KEITH A. GALLOWAY,
vs.
As the parties‟ responses to that Scheduling Order on Remand and pending motions involve findings of fact, they are discussed, together with subsequent procedural history, in the Findings of Fact, below.
Under the terms of the Scheduling Order on Remand entered February 11, 2013, Petitioner had until February 26, 2013, within which to “submit documentation, argument, and support for his claims for medical expenses, costs, and attorneys fees.” Petitioner did not meet this deadline, nor did
he ask for an extension of time prior to the expiration of the February 26, 2013, deadline.
Two days after the deadline, on February 28, 2013, Petitioner submitted a document entitled “Petitioner‟s Submission of Medical Costs and Attorney‟s Fees” (Petitioner‟s 1st Submission), which states:
COMES NOW, Keith A. Galloway, by and through his representative, Letta Dillard Gorman, and provides the following:
That Mr. Galloway incurred certain medical costs as a result of the injuries he sustained when denied reasonable accommodations by the Respondent. These include short-term and long-term injuries.
That Exhibit 1 is a spreadsheet of some of these medical costs.
That Mr. Galloway incurred other actual costs as a direct result of the discrimination by the Respondent.
That additional medical costs were incurred but Mr. Galloway needs an extension of time to gather those records.
That Mr. Galloway incurred reasonable attorney‟s fees as presented in Exhibit 2.
WHEREFOR THESE PREMISES CONSIDERED,
Mr. Galloway submits the attached documentation for medical costs and attorney‟s fees and requests an extension of time to submit additional medical cost documentation.
Respectfully submitted on this the 27th day of February 2013 via electronic filing.
/s/ Letta Dillard Gorman Letta Dillard Gorman
Law Office of Letta Dillard Gorman
P.O. Box 207 Hartford, AL 36344 334-258-9148
FAX 850-258-9148
Lgorman1109@gmail.com Certificate of Service
I certify that I have provided a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the honorable Christine Wilson via email and electronically on this 27th day of February 2013.
/s/ Letta Dillard Gorman Letta Dillard Gorman
Exhibit 1 attached to Petitioner‟s 1st Submission provides:
EXHIBIT 1
GALLOWAY MEDICAL COSTS
Alabama Artificial Limb and
Orthopedic Service 13,866
Wiregrass Medical Center 25,653 Dr. McBryde 9555
TOTAL 49,074
Exhibit 2 to Petitioner‟s 1st Submission states:
EXHIBIT 2
Attorney‟s Fees Galloway
2011 Met with client (1 hour)
Research (4 hours)
Reviewed Petition for Relief (.25 hours)
Filed to be authorized as representative (.25 hours)
Prepared for mediation (1 hour) Mediation (6 hours)
Travel to Tallahassee (200 X .50=
$100)
2012 Discussed and filed for Administrative hearing (1.5 hours)
Subpoenas (1 hour X 3) Prepared for hearing (2 hours) Hearing (10 hours)
Travel (200 X .50 = $100)
Negotiation (2 hours)
Drafted and submitted Recommended Order (1 hour)
Prepared and submitted Exceptions (.5 hours)
2013 Spoke with Mr. Galloway regarding Order (.5 hours)
Spoke with Mr. Galloway re: medical costs (1 hour)
Collected and submitted medical costs (.5 hours)
Total in court: $200 X 22 = $4,400 Out-of-court: $150 X 28.5 = $4,275 Travel: $300
TOTAL: $8,975
Petitioner did not submit a request for additional time to submit documentation prior to the February 26, 2013, deadline.
Petitioner‟s request for additional time set forth in Petitioner‟s 1st Submission does not explain why the original deadline was not met or why additional time was needed. In addition, Petitioner‟s request for additional time was limited to a request for an “an extension of time to submit additional medical cost documentation.”
Petitioner‟s 1st Submission did not include any argument in support for his claims for medical expenses, costs,
and attorney‟s fees as required by the Scheduling Order on Remand.
Petitioner‟s 1st Submission did not include any claims for litigation costs.
In addition, Petitioner‟s 1st Submission does not request or otherwise suggest that an evidentiary hearing is necessary regarding his entitlement to, the amount, or the basis of his claims for medical expenses or attorney‟s fees.
On March 13, 2013, Respondent timely filed Respondent‟s Response to Petitioner‟s Sumbission [sic] of Medical Costs and Attorney‟s Fees (Response to 1st Submission).
The Response to 1st Submission notes that Petitioner‟s 1st Submission was untimely and did not contain any documentation, argument, and support for his claims as required by the Scheduling Order. The Response to 1st Submission also makes reference to a “Memorandum in Support of Costs and Attorney‟s Fees, filed [by Petitioner] on February 28, 2012.”
As of the date of the Response to 1st Submission, however, the referenced Memorandum in Support of Costs and Attorney‟s fees had not been filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings.
On March 19, 2013, Petitioner filed a document entitled “Petitioner‟s Response to Respondent‟s Response and Petitioner‟s Supplemental Submission of Medical Costs and
COMES NOW, Keith A. Galloway, by and through his representative, Letta Dillard Gorman, and responds to the Respondent‟s response to Mr. Galloway‟s submission of information related to his medical costs and attorney‟s fees:
Mr. Galloway submits that the source documentation for medical costs and attorney‟s fees is being sent under separate cover.
Respectfully submitted on this 14th day of March 2013 via electronic filing and/or Fax and email.
Although Petitioner‟s Response to Response states that it was submitted on March 14, 2013, it was not filed until the morning of March 19, 2013.
On the afternoon of March 19, 2013, Respondent filed Respondent‟s Motion to Strike Petitioner‟s Supplemental Submission of Medical Costs and Attorney‟s Fees on the grounds that Petitioner‟s submissions were untimely and that materials referenced by Petitioner in its Response to Response had still not been filed.
On March 21, 2013, Petitioner filed a document entitled “Petitioner‟s Detailed Attorney‟s Fees” which essentially reiterates Exhibit 2 of Petitioner‟s 1st Submission, with more specific dates. Although Petitioner‟s representative, Ms. Gorman, signed the document under a written statement providing, “I swear the above costs to be true and accurate to the best of my knowledge,” the document is not notarized, and, as in the previous submission, does not set forth a claim for litigation costs.
On March 22, 2013, Petitioner submitted, under a white cover sheet bearing the handwritten notation, “Case # 11-4558 Galloway v G-4S,” a stack of documents with entries regarding medical expenses, without further explanation. Many of the
entries for the medical expenses post-date the final hearing in this case, but none of the entries are dated after the date of the Scheduling Order on Remand. Petitioner does not explain the delay in filing.
On March 28, 2013, Respondent filed Respondent‟s Motion to Strike Petitioner‟s Submission of Medical Invoices on the grounds that they were “untimely, irrelevant, unsupported, and legally barred for the reason set forth in Respondent‟s [Response to 1st Submission].”
On April 2, 2013, Petitioner filed “Petitioner‟s Objection to Respondent‟s Motion to Strike Petitioner‟s Submission of Medical Invoices” arguing that, at the final hearing, the undersigned allowed Petitioner to proffer testimony concerning his injuries and medical costs he sustained to that point related to those injuries arising from the alleged discrimination, and that he continues to suffer medical costs because of those injuries.
Petitioner‟s objection to Respondent‟s Motion to Strike further argues that, as a result of those injuries, he had to have surgery and continues to have problems with his leg, heart, and blood pressure. Petitioner‟s objection also raises legal arguments as to why he should be able to recover for his injuries, and states that “Mr. Galloway requested additional time to submit medical invoices due to the continuing nature of
his injuries.” Notably, however, the request for additional time came after the submissions were due.
While considering the various filings since the Scheduling Order on Remand, the undersigned discovered that Petitioner had never filed Petitioner‟s Memorandum in Support of Costs and Attorney‟s fees referenced in Respondent‟s Response to 1st Submission. Upon further review of the docket, the undersigned also realized that Petitioner‟s representative, although licensed to practice law in the State of Alabama, never entered an appearance as an attorney in this matter, but rather entered her appearance as a qualified representative under Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.106 and 28-106.107.1/ Therefore, the undersigned entered an Order Requiring Additional Filings on April 2, 2013, which provided in pertinent part:
Petitioner shall file a copy of the “Memorandum in Support of Costs and Attorney‟s Fees” referenced in Respondent‟s Response to 1st Submission, within 10 days from the date of this Order, together with an explanation of why it was not originally filed with DOAH; and
Both parties shall file, within 30 days from the date of this Order, a memorandum on the authority, if any, of the Florida Commission on Human Relations to award attorney fees to a party represented by a qualified representative under the circumstances of this case.
Ruling on any pending motions is deferred pending consideration of the additional filings requested in this Order.
Thereafter, on April 8, 2013, Petitioner filed the requested Petitioner‟s Memorandum in Support of Costs and Attorney‟s Fees (Petitioner‟s Memorandum) referenced in Respondent‟s Response to 1st Submission. Petitioner‟s Memorandum argues that Petitioner should be able to recover medical expenses from injuries Petitioner sustained and continues to sustain as a result of Respondent‟s denial of reasonable accommodations to Petitioner. According to Petitioner‟s Memorandum, in addition to the initial injury to Petitioner‟s leg, Petitioner has had continued “physical problems with his leg, which affected his heart and blood pressure . . . and as a direct result of that injury, [Petitioner] had a heart attack and stroke.” Petitioner‟s Memorandum, however, does not ask for attorney‟s fees and does not request an evidentiary hearing.
That same day, April 8, 2013, Petitioner also submitted a document entitled “Petitioner‟s Response to Order for Documentation of Submission of Memo on Medical Costs and Attorney Fees filed” (Petitioner‟s Response to Order for Additional Filings) which explains that “counsel for
Mr. Galloway has continued to experience technical difficulty in efiling the documents to DOAH ([referencing Petitioner‟s Memorandum]) and finally sent the document by facsimile.” Petitioner‟s Response to Order for Additional Filings, suggests,
for the first time, that an evidentiary hearing is necessary, by
stating:
All allegations made in [Petitioner‟s Memorandum] were proffered at the hearing in Pensacola, except Paragraphs 7, 8, 9, and 11 that will require additional testimony to support the medical billing submitted.
On April 18, 2013, Petitioner submitted a two-page document entitled “Petitioner‟s Support of Attorney‟s Fees” which states that “counsel for Mr. Galloway is not a member of the Florida State Bar, but has been admitted for practice in the Northern District of the federal court in Florida, where
Mr. Galloway‟s lawsuit would have been properly filed.” Petitioner‟s Support of Attorney‟s Fees further argues that Petitioner‟s representative was addressed with the suffix “Esq.” in “all orders and communications from EEOC/FCHR, DOAH, and opposing counsel.” The document also states that “there are
„attorney‟ and „non-attorney‟ qualified representative . . . and “Ms. Gorman is an attorney qualified representative in this matter.” Petitioner argues that, under applicable law, Petitioner, as prevailing party, may be awarded a reasonable attorney‟s fee. There is no evidence, however, that Ms. Gorman appeared, or attempted appear, in this case pro hac vice.
On April 30, 2013, Respondent filed Respondent‟s Response to the Administrative Law Judge‟s Request for Information Concerning Whether Letta Dillard Gorman is Entitled
to Attorney‟s Fees, wherein Respondent argues that, under applicable case law, attorneys fees cannot be awarded to a qualified representative who did not appear as an attorney.
The arguments of both parties regarding attorney‟s fees have been considered and are further discussed under the Conclusions of Law, infra.
Regarding Petitioner‟s claims for medical expenses, since the Scheduling Order On Remand, Petitioner‟s only reference to evidence adduced at final hearing related to Petitioner‟s claim for medical expenses is found in paragraph number three of Petitioner‟s Response to Response filed March 19, 2013, which states, in pertinent part:
3. That copies of the documentation of medical expenses related to the discriminatory actions of the Respondent (page 213, lines 6-23, page 214, lines 18- 25, page 215, lines 1-6, and page 217, lines 1-16 of Transcript of the hearing in Pensacola) are being sent under separate cover as they are too voluminous to scan.
As noted in the Conclusions of Law, infra, Petitioner‟s Response to Response is actually a reply, which is not allowed under applicable procedural rules for DOAH proceedings. See discussion under Conclusions of Law, infra.
Even if the citations to the record are considered, the references are insufficient to provide a reasonable nexus
between the alleged medical costs and the injury resulting from discrimination.
Page 213, lines 6-23, of the official transcript (Transcript) of the final hearing in this case referenced in Petitioner‟s Response to Response reflects the following testimony of Petitioner in response to Ms. Gorman‟s questions:
Q. What happened to your leg?
A. The leg, it had swollen up and it had a split on the corner of where it had split open.
Q. Was it bleeding?
A. Yes, ma‟am, it was.
Q. What did you do next?
A. I told him [the guard] I‟m not going to be able to make this, my leg is gone, I cannot do the work or anything, I cannot walk, I said you need to call Theresa. And he said I agree, and he said I can see that you‟re in pain right now. We called Theresa and we waited for a response and we never got a response back. I told him I‟m going to have to leave, I‟ve got to get this prosthetic off before it swells up to the point where I can‟t. And when I got home, it was so swollen I had to have my wife literally pull the prosthetic off my leg while I held onto the bed so she wouldn‟t drag me.
In his referenced testimony reported on page 214, lines 18-25, and page 215, lines 1-2, of the Transcript, Petitioner states:
I constantly had -- right now where the split is, it has never healed. I still have problems with it. Sometimes I can get up and I get ready to put the prosthetic on and all of a sudden it just starts bleeding there. The doctors are hoping that it will
heal natural. I have been into the hospital where it has just literally busted open and I couldn‟t get the bleeding stopped. This happened back in April, and since then I‟ve also had problems with my right foot that I was in the hospital with also.
The referenced page 215, lines 3-92/ of the Transcript reports the exchange between Ms. Gorman, as questioner, and Petitioner‟s answers as follows:
Q. Have you had infections?
A. Yes, ma‟am.
Q. Were you emotionally distraught from losing that job?
A. Yes, ma‟am, because I rather enjoyed the job. I enjoyed meeting the people coming into the rest area. There were some characters I would meet, and some real nice people and everything.
Page 217, lines 1-16 of the Transcript referenced in Petitioner‟s Response to Response reflects the following questions from Ms. Gorman and Petitioner‟s answers:
BY MS. GORMAN:
Q. Have you had to incur medical costs since the injury?
A. Yes, ma‟am.
Q. Do you have any -- do you have insurance?
A. Yes, ma‟am.
Q. Do you know about how much your medical costs have amounted to?
A. This last time, with the surgery and everything I had to have and everything and with the time spent in the hospital, it‟s going to be quite a little bit.
Q. Do you have any idea?
A. It‟s probably going to be about
$50,000 that we‟re going to end up paying.
According to the record reflected in the Recommended Order entered in this case, the injury to Petitioner‟s leg occurred on the evening of October 28, 2010, when he showed up to work and walked during his training. Other than two patient payments of $15 each apparently made on November 1, 2010, and December 30, 2010, none of the alleged medical costs reflected in the stack of documents submitted by Petitioner on March 22, 2013, reflect dates corresponding to October 28, 2010, when Petitioner‟s leg was injured.
Further, as noted in Respondent‟s Motion to Strike Petitioner‟s Submission of Medical Invoices, many of the invoices appear to be for general supplies for Petitioner‟s prosthetic leg with no causal connection to his claim in this case, some invoices predate the injury, none of the invoices identify why Petitioner was being treated, and the majority indicate that the referenced charges were paid by Blue Cross/Blue Shield, not Petitioner.
Petitioner offered no testimony, expert or otherwise, on the issue of whether the medical expenses set forth in Exhibit 1 of Petitioner‟s 1st Submission or in the late-filed medical invoices were related to the injury to Petitioner‟s leg sustained on October 28, 2010.
Petitioner otherwise failed to prove that he incurred medical expenses as a result of Respondent‟s discrimination.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Rulings on Pending Motions
Petitioner‟s request an extension of time to submit additional medical cost documentation contained in Petitioner‟s 1st Submission filed February 28, 2013, is DENIED. Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.204(4) provides:
Motions for extension of time shall be filed prior to the expiration of the deadline sought to be extended and shall state good cause for the request.
Petitioner‟s 1st Submission was filed two days after the 15-day deadline to “submit documentation, argument, and support for his claims for medical expenses, costs, and attorneys fees” set forth in the Scheduling Order on Remand entered February 11, 2013. In addition, Petitioner‟s request for additional time did not state good cause.
Respondent‟s Motion to Strike Petitioner‟s Supplemental Submission of Medical Costs and Attorney‟s Fees is GRANTED. As noted above, Petitioner did not timely request additional time to submit additional medical cost documentation. In addition, Petitioner never requested additional time to submit a supplemental submission regarding attorney‟s fees. Moreover, Petitioner‟s supplemental submission was filed as “Petitioner‟s Response to Response and Petitioner‟s Supplemental Submission of Medical Costs and Attorney‟s Fees” which the
undersigned finds was an impermissible reply. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.204(1)(“No reply to the response shall be permitted unless leave is sought from and given by the presiding officer.”).
Respondent‟s Motion to Strike Petitioner‟s Submission of Medical Invoices (Respondent‟s Motion) is GRANTED for the reasons previously stated and under the grounds set forth in Respondent‟s Motion.
To the extent that Petitioner‟s Response to Order for Additional Filings requests an evidentiary hearing by suggesting, for the first time, that an evidentiary hearing is necessary, the request is DENIED. Petitioner‟s suggestion that a hearing is necessary was filed on April 8, 2013, well past the 15-day deadline for filing such request as required by the Scheduling Order on Remand entered February 11, 2013. In addition, Petitioner failed to confer with opposing counsel and provide several mutually-agreeable dates for conducting such a hearing as required by the Scheduling Order on Remand. Petitioner‟s Claim for Medical Expenses
As framed by the Commission‟s Order of Remand, the issue regarding Petitioner‟s claim for medical expenses is “whether the medical expenses sought by Petitioner were the result of the unlawful discrimination found to have occurred.” Petitioner has the burden of proving his claim for medical
expenses by a preponderance of the evidence. See Dep‟t of
Banking and Fin. v. Osborne Stern & Co., 670 So. 2d 932, 934 (Fla. 1996)(general rule is that party asserting the affirmative has burden of presenting evidence on that issue);
§ 120.57(1)(j), Fla. Stat. (except in penal or licensure proceedings or as otherwise provided by statute, findings of fact shall be based upon a preponderance of the evidence); cf.
Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1361 (11th Cir. 1982)(“[O]ur cases hold that a Title VII plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing the economic injury resulting from the adverse employment action.”); Hockett v. U.S., 730 F.2d 709, 712 (11th Cir. 1984)(“district court correctly stated that plaintiff had the burden of proving causation by a preponderance of the evidence”); Cassel v. Price, 396 So. 2d 258, 266 (Fla.
1st DCA 1981)(to prove causation plaintiff must show more likely than not that defendant‟s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the result).
Petitioner has failed, both procedurally and a matter of fact, to prove his claim for medical expenses. Procedurally, as noted above, Petitioner did not timely submit medical information in support of his claim. Therefore, Respondent‟s Motion to Strike Petitioner‟s Supplemental Submission of Medical Costs and Attorney‟s Fees and Motion to Strike Petitioner‟s
Submission of Medical Invoices were granted, and the invoices should not be considered.
Factually, even if the late-filed invoices were considered, they do not indicate why Petitioner was being treated, many pre-date Petitioner‟s injury, and the majority of the invoices have apparently already been paid. Moreover, Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his claims for medical expenses set forth in Exhibit 1 of Petitioner‟s 1st Submission or his claims of medical expenses for his high blood pressure, a heart attack, and stroke allegedly resulting from Petitioner‟s failure to accommodate Petitioner‟s disability. Petitioner offered no testimony, expert or otherwise, on the issue of whether the medical expenses set forth Exhibit 1 of Petitioner‟s 1st Submission or in those late-filed medical invoices were related to the injury to his leg sustained on October 28, 2010, and the evidence submitted by Petitioner is insufficient to show a causal connection between Petitioner‟s injuries for which he claims medical expenses and Respondent‟s discrimination. Without more, Petitioner‟s claim for medical expenses is speculative, at best.
In sum, just as in McIntosh v. Dollar General, FCHR Order No. 10-047 (May 25, 2010), “the record before the Commission does not establish that the medical bills in question were incurred as a result of Respondent‟s failure to accommodate
Petitioner‟s disability handicap.”3/ Id., p. 4; cf. Orange Cnty.
Bd. of Cnty. Comm‟rs v. Brenemen, 233 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1970)(while causal connection may be proved by lay or medical testimony, speculation based on mere possibilities is not sufficient).
Petitioner‟s Claim for Attorney‟s Fees
While the original Recommended Order in this case recommended “[a]warding Petitioner his costs and a reasonable attorney‟s fee,” as explained above, that recommendation was based upon the undersigned‟s oversight of the fact that Petitioner‟s representative, while licensed as a attorney in the State of Alabama, never entered an appearance in this matter as an attorney. Rather, Petitioner‟s representative appeared in this matter as a qualified representative under Florida Administrative Code Rules 28-106.106 and 28-106.107.
Here, as in the Commission‟s recent Interlocutory Order in Lugo v. Haynes, DOAH Case No. 11-1116 (Fla. DOAH
Jan. 28, 2013, ¶ 61; FCHR Apr. 4, 2013), adopting Judge Watkins‟ Conclusions of Law, it is concluded:
Nothing in section 760.35(3) authorizes the award of attorneys‟ fees to non-attorneys. The Florida Supreme Court tells us that: “When the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous and convey a definite meaning, courts . . . must read the statute as written, for to do otherwise would constitute an abrogation of legislative power.” Nicoll v. Baker, 668 So. 2d 989,
990-91 (Fla. 1996). See also Dep‟t of Ins. v. Fla. Bankers Ass‟n, 764 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
Florida has a unified bar, and all persons engaged in the practice of law in Florida must be members of that bar. Petition of Fla. State Bar Ass‟n, 40 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1949). While Ms. Gorman may have been admitted pro hac vice in a case in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, she did not do so in this case. There is no evidence that Ms. Gorman ever qualified to enter an appearance in this case as an attorney or that she was authorized to bill for services as an attorney.
Rather than entering an appearance pro hac vice,
Ms. Gorman chose to enter her appearance in this case as a qualified representative. Attorney‟s fees cannot be awarded for services provided by an attorney not authorized to practice law in Florida. See Morrison v. West, 30 So. 3d 561, 565 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)(contingent fee contract for legal services in Florida by attorney not authorized to practice in Florida void unless services provided fit into one of the exceptions which “generally require association with a Florida attorney.”).
Therefore, it is concluded that Petitioner is not entitled to an award of attorney‟s fees. Further, as Petitioner has not provided evidence of recoverable litigation costs, it is concluded that he is not entitled to an award of costs.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and for the reasons stated above, it is
RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order after remand:
Leon County, Florida.
JAMES H. PETERSON, III
Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 2013.
1/ See Order Accepting Qualified Representative, entered in this case on October 20, 2011, authorizing Letta Dillard Gorman “to appear in this proceeding as the Qualified Representative of Petitioner ”
2/ The actual reference in Petitioner‟s Response to Response is to page 215, lines 1-6 of the Transcript. The additional lines 7-10 were added to provide for Petitioner‟s answer to
Ms. Gorman‟s question found on lines 5-6 on page 215.
3/ Even if Petitioner had shown that he incurred medical expenses as a result of Respondent‟s failure to accommodate his disability, compensatory damages for those expenses should not be recoverable in this administrative action. As concluded in the original recommended order in this case (Recommended Order), “[t]he failure of section 760.11(6) to authorize [compensatory damages available under 760.11(5) for judicial actions brought under 760.11(4)(a)] for administrative actions under 760.11(4)(b) is fatal to Petitioner‟s claim for compensatory and punitive damages.” See Recommended Order, n. 5.
Christine L. Wilson, Esquire Jackson Lewis LLP
Cheyanne Costilla, Interim General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Suite 100
All parties have the right to submit written exceptions within 15 days from the date of this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the Final Order in this case.
