume you will not be willing to honor the agreement.
The February 14, 2002, letter contains the initials "MM/mm" under Mr. Mastin's signature. The spelling and punctuation in the letter, and the unprofessional language thereof, are consistent with other documents which were authored by Mr. Mastin and typed either by him or his wife and not someone employed as a secretary.
Attached to the February 14, 2002, letter was a copy of what purported to be an agent of record letter. The Augustine's signatures appear at the bottom of the page.
Mr. Mastin's signature appears, without any underlining, to the write of the signatures of the Augustines and, under his signature it is "DATED 02/17/00" (hereinafter referred to as the "Agent of Record Letter").
The Agent of Record Letter states the following:
This is to certify that the firm Ait/Michael
Mastin will be considered agent of record on all life insurance and or annuity products purchased from Ervin Augustine and or Rhoda Augustine. This agreement will begin February 17, 2000 and will terminate on February 17, 2003, unless a new agreement is signed by Ait.
If the above products are purchased through another agency or broker, agent or direct [sic] all commissions that would have been paid in full shall be payable to Ait/Michael
d. Mastin by either the life Insurance [sic] company, agency, broker, agent or owner or beneficiary of the policy or policies.
If this action requires a court action or the hiring of an attorney to reach a settlement the above named persons or company shall be responsible for all attorney fees and court and related costs related to this matter for the execution of this agreement.
Mrs. Augustine, who was almost 77 years of age when she received Mr. Mastin's letter and the Agent of Record Letter, became very upset about what she perceived to be the threatening tone of Mr. Mastin's letter and the consequence of having possibly violated the Agent of Record Letter. While she did not recall ever having seen, much less, signed the Agent of Record Letter, she recognized the signatures on the document to be her's and her husband's and, therefore, assumed in her panic that she had indeed signed it.
Mrs. Augustine telephoned Mr. Mastin shortly after receiving his letter and the Agent of Record Letter in an unsuccessful effort to resolve the matter.
After unsuccessfully attempting to work things out with Mr. Mastin, Mrs. Augustine, who was worried about having to pay Mr. Mastin the commissions earned by the insurance agent she had dealt with in what she afraid was a violation of the Agent of Record Letter, as well as any legal fees incurred by
Mr. Mastin, went to the Department's Plantation, Florida, office on March 1, 3002, seeking assistance.
Mrs. Augustine met with Debbie Brown, a Senior Manager, Analyst 1, in the Department's Bureau of Outreach, Division of Community Service. Mrs. Augustine completed a Consumer Assistance Report, in which she wrote the following:
In the year 2000, the agent, Michael Mastin, had my husband sign the form, Agent of Record letter. My husband was diagnosed with Alzheimers in 1997 and so he signed the form. I was afraid of my husband's outburst & so I also signed. . . . Any life insurance or annuity that was purchased until the year 2003, even though he did not sell the products, I will have to pay him the commissions.
Petitioner's Exhibit 17. Mrs. Augustine, having given the Agent of Record Letter more thought, could not remember having signed it, but due to the fact that it was her signature and that of her husband at the bottom of the document Mr. Mastin had sent,
she believed that she must have signed it. Questioning why she did not remember signing the Agent of Record Letter and, likely, looking for a justification for not complying with its terms, she suggested that she had done so because Mr. Augustine, during an outburst of anger, had made her.
Mrs. Augustine gave a copy of the February 1, 2002, letter and a copy of the Agent of Record Letter Mr. Mastin had sent her to Ms. Brown, who maintained possession and control of both in her office. Ms. Brown gave Mrs. Augustine a receipt for the documents. Although not kept under lock and key, the evidence in this case failed to prove that anyone had any reason to access either document.
Shortly after her visit with Ms. Brown, Mrs. Augustine wrote the following letter to Mr. Mastin:
Mike; Since I was given a 30day [sic] time limit, I thought I should send you this letter, to confirm the fact that I am responding to you.
Some of the things that you wrote in your letter are incorrect, never the less [sic] I contacted the state insurance department, and you will hear from them.
I was so stressed out with Augie's condition, I will never understand how you can do this to me. You know he had Alzeimer's [sic] and I signed the form to avoid an outburst from him. You have seen him during one of these episodes.
Petitioner's Exhibit 49. Mrs. Augustine again indicated that she had signed the Agent of Record Letter for the same reasons she indicated she signed it in the Consumer Assistance Request she made with the Department.
Ms. Brown informed Mr. Mastin of the filing of the Consumer Assistance Request by letter dated March 4, 2002. Mr. Mastin responded to that letter by letter dated March 8,
2002. Not satisfied with his response, Ms. Brown forwarded the matter to the Department's Bureau of Investigation, where it was assigned to Special Investigator Linda L. Grant.
As part of her investigation, Ms. Grant met with Mrs. Augustine on April 9, 2002. After fully discussing the matter with Ms. Grant, Mrs. Augustine wrote a nine-page
narrative explaining her involvement with Mr. Mastin. Parts of the narrative, such as policy numbers and other specific facts which Mrs. Augustine could not recall, had to be looked up.
Ms. Grant assisted Mrs. Augustine by ensuring that information that Mrs. Augustine could not recall but could be found in other sources was obtained and included in the narrative. Ms. Grant also typed Mrs. Augustine's hand-written narrative.
Mrs. Augustine was asked by Ms. Grant to read both her hand- written and the typed versions to ensure accuracy, and after she complied, both were sworn to by Mrs. Augustine.
With regard to the Agent of Record Letter, Mrs. Augustine swore to the following:
I later received a letter dated 2/14/02 from Mastin expressing his anger over the matter and stating he found an agreement in his file that I signed on 2/17/00 that is a legal[sic] enforceable document. He enclosed a copy of the alleged 2/17/00 agent of record letter. I was shocked because I had no recollection of the form and I did not have a copy of the agent of record letter in my files. The signatures on the letter appears [sic] to be mine and that of my late husband. I have no recollection of Mastin discussing the contents of the letter or any agreement regarding future commissions belonging to him through 2/17/03. In most of my purchases from Mastin he filled out all the paperwork and gave me and my husband a stack to sign without reading. We both trusted him. . . .
Petitioner's Exhibit 48.
Mrs. Augustine gave Ms. Grant the actual copy of the February 14, 2002, letter and the attached Agent of Record Letter which Mr. Mastin had sent to her.
Ms. Grant's conduct with Mrs. Augustine during her meeting with her on April 9, 2002, was professional and ethical. The information she obtained in the affidavit completed and signed by Mrs. Augustine was in no way unduly influenced by the assistance, which was intended to ensure that the narrative contained accurate and detailed information, which was given by Ms. Grant to Mrs. Augustine.
Between the assignment of the matter to her and September 2002, Ms. Grant spoke with and met with Mr. Mastin on several occasions as part of her investigation. She acted professionally and with due regard for Mr. Mastin's rights throughout her dealings with him.
Mr. Mastin wrote two letters to Mrs. Augustine, both dated September 19, 2002. Both letters essentially threaten Mrs. Augustine that he would seek fees from her if she continued to pursue her complaint against him with the Department. See Petitioner's Exhibits 21 and 22.
The more Mrs. Augustine thought about the whole matter and with Ms. Grant's reasonable prodding of her memory, the more Mrs. Augustine began to doubt having signed the Agent of Record Letter. Mrs. Augustine eventually concluded that she simply had no memory of having signed the Agent of Record Letter. Consequently, on April 24, 2002, she returned to Ms. Grant's office and completed and signed a hand-written and typed four page supplement to her April 9, 2002, affidavit.
In pertinent part, Mrs. Augustine wrote the following in her affidavit supplement:
. . . . I have inspected a document dated Feb. 17, 2000 listing Parts I, II & III of a retainer agreement, and I have never seen this document. To my recollection, there was no written retainer agreement between Michael Mastin, myself and my late husband Ervin Augustine. I reaffirm that I never
received or had knowledge of any Feb. 17, 2000 Agent of Record letter prior to Michael Mastin sending me a copy in his correspondence dated Feb. 14, 2002. . . .
Petitioner's Exhibit 47. Mrs. Augustine goes on in the affidavit supplement to describe what she reasonably considered to be the threatening correspondence she had received from
Mr. Mastin since she filed the Consumer Assistance Report with the Department.
Again, Ms. Grant's conduct with Mrs. Augustine during her meeting with her on September 24, 2002, was professional and ethical. The information she obtained in the affidavit supplement completed and signed by Mrs. Augustine was in no way unduly influenced by the assistance, intended to ensure that the narrative supplement contained accurate and detailed information, which was given by Ms. Grant to Mrs. Augustine.
On September 23, 2002, Ms. Grant and her immediate supervisor, Robert Keegan, met with Mr. Mastin. During this meeting Mr. Mastin gave copies of a number of documents pertaining to this matter to Ms. Grant and Mr. Keegan. One of the documents was a copy of an annuity contract application (hereinafter referred to as the "Application") that had been signed by the Augustines. Petitioner's Exhibit 42.
Ms. Grant, who had astutely doubted the authenticity of the Agent of Record Letter due to Mrs. Augustine's confusion
about the document, compared the signatures on the Application with the signatures on the Agent of Record Letter. Because of what Ms. Grant concluded were suspicious similarities between the signatures on the Application and Agent of Record Letter, both documents were submitted to the Crime Lab of the Broward County Sheriff's Office for analysis of Mrs. Augustine's signature.
Howard Seiden, a forensic document examinter, who was accepted as an expert in this matter, examined Mrs. Augustine's signature on the Application and the Agent of Record Letter. He concluded the following:
After examination of the submitted documents, it is the finding of this examiner that, the questioned Rhoda Augustine signature on the [Agent of Record Letter] is a reproduction of the Rhoda Augustine signature found on the [Application].
The most likely mechanism for this, is that the signature on the original document or a copy thereof of in [the Application] was copied, then cut from the copy and placed in position of the original document in [the Agent of Record Letter] and the entire document copied again. An alternate mechanism that may have been utilized is to scan the known signature in [the Application] and using computer software transfer that signature onto a scanned document of [the Agent of Record Letter].
This document could then be printed.
After Mr. Mastin wrongfully suggested that the fabricated signature on the Agent of Record Letter provided to
Mr. Seiden had been created by Ms. Grant, the copy of the Agent of Record Letter which Mrs. Augustine had provided to Ms. Brown when she first complained to the Department and which had been continuously maintained in the custody of Ms. Brown since
Mrs. Augustine had provided it to her, was retrieved by Dennis Adams, a Special Investigator for the Department's Bureau of Investigation, and delivered directly to Mr. Seiden for analysis. At no time did the copy of Agent of Record Letter come into the possession of Ms. Grant. More importantly, no credible evidence was presented in this proceeding to suggest that Ms. Grant or anyone other than Mr. Mastin had anything to do with the fabrication of Mrs. Augustine's signature on the Agent of Record Letter.
Mr. Seiden, after analyzing the copy of Agent of Record Letter maintained by Ms. Brown concluded that
Mrs. Augustine's signature was an exact copy of the signature which had been reproduced from the Application onto the Agent of Record Letter sent by Mr. Mastin to Mrs. Augustine.
Mr. Seiden's expert opinion explains why
Mrs. Augustine was so confused when she received the Agent of Record Letter. The signature on it was indeed her signature, as she concluded it was. What she did not realize, however, was that her signature had been placed there, not by her, but by Mr. Mastin. Mr. Seiden's opinion also vindicates Ms. Grant's
suspicion concerning the authenticity of the Agent of Record Letter.
In summary, Mrs. Augustine did not sign the Agent of Record Letter. Instead, her signature had been cut and pasted from her actual signature on the Application. It is inferred that Mrs. Augustine's signature on the Agent of Record Letter was fabricated by Mr. Mastin or someone under his direction. Mr. Mastin's Unconvincing Position.
Mr. Mastin asserted through his testimony and other evidence that he did not fabricate the Agent of Record Letter. In support of his position, while he did not dispute that the Agent of Record Letter had been fabricated, he suggested, unconvincingly, the following:
Ms. Grant fabricated the Agent of Record Letter in an effort to bolster her career at the Department; and
He has a copy of an agent of record letter with the Augustine's signatures on it which has not been proved to be a fabrication.
Mr. Mastin's testimony and the evidence he offered in support of his assertion that he did not fabricate the Agent of Record Letter was unconvincing for a number of reasons:
The ultimate facts of this case taken as a whole, do not support Mr. Mastin's testimony;
Mrs. Augustine's prior inconsistent statements were adequately explained. She was sent a document by Mr. Mastin which, although it had never been signed by her, did in fact include a copy of her actual signature on it. Seeing her signature, she simply concluded that, although she did not remember signing it, she must have done so. Ultimately, the evidence proved that she did not sign the very document
Mr. Mastin sent to her;
Mr. Mastin's assertion that the fabricated document was created by Ms. Grant deserves no more discussion. This wrongful and malicious assertion is not supported by any credible evidence; and
Finally, Mr. Mastin's assertion that he has a copy of an agent of record letter signed by the Augustines which has not been proved to be a fabrication is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Mr. Mastin' did have admitted an agent of record letter which was not proved to be a fabrication. He argues, therefore, that he had no reason to send a copy of a fabricated document. This argument is rejected. The copy of the agent of record letter admitted by Mr. Mastin could not be shown to be a fabrication without having the document or a copy thereof from which an actual signature would have been transferred to the copy of the document admitted by Mr. Mastin. Given this reasonable explanation for why the document has not
been proved to be false, it cannot be concluded that it has not been fabricated. This is especially true in light of the fact that it has been proven that there is a fabricated Agent of Record Letter. This fact sheds sufficient doubt on the authenticity of the copy of the agent of record letter admitted by Mr. Mastin to reject its authenticity also.
D. Primary Agent Designation.
Mr. Mastin failed to designate himself as the primary agent for AIT, the factitious name he conducted insurance business under.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Jurisdiction.
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this proceeding and of the parties thereto pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (2004).
The Burden and Standard of Proof.
The Department seeks to impose penalties against Mr. Mastin through the Administrative Complaint that include mandatory and discretionary suspension or revocation of his licenses. Therefore, the Department has the burden of proving the specific allegations of fact that support its charges by clear and convincing evidence. See Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities and Investor Protection v.
Osborne Stern and Co., 670 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1996); Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1987); and Pou v. Department of
Insurance and Treasurer, 707 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
What constitutes "clear and convincing" evidence was described by the court in Evans Packing Co. v. Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, 550 So. 2d 112, 116, n. 5 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), as follows:
. . . [C]lear and convincing evidence requires that the evidence must be found to be credible; the facts to which the witnesses testify must be distinctly remembered; the evidence must be precise and explicit and the witnesses must be lacking in confusion as to the facts in issue. The evidence must be of such weight that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact the firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.
Slomowitz v. Walker, 429 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
See also In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1997); In re Davey, 645 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1994); and Walker v. Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 705 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)(Sharp, J., dissenting).
The Department's Charges.
Section 626.611, Florida Statutes, mandates that the Department suspend or revoke the license of any insurance agent if it finds that the agent has committed any of a number of acts specified in that Section.
Section 626.621, Florida Statutes, gives the Department the discretion to suspend or revoke the license of any insurance agent if it finds that the agent has committed any of a number of acts specified in that Section.
The Administrative Complaint in this case contains three counts. Those counts are premised upon three related, but separate factual allegations:
In Count I it is alleged that Mr. Mastin engaged in "an arrangement with Rhoda and Ervin Augustine whereby [he] waived [his] fees for tax return preparation services rendered to them in consideration for their purchasing annuity products from [him]" (hereinafter referred to as the "Unlawful Inducement Issue").
In Count II it is alleged that Mr. Mastin "[o]n or about February 14, 2002, . . . mailed a letter to Rhoda Augustine and enclosed therewith a falsified document purporting to be an agreement between [him] and the Augustines regarding [his] insurance business relationship with the Augustines" (hereinafter referred to as the "Fabricated Document Issue").
In Count III it is alleged that that Mr. Mastin operated AIT, an insurance agency, at 1371 South Andrews Avenue, Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 and that "[t]here is no designated primary agent for this insurance agency location" (hereinafter referred to as the "Primary Agent Designation Issue").
Alleged Violations of Section 626.611, Florida Statutes
The Department has alleged that Mr. Mastin violated the following acts described in Section 626.611, Florida Statutes:
(4) If the license or appointment is willfully used, or to be used, to circumvent any of the requirements or prohibitions of this code.
. . . .
Demonstrated lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance.
Demonstrated lack of reasonably adequate knowledge and technical competence to engage in the transactions authorized by the license or appointment;
Fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license or appointment.
. . . .
(13) Willful failure to comply with, or willful violation of, any proper order or rule of the department or willful violation of any provision of this code.
The Department alleged that Mr. Mastin violated all of the foregoing quoted acts with regard to the Unlawful Inducement Issue, violated Sections 626.611(4), (7), (9), and (13), Florida Statutes, with regard to the Fabricated Document Issue, and violated Sections 626.611(4), and (13), Florida Statutes, with regard to the Primary Agent Designation Issue.
Alleged Violations of Section 626.621, Florida Statutes
The Department has alleged that Mr. Mastin committed the following acts in violation of Section 626.621, Florida Statutes:
Violation of any provision of this code or of any other law applicable to the business of insurance in the course of dealing under the license or appointment.
Violation of any lawful order or rule of the department, commission, or office.
. . . .
(6) In the conduct of business under the license or appointment, engaging in unfair methods of competition or in unfair or deceptive acts or practices, as prohibited under part IX of this chapter, or having otherwise shown himself or herself to be a source of injury or loss to the public or detrimental to the public interest.
. . . .
(9) If a life agent, violation of the code of ethics.
The Department alleged that Mr. Mastin violated all of the foregoing quoted acts with regard to the Unlawful Inducement Issue and the Fabricated Document Issue, and violated Sections 626.621(2) and (3), Florida Statutes, with regard to the Primary Agent Designation Issue.
The Unlawful Inducement Issue.
The Department proved clearly and convincingly that Mr. Mastin engaged in "an arrangement with Rhoda and Ervin
Augustine whereby [he] waived [his] fees for tax return preparation services rendered to them in consideration for their purchasing annuity products from [him]."
His actions clearly constitute a violation of Section 626.611(13), Florida Statutes, which provides that it is a violation for an agent to willfully fail to comply with, or to willfully violate, any proper order or rule of the Department or Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. Section 626.621(2) and (3), Florida Statutes, contain similar prohibitions, which he violated. In particular, it is concluded that Mr. Mastin violated these provisions by willfully violating the following statute and rule:
Section 624.9541(1)(h)1.b., Florida Statutes, which defines the following unfair method of competition or deceptive act or practice:
(h) Unlawful rebates.--
1. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, or in an applicable filing with the office, knowingly:
. . . .
Paying, allowing, or giving, or offering to pay, allow, or give, directly or indirectly, as inducement to such insurance contract, any unlawful rebate of premiums payable on the contract, any special favor or advantage in the dividends or other benefits thereon, or any valuable consideration or inducement whatever not specified in the contract;
b. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-215.220, which provides the following:
Rebating is declared to be unethical. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall knowingly permit or offer to make or make any contract of life insurance, life annuity or disability insurance, or agreement as to such contract other than as plainly expressed in the contract issued thereon, or pay or allow, or give or offer to pay, allow, or give, directly or indirectly as an inducement to such insurance, or annuity, any rebate of premiums payable on the contract, or any special favor or advantage in the dividends or other benefits thereon, or any valuable consideration or inducement whatever not specified in the contract.
Mr. Mastin violated both these provision when he offered to, and did, prepare Tax Returns for the Augustines for no charge in exchange for their purchase of insurance products from him.
His conduct also constituted a violation of Section 626.621(6), Florida Statutes, because he engaged in "unfair methods of competition" by inducing the Augustines to purchase insurance products from him in exchange for free Tax Return preparation.
The Department failed to explain how the conduct alleged in Count I constituted a violation of Section 626.611(4), (7), or (8), Florida Statutes.
The allegation that Mr. Mastin also violated Section 626.11(1), Florida Statutes, is redundant. That provision
provides the following and is no more than a repeat of the violation alleged in Section 626.611(13), Florida Statutes:
No person shall transact insurance in this state, or relative to a subject of insurance resident, located, or to be performed in this state, without complying with the applicable provisions of this code.
As to the allegation that Mr. Mastin violated Section 626.621(9), Florida Statutes, the Department failed to prove what violation of the code of ethics Mr. Mastin committed.
Finally, the Department conceded that it has not proved that Mr. Mastin violated Section 626.611(9), Florida Statutes.
The Fabricated Document Issue.
The Department proved clearly and convincingly that Mr. Mastin "[o]n or about February 14, 2002, . . . mailed a letter to Rhoda Augustine and enclosed therewith a falsified document purporting to be an agreement between [him] and the Augustines regarding [his] insurance business relationship with the Augustines" (hereinafter referred to as the "Fabricated Document Issue").
Mr. Mastin's conduct constituted a violation of Sections 626.611(7) and (9), Florida Statutes. By sending a fabricated document to Mrs. Augustine, he engaged in a dishonest practice in the conduct of his insurance business and he
demonstrated the lack of trustworthiness to engage in the insurance business.
His actions also clearly constituted a violation of Section 626.611(13), Florida Statutes, which provides that it is a violation for an agent to willful fail to comply with, or to willful violate, any proper order or rule of the Department or Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. Section 626.621(2) and (3), Florida Statutes, contain similar prohibitions, which he violated.
In particular, it is concluded that Mr. Mastin violated the provisions listed in paragraph 79 by violating Section 624.9541(1)(e)1.e., Florida Statutes, which defines the following unfair method of competition or deceptive act or practice:
(e) False statements and entries.---
1. Knowingly:
. . . .
e. Causing, directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, delivered to any person, or placed before the public,
any false material statement.
The Department failed to prove, however, that
Mr. Mastin violated Section 626.611(13), or 626.621(2) or (3),
Florida Statutes, because the Department failed to prove its allegation that he violated the following statute and rule:
Section 626.9541(1)(b)4., Florida Statutes, which defines the following unfair method of competition or deceptive act or practice:
(b) False information and advertising
generally.--Knowingly making, publishing, disseminating, circulating, or placing before the public, or causing, directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, or placed before the public:
. . . .
4. In any other way,
an advertisement, announcement, or statement containing any assertion, representation, or statement with respect to the business of insurance, which is untrue, deceptive, or misleading.
. . . .
Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-215.230(2) provides the following:
(2) No person shall make, publish, disseminate, circulate, or place before the public, or cause, directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, or placed before the public, in a newspaper, magazine, or other publication, or in the form of a notice, circular, pamphlet, letter or poster, or over any radio or television station, or in any other way, any advertisement, announcement or statement containing any assertion, representation or statement with respect to the business of insurance or with respect to
any person in the conduct of his insurance business, which is untrue, deceptive or misleading.
Neither of these provisions is intended to prohibit the specific type of fabrication Mr. Mastin has been proved to be associated with in this case. These provisions apply to an attempt by an agent to mislead the public or an individual in order to increase his or her insurance business. The evidence failed to prove that was Mr. Mastin's intent in sending the Agent of Record Letter to Mrs. Augustine.
The Department failed to explain how the conduct alleged in Count II constituted a violation of Section 626.611(4), Florida Statutes.
The allegation that Mr. Mastin also violated Section 626.11(1), Florida Statutes, which is quoted, supra, is redundant.
The Primary Agent Designation Issue.
The Department proved clearly and convincingly that Mr. Mastin conducted his insurance business as AIT at 1371 South Andrews Avenue, Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 and that "[t]here is no designated primary agent for this insurance agency location."
His actions clearly constituted a violation of Sections 626.611(13), and 626.621(2) and (3), Florida Statutes. In particular, it is concluded that Mr. Mastin violated these
provisions by violating Section 626.592(1), Florida Statutes, which requires that:
Each person operating an insurance agency and each location of a multiple location agency shall designate a primary agent for each insurance agency location and shall file the name of the person so designated, and the address of the insurance agency location where he or she is primary agent, with the department, on a form approved by the department. The designation of the primary agent may be changed at the option of the agency, and any change shall be effective upon notification to the department. Notice of change must be sent to the department within 30 days after such change.
Mr. Mastin, who was operating AIT, an insurance agency, failed to designate a primary agent for AIT.
The Department failed to explain how the conduct alleged in Count I constituted a violation of Section 626.611(4), Florida Statutes.
The allegation that Mr. Mastin also violated Section 626.11(1), Florida Statutes, is redundant.
Penalty.
Florida Administrative Code Rule Chapter 69B-231 provides guideline penalties for violations of Sections 626.611, 626.621, and 626.954(1), Florida Statutes, and Department rules.
Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-231.040, provides the following with regard to the calculation of the appropriate penalty where multiple violations are found:
Penalty Per Count.
The Department is authorized to find that multiple grounds exist under Sections 626.611 and 626.621, F.S., for disciplinary action against the licensee based upon a single count in an administrative complaint based upon a single act of misconduct by a licensee. However, for the purpose of this rule chapter, only the violation specifying the highest stated penalty will be considered for that count. The highest stated penalty thus established for each count is referred to as the “penalty per count”.
The requirement for a single highest stated penalty for each count in an administrative complaint shall be applicable regardless of the number or nature of the violations established in a single count of an administrative complaint.
Total Penalty. Each penalty per count shall be added together and the sum shall be referred to as the “total penalty”.
Final Penalty. The final penalty which will be imposed against a licensee under these rules shall be the total penalty, as adjusted to take into consideration any aggravating or mitigating factors, provided however the Department shall convert the total penalty to an administrative fine and probation in the absence of a violation of Section 626.611, F.S., if warranted upon the Department’s consideration of the factors set forth in rule subsection 69B-231.160(1), F.A.C.
Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-231.160 provides the following relevant aggravating and mitigation factors:
For penalties other than those assessed under Rule 69B-231.150, F.A.C.:
Willfulness of licensee’s conduct;
Degree of actual injury to victim;
Degree of potential injury to victim;
Age or capacity of victim;
Timely restitution;
Motivation of agent;
Financial gain or loss to agent;
Cooperation with the Department;
Vicarious or personal responsibility;
Related criminal charge; disposition;
Existence of secondary violations in counts;
Previous disciplinary orders or prior warning by the Department; and
Other relevant factors.
Applying the foregoing rules to this case, it is concluded that the Department's suggestion that Mr. Mastin's licenses should be revoked has merit. A consideration of virtually all of the factors quoted in paragraph 90 support the Department's requested revocation of Mr. Mastin's license. His conduct was willful; Mrs. Augustine, a widow in her 70's was injured both emotionally and financially; his motivation was his greed; he was personally responsible for the violations proved in this case; he has been twice previously disciplined by the Department; and, rather than cooperating with the Department, he made malicious and scandalous accusations against Department employees.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department finding that Michael Dean Mastin violated the
provision of Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, described, supra., and revoking his license.
DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
S
LARRY J. SARTIN
Administrative Law Judge
Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building
1230 Apalachee Parkway
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060
(850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675
Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 2005.
ENDNOTES
1/ All references to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, or sections thereof, are to those versions pertinent to the times alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
2/ Mr. Augustine was born on March 17, 1912.
3/ Mrs. Augustine was born on February 28, 1925.
4/ Official recognition of the amount of the standard deduction for two married taxpayers filing a joint return for the tax years 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000 has been taken pursuant to
Section 90.202(5), Florida Statutes (2004).
5/ Id.
6/ Although Mr. Augustine died during the 2000 calendar year, Mrs. Augustine was able to file a joint Federal income tax year for that year.
7/ Id. Endnote 4.
8/ Id.
9/ The Schedule A's offered in evidence by Mr. Mastin also indicate that the Augustines' real estate taxes declined from
$780.00 in 1998 to $543.00 in 1999, and then increased to
$960.00 in 2000. Although not impossible, it does not seem realistic that their taxes were decreased.
10/ Ms. Kelly unconvincingly testified that she recognized the Fee Waiver Revocation Letter, but later admitted that she merely assumed that she had typed the letter because her initials were included in it and that she could not recall ever seeing the document.
COPIES FURNISHED:
Gregg S. Marr, Esquire Division of Legal Services
Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building
200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333
Paul Bass, Esquire Paul H. Bass, P.A.
Datran Tower II, Suite 1509 9130 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156
Deborah Marks, Esquire Deborah Marks, P.A.
999 Brickell Bay Drive, Suite 1809
Miami, Florida 33131
Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer
Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Carlos G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
| Issue Date | Document | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| Oct. 13, 2005 | Agency Final Order | |
| Aug. 02, 2005 | Recommended Order | Respondent prepared tax returns free for purchase of insurance products from him and fabricated an agent of record agreement. |
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