Filed: Dec. 18, 2015
Latest Update: Mar. 02, 2020
Summary: NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT PORTALP INTERNATIONAL SAS, a ) French corporation, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D15-1676 ) DANIEL ZULOAGA and PORTALP USA, ) INC., a Florida corporation, ) ) Appellees. ) ) Opinion filed December 18, 2015. Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Collier County; James R. Shenko, Judge. Robert J. Alwine of Robert Allen Law, Miam
Summary: NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT PORTALP INTERNATIONAL SAS, a ) French corporation, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D15-1676 ) DANIEL ZULOAGA and PORTALP USA, ) INC., a Florida corporation, ) ) Appellees. ) ) Opinion filed December 18, 2015. Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130 from the Circuit Court for Collier County; James R. Shenko, Judge. Robert J. Alwine of Robert Allen Law, Miami..
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NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING
MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
OF FLORIDA
SECOND DISTRICT
PORTALP INTERNATIONAL SAS, a )
French corporation, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2D15-1676
)
DANIEL ZULOAGA and PORTALP USA, )
INC., a Florida corporation, )
)
Appellees. )
)
Opinion filed December 18, 2015.
Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.130
from the Circuit Court for Collier County;
James R. Shenko, Judge.
Robert J. Alwine of Robert Allen Law,
Miami; and Alexander L. Palenzuela of
Law Offices of Alexander L. Palenzuela,
P.A., Miami, for Appellant.
William Diaz-Garcia and Steven V. Blount
of Blount Law, PL, Naples, for Appellee
Daniel Zuloaga.
No appearance for Appellee Portalp USA,
Inc., a Florida corporation.
BLACK, Judge.
Portalp International SAS challenges the trial court's order denying its
motion to quash service of process, asserting that Daniel Zuloaga's attempt to serve it in
France via Federal Express is invalid under the Hague Convention on the Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters article
10(a), November 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S. 163 (Hague Convention).
Portalp International argues that by the plain meaning of the text of article 10(a), the
Hague Convention only permits the mailing of judicial documents after process has
been served. We agree with the trial court's finding that the Hague Convention permits
service of process by mail and affirm.
I. Background
Mr. Zuloaga was the president of Portalp USA, LLC. After Portalp USA
terminated Mr. Zuloaga's employment, he filed a lawsuit for breach of employment
agreement against Portalp USA and its French majority shareholder, Portalp
International. 1 To effect service of process on Portalp International, Mr. Zuloaga sent
the summons and complaint by Federal Express to Portalp International's corporate
office in Fontaine, France. A copy of the Federal Express "proof-of-delivery" printout
was attached to the notice of filing proof of service indicating that these documents were
delivered to Portalp International's corporate office and signed for by "BEL." In
response to the notice, Portalp International entered a limited appearance and filed a
motion to quash service of process for failure to comply with the requirements of the
1
This appeal only concerns the method by which Mr. Zuloaga attempted to
effect service of process on Portalp International in France. Portalp USA did not
participate in this appeal.
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Hague Convention. Portalp International argued that the Hague Convention does not
allow for service of process by mail and therefore that service of process was invalid.
The trial court found Ackermann v. Levine,
788 F.2d 830 (2d. Cir. 1986), and Lestrade
v. United States,
945 F. Supp. 1557 (S.D. Fla. 1996), which held that article 10(a)
permits service of process by mail, to be persuasive, and it concluded that service of
process was valid.
II. Standard of review
"When a trial court rules on a motion to quash service of process, we
review that ruling de novo." Baker v. Stearns Bank, N.A.,
84 So. 3d 1122, 1125 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2012). Likewise, we review de novo the trial court's interpretation of a treaty. See
Wigley v. Hares,
82 So. 3d 932, 940 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (quoting In re Application of
Adan,
437 F.3d 381, 390 (3d Cir. 2006)).
III. Discussion
Section 48.194(1), Florida Statutes (2014), provides, in part, that "[s]ervice
of process on persons outside the United States may be required to conform to the
provisions of the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters." "In Florida, the Hague Convention applies
in all cases 'where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for
service abroad.' " Grupo Radio Centro S.A.B. de C.V. v. Am. Merch. Banking Grp., Inc.,
71 So. 3d 151, 151 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (quoting Chabert v. Bacquie,
694 So. 2d 805,
812 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)); see SDS-IC v. Fla. Concentrates Int'l, LLC,
157 So. 3d 389,
391 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ("Article 1 of the Hague Convention provides that it 'shall apply
in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial
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or extrajudicial document for service abroad.' " (quoting Hague
Convention, supra, at
362)). And where it applies, "compliance with the [Hague] Convention is mandatory."
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk,
486 U.S. 694, 705 (1988).
The sole issue raised by Portalp International on appeal is whether service
of process by mail is permissible under article 10(a) of the Hague Convention. 2 Article
10(a) of the Hague Convention states that "[p]rovided the State of destination does not
object, the present Convention shall not interfere with . . . the freedom to send judicial
documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad." Hague
Convention, supra,
at 363 (emphasis added). 3 This is an issue of first impression in Florida, 4 though
several circuits of the U.S. courts of appeals and several Florida federal district courts
have considered the issue, resulting in a split of authority. The issue has not been
addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit.
The prevailing view among the circuits of the U.S. court of appeals that
2
Though Portalp International stated at the hearing on the motion to quash
service of process that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure do not permit service by
mail absent consent from the receiving party, it did not present any argument in that
regard and it does not address that issue on appeal.
3
Article 21 of the Hague Convention requires each contracting state to
indicate whether they object to article 10, and France has not objected to article 10.
See Research Sys. Corp. v. IPSOS Publicite,
276 F.3d 914, 926 (7th Cir. 2002);
France—Central Authority & practical information, Hague Conference on Private
International Law, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=authorities.details&aid=256
(last updated September 4, 2015). Further, Portalp International has not raised the
issue of whether Federal Express is a postal channel contemplated by the Hague
Convention.
4
In addressing a different issue arising under the Hague Convention, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal stated, "We understand the clerk's notice and the
appellant's citation not to be initial process but instead to be papers covered by [a]rticle
10(a) of the Hague Service Convention."
Chabert, 694 So. 2d at 812.
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have addressed this issue is that article 10(a) permits service by mail, provided the
destination country has not objected. See Brockmeyer v. May,
383 F.3d 798, 803 (9th
Cir. 2004);
Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 839; see also Research Sys. Corp. v. IPSOS
Publicite,
276 F.3d 914, 926 (7th Cir. 2002); Koehler v. Dodwell,
152 F.3d 304, 308 (4th
Cir. 1998). The courts in Brockmeyer and Ackermann looked beyond the text to the
intention of the drafters and the purpose of the Hague Convention to reach this
conclusion.
Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d at 802-03;
Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 839-40. Several
Florida federal district court opinions are consistent with this line of authority. See, e.g.,
Geopolymer Sinkhole Specialist, Inc. v. Uretek Worldwide Oy, No. 8:15–cv–1690–T–
36JSS,
2015 WL 4757937 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2015); TracFone Wireless, Inc. v.
Unlimited PCS Inc.,
279 F.R.D. 626 (S.D. Fla. 2012); Julien v. Williams, No. 8:10–cv–
2358–T–24 TBM,
2010 WL 5174535 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2010); Conax Fla. Corp. v.
Astrium Ltd.,
499 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (M.D. Fla. 2007); Lestrade,
945 F. Supp. 1557.
Conversely, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits determined that article 10(a)
does not permit service of process by mail and that article 10(a) only applies to the
sending of post-service documents. Nuovo Pignone, SpA v. STORMAN ASIA M/V,
310
F.3d 374, 384 (5th Cir. 2002); Bankston v. Toyota Motor Corp.,
889 F.2d 172, 174 (8th
Cir. 1989). Relying on canons of statutory construction, these courts determined that
the language of the Hague Convention was conclusive and reasoned that had the
drafters intended to allow for service of process by mail they would have used the term
"serve" or "service" in article 10(a) instead of the term "send" since forms of the term
"service" were otherwise used throughout the Hague Convention. See Nuovo
Pignone,
310 F.3d at 384;
Bankston, 889 F.2d at 173-74. A number of Florida federal district
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court opinions are consistent with this line of authority. See, e.g., Intelsat Corp. v.
Multivision TV LLC,
736 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Arco Elecs. Control Ltd. v.
Core Int'l,
794 F. Supp. 1144 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Wasden v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd.,
131
F.R.D. 206 (M.D. Fla. 1990); McClenon v. Nissan Motor Corp.,
726 F. Supp. 822 (N.D.
Fla. 1989); In re MAK Petroleum, Inc.,
424 B.R. 912 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2010). Portalp
International urges this court to adopt the position taken by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits
and give effect to the plain meaning of the text of article 10(a).
"As a general matter, a treaty is a contract, though between nations. Its
interpretation normally is, like a contract's interpretation, a matter of determining the
parties' intent." See BG Grp. PLC v. Republic of Argentina,
134 S. Ct. 1198, 1208
(2014) (citations omitted). "When interpreting a treaty, we 'begin with the text of the
treaty and the context in which the written words are used.' "
Volkswagenwerk, 486
U.S. at 699 (emphasis added) (quoting Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v.
U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa,
482 U.S. 522, 534 (1987)); see Gandara v.
Bennett,
528 F.3d 823, 827 (11th Cir. 2008) ("[A] treaty must be interpreted as a whole
in light of its object and purpose, including the preamble." (quoting Cornejo v. County of
San Diego,
504 F.3d 853, 861 n.13 (9th Cir. 2007))). "The clear import of treaty
language controls unless application of the words of the treaty according to their
obvious 'meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its
signatories.' " In re Comm'rs Subpoenas,
325 F.3d 1287, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano,
457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982)), overruling on other
grounds by Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.,
542 U.S. 241 (2004). As such,
only where the "treaty text is ambiguous when read in context in light of its object and
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purpose [should] extraneous sources . . . be consulted to elucidate the parties' intent."
In re Comm'rs
Subpoenas, 325 F.3d at 1294.
The preamble of the Hague Convention provides that it was created to
simplify and expedite the service of judicial and extrajudicial documents abroad. Hague
Convention, supra, at 362; accord Grupo Radio
Centro, 71 So. 3d at 151 ("The Hague
Convention is a multilateral treaty that was formulated in 1964 . . . to provide a simpler
way to serve process abroad, to assure that defendants sued in foreign jurisdictions
would receive actual and timely notice of suit, and to facilitate proof of service abroad."
(quoting
Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S. at 698)). Further, article 1, defining the scope,
provides that the Hague Convention only applies "where there is occasion to transmit a
judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad."
Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S. at 699
(emphasis added) (quoting Hague
Convention, supra, at 362). This limiting language
was included in the final text of the Hague Convention to address the delegates'
criticisms that the language in the preliminary draft "suggested that the [Hague]
Convention could apply to transmissions abroad that do not culminate in service."
Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S. at 701. Interpreting article 10(a) to apply only to post-
service documents would be inconsistent with the Hague Convention's purpose and
scope. Therefore, it is appropriate to consult extraneous sources such as "the history of
the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties" to
determine the meaning of article 10(a).
Wigley, 82 So. 3d at 935 n.1 (quoting Choctaw
Nation of Indians v. United States,
318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943)); accord Chan v.
Korean Air Lines, Ltd.,
490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989); see also
Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S.
at 700 ("Other general rules of construction may be brought to bear on difficult or
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ambiguous passages.").
In analyzing whether article 10(a) of the Hague Convention was intended
to permit service by mail, the court in Brockmeyer considered various extraneous
sources including commentaries on the history of the Hague Convention negotiations.
According to the official Rapporteur's report, the first
paragraph of [a]rticle 10 of the draft Convention, which
"except for minor editorial changes" is identical to [a]rticle 10
of the final Convention, was intended to permit service by
mail. A "Handbook" published by the Permanent Bureau of
the Hague Convention, which summarizes meetings of a
"Special Commission of Experts," states that to interpret
[a]rticle 10(a) not to permit service by mail would "contradict
what seems to have been the implicit understanding of the
delegates at the 1977 Special Commission meeting, and
indeed of the legal literature on the Convention and its
predecessor treaties." As further evidence of the
understanding of the parties at the time the Hague
Convention was signed, the United States delegate to the
Hague Convention reported to Congress that [a]rticle 10(a)
permitted service by mail.
Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d at 802-03 (citations omitted); see Lozano v. Montoya Alverez,
134 S. Ct. 1224, 1233 (2014) ("It is our 'responsibility to read the treaty in a manner
consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties.' " (quoting Olympic
Airways v. Husain,
540 U.S. 644, 650 (2004))). The court reviewed the opinions of
signatory countries to the Hague Convention, which reflected an "essentially unanimous
view" that service by mail is permitted by the Hague Convention.
Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d
at 802; see also Abbott v. Abbott,
560 U.S. 1, 16 (2010) (citing El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v.
Tseng,
525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999) (holding that in interpreting a treaty, the opinions of
other signatories are entitled to considerable weight)). Further, the court considered the
position taken by the United States Government. See
Abbott, 560 U.S. at 15 ("It is well
settled that the Executive Branch's interpretation of a treaty 'is entitled to great weight.' "
-8-
(quoting Sumitomo Shoji
Am., 457 U.S. at 185)); Kolovrat v. Oregon,
366 U.S. 187, 194
(1961) ("While courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by the
departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement
is given great weight."). Moreover, "[t]he United States government, through the State
Department, has specifically disapproved the Eighth Circuit's holding in Bankston," and
"State Department circulars also indicate that service by mail is permitted in
international civil litigation."
Brockmeyer, 383 F.3d at 803.
It is apparent that interpreting article 10(a) to permit service of process by
mail is consistent with the intent and expectations of the signatories. This interpretation
is also "consonant with the principles deemed controlling in the interpretation of
international agreements" to avoid "a narrow and restricted construction." See Factor v.
Laubenheimer,
290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933). Furthermore, in reaching the opposing
conclusion that article 10(a) does not permit service of process by mail, the courts in
Nuovo Pignone and Bankston relied on canons of statutory construction, a practice the
Supreme Court has cautioned against. See
Lozano, 134 S. Ct. at 1232-33 (" 'A treaty is
in its nature a contract between . . . nations, not a legislative act.' That distinction has
been reflected in the way we interpret treaties. It is our 'responsibility to read the treaty
in a manner consistent with the shared expectations of the contracting parties.' " (first
quoting Foster v. Neilson,
2 Pet. 253, 314 (1829) (Marshall, C.J.); then quoting
Husain,
540 U.S. at 650)).
Portalp International also emphasizes the concern addressed by the court
in McClenon that interpreting article 10(a) to permit service of process by mail would
render the "vast bulk of the [Hague] Convention . . . useless" because allowing service
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of process by mail would circumvent the rather involved procedure to effect service of
process otherwise provided for in the Hague Convention. See
McClenon, 726 F. Supp.
at 826 (citation omitted). However, effecting service of process as provided for in article
10(a) is only permitted if the destination country has not objected. See Hague
Convention, supra, at 363. And given the express limitation of the Hague Convention's
scope, which comports with its purpose, it is article 10(a) that would be rendered
"superfluous" if not interpreted to permit service by mail. Cf.
Ackermann, 788 F.2d at
839 (quoting Shoei Kako v. Superior Court,
109 Cal. Rptr. 402, 411 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1973)).
IV. Conclusion
We are persuaded by the Brockmeyer/Ackermann line of authority and
conclude that article 10(a) of the Hague Convention permits service of process by mail.
Therefore, we affirm the trial court's order denying Portalp International's motion to
quash service of process.
Affirmed.
LaROSE and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.
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