Pursuant to notice this cause came on for formal proceeding and hearing before P. Michael Ruff, a duly-designated Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings in Panama City, Florida, on January 7, 2008. The appearances were as follows:
For Respondent: Scott E. Wood, Esquire
The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether Petitioner has a disability, whether she was discriminated against based upon the disability, whether there
was a reasonably requested accommodation which was refused by the Respondent employer, and whether it maintained a hostile working environment.
This matter arose upon the filing of a charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) on or about June 7, 2007. The Petitioner alleges discrimination based upon disability involving a hearing impairment. She alleges her employment was terminated on
March 12, 2007. The Petitioner has also alleged that a hostile working environment was maintained by the Respondent and that a reasonable accommodation for her hearing impairment was denied by the Respondent.
The Commission entered a finding of "No Cause" based upon failure of the Petitioner to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination nor a prima facie case for a hostile work environment.
The Petitioner thereafter filed a Petition for Relief which was duly forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings and the undersigned Administrative Law Judge. A hearing thereon was conducted on January 7, 2008. At the hearing the Petitioner presented one witness and no exhibits. The Respondent presented one witness and six exhibits, all of which were admitted into evidence. Thereafter a transcript of the proceedings was
obtained and a Proposed Recommended Order was submitted by the Respondent which has been considered in the rendition of this Recommended Order.
This cause arose upon the filing of a Charge of Discrimination and ultimately a Petition for Relief by the above-named Petitioner against the Respondent, Principal Senior Living Group, d/b/a Benton Village (Benton Village or
Respondent). The Petitioner was an employee at the Respondent's assisted living and memory care facility, located in Panama City, Florida. That facility employs approximately 28 to 30 employees and had 53 residents as of the time of hearing.
The Respondent has an equal employment opportunity policy in place which precludes discrimination on the basis of any protected status including handicap or disability as to any employees, customers, vendors, or applicants for jobs. The Petitioner signed a document indicating that she had received a copy of that policy when she began employment on or about January 29, 2007. The Respondent, enforces the policy against discrimination and harassment and encourages employees to bring any such discrimination or harassment issues to the Respondent's attention so that it can take necessary steps to correct the situation.
The Petitioner received a handbook at the beginning of her employment period that outlined the Respondent's benefits, practices, and policies. The Equal Opportunity Policy is restated in that handbook. On page 18 of the handbook under the title "Discourtesy or Disrespect," the Respondent stated a rule as follows:
We expect all employees to be courteous, polite and friendly to our residents, vendors, and to their fellow employees. No one should use profanity or show disrespect to a resident or co-worker, or engage in any activity that could harm the company's reputation.
The Petitioner began working for the Respondent in early February 2007 as a personal care assistant (PCA). Her general job description included assisting residents with personal care and activities of daily living and performing daily housekeeping tasks.
Mr. Alan Williams is the Respondent's executive director. His duties involve resident care staffing including evaluation for promotion and administering discipline and managing the facility's budget. Mr. Williams was responsible for evaluating the Petitioner's job duties and performance.
The Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Tiffany Sims who was the Resident Services Director while the Petitioner was employed at the Respondent's facility.
The Petitioner is hearing-impaired and wears a hearing aid that allows her to hear within a normal range and follow normal conversations. She does have difficulty hearing when people speak in a low voice and at times has to request them to speak louder. The Petitioner acknowledged that her hearing aid allowed her to perform her job without any special treatment. Moreover, she was able to attend training course, which involved listening to a lecturer in a classroom, and did not request or need any special accommodation to understand the lecturer.
When the Petitioner was hired by the Respondent, she did not tell anyone she had a disability that prevented her from performing the job duties in her job description. She received the same training as the other employees and did not request or receive accommodations for her alleged hearing impairment during the training process. She acknowledged that she did not request special treatment because she did not need special treatment. During her testimony at hearing she admitted that she had never requested an accommodation of her employer. During less that three months of employment she was disciplined once by Ms. Sims and on two separate occasions by Mr. Williams. The Petitioner admits receiving corrective action admonishments from Ms. Sims on or about February 8, 2007. The corrective action document informed the Petitioner that there had been several resident complaints regarding the Petitioner's resident care and the care
with meal assistance. The corrective action also embodied an instruction to the Petitioner that within 30 days she should show significant improvement with care of residents, with no resident complaints or she could be subject to termination.
Mr. Williams disciplined the Petitioner on February 26, 2007. He was notified on that occasion by Supervisor Sandy Simon and his Assistant Director Renee Rhodes, that the Petitioner had been observed watching television by herself in the Alzheimer's ward. Mr. Williams went to an office where he could view a security monitor and personally observed the Petitioner watching television by herself. Mr. Williams accordingly executed a corrective action form or memorandum to the Petitioner, which the Petitioner admits receiving.
Mr. Williams administered discipline to the Petitioner on a second occasion on Tuesday, April 3, 2007. Mr. Williams had learned that the Petitioner had been involved in an altercation with a resident that involved raising her voice, yelling and engaging in disruptive behavior. Mr. Williams informed the Petitioner that this was unacceptable behavior and reflected badly on the Respondent. The Petitioner admitted the occurrence to Mr. Williams when he questioned her. There is a dispute over whether the Petitioner quit or was terminated as a result of this discussion. Mr. Williams established that, under the duly-adopted policy, arguing with a resident can be a
terminable offense. Mr. Williams' testimony is deemed credible and is accepted. It was thus established that the Petitioner became angry and informed Mr. Williams that she was quitting her employment during the course of this discussion.
One other incident occurred with Mr. Williams when he terminated an employee because the employee had yelled or cursed at a coworker. The employee who was terminated did not have any sort of disability of which Mr. Williams was aware.
Mr. Williams' undisputed testimony shows that the Petitioner's hearing impairment did not play any role in the decision to discipline for the television incident, nor in the decision to speak to her about the altercation with the resident or with any other employment decision he made with regard to the Petitioner. The Petitioner admitted that Mr. Williams never made any negative comments to her about her hearing or hearing impairment.
The Petitioner contended that some co-workers made fun of her hearing impairment during the course of her employment. The Petitioner acknowledged, however, that she never complained of this to the Human Resources manager or to Mr. Williams, even though she had received a copy of the company's policies against harassment and discrimination.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the subject matter of and the parties to this proceeding. §§ 120.569 and 120.57(1), Fla. Stat. (2007).
Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, is patterned after the Federal Employment Discrimination Laws embodied in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). Decisional law provides that cases arising out of the Florida Statute, therefore, should be interpreted in a like manner to those federal decisions interpreting the referenced federal civil rights law. Thus, disability discrimination claims arising under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, are analyzed in the same manner as are federal ADA claims. Holley v. Clairson Industries, LLC, 492 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir 2007).
The Petitioner has raised three claims: (1) that she is disabled due to her hearing impairment and that the Respondent discriminated against her on the basis of that disability; (2) that the Respondent failed to accommodate her disability; and (3) and that the Respondent maintained a hostile working environment.
In order to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination under the ADA and its Florida counterpart in Chapter 760, the Petitioner must demonstrate that: (1) she has
a disability; (2) she is a "qualified" individual, able to perform the essential functions of her employment position with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) that the Respondent unlawfully discriminated against her because of her disability. See D'angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1226 (11th Cir 2005); Gordon v. E.L. Hamm and Associates, Inc., 100 F.3d 907, 910 (11th Cir. 1996).
In order to establish a valid claim of disability discrimination the Petitioner must prove by preponderant evidence that she has a disability. A disability is defined by the ADA as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual; a record of such impairment; or being regarded has having such an impairment. See Holt v. Grand Mental Health Center, Inc., 443 F.3d 762, 765 (10th Cir. 2006); Gordon v. E.L. Hamm and Associates, Inc. supra.
The United States Supreme Court has noted that the term "substantial" must be "interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled." Holt, supra. See also Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc., v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002). A "substantial" impairment is one "that prevents or severely restricts [an] individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives," and that is "permanent or long term." Id.
Moreover, "[a] person whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication or by other measures does not have an impairment that presently substantially limits a major life activity." Greenburg v. Bell South Telecommunications, Inc.,
498 F.3d 1258, 1264 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-483 (1999).
The Petitioner was a qualified individual because she was able to perform her job responsibilities with or without reasonable accommodation. She failed to show, however, by preponderant evidence, that she had a physical impairment substantially limiting one or more of her major life activities. She admitted at hearing that she could hear within a normal range when she wore her hearing aid. She merely stated that, at times, she cannot hear when people speak in a low voice and she has to ask them to speak louder. She also admitted that she attended training courses and listened to lecturers without requiring special treatment such as sign language. The Petitioner therefore did not establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, because the record evidence did not establish that, with the assistance of hearing aids, she was disabled, as defined by the ADA and the above decisions. See Sutton supra. ("An individual has a disability if notwithstanding the use of a corrective device, the individual is substantially limited in a major life activity.")
Even if it be assumed that a disability was established by the Petitioner, she would still need to prove that discrimination against her on account of her disability had been caused by the Respondent. In order to determine whether discrimination has occurred, a court must employ the three step, burden-shifting framework in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) and McDonnell-Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In this approach the Petitioner must establish the four elements of a prima facie case of discrimination initially. Those elements are as follows: 1) she is a member of a protected class; 2) she is qualified to perform the job at issue; (3) she has suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) she was treated less favorably by the Respondent employer than other similarly- situated employees who are not members of her protected class. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997).
Assuming that the Petitioner is a member of a protected class, she has established that she is qualified to perform the job at issue. However, after considering the evidence presented at hearing, it is concluded that no adverse employment action actually occurred because the Petitioner quit the employment of the Respondent and did not suffer a termination or adverse employment action. Even assuming there had been an employment action, the Petitioner did not establish
a prima facie case of discrimination because she presented no evidence that she was treated less favorably by the Respondent than the Respondent treated similarly-situated employees outside her protected class. The determination of whether an employee is similarly situated has been described by court's reviewing discipline-related discrimination claims as follows:
In determining whether employees are similarly situated for purposes of establishing a prima facie case, it is necessary to consider whether the employees are involved in or accused of the same conduct and are disciplined in different ways.
Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Medical Center, 137 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoting Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997)), opinion modified by 151 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 1998)). Moreover, if the Petitioner fails to show the existence of similarly-situated employee, judgment as a matter of law for the Respondent is appropriate where no other evidence of discrimination is present. See Holifield v. Reno, supra. Here, not only did the Petitioner fail to show that she was treated less favorably than any similarly-situated employees, but
Mr. Williams had actually terminated an employee who was not disabled, who had been accused of similar conduct to the conduct of the Petitioner, involving participating in a disruptive altercation or argument at work.
Alternatively, assuming that the Petitioner met all four requirements to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, the burden of production would then shift to the Respondent to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the purported discriminatory action. See U.S. v. Crosby, 59 F.3d 1133, 1135 (11th Cir. 1995); Armstrong v. Flowers Hospital, 33 F.3d 1308, 1313-1314 (11th Cir. 1994).
A Respondent's burden in establishing a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for employment action is one of production and not persuasion. By articulating one or more non- discriminatory reasons, the burden of production can be sustained. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); see also Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436 (11th Cir. 1996).
Several non-discriminatory reasons for administering discipline to the Petitioner were shown by the Respondent. She was disciplined the first time because her immediate supervisor received complaints from residents that the Petitioner was not giving an adequate level of care. She was disciplined the second time because the executive director of the Respondent observed her sitting on a couch and watching television by her self when she should have been performing her job duties. Finally, the Petitioner was disciplined a third time for getting
into an argument with a resident where she raised her voice. The Respondent thus satisfied its burden in this regard.
Upon this showing of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment actions by the Respondent, it became incumbent upon the Petitioner to prove her claim by demonstrating that the legitimate reason offered by the Respondent was not the true reason for any employment action, but was really a pretext for discrimination. See Burdine, supra.
Conclusory allegations or statements of a Petitioner's opinion, without more in the way of evidence, cannot show pretext. Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Company, 101 F.3d 1371, 1376 (11th Cir. 1996). The Petitioner was required to present evidence of specific facts to establish pretext. Coutu v. Martin County Board of County Commissioners, 47 F.3d 1068, 1073-
74 (11th Cir. 1995) quoting Young v. General Food Corporation, 840 F.2d 825, 830 (11th Cir. 1988). See also Early v. Champion International Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990). The Petitioner not only failed to present facts to establish pretext and failed to contradict the legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for disciplining her, the Petitioner also admitted that Mr. Williams, whom she claimed terminated her, had never even made any negative comments to her regarding her hearing ability. In this regard, the Petitioner acknowledged that she had no
personal knowledge that Mr. Williams discriminated against her on account of her hearing impairment, but just had a feeling that the reason he disciplined her was because she was hearing impaired. The Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the reasons asserted by the Respondent for its actions with regard to administering discipline to the Petitioner were pretextual.
Regardless of the application of the burden-shifting framework referenced above, the Petitioner retains the ultimate burden of persuasion to show that the Respondent intentionally discriminated against her. Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1989). The Petitioner did not establish that her hearing impairment was a substantial or motivating factor behind any of the Respondent's actions. She has thus not satisfied her burden in this case.
The Petitioner also claims that the Respondent failed to provide her accommodation for her hearing impairment. The Petitioner bears the burden of establishing a prima facie showing that discrimination was caused by the Respondent by its failing to provide a reasonable accommodation for her impairment or disability. In order to do that the Petitioner must show that she had a disability within the meaning of the ADA, that the Respondent knew of it or had notice of it, and that with a reasonable accommodation she could have performed the essential functions of her job and that the Respondent refused to make the
accommodation. See Graves v. Finch Pruyn and Company, Inc., 457 F.3d 181, 184 (11th Cir. 2006).
The Petitioner also bears the burden of identifying an accommodation, and of demonstrating that the accommodation allows her to perform the job's daily functions. Lucas v. W.W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001); Earl v. Mervyns, 207 F.3d 1361, 1367 (11th Cir. 2000); Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 1997). Moreover, the duty to provide a reasonable accommodation is not triggered unless a specific demand for an accommodation has been made. Thus, an employee's failure to request a reasonable accommodation is fatal to a prima facie case of disability discrimination. Warren v. Volusia County,
188 F. App. 859-863 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Gaston v.
Bellingrath Gardens and Home, Inc., 167 F.3d 1361, 1363 (11th Cir 1999)).
In the case at bar, even assuming the Petitioner had a disability within the meaning of the ADA, she fails to make out a prima facie case of failure to accommodate. First, she admitted that she could perform her job functions without any sort of special treatment or accommodation. Additionally, the Petitioner admitted that she never once requested or demanded an accommodation. For these reasons the Petitioner fails to make
out a prima facie case that discrimination occurred by the Respondent failing to provide a reasonable accommodation.
Regardless if the Petitioner had been able to establish a prima facie case that she demanded and was denied a reasonable accommodation, she would still have the ultimate burden of establishing that the Respondent intentionally discriminated against her. Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 286 (11th Cir. 1997). The Petitioner was unable to meet this burden because she failed to present evidence that she was treated less favorably than any similarly-situated employee who was not disabled and she failed to present evidence that the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons offered by the Respondent to explain its actions were mere pretext.
The Petitioner testified at hearing that her co- worker's "picked on her" and "made fun of her." However, she did not illustrate any specific comments that were made to her that she perceived to be discriminatory and did not present evidence that the reasons she was picked on, if so, had to do with her hearing impairment. Nevertheless, her allegations of harassment at work will be analyzed under a hostile environment framework.
A hostile environment claim under Title VII is established under proof "the work place is permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harris v. Forklift System, Inc., 510 U.S.
1721 (1993)). In order to establish a hostile work environment, the Petitioner has the burden of showing that:
She belongs to a protected group;
She has been subject to unwelcome harassment;
The harassment must have been based on a protected characteristic of the Petitioner, in this case hearing impairment;
The harassment was sufficiently severe of pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and
The Respondent is responsible for such environment under a theory of vicarious or of direct liability. See Miller 277 F.3d 1269, 1275.
Even if the Petitioner belongs to a protected group, she has failed to establish the other elements required to make out a hostile environment claim. She failed to present specific allegations that would tend to show that she was subjected to a discriminatory or hostile work environment, but presented only her own conclusory allegations that she was harassed by coworkers based on her hearing impairment. These opinions or conclusory allegations, standing alone, are not enough to show that she was subjected to unwelcome harassment or that any
harassment was based on her hearing impairment. See Godoy v. Habersham County Board of Commissioners, 211 F. Apps. 850, 854 (11th Cir. 2006); (citing Early v. Champion International Corporation, supra). See also Leigh v. Warner Bros. Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1217 (2000) ("this court has consistently held that conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have not probative value").
Even if evidence had been established to show that the Petitioner was subjected to un-welcome harassment due to her hearing impairment, she did not present evidence that any harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of her employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment. This requirement contains both an objective and subjective component, which must result in both an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive and an environment that the Petitioner subjectively perceived to be abusive. Miller, 277 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002). In evaluating the objective severity of the harassment, the following factors are to be considered:
The frequency of the conduct,;
The severity of the conduct;
Whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating;
(4) Whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee's job performance. Id.
The Petitioner made vague allegations that she was being harassed without giving specific accounts of facts as to what comments were made, or how often they were made, or other related circumstances. She failed to present any substantial persuasive evidence whereby a reasonable person could determine that the working environment was hostile or abusive. The Petitioner also failed to present persuasive evidence that any comments that were made would have had the effect of interfering with a reasonable employee's job performance. Thus sufficient evidence to establish the objective component of her burden to show that she was subjected to a hostile environment was not adduced.
The subjective component of her burden to show a hostile environment was not established either. The Petitioner admitted that she never complained to management about being harassed by her coworkers. Moreover, she made conclusory allegations that she was tired of being picked on, but did not testify that her coworkers' conduct was physically threatening or humiliating or that it interfered with her job performance. Thus the Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence that she perceived the alleged harassment from coworkers to be so severe or pervasive as to create a discriminatorily abusive work environment, as defined above.
In any event, it has not been demonstrated that the Respondent was responsible if a hostile working environment had prevailed, under a theory of vicarious or direct liability. An employer "is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable, hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher authority) over the employee." Miller, 277 F.3d 1269 at 1278. On the other hand, "[w]here the perpetrator of the harassment is a merely a co-employee of the victim, the employer will be held directly liable if it knew or should have known of the harassing conduct, but failed to take prompt remedial action." Id.
The Petitioner did not allege that any supervisors made any comments regarding her hearing ability, but only alleged such harassment by coworkers. She failed to allege that the Respondent was vicariously liable for harassing conduct.
She also admitted that she never reported such conduct by coworkers to any supervisors or to her human relations department. She also did not present testimony that any harassment occurred in the presence of any supervisors. Thus, she failed to meet her burden of showing that the Respondent knew or should have known about the alleged harassing conduct. Thus a prima facie case of hostile environment-based discrimination has not been established.
If sufficient evidence of such a hostile and discriminatory environment had been adduced, the Respondent would still not be liable pursuant to the so called "Farragher- Ellerth Defense" if it exercised reasonable care to prevent or correct the discriminatory behavior promptly, and the Petitioner unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities the Respondent provided. See Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, 480 F.3d 1287, 1303 (11th Cir. 2007); citing Farragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
An employer may demonstrate the exercise of reasonable care by showing the existence of an anti-harassment policy during the period of the Petitioner's employment. See Ferraro v. Kelwood Company, 440 F.3d 96, 102 (2nd Cir. 2006). Moreover, proof that an employee unreasonably failed to use an employer's complaint procedure, under the second element of the above- referenced defense, will normally suffice in satisfying an employer's burden of establishing the defense. Id.
The Respondent presented evidence that it had a policy in place to prevent discriminatory behavior and to correct any that occurred. There is no dispute that the Petitioner received and signed a document attesting to receipt of this policy when she began her employment. The policy was also contained within
the Respondent's employee handbook which she received at the beginning of her employment. The policy mandated that the Respondent did not tolerate any form of harassment or discrimination related to any of the protected categories referenced in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including disability. Further, the policy provided a procedure to report any harassment or discrimination to a supervisor or to the Human Resources Manager. The Petitioner made no allegation that the policy was unreasonable in any way or that it was not effectively communicated to all of the Respondent's employees. For these reasons, the Respondent has established the first element of the Farragher-Ellerth defense. See generally Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, supra (citing Frederick v.
Sprint/United Management Company, 246 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir.
2001)).
With regard to the second element of the of the Farragher-Ellerth defense, the Petitioner admitted that she did not take advantage of the anti-harassment policy by reporting any alleged harassing conduct to a supervisor or the Human Resources Manager. Since she did not comply with the reporting rules and procedures established by the Respondent and did not present any justification for failure to comply, the Respondent has sufficiently established that it is not liable to the
Petitioner for any harassing or discriminatory conduct, even if such was perpetrated by co-employees. See generally Baldwin v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Alabama, supra (citing Frederick v.
Sprint/United Management Company, supra). Accordingly, in consideration of the above discussion and conclusions, based upon the above findings of fact, the Petitioner's claim must fail.
Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore,
RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the subject petition in its entirety.
DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida.
P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 2008.
Scott E. Wood, Esquire
15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
